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The Arab States and the Arab League 



THE ARAB STATES 

and the 
ARAB LEAGUE 

A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 
VOL. I CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 



by 

MUHAMMAD KHALIL 

LL. B. (Liverpool) : LL. D. (Leyden) 



KHAYATS 
Beirut 



Dedicated to the Memory of 
my Mother and Father 



First Published 1962 
Copyright Muhammad Khalil 1962 

All rights reserved 
This book may not be reproduced 

either in whole or in part 

without the written permission 

of the Author and the Publisher 



Published by 
KHAYATS, 92-94 Rue Bliss, Beirut 



CONTENTS 



VOLUME II : 



Page 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS xi 

Index 1002 



Vll 



Corrigenda 



Page 



Error 



Position 



16 


Abul-Huda 


title of Doc. 6 


Abu ftl-Hud* 


I? 


Sultanes 


line 5 


Sultanates 


20 


al-'Askari 


footnote 


al-'Askary 


21 


Ash-Shurayqi 


title of Doc. 10 


ash-Shurayqy 


22 


Indcpcndccc 


line 2 of para, i 


independence 


22 


collegaue 


line 3 


colleague 


22 


rMmer 


line 44 


Prime 


22 


here "al-AqaKm" 


footnote (i) 


here is ai-Aqalim" 


22 


interchangeably 


footnote (3) 


interchangeably 


23 


'Abdullah 


footnote (2), line i ) 


'Abdullah's 


27 


aeircved 


line 16 


achieved 


27 


J7int 


line 1 6 


joint 


27 


the 


line 26 


that 


28 


boudaries 


line 4 


boundaries 


28 


sigaturc 


line 8 


signature 


31 


representative 


line i of Doc. 19 


representative 


56 


Sa'udi Arabi 


line 4 of Doc. 29 


Sa'udi Arabia 


57 


Miniter-Plenipotentiary 


line 16 


Minister-Plenipotentiary 


67 


activitiezs 


line 20 


activities 


69 


Governent 


line 33 


Government 


70 


Delivrance 


line 4 


Deliverance 


70 


Aly Namazy 


line 10 


'Ali Namazi 


70 


al-Wehhab 


line ii 


al-Wahhab 


70 


al-Hindy 


line xi 


al-Hindi 


70 


al-Hindy 


line 14 


al-Hindi 


73 


omission of initials 


end of footnote 


add (E.F.) 


106 


League) 


line 2 of footnote (i) 


League, 


1 06 


Siteenth 


line 3 of footnote (i) 


Sixteenth 


113 


instrumett 


line 5 of footnote 


instruments 


H3 


Janary 


line 6 of footnote (i) 


January 


1X4 


At 


line 28 


A (delete"?') 


117 


internatinal law 


line 4 of footnote 


international law 


123 


cconcludcd 


line 2 of Article i, pan E 


concluded 


125 


crcdiditor 


lines 6-7 of Article I, 


creditor 






part 2 in Doc. 51 




129 


instrument 


line x of para. 2 of 


instruments 






footnote (i) 




130 


Repubic 


line 9 of footnote 


Republic 


130 


Janary 


line xo of footnote 


January 


130 


intruments 


line xi of footnote 


instruments 


130 


Institution* 


line 13 of footnote 


Institution 


<45 


al-Arabiyya 


line 3 of footnote 


al-'Arabiyya 


145 


These 


line 7 of footnote (i) 


Those 


157 


constrasted 


line 2 of footnote 


contrasted 


191 


that that 


line 5 of Doc. 119 


that 


201 


Settled 


line 22 


Settle 


201 


al-Balhawan 


line 36 


al-Bahlawan 


216 


agree 


lines 2-3 of Article 3 


agreement 


163 


Fawzy 


line 14 


Fawzi 



CORRIGENDA 



267 al-Atassi 

267 al-Khoury 

271 worse 

304 Midlle 

322 As well 

324 Comuniqu 

324 'Azmy 

332 joint 

347 Governent 

353 Nadha 

360 Governent 

368 Bagdad 

368 Baghadad 

380 hostilities 

381 International Affairs Iraq 
384 Paha 

511 Declartion 

612 SHABTAI 

612 SIZRI 

736 internanional 

752 Field Marshall 

793 Mr. (V.N.) Krishna Menon 

815 Gouvernent 

943 Hussein Wulficar Sabry 

966 Communsism 



line 7 

line 29 

line 9 

line 3 of footnote 

line 25 

title of Doc. 178 

line 2 of footnote (2) 

line 1 1 

line 6 of footnote (2) 

line ii of para. (9) 

line 5 

title of Doc. 196 

line 4 of para. I, Doc. 

line 2 of Article 5 

running title 

title of letter No. 6 

title of Doc. 231 

signature to Doc. 271 

signature to Doc. 271 

line 2 of Article 2, 

Doc. 342 
line i of footnote 
line 28 of Doc. 354 
line 13 of Doc. 270 
line 27 of Doc., 416 
line 3 



al-Atasi 
al-Khouri 
worst 
Middle 
As is well 
Communique' 
'Azmi 
join 

Government 
Nahda 
Government 
Baghdad 
196 omit Baghadad 

hostilities 

International Affairs : Jordan 
Pasha 

Declaration 
SHABAI 
BIZRI 
international 

Field Marshal 
Mr. (V.K.) Krishna Menon 

Gouvernment 
Hussein Dhulficar Sabry 

Communism 



List of Documents 
Volume 2 

I. ARAB UNITY: MISCELLANEOUS PROJECTS i 

1 . Memorandum Presented to the King-Crane Commission by the 

General Syrian Congress 

(July 2, 1919) 3 

2. Resolution Adopted by the General Syrian Congress 

(Damascus, March 7, 1920) 4 

3. Statement by the Arab National Congress, Jerusalem 

(December 13, 1931) 7 

4. Nuri as-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent Project 

(1943) 9 

5. Political Memorandum Concerning the Settlement of the Arab 

Question in General and the Syrian Question in Particular, 

Submitted to Amir 'Abdullah by a Number of Transjordanian 

Dignitaries 

(Amman, March 6, 1943) 12 

6. Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Prime 

Minister Tawf iq Abu al-Huda Concerning the Question of Arab 
Unity 

(August 24, 1943) 16 

7 Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Mustafa 
an-Nahhas, Egyptian Prime Minister 
(August 14, 1944) 19 

8. Note Addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Chairman of the 

Subsidiary Committee of the Preparatory Conference on Arab Unity, 
Embodying the Views of the Iraqi Government and Its Reservations 
Concerning the Draft Pact of the Arab League 
(March n, 1945) 20 

9. Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Hamid Franjiyya), 

Concerning the Greater Syria Plan 

(November 13, 1945) 21 

10. Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Muhammad ash-Shurayqy) 

to the Statement of the Lebanese Foreign Minister 

(November, 1945) 21 

11. Excerpts from the Speech from the Jordanian Throne, Dealing 

with the Question of Arab Unity 

(November n, 1946) 23 

12. Excerpts from the Reply to the Speech from the Throne, Made by the 

Jordanian Legislative Assembly 

(November 11, 1946) 24 

13. Question Addressed by a Number of Deputies to the Jordanian 

Foreign Minister Regarding the Statement of the Lebanese Foreign 

Minister about Syrian Unity 

(November 11, 1946) 25 

14. Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Muhammad ash-Shurayqy), to 



XI 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the Question of the Jordanian Deputies 

(November 19, 1946) 26 

15. Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Philip Taqla), in 

Connection with the Jordanian Foreign Minister's Statement on 

Syrian Unity 

(November 22, 1946) 28 

1 6. Statement by the Syrian Acting Foreign Minister, Made in the 

Chamber of Deputies, Concerning Syrian Unity 

(November 23, 1946) 28 

17. Statement to the Press Made by the Jordanian Foreign Minister 

(Muhammad ash-Shurayqy), in Connection with the Lebanese 

Foreign Minister's Statement on Syrian Unity 

(November 24, 1946) 29 

1 8. Statement by the Jordanian Prime Minister and Acting Foreign 

Minister (Ibrahim Hashim) in the Legislative Assembly, in Reply 
to the Statement of the Syrian Foreign Minister (Khalid al-'Azm), 
Concerning Syrian Unity 
(November, 1946) 30 

19. Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Muhammad 

ash-Shurayqy) at the Council of the Arab League, in Connection 
with the Stand Taken over the Question of Syrian Unity by Sa'dallah 
al-Jabiry, Syrian Prime Minister 
(November 26, 1946) 31 

20. Resolution Adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, 

Concerning Syrian Unity 

(November 28, 1946) 33 

21. Covering Letter by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Muhammad 

ash-Shurayqy), Addressed to the President of the Arab League 
Council, Together with a Memorandum, Concerning Syrian Unity 
(November, 1946) 34 

22. Statement to the Press Made by the Syrian Foreign 

Minister (Khalid al-'Azm), Concerning Syrian Unity 

(December 2, 1946) 35 

23. Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Muhammad 

ash-Shurayqy) Made in the Legislative Assembly, in Reply to a 
Question Concerning Syria's Attitude towards the Arab Foreign 
Ministers' Resolution 
(December 7, 1946) 36 

24. Resolution of the Jordanian Legislative Assembly Concerning 

Syrian Unity 

(December 7, 1946) 40 

25. The Syrian (Qudsi) Project Submitted to the Political Committee 

of the Arab League for Establishing an Arab Federation 

(January 23, 1951) 40 

26. Jordanian Prime Minister's (Tawfiq Abu al-Huda's) Statement on the 

Subject of the Iraqi- Jordanian Union 

(January 12, 1952) 46 

27. Memorandum Submitted by the Iraqi Delegation to the Arab 

League, Concerning the Establishment of an Arab Federation : 

Jamali Project 

(January n, 1954) 47 

xii 



List of Documents 

II. THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 51 

28. The Alexandria Protocol (Establishing the League of Arab States) 

(October 7, 1944) 53 

29. The Covenant of the League of Arab States 

(Cairo, March 22, 1945) 56 

30. Statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister (Fadhil al-Jamali) Made before 

the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, Criticising Secretary-General 

('Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam) of Arab League 

(May 3, 1949) 61 

3 1 . Reply of the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the Iraqi 

Foreign Minister's Statement before the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies 
(May 14, 1949) 65 

32. Draft Statute of the Arab Court of Justice Prepared by the 

Three-Man Commission Appointed by the Council of the Arab 

League at Its Twelfth Ordinary Session 

(April 13, 1950) 72 

33. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Inviting Secretary-General of 

League of Arab States to Attend Session of the General Assembly 
(November i, 1950) 80 

34. Address by the Secretary-General of the Arab League ('Abd ar-Rahman 

'Azzam), Delivered at the U.N. General Assembly on the Occasion 
of the Assembly's Invitation to Him to Attend Its Meetings 
(November i, 1950) 81 

35. Internal Regulations of the Council of the League of Arab States 

(October 13, 1951) 82 

36. Internal Regulations of the Committees of the League of Arab States 

(October 13, 1951) 85 

37. Press Statement by the Secretary-General of the Arab League 

('Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam), Concerning Egypt, Libya, North 

Africa, and Palestine 

(Paris, December 4, 1951) 87 

38. Internal Regulations of the Secretariat-General of the League of 

Arab States 

(May 10, 1953) 88 

39. Report Presented to the Council of the League of Arab States at Its 

2 ist Ordinary Session of March 1954, by the Three-Man Commission 

in Charge of the Preparation of the Statute for an Arab Court 

of Justice 90 

40. Agreement between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 

Cultural Organization, and the League of Arab States 

(November 26, 1957) 92 

41. Accord entre 1'Organisation Internationale du Travail et la Ligue 

des Etats Arabes 

(May 26, 1958) 94 

III. TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED UNDER THE 

AUSPICES OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 97 

42. Cultural Treaty 

(November 27, 1945) 99 



Kill 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

43. Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation among the 

States of the Arab League 

(April 13, 1950) 101 

44. Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Joint Defence and 

Economic Co-operation (and to the Military Annex) among the 

States of the Arab League 

(February 2, 1951) 105 

45. Extradition Agreement among the States of the Arab League 

(September 14, 1952) 106 

46. Agreement (among Arab League States) Regarding the Execution of 

Judgments (September 14, 1952) 109 

47. Convention Concerning the Nationality of Arabs Resident in 

Countries of Which They Are Not Nationals 

(September 23, 1952) 112 

48. Convention of the Arab Union for Wireless Communications 

and Telecommunications 

(April 9, 1953) 113 

49. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the League of 

Arab States 

(May 10, 1953) 116 

50. Convention for the Facilitation of Trade Exchange and the Regulation 

of Transit Trade among States of the Arab League 

(September 7, 1953) 122 

51. Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions 

and the Transfer of Capital among States of the Arab League 
(September 7, 1953) 125 

52. Nationality Agreement 

(April 5, 1954) 127 

53. Convention for the Amendment of the Convention for the 

Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer 

of Capital among States of the Arab League 

(December 15, 1954) 129 

54. Agreement for the Establishment of the Arab Financial Institution 

for Economic Development 

(June 3, 1957) 130 

IV. ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS 143 

A. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ARAB STATES 145 

55. Arab Countries Not Represented on the League 

(June II, 1946) 145 

56. The Present Financial Position of the Secretariat-General 

(September 4, 1957) 145 

B. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . . 147 

57. The Arab League as a Regional Organization 

(April i, 1950) 147 

58. Arab League States' Quota in the United Nations Secretariat 

(April i, 1950) 147 

59. The Arab League and the Cause of World Peace 

(February 2, 1951) 147 



xiv 



List of Documents 

60. The General International Situation 

(May 9, 1953) 149 

61. Co-operation between the States of the Arab League and the States 

of the Asian- African Bloc 

(January 21, 1954) 149 

62. The Asian- African Conference To Be Held in Djakarta 

(December n, 1954) 149 

63. Posts in the Secretariat of the United Nations 

(October i, 1955) 150 

C. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND EGYPT 151 

64. The Support of Egypt's Decision to Nationalize the Suez Canal 

(Company) 

(August 12, 1956) 151 

65. The Solidarity of the Arab States with Egypt 

(August 13, 1956) 151 

66. The Attitude of Certain Western States towards Egypt's Decision 

to Nationalize the (Suez) Canal Company 

(October 15, 1956) 152 

67. The Situation after the Withdrawal of the Forces of Aggression 

from Egyptian Territory 

(March 21, 1957) 153 

D. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND NORTH AFRICA: ALGERIA, 

MOROCCO, TUNISIA 155 

68. The North African Questions 

(April 9, 1953) 155 

69. The Algerian Question 

(October 14, 1955) 156 

70. The Question of Morocco 

(October 14, 1955) 156 

7 1 . The Attitude of the French Authorities towards the Offer of Arab 

Assistance to the Distressed People of Algeria and Morocco 

(October 14, 1955) 157 

72. The Support for the Algerian People and the Deprecation of 

France's Aggression 

(March 29, 1956) 157 

73. The Question of Algeria 

(April 12, 1956) 158 

74. Annual Budget for Aiding Algeria 

(October 18, 1958) 158 

E. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND PALESTINE 

75. The Boycott of Zionist Goods and Products 

(December 2, 1945) 161 

76. The Representation of Palestine on the Council of the League 

(December 4, 1945) 161 

77. The Higher Arab Executive Committee 

(June 12, 1946) 162 

78. Boycott of Zionist Products and Goods 

(June 12, 1946) 162 



XV 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

79. Jewish Terrorism in Palestine 

(December 12, 1946) 163 

80. Rejection of Palestine Partition Plan 

(December 12, 1946) 164 

81. Defending Palestine 

(October 9, 1947) 164 

82. Demanding the Return of the Palestine Refugees to Their Homes 

(March 17, 1949) l6 5 

83. Peace with Israel 

(April i, 1950) 165 

84. Ships Carrying Contraband Goods and Immigrants to Israel 

(April 8, 1950) 166 

85. The Policy of the Arab States towards the Question of Palestine 

(April 13, 1950) 166 

86. Separate Peace with Israel 

(April 13, 1950) 166 

87. Co-operation between the Arab States and U.N.R.W.A. 

(June 12, 1950) 167 

88. Israeli Aggressions in the Demilitarized Zones and against Syria 

(May 18, 1951) 168 

89. The Attitude of the Arab States towards International Conferences 

and Organizations in Which Israel Participates 

(May 19, 1951) 168 

90. The Question of Transferring the Israeli Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs to Jerusalem 

(September 14, 1952) 169 

91. The Palestine Refugees 

(September 23, 1952) 170 

92. The All-Palestine Government 

(September 23, 1952) 171 

93. Regional Conferences Attended by Israel 

(September 23, 1952) 171 

94. The Projects Relating to River Jordan and Its Sources 

(January i, 1954) 171 

95. American Financial Grants to Israel 

(April 5, 1954) 172 

96. Supervision of the Implementation of the Convention Regarding 

German Reparations to Israel 

(April 5, 1954) 172 

97. Aggression of Israel against the Armistice Regions of Palestine 

(April 6, 1954) 173 

98. Israel's Diversion of River Jordan 

(December n, 1954) 173 

99. The Preservation of the Properties of the Palestine Refugees 

(October 14, 1955) 173 

100. A. The Grant of Loans to the Palestine Refugees on Their Usurped 

Properties in Israel 

B. The Agreement for the Release of the Funds and Schedules 

of the Palestine Arabs 

C. A Proposal for the Formation of a United Nations Agency for 



xvi 



List of Documents 

Taking Care of the Palestine Refugees' Properties in Israel, 
and of Another Committee to Claim Their Rights and Make 
Compensation for Their Losses 

D. The Projects of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 
and Those of the Other International Organs for Settling 
the Palestine Refugees 
(October 14, 1955) 174 

101. The Question of Commercial Treaties between Israel and Foreign 

States and the Unification of the Measures Which Should Be Taken 

by All the Arab States in Connection with This Question 

(October 15, 1955) 175 

1 02. The Zionist Attempts to Compel the Jews in Foreign Countries to 

Migrate to Palestine 

(March 30, 1957) 175 

103. Israel's Attempts to Compel Its Resident Arabs to Exchange 

Their Properties for Properties of Jews Residing in the Arab States 
(March 30, 1957) 175 

F. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND OMAN 177 

104. Application of the Imama of Oman for Admission to the League 

of Arab States 

(October 14, 1955) 177 

105. The Imama of Oman 

(April 12, 1956) 177 

1 06. The Question of the Imama of Oman 

(October 22, 1956) 177 

107. The Question of the Imama of Oman 

(August 12, 1957) 178 

G. THE ARAB LEAGUE AND YAMAN AND PROTECTORATES . . 179 

108. The Question of the Protectorates 

(June ii, 1946) 179 

109. The Yamanite-British Negotiations 

(April i, 1950) 179 

no. Aggression by the British Authorities against the Yamanite Regions 

Known As the Protectorates 

(January 19, 1954) i?9 

in. The Report of the League's Mission to Yaman 

(April 3, 1954) 180 

112. The British Aggression on Yamanite Territory 

(March 30, 1957) 180 

113. The Report of the League's Mission to Yaman 

(April 24, 1957) 181 

V. INTER-ARAB STATES DISPUTES 183 

114. Egyptian-Sudanese Dispute: First Egyptian Communique 

(February 17, 1958) 183 

115. Egyptian-Sudanese Dispute: The Sudanese Communiqu6 

(February 18, 1958) 186 

1 1 6. Egyptian Sudanese Dispute: Second Egyptian Communique 

(February 19, 1958) 189 



xvn 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

1 17. Egyptian- Sudanese Dispute : Third Egyptian Communique 

(February 21, 1958) 190 

1 1 8. Lebanese Complaint to the Security Council against the United Arab 

Republic 

(May 22, 1958) 190 

119. Arab League Draft Resolution Concerning Lebanon's Complaint 

against the United Arab Republic 

(June 4, 1958) 191 

1 20. Lebanese Government's Response to the Arab League Draft 

Resolution Concerning Its Complaint against the United Arab 

Republic 

(June 5, 1958) 191 

121. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Lebanon's Complaint 

against the United Arab Republic 

(June u, 1958) 192 

122. President Camille Chamoun's Statement Explaining His 

Government's Request for the Landing of American Troops 

in Lebanon 

(July 15, 1958) 192 

123. President Dwight Eisenhower's Statement on the Landing of American 

Troops in Lebanon 

(Washington, July 15, 1958) 194 

124. President Dwight Eisenhower's Message to Congress on Lebanon 

(July 15, 1958) 194 

125. President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's Speech on Lebanon and Iraq 

(July 16, 1958) 196 

126. Letter from President Camille Chamoun to President Dwight 

Eisenhower Concerning the Landing of American Troops in Lebanon 
(July 21, 1958) 197 

127. President Dwight Eisenhower's Reply to Letter of President Camille 

Chamoun Concerning the Landing of American Troops in Lebanon 
(July 25, 1958) 197 

128. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Lebanon and Jordan 

(August 21, 1958) 197 

129. Tunisian Memorandum to the Arab League Concerning Tension 

between Tunisia and the United Arab Republic 

(October n, 1958) 198 

130. Reply by Mr. 'Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, Head of the U.A.R. Delegation 

(October n, 1958) 202 

131. Arab League Resolution on the Relations between Tunisia and the 

United Arab Republic 

(October 13, 1958) 203 

132. Arab League Invitation to Tunisian Delegation to Resume Participation 

in League Sessions 

(October 15, 1958) 204 

133. Arab League Political Committee Resolution on the Situation in Iraq 

(April 7, 1959) 204 

VI. OTHER INTER-ARAB TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND 

RELATIONSHIPS 207 

134. Mecca (Protectorate) Agreement between the Imam of 'Asir and the 



XVlll 



List of Documents 

King of Hijaz, Najd and Its Dependencies 

(October 21, 1926) 209 

135. Nile Waters Agreement between Britain and Egypt 

(May 7, 1929) 210 

136. Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage between Transjordan and 

Saudi Arabia, Together with Protocol on Arbitration and Schedule 

Appended to the Treaty 

(Jerusalem, July 27, 1933) 212 

137. Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood between Saudi 

Arabia and Yaman 

(Taif, May 20, 1934) 219 

138. Arbitration Covenant Appended to the Treaty of Taif between 

Saudi Arabia and Yaman 

(May 20, 1934) 223 

139. Statement by the Heads of Arab States at the End of the Conference 

of Inshas, Egypt 

(May 29, 1946) 224 

140. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashemite Kingdom 

of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq 

(April 14, 1947) 226 

141. Statement by the Public Relations Officer, Khartoum, Concerning 

the Modifications of the Nile Waters Agreement 

(October 18, 1952) 228 

142. Statement by Major Salah Salim, Egyptian Minister of National 

Guidance, at a Press Conference 

(Cairo, January 16, 1955) 229 

143. Statement by Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Representative to the United 

Nations, to the Chamber of Deputies 

(Baghdad, February 6, 1955) 230 

144. Statement by Major Salah Salim at a Press Conference, on the 

Conference of Arab League Representatives 

(February 7, 1955) 236 

145. Communique Issued by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faidi 

al-Atassi, on Syrian Policy at the Arab League Conference 

(February 8, 1955) 2 37 

146. Statement by Faris al-Khouri, Syrian Prime Minister, on the Arab 

League Conference 

(February 9, 1955) 238 

147. Communique on Talks between Syria and Egypt 

(Damascus, March 2, 1955) 239 

148. Communique on Talks between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia 

(March 6, 1955) 240 

149. Joint Statement on the Syrian-Iraqi Talks 

(Baghdad, March 19, 1955) 240 

150. The Syrian Government's Statement on Its Attitude towards Turkey 

(Damascus, March 22, 1955) 241 

151. Egyptian- Syrian Mutual Defense Pact 

(October 20, 1955) 242 

152. Egyptian Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact 

(October 27, 1955) 242 



xix 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

153. Exchange of Messages between King Saud, President Quwatli and 

President Nasser in Cairo and King Hussein, Regarding Arab Aid 

for Jordan 

(March 8-17, 1956) 245 

154. Communiqu6 Issued by the Heads of State of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 

Syria 

(March 12, 1956) 247 

155. Communique on the Talks between King Hussein and President 

Quwatli 

(Damascus, April u, 1956) 249 

156. Military Pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Yaman 

(April 21, 1956) 250 

157. Communique on the Talks between King Saud, Colonel Nasser and 

the Imam Ahmed 

(Jidda, April 21, 1956) 253 

158. Extract from a Speech by Samir ar-Rifa'i, Prime Minister of 

Jordan, in the Chamber of Deputies Regarding Foreign Aid to 

Jordan and Oil Revenues 

(May 7, 1956) 253 

159. Statement by General c Abd al-Hakim c Amir, Commander-in-Chief of the 

Joint Arab Command 

(November 30, 1956) 254 

1 60. Speech by Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id of Iraq Concerning the 

Baghdad Pact, Transmitted by the Iraqi Broadcasting Station 
(December 16, 1956) 255 

161. Egyptian Government's Reply to Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id's Radio 

Speech of December 16, 1956 

(December 20, 1956) 279 

162. Treaty of Solidarity between Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt: 

Accord on Jordan 

(Cairo, January 19, 1957) 287 

163. President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's Speech on the Occasion of the Visit 

to Damascus of the Leaders of the Iraqi Revolution 

(July 19, 1958) 289 

164. U.A.R. Iraqi Mutual Defence Pact 

(July 19, 1958) 289 

165. Nasir-Shihab Joint Communique 

(U.A.R. Lebanese Border, March 25, 1959) 290 

VII. THE ARAB STATES AND OTHER STATES: 

THE BACKGROUND 293 

1 66. Sykes-Picot Agreement for the Partition of the Arab World: 

Britain and France 

(April 26 October 23, 1916) 295 

167. Soviet Appeal to Muslims in U.S.S.R 

(December 3, 1917) 298 

1 68. British and Anglo-French Declarations to the Arabs 

(January-November, 1918) 300 

169. Amir FaysaPs Memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference 

(January i, 1919) 302 



List of Documents 

170. The Lausanne Treaty of Peace: Turkey and the Allied and 

Associated Powers 

(July 24, 1923) 304 

VIII. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY 309 

171. Note from the British Government to the Egyptian Government 

Containing Proposals for the Defence of Egypt, Together with a Note 

Concerning the Sudan 

(April n, 1951) 311 

172. The Egyptian Government's Reply (to the British Note on the 

Defence of Egypt, and on the Sudan) 

(April 24, 1951) 312 

173. Middle East Defense Command: Four-Power Proposal to Egypt 

(October 13, 1951) 314 

174. Statement by the United States Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) 

Regretting Egypt's Rejection of the Four-Power Defense Proposals 

and Abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 

(October 17, 1951) 315 

175. Middle East Defense Command: Joint Statement by the Four 

Powers 

(November 10, 1951) 316 

176. Note from the Russian Government to the Egyptian Government 

Concerning the Proposed Establishment of a Middle East Command 
(November 21, 1951) 317 

177. Exchange of Notes between the Russian Government and the 

Governments of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, France and 

Turkey on the Establishment of a Middle East Command 

(November 24 December 18, 1951) 320 

178. Extract from the Communique Issued after Talks between President 

Harry Truman and Prime Minister Winston Churchill 

(Washington, January 9, 1952) 324 

179. Egypt's Reply to the Truman-Churchill Communique 

(January 10, 1952) 324 

1 80. Soviet Government's Note to Great Britain Concerning the Near 

and Middle East 

(January 28, 1952) 325 

181. Statement by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Security 

in the Near and Middle East 

(Apiil 16, 1955) 328 

182. Statement by President D wight Eisenhower on the Near East 

(November 9, 1955) 331 

183. Soviet Statement on the Middle East 

(April 17, 1956) 33i 

184. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's Proposals on the Middle 

East (January 7, 1957) 333 

185. Soviet Proposals on the Middle East (Addressed to the United States 

Government) 

(February n, 1957) 337 

186. U.S. Reply of March n, 1957 to Soviet Proposals of 

February n, 1957 340 



xxi 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

187. Complaint about Threats to the Security of Syria and to International 

Peace : Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria 

(Salah Bitar) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 

(Dag Hammarskjold) 

(October 15, 1957) 342 

1 88. Letter from Head of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics to the United Nations (Andrei Gromyko) to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (Dag Hammarskjold) 
(October 16, 1957) 344 

189. Statement by the United States Representative (Henry Cabot Lodge) 

to the United Nations before the General Assembly 

(October 18, 195?) 345 

190. Statement by the United States Representative (Henry Cabot Lodge) 

to the United Nations before the General Assembly 

(October 25, 1957) 346 

IX. SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIPS 351 

A. IRAQ 353 

191. Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq (Baghdad, 

June 30, 1930) Together with Exchange of Notes on a Separate 

Financial Agreement 

(August 19, 1930) 353 

192. Treaty of Non- Aggression (Sa'dabad Pact) between Afghanistan, 

Iran, Iraq, and Turkey 

(July 8, 1937) 363 

193. Communication from the Minister of Iraq in Washington ('Ali Jawdat) 

to the American Secretary of State (Cordell Hull) Informing the 
United States of a State of War between Iraq and the Axis Powers 
(January 16, 1943) 364 

194. Statement in the Name of the Regent of Iraq Announcing Iraq's 

Decision to Reject the Portsmouth Treaty 

(January 22, 1948) 365 

195. Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Iraq 

(April 21, 1954) 366 

196. Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey (the Baghdad 

Pact) 

(Baghdad, February 24, 1955) 368 

197. Special Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom 

and the Government of Iraq, Together with Exchange of Letters 

and Memoranda 

(Baghdad, April 4, 1955) 3?o 

198. U.S. Statement Supporting the Baghdad Pact 

(November 29, 1956) 376 

199. Statement Regarding the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations between 

the Iraqi Republic and the Soviet Union 

(July 23, 1958) 376 

200* Statement Regarding the Iraqi Government's Recognition of the 
Government of the Chinese People's Republic 
(July 23, 1958) 377 



xxn 



List of Documents 

20 1. Statement Regarding the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 

between the Iraqi Republic and Yugoslavia 

(July 23, 1958) 377 

B. JORDAN 379 

202. Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Amir of 

Trans Jordan, Together with Annex and Exchange of Notes 

(March 22, 1946) 379 

203. Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and the Kingdom of 

Trans Jordan 

(Ankara, January n, 1947) 385 

204. Treaty of Alliance (Together with Annex) between the United 

Kingdom and the King of Trans Jordan 

(Amman, March 15, 1948) 386 

205. Communique Issued by the Jordanian Royal Cabinet on Relations 

with Britain 

(March 3, 1956) 390 

206. Exchange of Notes Terminating the Treaty of Alliance of March 

15, 1948, (with Joint Declaration of February 13, 1957) 

(Amman March 13, 1957) 390 

C. LIBYA 397 

207. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning Italian-Libyan 

Disputed Property, and Establishing U.N. Tribunal 

(December 15, 1950) 397 

208. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the United Kingdom of 

Libya and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(July 29, 1953) 402 

209. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Extending Mandate of U.N. 

Tribunal in Libya 

(October 23, 1953) 425 

210. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 

and the Government of the United Kingdom of Libya 

(September 9, 1954) 425 

211. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Terminating U.N. Tribunal in 

Libya 

(December 6, 1955) 439 

212. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Regarding Technical Assistance 

to Libya 

(December 9, 1955) 440 

D. NORTH AFRICA: ALGERIA 443 

213. National Liberation Front of Algeria (F.L.N. ) 

Statement of Policy 443 

214. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Algeria 

(November 25, 1955) 468 

215. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Algeria 

(February 15, 1957) 468 

216. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Algeria 

(December 10, 1957) 468 



xxm 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

217. Resolution Adopted by the Tangier Conference for the Unification 

of the Maghrib Countries 

(April 30, 1958) 469 

218. Statement by the President of the Council of Ministers (Ferhat 'Abbas), 

Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, on the Occasion 

of the Proclamation of the Republic 

(Cairo, September 26, 1958) 469 

219. Memorandum on the Situation in Algeria, Submitted to the U.N. 

Secretary-General by the New York Algerian Office in the Name of 

the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria 

(April 28, 1959) 473 

220. Yugoslav-Algerian Joint Communique 

(June 12, 1959) 475 

221. Text of General Charles De Gaulle's Statement on Algeria 

(September 16, 1959) 476 

222. Reply of the Provisional Government of Algeria to General Charles de 

Gaulle's Proposals 

(Tunis, September 28, 1959) 480 

E. PALESTINE 483 

223. The (Basle) Program of the World Zionist Organization 

(August 29, 1897) 483 

224. The British (Balfour) Declaration of Sympathy with Zionist 

Aspirations 

(June 4 November 2, 1917) 483 

225. Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission on Syria and 

Palestine 

(August 28, 1919) 484 

226. Mandate System : Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 

Nations 492 

227. The Mandate for Palestine 

(July 24, 1922) 493 

228. British Policy on Palestine: British Government's White Paper 

(May 17, 1939) 498 

229. The Zionist (Biltmore) Programme 

(May n, 1942) 506 

230. The Bevin Declaration of Policy in Palestine, Made in the House 

of Commons 

(November 13, 1945) 507 

231. Arab States' Reply to the Bevin Declaration of Policy with 

Respect to Palestine 

(December 1945) 511 

232. Higher Arab Committee's Reply to the British Government's 

Decision to Allow Jewish Immigration According to the Bevin 
Declaration, Addressed to the High Commissioner of Palestine 
(January 19, 1946) 5*3 

233. Statement by the Council of the Arab League on the 

Anglo-American Committee's Report on Palestine 

(June 1946) 515 



XXIV 



List of Documents 

234. Resolution on Palestine by the Council of the Arab League Meeting 

at Bludan 

(June 12, 1946) 517 

235. Exchange of Letters between King Ibn Sa'ud and President Harry S. 

Truman 

(October 15-28., 1946) 518 

236. United Kingdom's Memorandum for the Administration of Palestine, 

Submitted to the London Conference on Palestine 

(February 10, 1947) 522 

237. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Constituting and Instructing 

the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine 

(May 15, 1947) 525 

238. Memorandum Submitted by the Political Committee of the Christian- 

Muslim Conference in Lebanon, to the Governments of Great 
Britain and the United States, and to the Governments Participating 
in the United Nations Organization 
('Alayh, Lebanon, July 28, 1947) 526 

239. Summary of the Report of U.N.S.C.O.P. ( U.N. Special Committee 

on Palestine) 

(August 31, 1947) 528 

240. Principles Submitted to the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee by the 

Higher Arab Committee as the Basis for the Future 

Constitutional Organization of Palestine 

(September 30, 194?) 53* 

241. Compromise Solution of the Palestine Problem, as Presented to the 

U.N. General Assembly by the Arab States Delegations 

(November 29, 1947) 532 

242. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Future Government of 

Palestine (Partition Resolution) 

(November 29, 1947) 533 

243. Statement by the Arab Governments Condemning the Palestine 

Partition Resolution 

(December 17, 1947) 550 

244. Statement on the Palestine Question by the Committee of the Christian 

Union of Palestine Addressed to All World Religious and Political 

Bodies 

(March 3, 1948) 55* 

245. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Developments in 

Palestine 

(March 5, 1948) 553 

246. Letter by the Head of the Higher Arab Committee for Palestine, 

Addressed to the Arab Prime Ministers, Concerning the Exodus of 

the Palestine Arabs 

(March 8, 1948) 553 

247. U.N. Security Council Resolution Calling for a Truce in Palestine 

(April 17, 1948) 554 

248. U.N. Security Council Resolution Establishing Truce Commission 

for Palestine 

(April 23, 1948) 555 

249. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Providing for the Protection 

of the City of Jerusalem and Its Inhabitants: Reference to the 

XXV 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



Trusteeship Council 

(April 26, 1948) 555 

250. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Providing for the Protection of 

the City of Jerusalem and Its Inhabitants : Appointment of a Special 

Municipal Commission 

(May 6, 1948) 556 

251. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Providing for the Appointment 

of a United Nations Mediator for Palestine 

(May 14, 1948) 556 

252. Statement Issued by the Governments of the Arab League States 

on the Occasion of the Entry of the Arab Armies into Palestine 

(May 15, 1948) 557 

2 53 U.N. Security Council Resolution Establishing a Four- Week Truce 
in Palestine 
(May 29, 1948) 561 

254. Reply of the Arab States to the Security Council's Proposal for 

the Acceptance of the Truce for Palestine 

(June 2, 1948) 562 

255. Two Memoranda Sent by the Political Committee of the Arab 

League to the U.N. Mediator (Count Folke Bernadotte) and to the 

Security Council, Rejecting the Extension of the Truce 

(July 8 and July 9-10, 1948) 563 

256. Statement by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Concerning 

the Setting-Up of the All-Palestine Government 

(July 10, 1948) 566 

257. U.N. Security Council Resolution Establishing a Permanent Truce 

for Palestine 

(July 15, 1948) 568 

258. Memorandum by the Arab League, in Reply to the Security Council's 

Resolution Providing for the Second Cease- Fire in Palestine 

(July 18, 1948) 569 

259. Excerpts from the Progress Report of the U.N. Mediator (Count Folke 

Bernadotte) on Palestine 

(September 16, 1948) 572 

260. U.N. Security Council Resolur'on Condemning Assassination of 

U.N. Mediator (Count Folke Bernadotte) in Palestine 

(September 18, 1948) 579 

261. Proclamation of the Independence of Palestine by the Higher Arab 

Committee and the Representatives of Palestine Meeting in Congress 
(October i, 1948) 579 

262. U.N. Security Council Resolution on the Progress of Investigation 

of Assasination of Mediator and on Truce Supervision 

(October 19, 1948) 580 

263. U.N. Security Council Resolution Calling for Withdrawal of Israeli 

and Egyptian Forces and Appointing Advisory Committee to Acting 

Mediator 

(November 4, 1948) 581 

264. U.N. Security Council Resolution (Calling for Armistice in Palestine) 

(November 16, 1948) 581 

265. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Palestine Establishing the 



XXVI 



List of Documents 

Conciliation Commission ) 

(December n, 1948) 582 

266. U.N. Security Council Resolution Ordering Immediate Cease-Fire 

in Southern Palestine and Also Implementation of Council's 

Resolution of November 4, 1948 

(December 29, 1948) 584 

267. Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement 

(February 24, 1949) 585 

268. Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement 

(March 23, 1949) 595 

269. Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement 

(April 3, 1949) 599 

270. The Lausanne Protocol (Putting Forth "Working Documents" for 

Armistice Negotiations, Prepared by the Conciliation Commission 

for Palestine) 

(May 12, 1949). 607 

271. Israeli- Syrian General Armistice Agreement 

(July 20, 1949) 607 

272. U.N. Security Council Resolution Paying Tribute to Late Mediator 

(Count Folke Bernadotte) and to Acting Mediator (Ralph Bunche) 
(August u, 1949) 615 

2 73 . U. N . S ecurity Council Resolution Abolishing Office of Acting 

Mediator and Continuing Work of Truce Supervision Organization 
(August II, 1949) 615 

274. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Palestine Establishing 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 

in the Near East (U.N.R.W.A) 

(December 8, 1949) 616 

275. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Palestine: 

Internationalization of Jerusalem 

(December 9, 1949) 620 

276. Declaration by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and 

the United States, Regarding Security in the Near East : Tripartite 

Declaration 

(May 25, 1950) 621 

277. Statement by the Arab League States in Reply to the Tripartite 

Declaration of May 25, 1950, Regarding Security in the 

Near East 

(June 6, 1950) 621 

278. U.N. Security Council Resolution on Palestine (on the Progress 

and Implementation of Armistice Agreements between the 

Several Arab States and Israel) 

(November 17, 1950) 623 

279. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning the Protection 

of the Holy Places 

(December 13, 1950) 624 

280. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning the Repatriation of 

the Arab Refugees 

(December 14, 1950) 625 

281. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning the Work of the 

Conciliation Commission for Palestine 

(January 26, 1951) 626 

xxvii 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

282. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Incidents in the 

Northern (Syrian-Israeli) Demilitarized Zone: Israel's 

Drainage Operations in Huleh Marshes 

(May 8, 1951) 626 

283. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Incidents along the 

Syrian-Israeli Frontier: Israel's Drainage Operations in 

Huleh Marshes 

(May 18, 1951) 627 

284. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Restrictions on the 

Passage of Ships thiough the Suez Canal 

(September i, 1951) 629 

285. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning Israel's Complaint 

against the Arab States 

(December 21, 1952) 630 

286. Statement by President Dwight Eisenhower on Eric Johnston's Mission 

to the Middle East 

(October 16, 1953) 631 

287. U.N. Security Council Resolution Requiring Israel's Suspension of 

Work in the Demilitarized Zone, River Jordan 

(October 27, 1953) 632 

288. U.N. Security Council Resolution Condemning Israel for the 

Qibya Incident 

(November 24, 1953) 632 

289. U.N. Security Council Resolution Condemning Israel for Its 

Attack on the Gaza Strip 

(March 29, 1955) 633 

290. U.N. Security Council Resolution Regarding the General Conditions 

along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line 

(March 30, 1955) 634 

291. Letter from the Higher Arab Committee for Palestine, Presented 

to the Heads of Arab Governments, Foreign Ministers, 

Secretariat-General of the Arab League, and to Leaders of 

Political Parties and Parliamentary Blocs, Concerning Mr. 

Eric Johnston's Scheme 

(August 18, 1955) 634 

292. U.S. Proposals for the Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 

Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Council 

on Foreign Relations 

(August 26, 1955) 638 

293. Statement by the British Foreign Office Regarding Secretary of 

State John Foster Dulles's Proposals for a Settlement of 

the Arab-Israeli Problem 

(August 27, 1955) 641 

294. U.N, Security Council Resolution Concerning the Egyptian- 

Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line 

(September 8, 1955) 642 

295. Extract from a Speech by President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir to Cadets 

Graduating from Military School, on the Supply of Arms to 

Israel 

(October 2, 1955) 642 



xxvin 



List of Documents 

296. Statement by British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden at Mansion 

House 

(November 9, 1955) 643 

297. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning U.N.R.W.A/S 

Budgets for Relief and Rehabilitation 

(December 3, 1955) 645 

298. U.N. Security Council Resolution Condemning Israel for Its Attack 

on Syria (Sea of Galilee) 

(January 19, 1956) : 646 

299. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Tension along 

the Armistice Demarcation Lines 

(April 4, 1956) 647 

300. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Arab Refugees (Continuing 

Work of U.N.R.W.AO 

(February 28, 1957) 648 

301. American Statement Concerning the Meeting between U.S. Secretary 

of State John Foster Dulles and Israeli Foreign Minister Golda 

Meir (March 18, 1957) 650 

302. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Concerning Assistance by 

U.N.R.W.A. to Arab Refugees 

(December 12, 1957) 650 

303. U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Jordan's Complaint 

against Israeli Activities in the Area of Government House, 

Jerusalem 

(January 22, 1958) 652 

304. U.N. General Assembly Resolution Continuing Work of U.N.R.W.A. 

(December 12, 1958) 653 

305. Recommendations by the Committee of Arab Experts in Reply 

to the Proposals of the U.N. Secretary-General Regarding 

Continuation of U.N. Assistance to Palestine Refugees 

(Sofar, Lebanon, August 17, 1959) 654 

F. ARABIAN PENINSULA: THE PROTECTORATES 657 

306. General Treaty for the Suppression of Piracy and Slave Trade 

(January 8, 1820) 657 

307. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Muscat and the United 

States 

(September 21, 1833) 658 

308. Treaty of Friendship between Lahij and Britain 

(February n, 1843) 659 

309. Treaty of Commerce between Muscat and France 

(November 17, 1844) 660 

310. Perpetual Maritime Truce between the Shaykhs of the Omani Coast 

(May 4, 1853) 663 

311. Muscati Sultan's Cession of the Islands of Kuria Muria to Britain 

(July 14, 1854) 664 

312. Persia's Lease of Bandar 'Abbas, Qishm and Hurmuz to Muscat 

(November 17, 1856) 664 

313. Declaration by Britain and France Guaranteeing the Independence 

of Muscat and Zanzibar 

(March 10, 1862) 666 

xxix 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

314. Saudi Assurances to Britain 

(April 21, 1866) 666 

315. Agreement between the Shaykh of Bahrein and Britain 

(December 22, 1880) 667 

316. Exclusive Agreement between Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Britain 

(March 20, 1891) 667 

317. Agreement between the Shaykh of Bahrein and Britain 

(March 13, 1892) 667 

318. Exclusive Agreement between the Shaykh of Kuwait and Britain 

(January 23, 1899) 668 

319. Undertaking by Shaykh of Kuwait to Britain Concerning Oil 

(October 27, 1913) 668 

320. Undertaking by the Shaykh of Bahrein, Regarding Oil, 1914 

(May 14, 1914) 669 

321. British Government's Promise to Recognize Kuwait as a 

British - Protected State 

(November 3, 1914) 669 

322. Treaty between the Shaykh of Qatar and Britain 

(November 3, 1916) 670 

323. Treaty of al-Sib between the Sultan of Muscat and the 

Shaykh of Oman 

(September 12, 1920) 671 

G. SAUDI ARABIA 673 

324. Treaty of Jiddah between the United Kingdom and King Ibn 

Sa'ud of the Hijaz and Najd and Its Dependencies 

(May 20, 1927) 673 

325. Exchange of Notes between the United Kingdom and 

Saudi Arabia for the Modification of the Treaty of Jiddah of 

May 20, 1927 

(Mecca / Jiddah, October 3, 1936) 674 

326. U.S. Saudi Arabian Dhahran Air Base Agreement 

(June 18, 1951) 677 

327. U.S. Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 

(June 18, 1951) 683 

328. Anglo Saudi Arabian Buraimi Arbitration Agreement 

(July 30, 1954) 686 

329. Statement by Sir Reader Bullard Explaining the Reason for His 

Resignation from the Arbitration Tribunal 

(September 16, 1955) 691 

330. Statement by Shaykh Yusuf Yasin, Replying to Sir Reader Bullard's 

Charge and Explaining His Own Position in the 

Arbitration Tribunal 

(September 17, 1955) 691 

331. U.S. Saudi Arabian Agreement on Co-operation 

(April 2, 1957) 692 

H. (I) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: EGYPT 695 

332. Convention between Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 

Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey, 
Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal 



XXX 



List of Documents 

(Constantinople, October 29, 1888) 695 

333. Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Egypt, 

Together with a Convention Concerning the Immunities and 

Privileges To Be Enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt 

(August 26, 1936) 697 

334. Declaration of Support by the British Ambassador to Egypt (Miles 

Lampson) 

(Cairo, June 8 5 1941) 718 

335. Papers Regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo- 

Egyptian Treaty of 1936 

(October, 1946) 718 

336. Excerpts from the Speech from the Egyptian Throne, Concerning the 

Abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 

(November 16, 1950) 724 

337. Egyptian Bill Abrogating the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and 

the Sudan Condominium Agreements of 1 899, as Presented to 

the Egyptian Parliament by the Prime Minister 

(October 8, 1951) 725 

338. The British Position Regarding the Suez Canal: Excerpts from the 

Address by the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) in the 

House of Commons 

(May n, 1953) 726 

339. The Egyptian Position Regarding the Suez Canal: Address by the 

Prime Minister of Egypt Mohammad Najib, to the Egyptian People 

(Cairo, May 19, 1953) 727 

240. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base: 
Heads of Agreement 
(July 27, 1954) 729 

341. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base 

(Cairo, October 19, 1954) 731 

342. Treaty of Friendship between India and Egypt 

(April 6, 1955) 736 

343. Discussions between the United States, Britain, Egypt and the 

World Bank Concerning the Financing of the Aswan High 

Dam Project 

(December 17, 1955) 737 

344. Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation between 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Egypt 
(January 29, 1956) 73& 

345. U.S. Government's Statement Withdrawing Support for the Aswan 

High Dam Project 

(July 19, 1956) 742 

346. President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's Speech on the Occasion of the 

Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company 

(Alexandria, July 26, 1956) 74^ 

347. Egyptian Law Nationalizing the Suez Canal Company 

(July 26, 1956) 77i 

348. Tripartite (U.S. - French - British) Statement on the Suez Canal 

(London, August 2, 1956) 773 

349. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Statement on the Suez Canal Issue 

in the (August 8, 1956) 774 



XXXI 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

350. Soviet Government Proposals for the London Talks on the 

Suez Canal Issue 

(August 9, 1956) 7?8 

351. President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasi's Statement Rejecting Invitaion to the 

London Conference 

(August 12, 1956) 783 

352. U.S. Secretary of States John Foster Dulles's Proposals on the Suez 

Canal, as Approved by 18 States 

(August 23, 1956) 787 

353. Letter From President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir to the Chairman of the 

Suez Committee 

(September 9, 1956) 789 

354. Egyptian Note on the Suez Dispute Delivered to the United Nations 

(September 10, 1956) 793 

355. Statement and Declaration Issued at Close of the Second London 

Conference 

(September 21, 1956) 795 

356. Resolutions Adopted by the Council of the Suez Canal Users' 

Association : Resolution on the Organization of the Suez Canal 

Users* Association 

(October 4, 1956) 796 

357. Indian Proposals on the Suez Canal Dispute Made Public on 

(October 24, 1956) 799 

358. Anglo-French Ultimatum to the Governments of Egypt and Israel 

(October 30, 1956) 801 

359. U.N. Security Council Draft Resolution Moved by the United States 

(October 30, 1956) 801 

360. Address by President D wight Eisenhower on Eastern Europe and the 

Middle East 

(October 31, 1956) 802 

361. Exchange of Notes between the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations and the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Concerning the Suez Canal 

(October 24, and November 2, 1956) 804 

362. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 2, 1956, Following 

the British-French-Israeli Aggression against Egypt . . . . 807 

363. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 4, 1956, Ordering 

the Cease-Fire Order of November 2, 1956 808 

364. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 4, 1956, 

Requesting Plan for U.N. Force 809 

365. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 5, 1956, 

Establishing U.N. Command 809 

366. Note from Premier Nikolai Bulganin to Prime Minister David 

Ben-Gurion 

(Novembers, 1956) 810 

367. Note from Premier Nikolai Bulganin to Prime Minister Anthony Eden 

(Novembers, 1956) 811 

368. Note from Premier Nilolai Bulganin to Premier Guy Mollet 

(November 5, 1956) 812 

369. Letter from Premier Nikolai Bulganin to President Dwight 

Eisenhower 

xxxii 



List of Documents 

(November 5, 1956) 813 

370. Letter from President Dwight Eisenhower to Prime Minister 

David Ben Gurion 

(November 7, 1956) 815 

371. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 7, 1956, Calling 

for Withdrawal of Israeli, British and French Forces.. .. 816 

372. Note from Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to Premier Nikolai 

Bulganin 

(November 8, 1956) 816 

373. Letter From Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to President Eisenhower 

(November 8, 1956) 817 

374. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 10, 1956, 

Referring Middle East Question to nth General 

Assembly 818 

375. Communiqufc by the Arab Kings and Presidents on the Suez Canal Crisis 

(November 15, 1956) 818 

376. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 24, 1956, Reiterating 

the Call to Britain, France and Israel to Withdraw Their 

Forces from Egypt 820 

377. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of November 24, 1956, 

Approving the Basis for Presence of Emergency Force in 
Egypt and Authorizing U.N. Secretary- General to Proceed with 
Clearance of Suez Canal 821 

378. Egyptian Law No. I of 1957 Abrogating the 1954 Agreement with the 

United Kingdom 

(January i, 1957) 821 

379. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of January 19, 1957 Requesting 

U.N. Secretary- General to Secure Complete 

Withdrawal of Israeli Forces 822 

380. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of February 2, 1957, Deploring 

Israel's 

Failure to Complete Withdrawal 823 

381. U.N. General Assembly Resolution of February 2, 1957 

Concerning Withdrawal 823 

382. Egyptian Declaration of April 24, 1957, Concerning the 

Suez Canal 824 

383. London Communique of May 9, 1957, Issued by the Council of the 

Suez Canal Users' Association 827 

H. (II) UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC : 1958 TO DATE 

384. General Conditions of Rendering Technical Assistance, Provided for in 

the Agreement of the Economic and Technical Co-operation 

between the Republic of Egypt and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics 

(January 29, 1958) 827 

385. United Arab Republic and Suez Stockolders' Agreement on 

Compensation Terms 

(April 29, 1958) 835 

386. Agreement between the Government of the U.A.R. and the 

Compagnie Financier e de Suez, Including Annexes 4, 5 and 12 
(Geneva, July 14, 1958) 838 



XXXlll 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

387. Financial Agreements between the U.A.R. and France, Including Annexes 

(Zurich, August 22, 1958) 851 

388. Financial Agreements between the U.A.R. and the United 

Kingdom, Including Annexes 

(February 28, 1959) 868 

I. YAMAN 885 

389. Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation between His Majesty 

in Respect of the United Kingdom and of India, and the 

King of the Yaman (with Exchange of Notes) 

(San c a, February n, 1934) 885 

390. Agreement between the United States and Yaman 

(San c a, May 4, 1946) 887 

391. Exchange of Notes Regarding Relations between the Government 

of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 

and the Government of the Yaman 

(London, January 20, 1951) 889 

X. POSITIVE NEUTRALITY 893 

392. Communique on the Talks between Prime Minister Jawaharlal 

Nehru and President Jamal 'Abd-an-Nasir 

(February 16, 1955) 895 

393. Final Communique of the Bandung Conference 

(April 24, 1955) 895 

394. Joint Statement by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President 

Jamal c Abd an-Nasir 

(July 12, 1955) 901 

395. President Jamal *Abd an-Nasir' s Statement on the Egyptian Agreement 

with Czechoslovakia for the Purchase of Arms 

(September 27, 1955) 903 

396. Tass Statement on the Sale of Arms from the Communist Bloc to Egypt 

(October 3, 1955) . . . . 907 

397. The Brioni Conference: Joint Statement by Presidents Josip Broz 

Tito, and Jamal c Abd an-Nasir and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
(July 19, 1956) 907 

398. President Dwight Eisenhower's Message to Congress Requesting 

Authorization for U.S. Economic Programme of Economic 

and Political Assistance in the Middle East 

(Eisenhower Doctrine) 

(January 5, 1957) 909 

399. U.S. Congressional Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in 

the Middle East 

(January-March, 1957) 9 J 5 

400. King Husayn's Letter to His Prime Minister, Sulayman an-Nabulsi 

Concerning the Dangers of Communism 

(January 31, 1957) 916 

401. U.S. Saudi Arabian Joint Communique, Following King Sa'ud's 

Visit to the United States 

(February 8, 1957) 9*9 



XXXIV 



List of Documents 

402. Statement by Arab Heads of State on Positive Neutrality, Egypt and 

the Suez Canal, Palestine, Yaman, and Algeria : King Sa'ud, 
King Husayn, President al-Quwwatli, President 'Abd an-Nasir 
(February 27, 1957) 921 

403. U.S. Lebanese Joint Communique Regarding Ambassador James 

P. Richards's Mission to the Middle East 

(Beirut, Lebanon, March 16, 1957) 922 

404. U.S. Libyan Joint Communique 

(Tripoli, Libya, March 20, 1957) 923 

405. U.S. Iraqi Joint Communique 

(Baghdad, Iraq, April 8, 1957) 924 

406. U.S. Saudi Arabian Joint Communique 

(Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April n, 1957) 925 

407. Ambassador James P. Richards's Statement at San'a, Yaman 

(April 15, 1957) 925 

408. U.S. Sudanese Joint Communique 

(Khartoum, Sudan, April 22, 1957) 925 

409. U.S. Libyan Joint Communique 

(Tripoli, Libya, May 4, 1957) 926 

410. U.S. Tunisian Joint Communique 

(Tunis, Tunisia, May 6, 1957) 926 

411. U.S. Moroccan Joint Communique 

(Rabat, Morocco, May 8, 1957) 927 

412. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir at a Luncheon Given in His 

Honour by Premier Nikita Khruschev at the Kremlin, Moscow 
(April 30, 1958) 927 

413. Khrushchev c Abd an-Nasir: Joint Communique 

(May 15, 1958) 929 

414. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasii at the Presidency, Cairo, 

on the Day of His Return from Moscow 

(May 16, 1958) 931 

415. Speech by President J. 'Abd an-Nasir in Damascus Following His 

Return from Moscow 

(July 18, 1958) 939 

416. Tito c Abd an-Nasir: Joint Communique 

(February 28, 1959) 943 

417. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir in Damascus 

(March n, 1959) 946 

418. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir in Damascus 

(March 12, 1959) 948 

419. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir in Damascus 

(March 13, 1959) 951 

420. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir in Damascus 

(March 15, 1959) 956 

42 1 . Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir in Damascus 

(March 20, 1959) 963 

422. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir, Addressed to U.A.R. 

Citizens and Several Lebanese and Other Arab Delegations 

(March 22, 1959) 966 



XXXV 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

423. Speech by President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir at the Officers' Club , Cairo 

(April 25, 1959) 975 

424. King Husayn's Speech at the U.N. General Assembly 

(New York, September 4, 1960) 982 

425. President Jamal c Abd an-Nasir's Speech at the U.N. General 

Assembly New York 

(September 27, 1960) 987 



XXXVI 



I 



Arab Unity: Miscellaneous 
Projects 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

Memorandum Presented to the King-Crane 
Commission by the General Syrian Congress 

July 2, 1919 (i) 

We the undersigned members of the General Syrian Congress, meeting 
in Damascus on Wednesday, July 2nd, 1919, made up of representatives from 
the three Zones, viz., the Southern, Eastern, and Western, provided with 
credentials and authorizations by the inhabitants of our various districts, 
Moslems, Christians, and Jews, have agreed upon the following statement 
of the desires of the people of the country who have elected us to present 
them to the American Section of the International Commission; the fifth 
article was passed by a very large majority; all the other articles were accepted 
unanimously. 

1. We ask absolutely complete political independence for Syria within these 
boundaries : the Taurus System on the North; Rafah and a line running 
from Al Jauf to the south of the Syrian and the Hejazian line to Akaba on the 
south; the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers and a line extending east of Abu 
Kamal to the east of Al Jauf on the east; and the Mediterranean on the west. 

2. We ask that the Government of this Syrian country should be a democratic 
civil constitutional Monarchy on broad decentralization principles, safeguard- 
ing the rights of minorities, and that the King be the Emir Feisal, who carried 
on a glorious struggle in the cause of our liberation and merited our full 
confidence and entire reliance. 

3. Considering the fact that the Arabs inhabiting the Syrian area are not 
naturally less gifted than other more advanced races and that they are by no 
means less developed than the Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Roumanians 
at the beginning of their independence, we protest against Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, placing us among the nations in their 
middle stage of development which stand in need of a mandatory power. 

4. In the event of the rejection by the Peace Conference of this just protest 
for certain considerations that we may not understand, we, relying on the 
declarations of President Wilson that his object in waging war was to put an 
end to the ambition of conquest and colonization, can only regard the mandate 
mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as equivalent to the 
rendering of economical and technical assistance that does not prejudice our 
complete independence. And desiring that our country should not fall a prey 
to colonization is farthest from any thought of colonization and has no poli- 
tical ambition in our country, we will seek the technical and economical 
assistance from the United States of America, provided that such assistance 
does not exceed 20 years. 

5. In the event of America not finding herself in a position to accept our 
desire for assistance, we will seek this assistance from Great Britain, also pro- 
vided that such assistance does not infringe the complete independence and 
unity of our country and that the duration of such assistance does not exceed 
that mentioned in the previous article. 



(i) The text is copied from Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Con- 
ference, 1919, vol. I2 y pp. 780-781. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

6. We do not acknowledge any right claimed by the French Government in 
any part whatever of our Syrian country and refuse that she should assist us 
or have a hand in our country under any circumstances and in any place. 

7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish common- 
wealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist 
migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title 
but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, 
and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common 
rights and assume the common responsibilities. 

8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria, 
known as Palestine, nor of the littoral western zone, which includes Lebanon, 
from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be 
guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances. 

9. We ask complete independence for emancipated Mesopotamia and that 
there should be no economical barriers between the two countries. 

10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condem- 
nation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any 
treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any 
private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern 
part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions 
and agreements. 

The noble principles enunciated by President Wilson strengthen our 
confidence that our desires emanating from the depths of our hearts, shaJl be 
the decisive factor in determining our future; and that President Wilson and 
the free American people will be our supporters for the realization of our hopes 
thereby proving their sincerity and noble sympathy with the aspiration of 
the weaker nations in general and our Arab people in particular. 

We also have the fullest confidence that the Peace Conference will realize 
that we would not have risen against the Turks, with whom we had par- 
ticipated in all civil, political, and representative privileges, but for their 
violation of our national rights, and so will grant us our desires in full in order 
that our political rights may not be less after the war than they were before, 
since we have shed so much blood in the cause of our liberty and independence. 
We request to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at the Peace 
Conference to defend our rights and secure the realization of our aspirations. 

2 Resolution Adopted by the General Syrian Congress 

Damascus , March 7, 1920 (i) 

The General Syrian Congress, which is fully representative of the Syrian people 
in their three territories, namely, the interior, the coastal region, and the southern 

(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan- 
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947)* pp. 6-9. Attention is drawn to the fact 
that this Resolution will be frequently referred to in some of the Jordanian Government's 
documents reproduced in this volume as the "National Syrian Covenant". The reader 
should also note that the name "Syria", as used in this document, and also in some of the 
Jordanian documents dealing with the question of Syrian unity (reproduced in this 
volume) , is meant to include Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, in addition to "Syria" 
as it existed between 1922 and 1958. ED. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



region - Palestine, adopts the following resolution at its plenary session held on 
Sunday, Jamadi ath-Thani 16, 1338 A.H., and in the evening of the following Mon- 
day 3 corresponding to March 7, 1920 (A. D.): 

The political societies and parties of the Arab nation, with its ancient glory and 
flourishing civilization, did not, during the Turkish period, take up the political 
struggle and shed the blood of its freedom-loving martyrs in revolt against the Turk- 
ish Government, save in order to seek complete independence and a life of freedom. 
This (the Arab nation did) as a nation with an independent existence and with a 
nationalism of its own, with the right to govern itself, like other peoples whose civili- 
zation and progress are not in advance of its own. 

(The Arab nation) took part in the World War on the side of the Allies, relying on 
the general and specific promises which they had openly declared in their official 
councils and through their political leaders and heads of governments, and especially 
their specific pledges to His Majesty, King Husayn, concerning the independence of 
the Arab countries. 

(The Arab nation took part in the War) also on the strength of President Wilson's 
open declaration of the noble principles calling for the freedom and the independence 
of peoples, large and small, on a footing of equality in rights, the ending of the policy 
of conquest and colonization, the abolition of secret treaties which are prejudicial to 
the rights of nations, and the granting of the right of self-determination to the libera- 
ted peoples. (All) this was officially approved by the Allies, as (is evidenced) by the 
statements of M. Briand, the French Prime Minister, before the (French) Chamber 
of Deputies on November 3, 1916; by (the statement) of Lord Grey, the Foreign 
Secretary of Great Britain, before the Foreign Affairs Committee on November 23, 
1916 ; by the declaration of the Allies in their reply to the Memorandum of the Central 
Powers, submitted by M. Briand through the American Ambassador in Paris ; by the 
Allies' reply of January 10, 1917, to the Memorandum of President Wilson; by the 
statement of the French Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 1917; by the statement of 
the (French) Senate on the 6th of the same month ; and by the speech delivered by 
Mr. Lloyd George in Glasgow on (July) 29, 1917. 

The exploits of His Majesty King Husayn on the side of the Allies were the major 
incentive to liberate the Arab nation and save it from the yoke of Turkish rule; these 
(exploits) have immortalized for His Majesty the best and finest repute in Arab history. 

His noble sons and the Arab nation fought most courageously on the side of the 
Allies for three years in the course of which they fought a regular war for which they 
received credit, as attested by the prominent political and military leaders of the Allies 
themselves and of the rest of the civilized world. 

A great number of the sons of the (Arab) nation who joined the Arab movement 
from the (various) parts of Syria, the Hijaz and Iraq sacrificed their lives. (This was) 
in addition to the actions carried out in particular by the Syrians in their country - 
actions which facilitated the victory of the Allies and the Arabs in spite of the persecu- 
tions, tortures, slaughter and exile which (the Syrians) had suffered. These actions 
greatly contributed to the defeat of the Turks, their evacuation of Syria, and the 
brilliant victory of the Allies' cause. (The victory) realized the hopes of the Arabs in 
general and (those) of the Syrians among them in particular. They thus hoisted the 
Arab flags and established national governments in the (various) parts of the country 
before the entry of the Allies into it. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

When military arrangements necessitated that Syria (i) be divided into three 
zones, the Allies officially declared that they had no ambitions over Syria, and that, in 
pursuing war in the (Middle) East, they aimed at nothing but the final liberation of 
peoples from Turkish rule. They also asserted that the division (of the country) into 
zones was only a temporary military measure which had no effect on the future of the 
country, its independence or unity. They then officially decided (to embody this as) 
Article 22, clause i, of the Peace Treaty with Germany, whereby they recognized our 
independence in confirmation of their promise to grant the right of self-determination 
to peoples. Later they sent the American Commission (2) in order to learn the wishes 
of the people, which wishes were made manifest in the demand for independence and 
complete Syrian unity. Nearly one year and a half has (now) elapsed and the country 
is still subjected to military occupation and division which have caused it great losses, 
hampered its business and its economic and administrative interests, and caused its 
sons to harbour misgivings about its future. The people have thus been prompted, in 
many territories, to start national uprisings, protesting against foreign military rule 
and demanding the independence and the unity of their country. 

Therefore, we, members of this Congress, in our capacity as representatives 
of the Syrian people throughout the whole of Syria, speaking in the name of the 
Syrian nation and openly expressing its wishes, have found it necessary to find a way 
out of this critical situation. (This we have decided to do) relying on our natural and 
legitimate right to a life of freedom; on the blood shed by our martyrs; on our long 
struggle for this sacred aim; on the promises, pledges and noble principles previously 
referred to ; and on what was and still is being daily witnessed by us of the nation's 
firm determination to demand its rights and unity and to attain these by all means. 

We therefore unanimously declare the following: 

(1) The complete and unblemished independence of our Syrian country in its 
natural boundaries - including Palestine - on the basis of a civil representa- 
tive (system of government); 

(2) The safeguarding of the rights of the (non-Arab) minority; 

(3) The repudiation of the Jewish allegations (purporting) to make Palestine a 
national home for the Jews or a place to which they would migrate; 

(4) We have chosen His Highness Amir Fay sal, the son of His Majesty King 
Husayn, who has pursued his struggle for the liberation of the country and 
made the nation find in him its great leader, as the constitutional King of Syria 
under the title of cc His Majesty King Faysal the First"; 

(5) We have declared the end of the present governments of military occupation in 
the three regions, provided that there should be established in their stead a 
monarchy with a representative government which shall be responsible to 
this Council^) in all matters concerning the principle of complete independ- 
ence of the country until the government shall be able to convene its parlia- 
ment; 

(6) It remains understood that these districts (4) shall be governed according to 
the system of decentralized administration, with due regard to the national 



(1) The Arabic term used here is cc al-Bilad as-Suriyya ", literally meaning the "Syrian 
homeland". ED. 

(2) Presumably referring here to the King-Crane Commission. ED. 

(3) Presumably meaning the Syrian General Congress itself. ED. 

(4) The Arabic term used here is "al-Muqata'at". ED. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



aspirations of the Lebanese regarding the administration of the districts of 
Lebanon within the boundaries known before the general (World) War and on 
condition that (Lebanon) shall remain beyond any foreign influence. 

In view of (the fact) that the Arab Revolt was started in order to liberate the 
Arab people from the rule of the Turks , and since the reasons which serve as 
bases for the independence of Syria are the same as those which serve as bases 
for the independence of Iraq, and as there exist between the two countries 
such linguistic, historical, economic, geographical and racial bonds as to render 
each of the two countries indispensable to the other. 

We therefore demand the complete independence of Iraq, provided that 
there shall be formed a political and economic federation between the two 
sister countries. 

(Finally), we (declare), in the name of the Syrian nation that has designated 
us to act for it, that we will maintain our friendly (relations) with the noble 
Allies and fully respect their interests as well as those of the other States. We 
have full confidence that the noble Allies as well as all the other civilized States 
will meet our present action, which is based on (our) legitimate and natural 
right to live, with the noble purpose and honourable intentions we are wont to 
find in them, and that they will recognize this independence. (We also trust) 
that they will withdraw their forces from the Arab and southern territories, 
so that the national soldiers and the national administration may maintain 
order and administer (the country), maintaining at the same time reciprocal 
(friendship with the Allies). In this way, the Syrian Arab nation will reach a 
high degree of progress and become an active member of the civilized world. 
The Syrian Government which will be formed on the (above) basis shall put 
this resolution into effect. 



Statement by the Arab National Congress, Jerusalem 

December 13, 1931 (i) 

All those who have taken part in, or followed the course of, the various phases of 
the Arab movement realize what noble efforts have for long been exerted by the 
Arab leaders, thinkers and young men, particularly after the promulgation of the 
Ottoman Constitution, in order to reconstruct a general Arab cause aiming at the 
realization of an independent Arab entity that comprises the various Arab countries, 
and to achieve for the Arab nation the independence enjoyed by all free nations of 
the world. The political struggle of the Arabs had a sacred objective, the effects of 
which were reflected in the activities of the societies and clubs, and the congresses 
which they used to hold. Then came the great Arab Revolt during which the Arabs 
were promised the achievement of their noble purpose. For this sacred cause of 
independence the Arabs, during the Great World War, gave (much) precious blood 
and (made many) costly sacrifices. 



( i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in M. 'Izzat 
Darwaza: Hawl al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha (Concerning the Modern 
Arab Movement)) vol. 3 (Sidon, Lebanon, )jp5/, pp. 301-303. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

However, as soon as the War was over, the Arabs began to encounter, on the 
part of the colonial ambitions of states, denial of their rights and of their struggle, 
as well as ingratitude for their sacrifices. They beheld their (erstwhile) allies viciously 
placing obstacles in their way to independence. The outcome of this was that the 
Allies openly came out with their plots, when before they had secretly engineered 
them in order to dismember the Arab homeland and to stab the Arab cause, itself 
one of the greatest national causes in the world, representing one of the greatest 
nations on earth, (famous for its) glories, civilization and history - a nation comprising 
today no less than 70 million people and situated in the world's most favoured regions 
of Asia and Africa. 

One of the features of this infamous plot, and also one of the means of ensuring 
its success, was the separation of the inhabitants of each Arab country from their 
brethren in the others by (encouraging their preoccupation) with artificial regional is- 
sues, diminutive local problems and diverse tribulations. (The aim of this) was to 
limit the scope of (Arab) efforts and prevent these efforts from extending to wider 
horizons, to a level at which the (various) Arab problems could converge in a closely 
knit and integrated form, in line with the natural course of the renascence of nations 
and the progress of peoples. 

These contrived preoccupations consumed the time of the citizens of each 
country. In fact, every faction amongst the Arabs was immersed in them ; so much so 
that the imperialists almost achieved the object of their conspiracies, that of making 
the Arabs divided and without a great cause. (But the Arabs have a cause) for which 
their leaders and their societies have worked and for which (they have made) sacrifices 
and lost martyrs. The primary object of (this cause) is to achieve the unity and inde- 
pendence of the Arabs, and so revive their ancient prosperous civilization, a civili- 
zation whose constructive accomplishment is well known in history and to which the 
world succumbed, and which filled the whole universe with knowledge, prosperity 
and enlightenment. 

This is what led some Arab leaders, well known for their contributions to the 
Arab movement, to invite a number of the representatives of the Arab countries, who 
had attended the General Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem, to a conference which 
they held on Monday evening, Sha'ban 4, 1350 A.H., corresponding to January 13, 

1931- 

They discussed what should be done to guard against the imperialistic catast- 
rophes which had befallen their countries and the local problems with which the im- 
perialists had flooded them. 

They adopted the following points as a sacred covenant, which shall be the 
objective of the Arabs, in their various countries, and the target and goal of their 
efforts, as well as the torch by (whose light) they will resume their struggle for 
(their) cherished independence. They will follow the principles of (this covenant) so 
that God may help them attain (their) objective and fully realize their wishes. The 
text of the covenant is as follows: 

Article i. The Arab countries constitute an indivisible unit; the (Arab) nation 
does not acquiesce in any sense to the fragmentation which it has been undergoing. 

Article 2. The efforts of all the Arab countries shall be directed towards one 
objective, namely their complete independence and unity, and the combatting of every 
idea which aims at restricting (Arab) efforts to local and provincial policies. 

Article 3. As imperialism, in all its forms and types, is diametrically opposed to 
the dignity and great objective of the Arab nation, the Arab nation will reject it and 
resist it with all its might. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



The conference has also considered it necessary to convene a general Arab 
conference, (to be held) in one of the Arab capitals, for the purpose of discussing the 
means of publicizing and maintaining the covenant, as well as the course that should 
be followed for its fulfilment. 

We, the undersigned, have been deputed (to act) as an executive committee for 
publicizing this covenant in the Arab world, and for making preparations, for the 
conference, as well as to act as a liaison for correspondence between the various Arab 
countries on matters relating to this task. 

We have started this task, with the assistance of God Almighty, motivated by 
that living and generous spirit which manifested itself at (our recent) important meet- 
ing, and which appears time and again in the (various Arab) countries. This spirit 
has ever strongly and violently protested against the imperialist despotism, which has 
oppressed and exhausted the Arabs, torn down their solidarity by artificially - created 
local problems, and obstructed their progressive efforts towards the attainment of 
success for (the Arab) cause in accordance with this covenant. 

May God give support to our purpose. 

Signed by : 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Khayr ad-Din az-Zirikli, Subhi al-Khadra, 
'Ajaj Nuwayhid, As'ad Daghir, 'Izzat Darwaza - as members of the Executive 
Committee of the Congress. 

It has also been signed by : Rashid Rida, Muhammad Bahjat al-Athari, Ibrahim 
al-Wa'iz, Khayr ad-Din az-Zirikli, Subhi al-Khadra, Ibrahim al-Khatib, 'Ali 'Ubayd, 
Muhammad Ishaq Darwish, 'AH Nasir ad-Din, Salah 'Uthman Bayhum, Muhammad 
al-'Afifi, Riyad as-Sulh, Shukri al-Quwwatly, Raghib Abu as-Sa J ud ad-Dajani, 
Ahmad Hilmi, Salim al-Hindawi 'Izzat Darwaza, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Muhammad 
Tahir al-Juqqa, 'Umar at-Tibi, Muhammad 'Ali Bayhum, Mu'in al-Madi, Nabih al- 
'Azma, Salih al-'Awran, Mustafa al-Ghalayini, Husayn at-Tarawna, Ahmad al-Imam, 
Muhammad 'Ali at-Tahir, 'Awni al-Ka'ki, 'Ajaj Nuwayhid, 'Abdullah ad-Dawud, 
Muhammad Tariq, Khalil at-Talhuni, Sami as-Sarraj, Muhammad Bannuna, Sa'id 
Thabit, Bashir as-Sa'dawi, Sulayman as-Sudi, Muhammad Husayn ad-Dabbagh al- 
Makki, Kamil ad-Dajani. 



Nuri As-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent Project A 

1943 (i) T" 

The following proposals of mine are based on the close and firm ties between 
Iraq and all the Arabs inhabiting historical Syria. The States of the Arabian Peninsula 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text which forms part of the 
Memorandum submitted by Nuri as-Sa'id at the beginning of 1943 to Mr. R.G. Casey , 
British Minister of State in the Middle East (Cairo). This Memorandum was entitled) in 
part) Istiqlal al-'Arab wa Wahdatuhum: Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyya al-'Arabiyya 
(Arab Independence and Unity: Memorandum on the Arab Cause)) printed by the 
Government Press, Baghdad, 1943. The part translated above occurs on pp. 19-22 of 
this Memorandum and follows a somewhat lengthy exposition (15 pages) of political condi- 
tions in the Arab countries since the latter part of the Ottoman era) as well as their rela- 
tions with Britain and France since the First World War. ED. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



have an economic system which differs from our own, though they are very close to us 
in respect of language, customs and religion. On the other hand, Egypt has a bigger 
population than that of backward (i) States. It also has its (own) problems in the 
Sudan and elsewhere. Because of this, I have assumed that these States are not in- 
clined to join an Arab federation (2) or an Arab League from the start (3). But 
if the union (ittihad) of Iraq and Syria does materialize, it may then be very likely that 
these States mentioned (4) may in the course of time show their desire to join this uni- 
on. But I expect that this union - even if confined to Iraq and Syria - will at the very 
beginning lead to the facilitation of joint consultation among all the Arab States and to 
all these States acting in concert, whether they are inside the union or outside it. For 
many of our problems are common, and we all belong to one civilization; thus, we 
generally have the same (way of) thinking and are moved by the same ideals, namely, 
the principles of freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, equality before the 
law, and the fundamental human brotherhood. 

Conclusion 

In my view, the only equitable solution indeed, the only hope of securing 
permanent peace, reassurance and progress in these Arab areas, is for the United Nat- 
ions to declare now the following: 

(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans Jordan be reunited into one State. 

(2) That the inhabitants of this State themselves shall decide upon the type 
of government to be adopted by this State, whether monarchal, republican, unitary 
or federal. 

(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria shall 
adhere at once, provided that the other Arab States are permitted to adhere to it 
whenever they please. 

(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the 
States Members of this League and presided over by one of the heads of States, who 
shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned. 

(5) That the Council of the Arab League shall be responsible for the following 
matters: 

(a) Defence 

(b) Foreign Affairs 

(c) Currency 

(d) Communications 

(e) Customs 

(f ) Protection of Minority Rights 

(g) Education. 

(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be granted a semi-autonomous administration in 
the area wherein they form a majority. They shall also be given the right to their 



(1) The Arabic word used here is cc al - mustakhlifa", which is probably meant to be 
"al-Mutakhallifa", literally meaning "backward, underdeveloped etc" On this basis, 
the phrase above may have beenmeant to refer to Egypt as one of the most densely popu- 
lated "backward countries." ED. 

(2) The Arabic term used here is "Ittihad" which can also be translated as "Union". ED. 

(3) The Arabic term used here is " 'Usba". ED. 

(4) That is, those of the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, and the Sudan. ED. 



10 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



own rural and urban administration, including schools, health institutions and police, 
provided that these health institutions and police shall be under the general super- 
vision of the Syrian State. 

(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all faiths shall have free access 
for the purpose of pilgrimage or worship. A special commission composed of the 
representatives of the three prevailing religions shall be set up to ensure this. 

(8) That the Maronites in Lebanon shall, if they so desire, be granted a privileged 
administration such as the one they enjoyed during the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire. This special administration, like those to be set up in accordance with 
paragraphs (6) and (7), above, shall rest on an international guarantee. 

Should it be possible, as is (proposed) above, to create a Confederation of the 
Arab States, comprising Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan at the beginning, 
to which the other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties 
faced by Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past twenty years will 
disappear. 

We see that the Arabs of Palestine are at present afraid that they may become a 
minority in a Jewish State. For this, we see that they are strongly opposed to granting 
special rights to the Jews. This hostility will, however, diminish if Palestine becomes 
part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews can establish their national home in those 
parts of Palestine where they are now a majority. They will, thus, feel more reassured 
as to their safety, since their Arab neighbours will show good will towards them, and, 
in addition, their economic opportunities will increase when they become a semi- 
autonomous religious community(i) in a much larger State than they had hoped for. 

The British Empire is not founded on negative bases, but on positive ideals. 
Free institutions and free co-operation will give it greater life and vigour. On the 
basis of this free co-operation a real union comprising many diverse peoples and 
countries has been established. This union depends on noble and firm principles 
which are inscribed in the heart and conscience of Man. If the Arab peoples are 
given the opportunity to establish such a free co-operation among themselves, they 
will then be able to deal tolerantly (2) with all the Jews living in their midst, whether 
these Jews are in Palestine or in (any) other country. Admittedly, conditions must 
be made and guarantees secured. But these conditions and guarantees must be 
practicable, lest they should become a dead letter, as has been the case with many 
provisions concerning minorities in European countries during the past twenty years. 

Should these proposals meet with approval they will require meticulous study 
until it becomes possible to take the appropriate measures at the suitable time and 
in the right order. Naturally enough, the union of the various parts of historical 
Syria must first be effected. On the one hand, this union may at the beginning (take 
the form of) a federation comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, 
provided that each Member State (3) continues to manage its own internal affairs, 
leaving defence, foreign affairs, currency and customs to the Central Government. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to unite Syria at once and at the same time to 
make whatever provisions may be necessary for the Jewish enclaves and the adminis- 



(1) The Arabic term used here is "ta'ifa". ED. 

(2) The Arabic word used in this connection is u at-tasahul". ED. 
C?) The Arabic term used here is "Duwayla", i.e. "small State". ED. 



II 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

tration of the City of Jerusalem. Measures should be taken at once to fix the bound- 
aries of these enclaves. This will necessitate the drawing up of an accurate ethno- 
graphical map of Palestine, which will show the number of Arabs and Jews in each 
district (/) and town, as also the drawing up of another map on the same scale as that 
of the (first) map, which will show the lands under cultivation as well as the lands 
which can be intensely cultivated in the future. In addition, an inquiry should be 
made into the number of Jews who have settled (in Palestine) since the outbreak of 
war in September 1939. 

The achievement of unity may necessitate sacrificing the rights of sovereignty 
and the traditional interests. The British Dominions have made similar sacrifices. 
It is also possible to require the Arab leaders to make sacrifices like these. 

I have throughout this Memorandum presumed that, as France declared before 
the War that she was willing to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon, she will not 
be given the chance to repudiate her undertaking, nor to place obstacles in the way of 
every union that may be created for the Arab countries by insisting on retaining old 
privileges and antiquated rights. 



Political Memorandum Concerning the Settlement of the Arab 
Question in General and the Syrian Question in Particular, Sub- 
mitted to Amir 'Abdullah by a Number of Trans Jordanian Dignitaries 

Amman, March 6, 1943 (2) 

SUBJECT : SYRIAN UNITY AND THE ARAB FEDERATION 

In accordance with Great Britain's previous and subsequent promises to the 
Arabs, 

And in view of the inability of the lawful French Government to carry out its 
temporary mandate on behalf of the League of Nations in Syria, and the ipso facto 
termination of this mandate by the loss of its legal character, 

And considering Syria's possession of a legally-acquired independence and a 
legitimate constitution, 

And with reference to the recent declaration of the British Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Anthony Eden, regarding Arab unity, 

We believe that the above, and even the facilitation of the task of the Democracies 
in the Near East, along with the reinforcement of the traditional Anglo- Arab friendship, 
and the maintenance of confidence and real stability in the Arab countries which have 
been liberated since the last war, necessitate the immediate implementation of one of 
the following two projects:- 



(1) The Arabic word used here is "Nahiya". ED. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor- 
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947} , pp. 64-70. The reader's 
attention is drawn here to the fact that in this document, as in the other documents in 
this section, the term cf lttihad" will be translated by "Federation", unless the context 
requires otherwise. ED. 



12 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

THE FIRST PROJECT 

A. The Syrian Unity Project "The Unified Syrian State", and the Arab Federation : 

1. The Allies should declare their support of the independence of Syria in its 
natural boundaries, and consider its national and geographic unity as the 
basis of its system of government; 

2. This declaration will, in fact, uphold the interests of the country and the 
wishes of the Syrian people, which they have expressed at the end of the 
last World War and on all occasions, as recorded by the American Plebis- 
cite Commission, namely, Mr. Crane's Commission, (i) Moreover, the Sy- 
rian Congress which was held in Damascus, representing all the regions of 
liberated Syria, namely, Northern Syria, Lebanon, Trans Jordan and Pa- 
lestine, also declared the above in (its) resolution of March 8, 1920, which 
was duly communicated to the (various) States and to the League of Nations. 
The (Syrian Congress) thus expressed in this historic resolution the real 
wishes of the Syrian people. It was that resolution which has since then be- 
come the National covenant of all Syrians. The present Syrian Government 
still considers the day on which it was proclaimed an official national day, 
and the flag which was designed (by that resolution) for Syriaas the same 
flag which (now) shelters the Government of Transjordan. 

3. The project of the Unified Syrian State consists of:- 

a) The recognition of an independent and sovereign Syrian State whose 
system of government shall be a constitutional monarchy. 

b) The Unified Syrian State shall comprise Northern Syria, Transjordan, 
Palestine and Lebanon. 

c) Both Palestine, in some of its districts, and ancient Lebanon shall each 
have, in accordance with the constitution, a special administration. In the 
case of the former, the rights of the Jewish minority and the special status 
of the Holy Places shall be duly safeguarded, while in the case of the 
latter due regard shall be paid to the national aspirations of the Lebanese. 

d) The Balfour Declaration shall be revoked for its inacceptance by the 
Arabs, who are the legitimate owners of the country. Otherwise, 
it shall be given a definitive interpretation which will dissipate 
the fears in the Arab and the Muslim worlds. Thus, the status quo, 
namely, a proportion of one third (Jews) to two thirds (Arabs), will be 
considered as adequate, and Jewish immigration will be absolutely 
prohibited. 

4. The Head of the Syrian State: 

His Highness Prince 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn shall be invited to become 
the head of the Syrian State, on the basis of the following legitimate con- 
siderations :- 

a) His established legitimate rights to the Jordanian Imara, (2) which 
is an important part of Greater Syria. 

b) His former and subsequent contribution of effective help to the Allies 
which help has covered the Syrian front in the present war. 

c) His being the first heir to the rights of his father, His Majesty the late 



(7) Referring here to the King-Crane Commission which visited Syria in the summer of 

79/9. See Doc. No. i. ED. 

(2) i.e. Princedom (from "Amir", meaning "Prince") . ED. 

13 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

King Husayn, in looking after the rights of the Arabs in general 
andthose of Syrians in particular. 

d) The promise made to him by the British Government, as far back as 
1 92 1 3 through its present Prime Minister, Mr. (Winston) Churchill, 
that he would head the Syrian State; also (in view of) the disappear- 
ance of all obstacles to the fulfilment of that promise after the collapse 
of France, which rendered (France's) legal mandate on behalf of the 
League of Nations inoperative, with Great Britain acquiring freedom 
of action in the various regions of Syria. 

e) The Syrians' wish to be ruled by a constitutional Monarchy in the 
event of the achievement of a general unity or of a central Federation 
(in the country). 

5 . The Arab Federation : 

Immediately after the proclamation of the establishment of the Unified 
Syrian State an Arab Federation shall be established. It shall consist of the 
States of Syria and Iraq (the Fertile Crescent) and shall have a co-ordinated 
(foreign) policy, defence, education, and national economy. Nothing shall 
prevent the other Arab States from joining this Federation, provided that 
the presidency of the Council of the Arab Federation be by rotation or, if 
necessary, entrusted to the Arab State which is largest (in terms of) wealth, 
influence and population. 

THE SECOND PROJECT 

B. A Concrete Project for the Establishment of a Syrian Federal State and an Arab Con- 
federation : 

Should the Unified Syrian State not be established immediately, it would not 
be impossible to proceed with the establishment of a Central Syrian Federation, 
namely, a Syrian Federal State, on the basis of the following principles. (These 
principles) have been laid down in the light of the real interests of the Syrian 
regions and with due regard to their present conditions, as well as to the real inter- 
ests of the Allies in so far as concerns the gaining of public confidence and the 
facilitation of the task of the defence of the Near East : 

1. A Central Syrian Federal State, comprising the Governments of Trans Jor- 
dan, Northern Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, shall be established in Syria, 
in its natural boundaries. Damascus shall be its capital. 

2. The Central Syrian Federation shall have competence over matters of def- 
ence, communications, national economy, foreign policy, education, and fed- 
eral justice. Each of the four regional governments shall retain its autono- 
my, except in such matters as may have become within the competence of 
the General Syrian Federal Government. 

3. The Syrian Federation shall have an "elected General Legislative Assem- 
bly", representing the federated regions ; the Prime Minister of the Federa- 
tion, as well as the members of the Federal Executive, shall be elected from 
(this Assembly), in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. 

4. The Syrian Federation shall be established by negotiation and agreement 
between the four regional Governents; the first step towards its realization 
shall be negotiation and an agreement between the Governments of Trans- 
jordan and Northern Syria. 

5 . The rules and the bases of the Federation shall be laid down in a draft federal 
constitution which shall be drawn up by a special committee representing 

14 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

the regions participating (in the Federation). The number of the members 
of (the Committee) and its powers shall be agreed upon (later). 

6. His Highness Prince 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn shall be designated head 
of the Syrian Federal State for the same reasons and considerations set out in 
clause 4 of the preceding project. The internal administration of Transjor- 
dan shall be entrusted to a deputy (acting on behalf) of His Highness. 

7. The draft constitution of the Syrian Federation shall be debated and appro- 
ved by the Representative Councils of the regional Governments sitting in 
(the form of a) Congress, or by a General National Assembly representing 
the regions of the Federation and elected for this purpose. 

8. The Federal Consitution shall be officially proclaimed and shall come into 
effect on the appointed date in accordance with the decrees concerned. 

9. In case of accession, later, by the Governments of Lebanon or Palestine to 
the Syrian Federation, or (their accession) on a confederate basis only, the 
conditions and the extent of such accession shall be separately approved by 
the Federal Legislative Assembly and by the regional Chamber of Deputies 
of the acceding State, and the coming into effect (of this accession) shall then 
be announced. 

10. Should the Government of Lebanon, for reasons of its own, fail to join the 
Central Syrian Federation, the Syrian territories which were incorporated 
into Lebanon against the wishes of (their) inhabitants shall be returned to 
Syria on the basis of a plebiscite. 

1 1 . Palestine's accession to the Syrian Federation and, consequently, to the Gen- 
eral Arab Confederation shall be conditional on the realization of the fol- 
lowing: 

a) A national constitutional government should be set up in Palestine in its 

present boundaries. 

b) The White Paper (/) shall continue to be provisionally effective, provid- 
ed that it should be replaced by a definitive official interpretation of the 
Balfour Declaration (2) by the British Government within a given per- 
iod. This interpretation should (be of such a nature as to) dissipate the fears 
of the Arab and Muslim worlds, by affirming the Palestine Arabs' na- 
tional and political rights to their own country, which they have inherited 
from their fathers and forefathers. The national status of (the Arabs) in 
Palestine should thus remain safeguarded and should not be undermined 
through any (further) Jewish immigration or any other measures. More- 
over, foreign Jewish immigration should be stopped forthwith, and the 
status quo, that is, the present proportion of one-third Jews to two- thirds 
Arabs a proportion brought about by a continuous foreign immigra- 
tion ever since the end of the last War, and the legitimacy of which has 
never been recognized by the Arabs - should be maintained. 

This Jewish proportion, which is accidental in Palestine and aganist 
the wishes of its Arab inhabitants, should be considered by the British 
Government an adequate justification for the claim that it has fulfilled 
its promise to the Jews. This is particularly so since (the British Gov- 
ernment) is, at the same time, committed to the Arabs by obligations 



(1) That 15, the British Government's White Paper of 1939* 

(2) See Doc. No. 226. ED. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

which conflict with the Balfour Declaration. And this, in addition to the es- 
tablished legitimate national rights of the Arabs to their inherited country. 

c) In the national administration of Palestine due regard shall be given to 
the special status of the Holy Places. 

d) The areas with a Jewish majority shall be granted a decentralized ad- 
ministration as an affirmation of the safeguarding of the rights of the 
Jewish minority. 

e) There shall be reciprocal beneficial economic co-operation between the 
General Arab Federation and the Jewish citizens of Palestine. 

f) The Arabs' recognition of these privileges to the Jewish minority in 
Palestine shall be conditional on the declaration of the responsible Jewish 
(Agency) of the Jewish final acceptance of this solution by notifying the 
British Government accordingly. 

12. In case the Palestine problem is not solved by the British on this basis, 
Palestine shall remain outside the Syrian Federation, and the Arabs, as a 
nation having a national covenant and legitimate national rights, shall contin- 
ue their non-recognition of the status quo in Palestine, and shall persist in 
demanding the revocation of the Balfour Declaration. (This is based on) the 
consideration that the Palestine problem is the main source of the poisoning 
of the relations between Britain (on the one hand) and the Arab and Muslim 
worlds (on the other), and that Palestine is not a place large enough to solve 
the problem of world Jewry. It is, indeed, in the opinion of Great Britain's 
friends, in the interest of all that the Palestine problem should be solved in 
the manner explained above. This is the most the Arabs can accept; suffice 
that it be in the interest of peace, stability and international justice in the 
present and in the future; in the same way it will put an end to dissension, 
suspicion, and the propaganda adverse to the Democracies in the Near East. 

13. Immediately upon the setting up of the Syrian Federal State, in accordance 
with the principles outlined in the previous clauses, the establishment of the 
Arab Confederation shall be proceeded with in accordance with the 
provisions of clause 5 of the first project. 



Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Prime 
Minister Tawfiq AbuP-Huda, Concerning the Question of Arab Unity 

August 24, 1943 (i) 

To our Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abu'1-Huda: 
Instruction regarding the question of Arab Unity 

1) His Excellency Nuri Pasha (as-Sa'id) has acquainted you with the necessary 
(points) which have been the basis of the talks between the Egyptian and the 
Iraqi Prime Ministers concerning (Arab) unity. 

2) What we have been informed of, in relation to what took place between their 
Excellencies, is the maximum possible within that sphere. 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian 
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) , pp. 101-103. See also Mudhakkirat al- 
Malik 'Abdullah (King Abdullah's Memoirs), in Arabic, Sao Paulo, Brazil>pp. 240-243. 



16 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

3) Transjordan is fully determined to support these laudable efforts. 

4) The late King Husayn meant by the Arab countries (i) those countries which 
are bounded, on the west, by the Egyptian frontiers, the Mediterranean 
and the Red Sea; on the north by the Turkish vilayets', on the east, by the 
Iranian frontiers, with the exception of the Principalities and Sultanes which 
have treaty relations with the Government of India, namely, (those of) the 
(then) Prince Ibn Sa'ud, the Prince of Bahrein, the Sultan of Muscat, and the 
Sultans of Hadramaut and Lahaj. As to the Ottoman Villayet of Yaman, the 
Mutasarrafiyya of 'Asir the Villayet of Hijaz and the Principality of Shammar- 
which is the Principality of ar-Rashid, with Ha'il as its centre - all these are 
within the "Arab countries" meant (by King Husayn). There remain outside 
only those Princes and Sultans who have, as mentioned, treaty relations with 
India, as well as the British Colony of Aden and the six Districts. 

5) The British reservations included the western coast of Syria, such as 
Mersine and Adana, and the late (King) agreed that these should not be con- 
sidered as purely Arab. 

6) Since both the coastal and the interior parts of Palestine and Syria were the 
object of the (Arab) Revolt, they constitute, therefore, the problem from which 
we should emerge either with total unity or with a confederation. In the form- 
er sense, it is to make of the whole (of these territories) a single government 
having the same character, in accordance with the two resolutions of the Syrian 
Congress of July 2, 1919, and of March 8, 1920, as communicated at the time 
by the Fay sal Government to the Governments concerned. In the latter sense, 
it is (to incorporate them into) a confederation which will maintain the regional 
governments as they are, and join them together in respect of matters which will 
be decided upon (later) in order to unite the various parts under one head. 

7) The Federation which is being worked for to-day, and which (primarily) 
depends upon Egypt and Iraq, will not be durable unless the Syrian territories 
- Greater Syria - are either united or federated. If the sovereignty of these 
territories remains incomplete under foreign mandates, or if (they remain) lo- 
cally disunited, their conformity (in policy) with Egypt and Iraq will be so 
weak and inconsistent that they will be unable to carry out their obligations in 
this respect. 

8) It is believed that, following the Atlantic Charter and as a result of what the 
present war has proved, Great Britain and the United Nations, as well as 
those who are with them, must have decided to rectify the mistakes of the last 
war and to build democracy on a sound basis. This (it is believed) will give 
the Eastern nations a status of independence, national honour, and readiness 
that will qualify them sufficiently to deserve being (considered) reliable 
for the maintenance of a comprehensive peace along the northern coast of 
Africa and the western coast of Palestine and Syria. It is therefore believed 
that if the question of unity is handled in a proper and co-ordinated manner 
by Iraq and Egypt, with an absolute insistence on either the unity of Syria or 
its federation, there would remain as far as Britain and America are concerned 
no difficulties to be met by those who are working for Arab unity. As for 
the French Mandate, France's present position in itself makes sure that it 



( /) Presumably referring here to the exchange of letters between (King) Husayn and Sir 
Henry Me Mahon in 19/5-1916. ED. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

will be impossible for her ever to undertake such a heavy burden again. The 
Arabs of Greater Syria are determined to attain their rights in their country, 
namely, independence and either unity or federation. This is a vital military 
necessity to Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt at the same time. 

9) As for the Palestine question, Great Britain has declared her policy with 
regard to it in the White Paper which she has not revoked to this day. There 
is no escape from the inclusion of Palestine in the federation or unity. This 
inclusion does not conflict with any solution proposed by any British com- 
mission sent for this (purpose), or by any Arab conference which has sub- 
mitted its proposals in this respect. It is possible to rely in this respect on the 
resolutions of the London Conference or on the resolutions of the Arab World 
Parliamentary Congress held in Egypt. 

As for Lebanon, there is no objection to leaving to her the choice between 
unity or federation with all these Arab countries, and to her maintaining the 
form and method (of government) she may choose; but (it should be under- 
stood that) the question of Great Lebanon(i) is among those Syrian rights 
which should not be neglected. 

As for the Sudan, it is at present, as is well-known, Anglo-Egyptian. 

As for North Africa, it is preferable that a way be found to come to an 
understanding with His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco and with His Highness 
the Bey of Tunisia. 

As for Libya(2) and Tripolitania, their question is to be (left) until due 
time. We are more than inclined to believe that Libya will have an Arab 
status. The question of Tripolitania is doubtful. 

As for Egypt, in spite of her being called so, she is one of the leading 
Arab countries. She is the land of Kinana(j), and has (with us) ancient re- 
lations and national bonds which (we) cannot disown, God forbid. The Arab 
countries, therefore, welcome with all their might unity with this dear state, 
and laud those who are working for it, especially (Egypt's) respected leader.(^) 

10) The Amir of Transjordan supports with all his power the efforts of Egypt 
and Iraq, and insists that Egypt and Iraq should work for the unity or fede- 
ration of Syria before any other Arab federation. Let, then, Your Excellency's 
discussions with His Excellency (the Egyptian Prime Minister) be conducted 
on this basis. We give you guidance by these instructions and leave to your 
known sagacity and wisdom any new (issues) that might come up (in 
the course of discussion). 

P.S. As for Najd, Hijaz and Yaman, I believe that these should not be urged 
with regard to (matters) which they may not find acceptable. Yet they 
should be kept informed of what is taking place, with the exception of 
those matters which Iraq, Egypt and those with them may consider 
as still being secret. 



(/) That is, "Grand Liban". ED. 

(2) By "Libya" here is presumably meant "Cyrenaica" (the province), since by definition 
Libya (the whole country) already includes Tripolitania. ED. 

(3) Kinana, in Arabic, means "quiver". A number of Arab historians and others refer to 
Egypt as "the land of Kinana", meaning thereby that Egypt is the most important coun- 
try for the defence of the Arab homeland. ED. 

(4) Mustafa an-Nahhas (Pasha). ED. 



18 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

Letter Addressed by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan to Mustafa- '7 

an-Nahhas, Egyptian Prime Minister 

August 14, 1944 d) 

To His Excellency Mustafa an-Nahhas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt: 

Your Excellency, 

'Abd al-Mun'im Bey ar-Rifa'i has returned with delightful and heart- 
warming news. This (indeed) is in keeping with what (we) have (always) expected 
and known of Your Excellency. God willing, the Jordanian Prime Minister will have 
the honour of attending (the meeting of) the Preparatory Committee of the (Arab) 
Unity Conference at the fixed time. 

I have thought it beneficial to communicate to Your Excellency my views 
concerning Palestine and its representation at the Conference. This is an exceedingly 
essential and serious matter, for I firmly believe that to leave out Palestine is to deny a 
right of hers which should not be neglected. It is for this reason that Your Excel- 
lency has always insisted on this representation and done the impossible to bring to 
the Arab Conference in London (2) those who did not attend. Now, however, I may 
say that, with the recent Zionist attempt against the departing (British) High Com- 
missioner, the danger constituted against Palestine by the Jews and their ambitions 
beyond Palestine has become fall the more) evident. In view of our close proximity 
(to Palestine), the Zionist movement threatens us here before any other country; 
hence the question of preserving the very existence and safety of Palestine is vital 
to Transjordan. 

We have thus instructed our Government, in a directive issued by us, to 
take the necessary (measures) to secure this noble aim, and to approach the British 
authorities and inform them that Palestine is the first line of defence to Transjordan 
and to the Arab countries lying behind it; that we shall take the necessary precautions 
for the safety of Palestine, especially when the Zionists have gone to the extent of 
attacking the Government, its centres, and its High Commissioner; and that, not- 
withstanding (all) this, the Arab nation will not close its door if a settlement, safe- 
guarding the security and sovereignty of Arab Palestine, is submitted to it. Your 
Excellency will therefore see that, under the circumstances, the question of repre- 
senting Palestine at the Conference is of first (importance) to us, and that opinion is 
one in both Transjordan and Palestine concerning this national problem. I have 
therefore summoned His Excellency the Egyptian Consul-General in Jerusalem, in 
order to transmit my present message to Your Excellency, by a quick and safe means. 
To clarify the matter (further), I am submitting to Your Excellency a list (j) of 
the names of the notables to whom I kindly request you to send invitations for attend- 
ing the Conference. I have indicated (in the list) the name of the party to which each 
of (these notables) belongs. 

I believe that this is the solution which satisfies us all. His Excellency the 
Consul-General will convey to you, in addition to my present letter, my personal 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor- 
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 99 - 100. 

(2) That is, the Conference convened in London by the British Government in January 
1939) and attended by the delegates of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yaman, 
but not by any representatives of Palestine. ED. 

(j) Not printed. ED. 

19 



8 



The Arab States and The Arab League 



entreaty that you may give effect to our request concerning the sending of the 
invitations. 

With my deepest affection and respect to Your Excellency, 

(Signature) 

Sha'ban 25, 1363 A.H., corresponding to 
August 14, 1944 

Note Addressed by the Iraqi Government to the Chairman of the 
Subsidiary Committee of the Preparatory Conference on Arab Un- 
ity, Embodying the Views of the Iraqi Government and Its Reserv- 
ations Concerning the Draft Pact of the Arab League 

March u, 1945 (i) 



To His Excellency the Chairman of the Subsidiary Committee for the Draft Pact of 
the League of Arab States, 
Greetings and respects, 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, in view of the delay in signing 
the minutes of the meetings of the Subsidiary Political Committee of the Preparatory 
Committee for the Arab Conference, which (delay) is because certain additions to and 
modifications of the draft Pact of the League of Arab States have been proposed and 
about the subject of which some members have not ascertained their Governments' 
views, Therefore, 

And in order to avoid any misunderstanding that may arise in this respect in 
future, 

And in order that I may advise my Government on this matter, I have deemed it 
fit to inform Your Excellency that the Iraqi Government considers that the following 
should be made clear :- 

First : Article 12: The States of the League may not interfere, jointly or severally 

in any dispute of whatever nature, that may arise between the State of Iraq 

and any (other) State or States of the League, or other (States), except at 

the request of the State of Iraq and the State or States party to the dispute. 

Second : Article 14- This Article gives to the (Member States of the) League the 

right to establish among themselves a wider co-operation than that provid- 

ed for in the Pact, should these States so desire. This authorization is, 

needless to say, (only) an admission of the right which is now enjoyed by 

the (Member) States of the League. It should, therefore, be clear that 

none of the States of the League may object, for any reason whatever, to 

any arrangements which some of the States of the League may make to 

widen the scope of such co-operation among themselves. 

Third: Article 15: The choice of the system of government in each of the States 
(Members) of the League is the exclusive right of the people of that State. 
But since the text of Article 15 of the draft (Pact) does not adequately clari- 
fy this principle, it should be made clear that the Iraqi Government cannot 
accept any departure from this principle which is recognized by all the 



(i)The Note was signed by Mr. Tahsin al-'Askari, Iraq's Minister in Cairo; translated 
by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian Govern- 
ment's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 107 - 108. ED. 



20 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

countries of the civilized world. 

I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will kindly inform me that you have 
taken note of the contents of this letter, so that I may be able to inform my Govern- 
ment accordingly before the isth of the current (month of) March. 

With all my respects to Your Excellency, 

March n, 1945 (Signed) TAHSIN AL'-ASKARY 

Minister of Iraq. 

Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Hamid Franjiyya), Q 

Concerning the Greater Syria Plan 

November 13, 1945 (i) 

I am surprised that this theme - meaning (2) the theme of unity or federation - 
should appear every now and then for motives which are no longer unknown to any- 
body. In our view, this question does not exist. The Lebanese Government has 
repeatedly announced its deprecation of such an idea, and I regret that we should each 
time find ourselves compelled to denounce it and to refute it. For how could we forget 
that the Arab countries became independent within (their) present boundaries, that 
each of them has recognized the independence of the other States within these boun- 
daries, and that the Arab League has been formed on this basis? For such illusory 
plans explicitly conflict with the Arab League Pact, and I am surprised that they 
should emanate from one of the Members of the League. 

The policy of Lebanon is clear and does not admit of ambiguity or equivocation: 
For Lebanon, thanks be to God, enjoys her independence and sovereignty within her 
present boundaries. She has joined the Arab League on this basis, and will accept no 
alternative to this policy. The Arab States have co-operated with each other with the 
utmost sincerity concerning all their common affairs, and it is my firm hope that this 
theme will not appear again lest it should disturb the propitious atmosphere in which 
we are closely collaborating for the good of all. 

Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash-Shurayqi) to the JQ 
Statement of the Lebanese Foreign Minister 

November 1945 (3) 

I was glad that my honourable colleague, His Excellency Hamid Bey Franjiyya, 
has given me this opportunity to clarify the Jordanian point of view with regard to the 
plan of Syrian unity or federation. 

The idea of Syrian unity or federation is a principle unanimously respected in 
Syria and Jordan, and has many supporters in Lebanon as well. It is not a theme that 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda- 
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), p. 233. 

(2) This phrase, interpreting the word "theme", above, does not form part of the State- 
ment in hand, but has been added by the editors of the Jordanian Government's 
White Book. ED. 

(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian 
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) pp. 234-236. 



21 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

is likely to disturb the magnificent atmosphere in which we are collaborating in our 
work for the good of all if we realize that unity or federation is one of the most 
cherished themes to Arab ears. This is because it is the thundering voice of the 
Arab Revolt of Independence in 1915, and the echo of the historic resolution unani- 
mously adopted in Damascus on March 8, 1920, by the delegates of the coastal, 
interior, northern and southern regions (i) of Syria, and with them there were the 
delegates of sister Lebanon as well. Nay, it is the watchword of the Syrian Revolu- 
tion, which was addressed, with the unanimous approval of (all) the national organi- 
zations, by the commander-in-chief to all the warriors, and they all generously 
offered their noble lives to achieve (its aims). It is, indeed, strange that the friendly 
Lebanese Government should deprecate the idea of unity or federation, and should 
not allow us to deprecate, in our turn, the idea of the regional division of the one 
homeland. It should, however, be noted that when we now advocate the idea of 
unity or federation, we do so only within the limits of the Pact of the League of 
Arab States and inspired by the general wish of every independent Syrian region. 

It is true that the Arab countries became independent within the present 
boundaries of each of them, and that they have recognized the independece of each 
other within these boundaries, as His Excellency my honorable collegaue says. But 
since when have independent States still the more so if they are regional states 
been unable to become united if the people wanted them to be united, or unable to 
federate by their own choice and free will, (or) even by virtue of their rights of sove- 
reignty as well ? 

But to say that the plan of unity or federation openly conflicts with the Pact of 
the League of the Arab States(2) is, in our view, a statement unsupported by proof. 
For Article 9 of the Pact provides that "those Arab League States desirous of closer 
collaboration with each other, and stronger ties than those specified by this 
Covenant (3) , have a right to conclude such agreements between themselves towards 
the realisation of those objects, as they desire". 

There is nothing, therefore, to prevent the realization of a confederation or of 
total unity, if we refer this (matter) to the wishes of the responsible Governments or 
to the general national wish. I maintain that as our dear Lebanon has the right to 
adhere to her aspirations and her own policy not accepting any other alternative 
while remaining faithful to the Pact of the League, so also Trans Jordan has the full 
right to adhere to her national covenant and her own policy - not accepting any other 
alternative - while remaining faithful to the Pact of the League, too. 

Yet, if the Pact of the League has stipulated that the system of government in 
each of the acceding States is one of the rights of that State, it is to this (stipulation) 
that the Jordanian Government has always held, guided by (the instructions of the) 
Head of the great Hashimite Dynasty. (The Jordanian Government) has thus made 
its call to unity or federation subject to the wish of the very people concerned, or 
to the (free) choice of the responsible Governments themselves. The general wish, 
in every nation which respects the true democratic principles, is undoubtedly the 
one that matters in such questions. This is the very sound view expressed at the time 
by His Excellency the learned (Mr.) Paris Bey al-Khouri, former Primer Minister 
of Syria. 



( /) The Arabic term used here "al-Aqalhn', ED. 

(2) See. Doc. No. 29. ED. 

(3} The terms "Pact" and "Covenant" are used interchangeable^ in this book. ED. 



22 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



As to (my) honourable colleague's explanation of the emergence of this call 
(to unity) by motives which are no longer unknown to anybody, as he says, I (can) 
assure His Excellency that these motives are the most noble motives and the most 
propitious to the national interest. Moreover, the official documents exchanged be- 
tween the higher political authorities on the subject of this cherished national aspira- 
tion will, when the time of their publication comes, be the truthful witness to the 
noble character of this call and of its disinterestedness. (They will also serve as) a 
decisive reply to those who want us to acquiesce absolutely to the partition of our 
dear homeland and to avoid everything that would realize its unity or federation by 
free choice, at a time when the right of self-determination has become a respected 
international right, and when national and even international unity characterize this 
modern age. 



Excerpts From the Speech From the Jordanian Throne, Dealing T y 

with the Question of Arab Unity L 1 

November u, 1946 (i) 

With this stand of ours, (2) and from this very (throne) we declare, Honourable 
Deputies, that we are seeking neither a (wider) possession which we desire, nor a 
throne which we want to establish, but that our aim is stability in this western part of 
the Arab world which overlooks the Roman sea (5), leads to the Western world, and is 
the doorway to our country. The security (of this part of the Arab world) lies in its 
unity, and the danger to it (resides) in its disunity. The will is God's, and the wishes 
(emanate) from the Nation which we have pledged ourselves to serve not to deceive 
or endanger the life thereof. We seek nothing except its honour and glory, the safe- 
guarding of its dignity, the raising of its prestige, and the safety of its religious and 
temporal values. We have pledged ourselves before God to serve and promote (our) 
faith and to unite the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, under their (common) flag 
and in their own fatherland, without any distinction among them. God is always with 
the group. (4) This is our aim, and these are our limits. May God protect us from the 
evils of the enemy. 

(Please) be informed, Honourable Deputies, that we are firmly decided on a 
close unity between ourselves and our sister Iraq, whose aim is the co-ordination of 
efforts and attitudes in the two sister countries. The door is not closed between the 
States of the Arab League and ourselves for any confederal co-operation, brotherly 
pact, or federation of such nature; for we are (and shall remain), God willing, ready to 
give advice to all, now and in the future. 

You have known, Gentlemen, that we have accepted the invitation of His Majes- 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda- 
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947)3 PP* 2 4 - 2 4 l 

(2) Referring here to King 'Abdullah own views on the question of Syrian unity dealt with 
in the preceding part of the Speech. ED. 

(3) That is, the Mediterranean. ED. 

(4) That is, God always lends His help wherever there is unity. ED. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 



ty the King of Egypt to consider matters relating to the future of (our) dear Pales- 
tine^/) We thank His Majesty for this generous invitation and this noble aim, for he 
has done what is fit and proper. We have spared no efforts to attain what His Majesty 
was aiming at, and we sincerely express our high praise to those of Their Majesties and 
Excellencies the Kings and Presidents who attended (the Conference) or who delega- 
ted others on their behalf. We hope we will carry out the decisions (of the Conference), 
as these provide the effective remedy which can serve that dear country which is pa- 
tiently bearing the procrastinations and delays it is being subjected to. You have also 
heard of the London Conference and of its postponement for a given time ; there is no 
harm in that, as the reconsideration of matters in dispute between friendly countries is 
the way that leads to the best results. Yet we have proposed what we found (fit) for 
raising funds to protect the lands against sale (2) and to raise the standard of the Arabs 
so that they may be (better) prepared to serve the fatherland. We (also) hope that the 
stamps which were issued for this purpose will be successfully circulated in Trans- 
Jordan, and we also hope that they will be successfully circulated in Palestine in ac- 
cordance with our recommendations to the Arab Higher Committee. 
Gentlemen: 

We have no more to add in this Speech except (to express) our firm desire to live 
in peace, friendship and brotherhood with our sister Arab States, and (to hope) that 
(our) association (through) the League will grow stronger and closer. We have pleas- 
ure to state that co-operation between our ally, Great Britain, and ourselves will, God 
willing, grow stronger and firmer during (this) stage of complete independence. 

Excerpts from the Reply to the Speech from the Throne, made by 
the Jordanian Legislative Assembly 

November u, 1946 (3) 

Your Majesty, 

God has honoured the nation by your declaration to its Deputies and to all the 
people, that, being what you are, you do not seek in your call for Syrian unity any 
(wider) possession or (an additional) throne, but the (realization of the) nation's ideals 
and charters, as well as the realization of a general stability and a general national 
unity. (You also declared that you seek) a unity which would eliminate dissension, put 
an end to division, safeguard the safety of the one Fatherland against the ravages of 
invaders and the devastators of (this) land, and consolidate its front lines to protect it 
against any danger. 

The Arabs in general and their veteran leaders in particular will follow none but 
this blessed call and its successful leadership, all aware that Your Majesty's share in 
the fields of war and politics was and still is more resplendent than the crown, and 
more honouring than the sceptre and the realm. 

What you have reviewed (in your Speech) of the developments of the Arab cause 
and the effect of the Revolt of Liberation under the leadership of the Great Libera- 



(1) Referring here to the Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents at Inshas, Egypt. 
See. Doc. No. 140. ED. 

(2) That w, the sale of Arab lands in Palestine to the Zionists. ED. 

(3] Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda- 
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947 ),PP- 247 - 248. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

tor may God be pleased with him and render him reward ; of Your Majesty's 
being the first to come to this land in order to resume the struggle after the catastrophe 
of Damascus and to take this loyal region as a base of effective assistance and help to 
every national movement and patriotic call all these shall not be forgotten by the 
Arab nation which has entrusted its cause to your dynasty for the realization of its 
mission. (Your dynasty) has thus fought a worthy fight for the sake of God, and has 
revived the past glories (of the nation). 
Your Majesty, 

It is a source of delight to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, and to all the Arabs 
that the plan of Iraqi-Jordanian unity should be accomplished in the very near future, 
in realization of the wishes of the two sister countries, as kindly referred to by you (in 
your Speech). (It is also a source of delight) that the message of Arab unity should 
be realized, within the limits of international pacts and the Pact of the Arab League, at 
the hand of the great Hashimite Family, so that (the nation) will be again, as it had 
started (in the beginning), pregnant with deeds and overflowing with hope, and that 
the solidarity of the Arab States will continue to be its programme, criterion, guiding 
light, and source of inspiration, (i) 

One of the great aspects, indeed, of this solidarity is what you have graciously 
referred to in the resolutions of the great Inshas Conference,^) and the noble resolu- 
tions and wise directives which Their Majesties and Excellencies the Arab Kings and 
Presidents have unanimously agreed upon at their historic Conference. The Arabs are 
still expecting (these resolutions and directives) to heal the bleeding wounds of Pales- 
tine, guarantee its legitimate rights, fulfil its cherished hope and restore its lost in- 
dependence. 

Question Addressed by a Number of Deputies to the Jordanian J 3 
Foreign Minister, Regarding the Statement of the Lebanese Foreign 

Minister About Syrian Unity 

November u, 1946 (3) 

The Lebanese Press published a statement (4) which the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister made in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on November 13, 1945, contain- 
ing the following: 

"Lebanon has joined the (Arab) League on the basis of her effectively complete inde- 
pendence, within her present boundaries, and of the independence of each of the 
States (Members) of the League. Therefore, the question raised from time to time, 
under the name of "Greater Syria", cannot be a subject of discussions, for we neither 
want "Greater Syria" nor accept it by any means." 

As this statement relates to the rights of the regional States of Syria including 
the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan we request His Excellency the Foreign Minister 
to enlighten the Chamber in respect of the Government's view regarding this state- 



1 i) The Arabic word used here is "Nibrasuha", literally meaning "lantern, chandelier, 
source of illumination, etc.". ED. 

(2) See. Doc. No. 140. ED. 

(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda- 
nian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) p. 251. 

(4) See Doc. No. 9 . ED. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

ment. It should, however, be understood that all the Deputies of the nation are not 
satisfied with (the said) statement because it conflicts with the country's natural and 
national rights. 

'ABD AL-QADIR AT-TALL 'ABUD AZ-ZABIN SALAMA AT-TAWWAL 
'ISA 'AWAD HUSAYN YUSUF SALIM AL-HINDAWI 

MUHAMMAD SABRI AT-TABBA' NAWFAN AS-SA'UD 

MA'ARIK AL-MAJALYYA YUSUF AL-'AKASHI 

Reply of the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash - Shurayqy), to the 
Question of the Jordanian Deputies 

November 19, 1946 (i) 

I thank the esteemed Deputies for their concern over everything relating to 
national rights, and I wish to define the Government's view regarding the statement 
referred to, as follows: 

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, while adhering to the Pact of the League 
of Arab States, will never give up the Covenant of Syrian unity or federation. (2) 
(This is) not only in its character as a Syrian state, but also because of its conviction 
that any revocation of this Covenant will also constitute a revocation of Syria's 
natural rights and a rejection of her national struggle, geographic existence, and 
common regional interests - (a revocation) which cannot be accepted by any Syrian 
who believes in his country. 

Everybody has recognized, from the very beginning, the independence of 
Lebanon, and also admitted her complete freedom regarding the question of unity or 
federation, because the wishes of the Lebanese people must remain above any other 
consideration. We expected that our honourable colleague, His Excellency the 
Lebanese Foreign Minister, would desire for the Syrian regions what he desires for 
Lebanon and what we, too, desire for her, and that he would thus refrain from inter- 
fering in what concerns the Syrian regions exclusively, unless (of course) he considers 
Lebanon a Syrian region - and we do not believe he thinks so. 

We have no doubt that there is no one who does not know that all the Syrians, 
including in particular the Jordanians, will accept nothing in exchange for their 
countries' unity or federation, and that there is none to make them forget that they 
have made sacrifices and struggled for nearly thirty years for the realization of this 
sacred aim. 

We have a right to ask why sister Lebanon should have been allowed to expand 
at the expense of Syria and without (Syria's) being consulted at the time, and yet 
why Syria - the partitioned, nay, dismembered (Syria) - should not be allowed to 
unite by her own free choice so that she may grow on the basis of her natural and 
national rights, and within the limits of her (own) regions. 

Reference has sometimes been made to the diversity in the form of government 
as an obstacle (to Arab unity), and this (in spite of) the knowledge that the nation has 
unanimously decided that "national unity" should not be sacrificed for the sake of 
the form of government. Besides, if the choice of a form (of government) is left to the 
nation itself - and this is what we have always advocated - there will no longer be any 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian 
Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), p. 252. 
(2) See Doc. No. 2. ED. 



26 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

room for the claims of those who oppose the principle of general Syrian unity. 
Moreover, the federal form (of government) does not in itself conflict with diversity 
in the form of government. If the Arab States can meet in the Council of their League 
in spite of the diversity in their forms (of government), why cannot the regional Syrian 
States meet in a Federal Council as well and carry out the people's wishes in de- 
termining their common interests and natural rights ? (This is all the more so) since 
this wise and practical measure has become, from the international point of view, one 
of our own rights? 

Reference has sometimes also been made to Zionism. Some have gone so far as to 
allege that the call for unity or federation is nothing but an (attempt at) expansion at 
the expense of Palestine. This is a strange misrepresentation, since Zionism will not 
feel at ease towards any Arab block that would encircle it and strangle it. On the con- 
trary, Syrian unity or federation will constitute a new defensive power that would 
repel the Zionist danger to Palestine and to the whole Syrian group (of States). Jordan 
is, indeed, proud of her efforts and struggle for the realization of the national aspira- 
tions in Palestine, Besides, if unity or federation can be aeieved only by our jyint 
action and common agreement, what room will there be left for suspicion ? 

Reference has also been made to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (i) and to the 
existence of a military alliance between Great Britain and Transjordan; (this reference 
has been made in spite of) the knowledge that the new Treaty has recognized our 
complete independence and that the alliance is to be exclusively defensive and within 
the limits of (what is admitted by) the Security Council, without the stationing of any 
(British) troops except by agreement between the two parties and in case of defensive 
exigencies. This is ( a measure ) adopted by all independent States when this is 
necessitated by their common interests and by the exigencies of their external 
security. Even if we concede, for argument's sake, the isolation is, within the new 
international system, better than alliances, would this necessitate our giving up (both) 
our national unity and the realization of our federation, now that we have all attained 
the means of the realization thereof without any encroachment upon our vested poli- 
tical and international rights? 

To clarify this further, I would ask whether Northern Syria, for example, when 
she accepted the treaty of 1936 and the military alliance which it entailed, would have 
refused her unity or federation with her provinces and coastal cities which had a 
special status at that time, or would have rather accepted every possible expansion of 
her national unity until the complete realization of her National Covenant ? 

I believe that no Syrian who has faith in his country does not consider that the 
continuation of the estrangement between our regions is only in the interest of 
(others). The Jordanian policy will continue to consider the Syrian general unity as 
the basis and the main (principle) of its national programme. In this, it will be 
inspired only by the national covenants and by Arab ideals. 

The Speech from the Throne last week so clearly explained this point that no 
further clarification will be needed. We, therefore, hope that His Excellency the 
esteemed Lebanese Foreign Minister was not driven to make his statement in the 
Chamber of Deputies by some of those who do not want to revoke publicly what 
they themselves had agreed upon. 



(j) See Doc. No. 204. ED. 

27 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

Statement by the Lebanese Foreign Minister (Philip Taqla), in Con- 
nection with the Jordanian Foreign Minister's Statement on Syrian 
Unity 

November 22, 1946 (i) 

Lebanon's attitude towards the question of Greater Syria has always been clear, 
for we do not want Greater Syria with or without Lebanon. 

I reiterate what I had said in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies: Lebanon has 
joined the Arab League on the basis of her independence within her present bouda- 
ries and on the basis of the independence of each of the other (Arab) States in their 
own boundaries. I am, indeed, surprised that the question of Greater Syria should be 
raised periodically and at particular dates, contrary to the Cairo Pact (2) and the true 
interests of the Arabs. Has His Excellency ash-Shurayqy Pasha forgotten the siga- 
ture of his country's representatives ? I do not believe that the countries meant by the 
Greater Syria plan agree with his point of view, for it would be better for them to have 
in international organizations several votes rather than one vote. It is, indeed, regret- 
table that this question, which was buried a long time ago, should be raised again, and 
at a time when the delegates of the Arab States are meeting to co-ordinate their efforts 
for (serving) their League. I, however, see nothing in the statement of ash-Shurayqy 
Pasha except a personal opinion which is of no political consequence. 



Statement by the Syrian Acting Foreign Minister, Made in the 
Chamber of Deputies, Concerning Syrian Unity 

November 23, 1946 (3) 

The Government has perused the statement and speeches made by the Foreign 
Minister of the Kingdom of Jordan and by some high official sources (there) 
expressly reiterating what had been unofficially circulated and published, both in 
the Press and in conversations, regarding a subject which relates to the very being of 
this country. 

In answer to the question of the honourable deputy, I hereby submit to you 
the view of (my) Government in this respect: 

The attitude of the authorities of the Kingdom of Jordan, as reflected in their 
plans and statements, is contrary to the general principles of international law, and 
contradicts the rules observed by states, as well as the Pact of the League of Arab 
States, which provides that every (Arab) State should respect the system of govern- 
ment existing in the other States, and should refrain from interfering in their internal 
affairs. (This Jordanian attitude) is also repugnant to the spirit of co-operation and 
amity on which the Pact of the League is based. 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jorda- 
nian Government's White Book (Amman) 1946), p. 255. 

(2) Presumably referring to the Pact of the Arab League. See Doc. No. 29 ED. 

(3) This Statement was made in answer to a question asked in the Syrian Chamber of 
Deputies by deputy Hamid al-Khawja> concerning Transj or dan's "ambitions" over 
Syria; translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the 
Jordanian Government's White Book (Amman 1947), pp. 259-260. ED. 

28 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



From the very dawn of the Arab (national) movement, Syria has been working 
to (achieve) the solidarity and unity of the Arab countries. In her struggle, she has not 
made a distinction between her (own) independence and (the realization) of this idea, 
which is cherished by every Arab. We can (indeed) say, in all pride, that our country 
has been (the) leading (one) in this field, and that the Arab (national) idea is still our 
guide and ideal. But we have always wanted the idea of federation or unity to be based 
on dignity and sovereignty, and have opposed the exploitation of this noble idea in 
order to undermine the independence and sovereignty of any (Arab) country. 

From the time when Transjordan was detached from this country (i) in 1920, 
following the tragedy of (French) occupation, we have been suffering greatly and 
making sacrifices for the sake of freedom, until (finally) God ordained (our) victory. 
Thus Syria achieved (her) full independence and sovereignty, shook off all shackles, 
and was admitted to the United Nations, participating thus, on a footing of equality 
with big states, in international conferences. The last thing achieved by (Syria) in the 
international field, was her admission to (the membership of) the Security Council 
and her occupation of a prominent position in that (U.N.) organ- thanks to the support 
of the Arab States and the other States. 

Syria, accordingly, has no desire (to join) any union that is not free of all blemishes 
or that would encroach upon the rights and privileges which she has gained and which 
are (commonly) enjoyed by sovereign states. (Nor would she accept any union) based 
on a foundation other than that chosen by the country as its charter and programme. 
For (Syria) adopted its republican constitution, through its Constituent Assembly, 
nearly twenty years ago, and is concerned over (the maintenance) of her republican 
system and accepts no alternative to it. 

We have no doubt that the Chamber (of Deputies) of the Syrian nation upholds 
this policy of ours, inspired as it is by the speech of His Excellency the President of 
the Republic in this Chamber last year, and based on adherence to the republican 
system, the consolidation of the ties of friendship and co-operation among the Arab 
States, and resistance to any kind of Zionist domination. 

Statement to the Press Made by the Jordanian Foreign Minister J *7 
(Ash-Shurayqy), in Connection with the Lebanese Foreign Minister's ' 

Statement on Syrian Unity 

November 24, 1946 (2) 

The French News Agency published a new statement made by His Excellency 
the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Philip Taqla, in which he clearly affirmed what 
he had previously declared in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies regarding Syrian 
unity or federation. His Excellency the (Foreign) Minister was this time particularly 
clever when he pointed out, in all sympathy for the interests of the Arabs, how the 
question of Greater Syria is raised periodically and at particular dates, contrary to 
what the Arab States had undertaken by virtue of the Cairo Pact (3), as he says. To 
enlighten Arab public opinion, and to put matters in their proper place, we think 



(/) Meaning here Syria. ED. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan- 
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) , pp. 256-257. 

(3) That is, the Pact of the Arab League. ED. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

that we should also declare, in our turn, that those who raise this question perio- 
dically and at particular dates, to give it a form other than its own and present it as if 
it were a subject of dispute and argument, are its opponents and not its advocates. 
(In doing so) they are ignoring the wishes of the Syrian people, the general Arab 
aspirations, and the provisions of Article 9 of the Cairo Pact, itself which provides 
that "those Arab League States desirous of closer collaboration with each other, and 
stronger ties than those specified by this Covenant, have a right to conclude such 
agreements between themselves towards the realisation of these objects, as they desire. 
Treaties and Agreements previously concluded, or which may be concluded with any 
other state, by any state belonging to the League, shall not be obligatory or binding 
on the other members." 

Would there be any room left, with the existence of this provision, to domineer 
over the will of the Syrian people or of the Arab States if they (choose) closer co- 
operation and stronger bonds which may be made possible through unity or federa- 
tion? I rather find in this domineering (action) an encroachment upon the very inde- 
pendence of the Arab States which can by no means be admitted by the Pact of 
Cairo. 

What indeed attracts attention is that His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister should openly oppose Syrian unity or federation, as such, even if the com- 
plete independence of Lebanon is maintained and no one asks Lebanon to join (this 
unity or federation). This constitutes an extremely domineering attitude over the 
affairs of others a (policy) which the democratic national circles in Lebanon have 
always avoided and in which they found a trend incompatible with Arab aspirations 
and the modern international principles, and (one) which is unlikely to further (even) 
the Lebanese aspirations themselves. 

If we were to be as completely frank as His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister has chosen to be and (such frankness) is necessary in such a case we 
should ask ourselves why sister Lebanon should be allowed to expand at the expense 
of the Syrian regions, against their free choice, and yet why Syria the partitioned, 
nay dismembered (Syria) should not be allowed to unite by her own choice and 
free will so that she may grow on the basis of her national and natural rights and within 
the limits of her (own) regions ? 

As for those who consider that we should sacrifice our national unity so that we 
may increase our votes in international organizations, I think that they are very well 
aware that one single important vote is still vetoing, in these organizations, all the 
votes of the United Nations. Yet who knows? May be they would justify further 
divisions of the one country as long as the reason is that we should have more votes in 
the international field. Let us wait then. 

O Statement by the Jordanian Prime Minister and Acting Foreign 
O Minister (Ibrahim Hashim) in the Legislative Assembly, in Reply 

to the Statement of the Syrian Foreign Minister (Khalid Al-'Azm), 

Concerning Syrian Unity 

November 1946 (i) 

(j) The above Statement was made in reply to a question raised by a member of the 
Assembly ( Sabri at-Tabba J ) in connection with Syria's official attitude towards 
the question of Syrian unity \ translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) 
text as it appears in the Jordanian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), 
pp. 261-262. ED. 

30 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

I reply to your question (by saying) that the Jordanian Government's reply to 
the various statements made in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies by the esteemed 
Deputies and by His Excellency the Syrian Foreign Minister is, as far as the essence 
of the question is concerned, the same as that given by the Jordanian Foreign Minister 
to His Excellency the Lebanese Foreign Minister. 

As for all the other things which His Excellency the Deputy (Foreign) Minister 
and the esteemed Deputies have said, to the effect that the responsible (authorities) in 
Transjordan have acted in contradiction to the rules observed by states, and violated 
the Pact of the League of Arab States, (I would say) : all this has nothing to do with 
the essence of the question, namely, the indispensable Syrian unity for which we 
should work, with God's help. This (indeed) is the wish of the whole of the Syrian 
people and their sound and ancient Covenant. 

As for the present conditions in Syria, I would say - in my capacity as a Prime 
Minister of a Syrian State lying in the south of that beloved country - that there is 
a great difference (on the one hand) between a country which was established by the 
Arab Revolt and by the national principles, and which gave shelter to the noble 
revolutionaries in days of crises, and (on the other hand), other administrations(i) 
which were established by the French Republic and by the Sykes-Picot Agreement; 
(2) - the two cannot be compared together - for when (France), regretting (having 
established Syria as a State ), then delivered her severe blows (against Syria, it was 
Jordan who) stood in support of those who were in power (in Syria) at the time. 
There is now in Syria another European State (j) which interfered and then 
evacuated; but he who evacuates cannot be trusted not to return when the oppor- 
tunity arises. There is nothing to prevent such catastrophes except the unity of the 
Syrian countries. 

As for the Pact of the Arab League, all the States (Members) of the League know 
very well that we adhere to it, and that (this Pact) does not prevent the unity of one 
country which has been partitioned by foreign imperialistic interests, with private 
interests wanting to keep it divided. The Syrian Nation, which has been tormented 
through its own sons, because of what it has been suffering from during the recent 
days, knows those who are working for its good. It is the nation that has the last word, 
and not those (Syrian rulers) against whom the Constitution Committee of their own 
Parliament decided that they had violated the Constitution by the Ordinances which 
they had issued. 

Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ash-Shurayqy) at the J Q 
Council of the Arab League, in connection with the Stand Taken over ^ 
the Question of Syrian Unity by Sa'dallah Al-Jabiry, Syrian Prime 

Minister 

(November 26, 1946) (4) 

While being thankful for the true feelings shown by the (representative of the) 
Member States who desire the welfare of the League, yet, in order to put matters in 
their proper place, I beg to state that the question has been submitted for discussion in 



(j) Presumably meaning the Syrian Republic - perhaps also Lebanon and Palestine. ED. 

(2) See Doc. No. 167. ED. 

(3) Presumably referring here to Britain. ED. 

(4) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan- 
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 262-265. 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

a sudden manner without our prior knowledge, and on a basis which conflicts with 
the competence of the Council (of the Arab League). For the Council of the League is 
bound by a Pact which does not authorize it to consider a dispute or disagreement if 
this (question) may be considered a dispute between two or more Member States 
of the League, unless the question is submitted to it for arbitration by the two conten- 
ding parties, or unless it considers the question on the basis of mediation and in con- 
formity with a special procedure which has not been observed here. 

I heard the Secretary-General (of the League) mention the word "complaint" and 
then explain it. The esteemed Council has no right to hear any complaints, in any 
case, but may arbitrate if appointed (for such a purpose) by the two contending par- 
ties. Yet the issue is not a dispute. It is only malicious propaganda which describes it 
as a dispute or a disagreement and exaggerates it. If you consider (the question) now 
being raised as an informal talk which is not of an official character, then I can 
assure you all that the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is foremost amongst those who 
have concern for solidarity among the States of the League and respect its Pact. Had 
we prepared our documents (in advance) and had you enabled us to expound our 
point of view as it should be (expounded), you would have found that it is not we who 
are stirring up a controversy on this subject; for those who are stirring it up are the 
opponents of our National Covenant. The question is a purely national one, relating 
to the general Arab conscience, the principles of the Arab Revolt, and the struggle in 
the necessity of which we believe and the course of which we have followed, together 
with our brethren, for about thirty years. 

"Greater Syria", honourable brethren, cannot be disputed by the protagonists of 
the Arab cause, nor can it be (the subject of a dispute), for what is meant by it ? 

By "Greater Syria" is meant Syria (i) in its natural boundaries, considering that 
it is a geographic, historical and national unit, constituting one (single) Arab country 
which is one of three (regions): Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Syrian territories, Jordan 
included, believe in their Arabdom, in their common land and interests, and in the 
natural state of affairs which God has ordained for them. It is (indeed) in the light of 
this that our national struggle has been (directed) ever since the dawn of Arab revival. 
In spite of (Syria's) occupation by foreign troops and its dismemberment into various 
regions at the end of the First World War, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agree- 
ment and the Balfour Declaration, it has declared its independence and unity in Dam- 
ascus, on this basis, since 1920. It has also provided for the necessity of striving for 
the realization of the Arab federation. This memorable (occasion) has become an of- 
ficial national day, and the citizens of all the Syrian regions have made of this historic 
resolution a National Covenant because it was issued unanimously by the General 
Syrian Congress (2). The General Syrian Congress is the only Constituent Assembly 
in which Syria was represented in its natural boundaries, and which comprised depu- 
ties of all the regions of Syria at the time. And its resolution has been observed by all 
the Syrian territories from the extreme north to the extreme south because it was a 
sound and true expression of their general wish. 

There is not, therefore, a new plan called "The Greater Syria Plan", in the sense 
in which it is being diffused and spread, but rather a continuation of the movement of 
the Arab struggle for the realization of national aspirations in the Syrian regions, 
within (Syria's) natural boundaries. But the establishment of artificial barriers, 



(1) The Arabic term used here is "Bilad ash-Sham". ED. 

(2) See Doc. No. 2. ED. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



together with the continuation of estrangement between the regions of one homeland, 
under the pretext of the diversity in the system of government, or for any other 
(reason) which may be inspired by foreigners or by those with personal designs, 
constitutes, in our view, a backing out of, and a flinching from the common struggle. 
(It also constitutes) an unjustifiable revocation of the Covenant of general Syrian unity 
in international circumstances under which the realization of this Covenant has be- 
come one of our own rights. (This is) all the more so since the diversity in the systems 
of government does not conflict with the federal system. Moreover, there is not one 
single Syrian region which has the right to revoke unilaterally the Covenant of unity, 
because (such action) would involve an encroachment upon the general national 
conscience and upon the rights and common interests of all the Syrian regions. What 
we must now ask ourselves is : if the common struggle for the realization of Syrian 
unity or federation was possible for us when we were under direct foreign domination, 
why should it not be possible for us to give effect to our determination and to our 
Covenant, now that our countries have become free, or at least the possibilities of our 
common action have become greater than ever before ? 

Is is indeed, strange that we should be held accountable for our national aspira- 
tion to unity or federation, when it is the realization of this aspiration that was aimed 
at by the Pact of our League, in letter and spirit. What attracts attention, indeed, is 
that the aspiration to unity or federation, which emanates from the general Arab cons- 
cience, should be considered as an encroachment upon the regime which exists in any 
of the Arab States j (in spite of) the knowledge that the national aspiration is one thing 
and the encroachment upon an existing regime is something else. For (this natural) 
aspiration) is a belief relating to freedom of opinion, the ability to pass judgment on 
national public matters, and (to) the political programmes not binding on others. The 
ultimate decision regarding (this aspiration), moreover, rests with the wish of the peo- 
ple which is the source of all power. 

A few days ago, when the Syrian Government's statement which unjustifiably at- 
tacked the Covenant of Syrian unity was published, I was reading in the same paper 
Mr. ChurchilFs proposals regarding the formation of the United States of Europe, 
You will all recall that Mr. Churchill had previously made a similar proposal, during 
the war, for the formation of a federal state comprising France and England. You will 
also recall that after the First World War Mr. Briand had adopted the project of the 
United States of Europe as well. These international precedents do not mean in any 
way that any of these statesmen was, in his proposals, encroaching upon the regimes 
in the other states, in spite of all the national and regional differences which exist 
between those states. 

I consider the esteemed Chamber is far above considering the call to the adher- 
ence to Arab ideals and national covenants which are unanimously respected by the 
Syrian people in their various regions as a source of dispute or disagreement. 

Resolution Adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, 20 

Concerning Syrian Unity 

November 28, 1946 (i) 

A controversy has recently taken place regarding the Greater Syria Plan. The 
Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, accordingly, held a special meeting in which 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic} text as it appears in the Jordan- 
ian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947) p. 267. 

33 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

they studied the question from its (many) angles. It appeared, however, that no one 
intended, by dealing with this subject, to encroach upon the independence and sov- 
ereignty of any State (Member) of the (Arab League) or to interfere in its system of 
government. 

They have, therefore, affirmed the adherence by their States to the Pact of the 
League, and their respect and observance thereof, in letter and in spirit. 

JAMIL MARDAM-BEY MUHAMMAD ASH-SHURAYQY 

(For the Syrian Foreign Minister) (Foreign Minister of the Hash- 

imite Kingdom of Jordan) 

YUSUF YASIN FADIL AL-JAMALI 

(Far the Foreign Minister of (Foreign Minister of Iraq) 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 

PHILIP TAQLA IBRAHIM 'AED AL-HADI 

(Foreign Minister of Lebanon) (Foreign Minister of the Kingdom 

of Egypt) 

MUHAMMAD AL-'UMARI 
( Representative of Yaman ) 

T Covering Letter by the Jordanian Foreign Minister (ash-Shurayqy) 
* Addressed to the President of the Arab League Council, Together 
with a Memorandum, Concerning Syrian Unity 

November 1946, (i) 

In confirmation of the adherence of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan to the 
Pact of the League of Arab States, my Government has requested me to submit the 
enclosed Memorandum. (This Memorandum) embodies the Jordanian point of view 
regarding the question of Syrian unity or federation, considering that this is a national 
principle which-is in no way related 10 the propaganda which has been spread about 
it and which the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States have finally agreed to end, 
being concerned for the dissipation of doubts and for the complete solidarity of the 
States of the Arab League. 

MUHAMMAD ASH-SHURAYQY 
Foreign Minister of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan 

(TEXT OF MEMORANDUM) 

The Jordanian Government considers that to advocate any national unity or 
federation, by (the right) political means or proper and lawful statements, 
without encroachment upon the rights of others, should not be regarded as a matter 
for disagreement, since every Arab country is essentially based on the unity or fede- 
ration of its various parts. Thus, if the lawful reasons for, and the possibilities of, 
unity or federation are present, without prejudice to any private or public right, it 
would be to the advantage of the Arabs that disunity should disappear. For (dis- 
unity) is harmful to the nation, being incompatible with the welfare of the country or 
with its aspirations and hopes. In the opinion of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, 
this does not conflict in any way with the respect of the independence of any of the 
States of the League or with the existing systems of government as long as the decision 

(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor- 
danian Government's White Book (Amman* i947)> pp. 265-266. 

34 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

regarding any unity or federation is ultimately left to the will of the people (i) 
concerned, in their character as the source of all power, to general (Arab) national 
conscience, and to voluntary agreements between the responsible Governments. 

While we fully appreciate the concern of the Committee of the Foreign Ministers 
of the Arab States in putting an end to the mischievous propaganda directed against 
the Greater Syria Plan, as stated in their joint statement,(2) we are submitting the 
present Memorandum in order to reserve (the right) of the Jordanian Government to 
(maintain) its point of view regarding a national principle to which it attaches parti- 
cular significance, a (principle) which has an essential bearing on (Jordan's) regional 
interests and national Covenant. 

Kindly accept my highest esteem 

HEAD OF THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND FOREIGN MINISTER 
OF THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. 

Statement to the Press, Made by the Syrian Foreign Minister 

(Khalid Al-'Azm) Concerning Syrian Unity 2 2 

December 2, 1946 (3) 

I have read a statement made by Mr. Ibrahim Hashim,the Jordanian Prime Min- 
ister, in the Legislative Assembly. (This statement) is distinguished from 
previous statements by two points which the Syrian Government refutes most strong- 
ly and frankly : 

i. The distinction between Trans Jordan and Syria in so far as concerns (their) 
emergence and establishment : 

It was mentioned in the above statement that the State of Jordan was established 
by the Arab Revolt and by national principles, and that the Republic of Syria was 
created by France and the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 

Recent history, which we all still remember, is the best answer to this assertion. 
For Jordan's present status is nothing but the outcome of a statement made by the 
British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, in which he declared 
the extension of Britain's rule (4) over this province which had been cut off from 
Syria following the catastrophe of 1920. This (statement) was followed by the 
British authorities' choice of the rulers of that region. Sovereignty there is still 
incomplete, since foreign troops are still stationed in Jordan with the consent of its 
rulers. Our own status, on the other hand, is the outcome of a constitution drawn up 
by the Constituent Assembly which was lawfully elected in 1928, and according to 
which the State is headed by a president elected by the nation. 

As for the Sykes-Picot Agreement - which was irrevocably rejected by the whole 
country - it was buried in its own cradle, and exists only in the discarded records of 
the buried history of imperialism. Our country now enjoys a full fledged independ- 
ence and a complete sovereignty, which are not restricted by any limitation or condi- 

(i)Literally, "nation". ED. 

(2) See Doc. 20. ED. 

(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jor- 
danian Government's White Book (Amman, 1947), pp. 268-269. 

(4) The Arabic term used here is "siyada", literally meaning "sovereignty, suzerainty, 
etc" which does not apply in this case. ED. 



35 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

tion and cannot be undermined by any agreement or treaty. Moreover, there is no 
sign of any foreign troops in (our) country. 

2. The allegation that the evacuation of Syria was brought about by a European 
State, and that those who evacuated cannot be trusted not to return whenever the 
opportunity arises: 

We are loath to think that any Arab would attribute the favour of Syria's 
national sovereignty, which is characterized by the complete evacuation (of foreign 
forces), to the act of the foreigners, or that he would underestimate the scores of 
thousands of victims, the tremendous efforts exerted, the frequent revolts which broke 
out, and the dreadful disasters which have befallen Syria. The last of these (revolts) 
comprised the events of last year, as a result of which Syria attained her goal and 
realized her cherished aspiration 3 complete sovereignty and independence. 

We also deem it grave that any Arab leader should think of or allude to the return 
of those who have evacuated the country when Syria, having made all these sacrifices 
to achieve her independence, will not hesitate to make many more, in order to safe- 
guard her independent status and republican regime. 

It is, indeed, strange that the international situation, which is being supervised 
by the United Nations Organization, with the support of the Security Council, should 
be underestimated to the extent that Member States of that Organization should be 
suspected of thinking of revoking what (they) had concluded, thus violating the 
United Nations Charter and disturbing peace. 

I affirm once more the declaration I have made on behalf of the Government 
before the Chamber of Deputies which represents the wishes of the nation - a decla- 
ration which obtained the unanimous approval of the Chamber, But to persist in rais- 
ing this question by statements and declarations which are made every now and then 
would only serve those who harbour evil designs against the Arabs; and who would be 
satisfied by the subversion of the Arab League , which is enhancing the Arab cause 
and is standing as an impregnable bulwark in the face of Zionist ambitions ? 



Statement by the Jordanian Foreign Minister ( Ash-Shurayqy ), 
Made in the Legislative Assembly in Reply to a Question Concerning 
Syria's Attitude Towards the Arab Foreign Ministers' Resolution 

December 7, 1946 (i) 

Honourable Deputies: 

The Chamber has devoted this sitting to hearing our reply to the following 
question : 

(The Question) 

A number of the members of this Chamber have requested the holding of this spe- 
cial meeting so that the Government may enlighten the country (on the following) : 
First : The reasons for the persistence of certain Syrian papers in attacking this Arab 
country in a manner harmful to (our) national ties and common patriotic struggle, and 
which alienates the citizens of the one homeland from one other. 
Second : The reasons for which His Excellency the Syrian Prime Minister and De- 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordan- 
ian Government's White Book (Amman)) 1947* pp. 270-275. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

puty Foreign Minister had made to the Press new statements which will inevitably give 
rise to controversy between the two parts of one country, an action which conflicts 
with the resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, on Novem- 
ber 28, 1946, and declared on their behalf by His Excellency the President of the Coun- 
cil of the League of Arab States for this session. 

Deputy 'Isa 'Awad 

(The Reply) 
First : Regarding the first part of the question, I would reply as follows : 

The charges, revilements, and open instigations published by the Syrian Press 
and offending the dignity and the very self of (our) struggling Arab country, have, in 
fact, gone beyond all the limits of official courtesy moral and national. Nothing but 
provocation is intended by this. Although this can hurt none but those who perpe- 
trate it, yet any local authority may connive at it whenever it wants to foster estrange- 
ment and the alienation of the citizens of one homeland from one another. And yet, 
who is to blame (for such estrangement and alienation) if it is true that we are seeking 
the well-being of the Arabs and the consolidation of the League of Arab States ? 
Second : As for the second part of the question, a political argument with His Excel- 
lency the Lebanese Foreign Minister has, as you recall, recently taken place on the 
the subject of the Covenant of Syrian unity or federation. This was followed by a 
planned attack, in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, by certain (deputies) of the 
northern region of (our) dear (Arab) homeland. (This attack) was not less extremist 
than that made by the papers referred to. These (deputies) unjustly and most exten- 
sively dealt with matters which essentially pertain to our domestic affairs, comparing 
the two countries together on a basis of error or subterfuge. All this (happened) 
because Jordan, which is a part of (Greater) Syria, was and still is advocating the unity 
of the homeland, within the limits of lawful possibilities, in pursuance of what the 
Syrian fatherland has pledged itself to, and of what was unanimously adopted at the 
time by its regions. 

This deliberate attack compelled His Excellency the Prime Minister, Ibrahim 
Pasha Hashim, following a question addressed to him in the Chamber, to reply to the 
statement made by the Syrian Government in its Chamber of Deputies. In the mean- 
time, while I was in Cairo as the head of the Jordanian delegation, the Council of the 
League of Arab States was taken by surprise by the Syrian delegation's raising the 
subject of Syrian unity or federation, or what is referred to by the Press as "The Grea- 
ter Syria Plan". In the hope of putting an end to the controversy while yet maintain- 
ing (our) principles, we were the first to welcome a private, and not an off icial, discus- 
sion of the question because it was not on the Council's agenda for that session. We 
explained frankly to our brethren that the call for the unity or the federation of the 
homeland by lawful means, in our view, essentially pertains to the Pact of the League 
in (its) letter and spirit, and is one of its aims (quite) the contrary of what was being 
spread and diffused. (We also explained) that to announce and advocate proposals and 
plans for unity or confederation (i) does not conflict with the general principles of 
international law, as long as the question does not go beyond the limits of an opinion 
and a free invitation. 



(i) The Arabic term used here is "ittihad duwaliyy", literally meaning "international 
federation". ED. 



37 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



This is supported by international practice and precedents. Mr. Churchill, for 
example, is still advocating the federation of the States of Western Europe; during the 
last war he proposed and advocated the establishment of a federal state which would 
comprise France and England. Mr. Briand,the French (ex-Prime) Minister, had also, 
at the end of the First World War, espoused the call to the plan of the United States of 
Europe. Such (a policy) can in no way mean that any of these responsible statesmen 
was, in his plans and proposals, encroaching upon the systems of government in the 
other States in spite of the national and regional differences between those States. And 
yet, how different is this from our (own) call to a unity or federation to which all the 
Syrian territories had jointly bound themselves, so that no Syrian district now has the 
right to revoke it unilaterally, because of the violation of the general national wish and 
common interests of the Syrian regions (which such an act would constitute). 

The Council of the League, having heard our point of view and discussed the 
question in a brotherly spirit, decided to consider the discussion private, and (also 
decided) that the Foreign Ministers should come to an agreement among themselves. 
We thus met in the most friendly and brotherly (manner), and arrived at the following 
joint resolution: 

(See Doc. No. 20) 

The Foreign Ministers entrusted the announcement of this joint communique to 
His Excellency the President of the Council of the League for this session. They all 
agreed to cease all political controversy. We were the first to adhere to this, in spite of 
the intimations we felt in the papers, aiming at the shelving of the (very) principle (of 
Greater Syria) and not at ending the controversy. 

And to reaffirm further our adherence to the Pact of the League of Arab States, 
we submitted to the President of the Council of the League the following Memoran- 
dum: 

(See Doc. No. 21) 

Honourable Deputies: 

You will notice from these explanations that, in all we did, we were only aiming at 
the maintenance of the Covenant of national unity or federation, on the one hand, and 
the Pact of the League of Arab States, on the other. We would have liked to hope 
earnestly that our brethren who are in power in Northern Syria would not unjustifi- 
ably revive the controversy, contrary to what was agreed upon among the (Arab) For- 
eign Ministers in Cairo. In view of the statement recently made by His Excellency 
the Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister at a Press conference on 
December 2, 1946, the Jordanian Government cannot but correct the mistakes con- 
tained in that official statement, so that Arab public opinion would be aware of our 
point of view as well. 

His Excellency Khalid Bey al-' Azm stated that Trans Jordan was not the outcome 
of the Arab Revolt. He knows that (statehood) is one thing and the recognition there- 
of is another. (He also knows) that this beloved part of the greater homeland was the 
main field of the Revolt, and that its Goverment is the same Syrian Arab Government 
which was reduced to the south when the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement most severely tore up our Syrian country into pieces. No better proof 
of this is provided than (this country's) fluttering flag, which is the flag of the Arab 
Revolt and is decorated by the star of Syrian unity that beloved flag which shall 
remain an everlasting symbol of the birth of our one homeland in its natural bound- 
aries. 

38 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

As to what was stated by His Excellency Khalid Bey al-'Azm, to the effect that 
Northern Syria is the outcome of the Constitution of 1928, this is what we, too, say, 
but with this difference: this Constitution (of 1928) is in fact a regional constitution 
which was drawn up after the partition (of Syria) and on the basis of (that partition), 
by virtue of the deletions made in it by the French in order to confirm the partition 

Partition was, in fact, only the fruit of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. How, then, 
could this Zionist and imperialistic Agreement have been buried in its cradle, when 
our one homeland is still divided ? For if we are actively seeking the repudiation of 
this unjust Agreement, we ought to co-operate and work in solidarity for the realiza- 
tion of unity or national federation and the achievement for our beloved country of its 
full national rights. 

Some of the Honourable Deputies in the northern part of the (Arab) homeland 
inquired whether we wanted to annex them, or to join them thus forgetting that we 
are all the sons of one homeland, and that we are seeking neither (their) annexation (to 
us) nor (our) joining them, but only reunion. We want the brothers and (members of) 
the same family to reunite and pray that God will bring together those who have been 
separated, now that the circumstances for their reunion have become favourable. We 
(also want) to decide on a practical and legal method whereby these two parts of (our) 
dear country could come together by common agreement, within the limits of lawful 
possibilities and without prejudice to the systems of government or to international 
vested rights. (This we want) since the matter will ultimately rest with the wishes of 
the nation or on voluntary agreements between the responsible governments in a man- 
ner which will guarantee the other rights on an international basis. 

As for Jordan's association with Great Britain through a treaty of friendship and 
alliance, this will not undermine any situation or vested right in the case of any unity 
or federation ; the examples of this, in the international sphere, are numerous and well- 
known. Moreover, with her new treaty, Jordan has become independent, similar to 
her sister (States), and God has thereby saved her from the Mandate and the Balfour 
Declaration; there is no way to deny this fact, much as malicious propaganda may 
try to distort facts. 



Honourable Deputies: 

It has been sometimes said that this is not the time for advocating unity or federa- 
tion; but what harm is there in this, when unity is (only) strength and disunity weak- 
ness, and (also) when (unity or federation) have (now) become possible and depend 
exclusively on the wishes of the nation. We do not even consider that anybody 
whoever he may be has a right to prevent the one homeland from being reunited or 
its rupture from being mended, by lawful methods, on the basis of complete freedom, 
within the limits of available possibilities, and without prejudice to anybody's right. 

His Exellency the Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister men- 
tioned, in his recent statement, that the declarations of His Excellency the Jordanian 
Prime Minister which (in fact) solely deal with the wish to see the country united 
impair the interests of the Arabs and make the foreigner wait for an opportunity to 
undermine the League of Arab States. As for us, we know of nothing more harmful to 
the interests of the Arabs than the division of their homeland, as a measure to weaken 
their prestige. We also find nothing in the fostering of division which is prejudicial to 
the common interests of our country, except an actual conspiracy against (our) nation- 
al aspirations and the aims of the Arab League. 



39 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Resolution of the Jordanian Legislative Assembly Concerning 
Syrian Unity 

December 7, 1946 (7) 

1. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly completely upholds the principle of the 
unity of Greater Syria, and declares the adherence of Jordan to the joint Syrian 
Covenant emanating from the only Constituent Assembly which comprised the 
representatives of all the Syrian regions who met in 1920, i.e. the General Syrian 
Congress. 

2. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly affirms that the Covenant of the "greater 
unity of the country", which was duly supported by the results of the plebiscite held 
for the Syrian people in all their regions, is also a national principle unanimously 
respected, and that no Syrian region may revoke it unilaterally. This principle should 
not constitute an encroachment on the private rights of the regions and their systems 
of government, as long as the question of its definition and fulfilment rests ultimately 
with the general national wishes, or with voluntary agreements between the re- 
sponsible Governments. 

3. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly protests against the violation, by the 
Syrian Prime Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister, of the resolution adopted by the 
Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Arab States at the League Council, concerning 
the cessation of political controversy in deference to solidarity among the Arab 
States. It also protests against the publication by some Syrian papers of abusive 
attacks which injure the dignity of this country and are detrimental to inter-Arab 
relations and to the common national interests. 

4. The Assembly charges the Government with the announcement of this 
resolution and its communication to the quarters concerned. 

The Syrian (Qudsi) Project Submitted to the Political Committee 
of the Arab League for Establishing an Arab Federation 

January 23, 7957 (2) 

i. The President of the Syrian Council of Ministers has the honour to submit, in 

the name of the Syrian Government, the following Memorandum to the Secretariat- 



(7) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in the Jordanian 

Government's White Book (Amman 1947), p. 276. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously sent him by the 

Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. The project was considered by 

the Political Committee, which decided: 

(i)To invite those Arab States zvhich signed the Treaty of Joint Defence and Eco- 
nomic Co-operation ( Arab Collective Security Pact ) to proceed to ratify this 
Treaty and to implement its provisions at the earliest possible date. 
(2}To set up a committee composed of the representatives of Member States under the 
chairmanship of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, in order to study the comments of 
these States on the Project (to be sent within three months) and to report to the 
Political Committee before June 75, '95^. 

The Council of the League approved the recommendations of the Political Com- 
mittee on February 2, 7957. (Resol 337 - Sess. 13 - Sched. 3). ED. D. 



40 



International Affairs'. Arab Unity 



General of the League of Arab States, as well as to their Royal Highnesses and Excel- 
lencies, the Representatives of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Hashimite 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Mutawakkilite Yaman, at the Political Committee (of the 
League) now meeting in Cairo. He is hoping that (this Memorandum) will be studied 
by this Committee and that recommendations be made by it to the Council of the 
League so that this Council may take decisions concerning (these recommendations) 
at its shortly forthcoming meeting. 

2. The dangerous character of the international situation is obvious and does not 
need any explanation. Events are rapidly following each other in such a way that 
imminent dangers are coming well within sight. All this (is taking place ) while the 
the Arabs remain as they are: weak, divided, hesitant, backward, and perplexed. 
This (state of affairs) renders their countries and peoples exposed to inevitable 
(catastrophes) which one finds difficult to define, and makes them, when divided, of 
no significance on the international scale. (This will be so) whether the cold war 
continues, whether the apprehended event takes place, (i) or whether it comes to 
settling accounts. 

It has been proved that small states are no longer of any significance, and that 
they have to form a block that will bind them together by firm legal ties; the strong 
effect of which will become manifest in peace and the durability of which will not 
be subject to doubt in war. 

3. Besides these* dangers, which are harassing the whoje world, we find that the 
Arab States have been inflicted with another danger, namely, the Jewish enemy 
settled in the midst of our countries, harbouring evil designs over us, and whose 
danger increases every time a Jewish immigrants' ship anchors on the shores of 
Palestine. 

4. Sound military considerations indicate tha: it is at present difficult for most of 
the Arab States individually to face this Zionist danger, whose chief concern has been 
to divide the Arab States and meet them one after the other, so that it may survive and 
then expand. The only way to ward off its danger at present is to encircle it with a 
defensive tier in the North, East and South. 

One of the greatest catastrophes we fear may befall the Arab world on account 
of Israel is the separation, on the one hand, of the Arabs of Egypt and the adjoining 
(Arab lands) to the West these constitute about 60 millions and on the other hand, 
the Arabs of the East al-Mashriq [these constitute about 20 millions]. The most 
dangerous arrow that has been directed by the Jews against the Arabs has been the 
separation of these two segments (of the Arab world) through their manoeuvres in 
the Negev and through their murder of Bernadotte for their definite interest. 

5. Let us remember that the Jews look onto the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, 
and that they have possibilities for the equipment of a mercantile fleet and navy that 
would expose all the neighbouring Arab coastal (States) to danger, whether in respect 
of their economic (affairs) or their integrity. Their designs in (the Gulf of) Aqaba, 
in particular indicate (the existence of) great expansionist intentions (on their part) 
in these waters. 

6. All of the Arab States will, sooner or later, (find themselves) equally (exposed) to 
these dangers, whether international or Zionist, however much these States may differ 
in their geographical situations or in their local conditions. This is a fact which is 



(/) By the "apprehended event" w, presumably) meant the outbreak of war. ED. 

41 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



worth remembering. For the question is not one of some of the Arab States proceed- 
ing to rescue their sister (States). Indeed, the realities of the situation (necessitate) that 
all of (these Arab) States should take good care of their integrity and safeguard their 
existence. 

The events of the past years, whether in the international sphere or in Palestine, 
and (also) the designs harboured against the Arab world, are self-explanatory proofs 
of what we are saying (now). 

7. It is common knowledge that it is only the elements of strength, military pre- 
paredness, and material possibilities, which give weight to States in the political 
field. Accordingly, only Turkey and Israel, on the basis of their armies, are at present 
seriously taken into consideration by the (experts of the) two world blocs for the 
defence of the Middle East and for the achievement of security therein. The Arabs 
are, however, in the view of war commanders and their experts, but negligible quanti- 
ties. For this (reason), no arms are shipped to them, and the aid which they have been 
repeatedly promised and which has eventually come to be restricted to endless 
investigations, studies and postponements, has not been granted. 

8. We would point out that should the Arabs remain in their (present) condition, 
the question would not be one of their alignment with the Democratic Bloc or with 
Communism. For whichever of these two Blocs comes out victorious, (the Arabs) 
will continue to be pestered with Zionism and with foreign pressure, from the East 
or from the West. The important thing is to create power first and then to determine 
our stand in the light of our interests, confidently and with conviction, before looking 
towards this camp or that. The after-events of the last war have demonstrated to the 
intelligent that if strong states are defeated, they are treated, and will eventually be 
treated, better than victorious weak states. 

9. For these considerations, a summary of which we have made above, we consider 
it necessary to propose a practical project that would include all the Arab States and 
that would ensure unification in foreign policy, in the national defence forces , in 
economics, and in the basic (public) utilities, and that would be considered by Arab 
public opinion and by world blocs as a subject of interest and hope or apprehension. 

Recent history demonstrates that this process takes three forms : 

First, the coming into being of the "Arab United States" , which is the 
supreme ideal of every Arab. The events of the past two centuries have < demon- 
strated the propriety of (this form) and its impact upon the nations of Europe and 
America. And it is not a novel thing in the history of the Arabs, since for the past 
twelve centuries they have been as one State, and this is stronger than a "United 
States ". 

As to the second form -which, as is demonstrated by history, is less effective 
in its results - it is Federation (i) between the Arab States. 

The third form - which is the weakest of the (three forms) - is Confederation. 

10. In submitting these proposals, we would declare our faith in the definite pre- 
ferability of the first form. And if we have mentioned the second and third forms, that 
has been only in order to overcome (any) difficulties and obstacles that may stand 
in the way of the first (form) or lead to an examination of the two other forms. 

We consider that to follow this path will prove to be in the national interest 



(i) The Arabic word used here is "al-Ittihad". Unless the context requires otherwise, the 
term "federation" will be used throughout this text for the Arabic "ittihad". ED. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 

and (will also) lead to effective strength that will have the last word in the Middle 
East and a (considered) view on the international scale, and that will guarantee for us 
and for our posterity the integrity of the homeland and constant hope under these 
dangerous international circumstances. 

On the other hand, the continuance of the relations among the Arab States as 
they are (now) has not led to the consolidation of the prowess of the Arabs in the 
recent past, and consequently nothing much can be expected from this (continuance) 
in the dangerous present and in the impending future. In our view (therefore) it is 
inevitable that the preceding proposal should be adopted. 

11. As regards the practical means of accomplishing this, we would suggest that the 
Political Committee (of the Arab League) should proceed, during its present meeting, 
to adopt the idea in principle and then proclaim it publicly, first, in order to revive the 
aspirations of the Arab peoples and reinforce their resoluteness in the internal field, 
and (secondly) in order to consolidate the Arab poltitical stand abroad. Next, a (sub-) 
committee representing all the (Arab) States should be immediately chosen. Its task 
should be to get in touch speedily with those in power in the (Arab) capitals, (in order) 
to) expound the idea and overcome (any possible) obstacles, to harmonize the 
(various) points of view. (Its task should also be) to prepare the texts and documents 
necessary for the new status, on strong, practical and fruitful bases to be studied by it 
carefully and vigilantly. It should (further) propose the texts and provisions that 
ought to be drawn up and enacted. (The sub-committee) should, however, complete 
its work within a short time to be specified in advance by the Political Committee. 

The Political Committee should immediately after that meet at a time to be 
agreed upon from now in order to examine the proposals of the appropriate (sub-) 
committee, and in respect of these to recommend immediately to the Council of the 
(Arab League) the adoption of whatever has been agreed upon. 

12. Since the present circumstances do not permit any delay, postponement or the 
loss of time, we consider that, in addition to the above, the (Arab) Collective 
Security (Pact) should be ratified on the basis of a unified command, and that the 
appropriate military committee or committees should be called upon to discharge 
their functions, in particular to organise the command in time of peace and to 
provide for general military training in the Arab countries. 

The combination of this political preparation with the accomplishment 
of military organisation will restore to the Arab masses that (same) faith with which 
they (were able in the past) to inscribe the most splendid and glorious (deeds) in their 
history and which can save them from impending dangers. In this way, they will 
(be able to) serve their nation as well as mankind, by their strong and useful stand and 
by their (being able) to prevent quarrelling between the strong (States). This is (all) 
in addition to the hidden riches in our lands and the fortunes on the abundance of 
which depend mechanical (means of) civilization. 

13. It is evident that the problem of weapons constitutes a handicap; the solution of 
which depends on overcoming (certain) outstanding problems. This requires a 
(certain) amount of time. For this reason, we think that the Arab States should im- 
mediately proceed to train the larges possible number from amongst their inhabitants 
with the weapons possessed by them at present and in a speedy and concrete manner, 
as was done by Germany before she was permitted to re-arm in the years 1930-1935. 
Were the Arab States to do this in earnest, speedily and resolutely, the States con- 
cerned would then become certain that the Arabs had begun to lead a new life and 
(to work) energetically. This would pave (the way) for the solution of the various 
outstanding Arab problems. For the importance of states is always gauged, particu- 



43 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



larly in the present circumstances, by their discipline and power, as well as by what 
military strength they may have at the appropriate time. 

We believe that the essential thing is to find the men who are trained in the 
defence of our homelands. For once these are found, it will be easy to secure the 
weapons and equipment necessary for their divisions. 

14. We do not exaggerate when we say that the preceding proposals represent the 
persistent desire of the Arab nation in (the) various (Arab countries). 

We are also confident that what we are aiming at is realistic. For, whether we look 
back to the past history of the Arab nation or to the very reality of the present, we find 
that the factors of (Arab) unity are latent, abundant and tranquil, waiting for the 
leaders of the (Arab) peoples to give the sign to rise in order to dispel the perched 
spectre of disunity for which there are no roots or foundations in the conscience of the 
(Arab) people. 

The peculiar thing is for us to see throughout the world, particularly in Western 
and Eastern Europe, the existence of unions that bring together nations that have dif- 
ferent origins, racial roots, languages, history and traditions, (nations) that are stand- 
ing in solidarity and unifying their foreign policies, that share in their defensive forces 
and harmonize their economic possibilities, at a time when the Arab States are dis- 
united although they are of one common origin, race, language, history, beliefs and 
also interests. 

We even think it still more peculiar, in so far as concerns Germany, Japan and 
the Allies, that the enemies of yesterday should come to terms with each other for 
the sake of (their) common interests, and that the armies which only a few years ago 
stopped (their) dreadful fighting should be unified in order to ward off the imminent 
danger. It would be a priori more becoming for the brothers of yesterday and tomor- 
row to unite with each other. 

Finally, we (do) see bigger unions (i) in all parts of the world: In North and 
South America, in the Atlantic region, in Eastern Europe, and in the Far East. Only 
these alliances can subsist. 

15. However, if we were to decide on the creation of one of the three forms of union, 
we would have to point out clearly that there are (certain) regimes which, logically 
enough, should be given paramount consideration, but which can be harmonized 
with the (steps) which we would be taking during the preliminary stages. This is in 
order that these regimes may be reconciled with the new form (of union). 

History is rich in examples of this type, showing that states, principalities 
(duwaylat) or provinces maintained a degree of their particular status and (at the same 
time) closely shared in the basic (public) utilities, so that this status came to be harm- 
onized, steadily and amicably, within the framework of the common national unity 
which eventually brought individuals to this status. 

1 6. We also find it to be (our) duty to refer to (the fact that) the divergencies among 
the Arab States in respect of their populations are an accomplished fact. (In this 
connection), the sense of realism also necessitates that the composition of the councils 
and (other) organs which will have supervisory power over the federation should be 
taken into consideration. 

17. However, (with regard to) the considerations which it has often been said stand 



(j) The Arabic term used here is ec al-Ittihadat al-Kubra". ED. 



44 



International Affairs : Arab Unity 



in the way of unity or federation, (we would point out that) social developments and 
international resolutions, whether slow and quiet, or sudden and tumultuous, are 
such that all considerations formed on a purely local basis would not (be able to) 
stand in their way. Indeed, stupendous and oppressive waves are rising in this world, 
in the face of which the status of the individual state will not endure. It (thus) 
becomes the duty (of all) to find a solution for them before things get out of hand and 
before it is too late. Some may consider that the proposals contained in this Memoran- 
dum are of unrealizable or fanciful kinds of projects. But we are convinced that 
for the Arabs to remain as they are in the face of the dangerous international cir- 
cumstances, brings (one) nearer to illusion and (makes things) less enduring. 

1 8. It is our frank opinion that the Arab States will be exposed to inescapable de- 
velopments, that it is better for them to work towards federation as free (States), and 
that our interest should lie in whatever we accomplish ourselves, and (should be the 
result) of the zeal and enthusiasm of the Arab nation, instead of having other forms 
(of unity) imposed upon us under circumstances beyond our power 3 (circumstances) 
which will be adverse to us and advantageous to our enemies, and because of which 
the Arab peoples will suffer terribly. 

19. National consciousness is ahead of the politicians in the Arab world. This 
consciousness will not tolerate the continuation of a policy which resulted in the 
tragedy of Palestine and which may still result in graver (tragedies) in one (Arab) 
country after another. It would (indeed) be prudent on our part to respond to the will 
of the peoples while they are still disciplined and confident and before the anarchy of 
disunity overtakes them and takes advantage of their present failure and of their 
desperation of the future. 

20. The Arab League has frustrated the hopes of the Arabs. It has been prodigal in 
display and words and sparing in results and accomplishments. Everyone has (come) 
to realize that the spirit which predominates in it does not keep abreast of the realities 
of the age, the movement of the times, the grave nature of events, or the peoples' will 
to go ahead. This is because (the League) has not followed a constructive path in the 
defensive, economic, cultural or social fields. The individual Arab has not felt its 
existence because it did not provide for any of his needs or revive in him any hope 
for evolution and progress. 

21. The present session of the Political Committee, and after it (that of) the Council 
of the League, has, in the eyes of all the Arabs, the decisive word concerning the 
(very) existence of the League. Likewise, world events under the present circumstan- 
ces have the decisive word between peace and war and between the two quarrelling 
blocs. Accordingly, either the League should disintegrate in the eyes of the nation, 
if it is to continue in its argumentations, commentaries, adjournments and references 
to committees and governments ; or, else, it should be rejuvenated if it is to adopt 
whatever will bring confidence to (Arab) public opinion. 

22. The (thing) which will be reassuring to public opinion is this federation which 
will pool together the (various) possibilities of the Arab States. Foremost among these 
comes the defensive force which will be the result of the integration of the armies 
of (these States), the provisions for their needs, and the bearing of their burdens, 
(a force) which will protect (the federation) against dangers and which will safeguard 
its integrity. Then (comes the force) which will result from the pooling of the resour- 
ces of these countries, which are complementary to each other, whether as regards 
(their) characteristics, their abundance or their conditions. (These) include the 
ability to carry out great projects in the economic, health education and social fields. 



45 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



This will raise the standard of living of the individual Arab in order that he may feel 
at heart that the homeland is not an abstract word but a reality that is reflected in the 
invulnerability and evolution which everyday life brings to him, and in order that he 
may be filled with enthusiasm for the defence of this homeland and be energetic and 
successful in (his) work in the service of his nation, humanity, and peace. 

Jordanian Prime Minister's ( T. Abn Al-Huda's ) Statement on 
the Subject of the Iraqi-Jordanian Union 

January 12, 1952 (r) 

A secret session of (the Jordanian) Parliament was held on December 18, 1951, 
in which I made certain statements on this subject (of union with Iraq). It is, indeed, 
a matter for regret that what was said during that session was greatly distorted. 
One would have expected that those who publicized the deliberations of the secret ses- 
sion would at least have reported faithfully what was said, or, when they saw that 
what they reported was distorted, would have made an effort to correct this perver- 
sion. 

Certain foreign (news) agencies have reported that I asserted at that session 
that the reason for our non-acceptance of the idea of unity was that Iraq wanted to cut 
down the financial aid to Jordan to one-and-a-half million dinars, (2) while at present 
Jordan receives five million pounds sterling from Britain. I hereby declare that this 
report is fabrication and lying. What I did say, in the presence of forty deputies and 
some Ministers attending the session, was that if the proposed union aimed at the 
unification of defence or the Army, or at any other practical joint action, we would 
have considered it useful and fruitful. But the written and unequivocal plan is 
confined to the unification of the Crown, provided the Army continues to receive 
foreign aid as before and (provided) it preserves its present status and composition 
for another five to ten years, after which time the question of what may be done con- 
cerning the Army or any other real co-operation in economic matters will be recon- 
sidered. 

With regard to other arrangements leading to real unification, such as unity in 
economic matters, etc., the plan put forward did not specify any basis or offer any 
details. It onlv stated that agreement could be reached on such points after the above- 
mentioned transitional period, and that discussion of the bases of such a future agree- 
ment should be left until that time. 

As to the sums mentioned, I did not speak of them at all with respect to the Army. 
I did say that a verbal promise had been made to me by a responsible person, at a time 
when I was not holding a responsible position, that in view of the present economic 
situation in Jordan, Iraq would assist by giving loans for a number of years, ranging 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in a number 
of Arabic newspapers, including ad-Difa' (Jerusalem) January 13, 1952. See also 
an-Nida* (Beirut) January 13 and 14, 1952; an-Nahar( Beirut) January 13, 1952; 
and Liwa' al-Istiqlal (Beirut), January 15, 1952. This statement by Prime Minister 
Abu al-Huda was broadcast from the Jordanian Broadcasting Station, Jerusalem 
(Ramallah). 

(2) The Jordanian dinar is equivalent to one pound sterling. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



between one million to one million-and-a-half dinars, provided that such loans would 
naturally be given after the unification of the Crown. I also stated in Parliament that 
such loans could not be a rational cause for effecting a change in the existence of the 
Kingdom and the position of the country, or for overlooking the rights of the throne. 
I also said that if it were a matter of loans, those could be obtained by other means 
that will not expose the country to a fundamental change such as the one proposed. 
I explained that, if accepted, the plan would forever deprive the heirs of the late King 
'Abdullah of the rights of the throne, since (these rights) would be transferred to 
others. 

The above-mentioned (news) agencies have reported that the second reason I 
gave for my reluctance concerning unification was that the British alliance protects 
Jordan from dangers, and that any unity does not realize this protection. This is a 
most shameful distortion of my words, as all the deputies and Ministers present at 
the session heard me say that when unification would be practicable in a way that 
would secure its desired objective we would be confronted with an external danger 
which we would have to take into consideration. I said that we would have then to 
think together with the other Arab States about our prospects of repulsing such 
a danger should it appear after our agreement. I did not even hint that it was the 
British alliance that protected us, but explained that we had to rely on ourselves and 
on those Arab States with joint interests before relying on any foreign Power. 

This is what I said at that secret session. I withstood all the attacks in connec- 
tion with that session, because I wanted to maintain its secrecy. But since certain 
persons have deviated from the customary secrecy and thus caused the distortion of 
facts and the spreading of calumny, I felt compelled to clarify the situation. 

Truth and justice compel me to say that die Iraqi plan submitted was a reply to 
another plan proposed previously during the reign of King 'Abdullah. When I knew 
about it I was not in office. When I came into office nobody discussed it with me. 
After the death of King 'Abdullah, the official leaders of Iraq, foremost among whom 
were the Regent and his Prime Minister, expressed their wish that Jordan should 
continue to maintain whatever it considered was in its interest. No contacts or conver- 
sations were maintained on this matter by official Iraqi elements.But several unofficial 
personages in Iraq and outside, having learned of the old pkn, and without under- 
standing the facts and the realities, circulated these rumours and interpretations and 
continued to circulate them in order to confuse and mislead public opinion. I am 
glad to make this statement and thus establish the truth of the matter. 

Memorandum Submitted by the Iraqi Delegation to the Arab 97 
League, Concerning the Establishment of an Arab ' 
Federation: Jamaly Project 

January n, 1954 (j) 

The Iraqi delegation to the League of Arab States presents its compliments to 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously sent him by the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. The project was considered by the 
Political Committee of the League which decided " to take noteofitand to recommend 
that the Governments of Member States should study it". This decision of the Po- 
litical Committee was approved by the Council of the League on January 27, 
(Resol 667 Sess. 20 Sched. 8). ED. 



47 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



the fecretariat-General of the League of Arab States, and begs the communication of 
the following Memorandum to the Member States for their consideration. 

It is no secret that the national policy of Iraq has always aimed at the unity of the 
Arabs and their solidarity. Indeed, the Iraqi Government declared in the Speech 
from the Throne on December i, 1953, tiiat " the onl y wa Y to save the Arabs from 
their present plight, to face the Israeli danger and to stabilize peace in this vital part 
of the world, is to achieve Arab federation(i). "The Iraqi Government is going ahead 
with this policy...". The Iraqi Government has noted with pleasure and delight 
the sincere desire, repeatedly expressed by sister Egypt through her President and 
members of her Government, for the federation of the Arab countries. Such a desire 
has been expressed at varying periods by the heads of the Governments of the other 
Arab States. 

The Iraqi delegation has seen fit, in realization of its policy and in response to the 
noble desire repeatedly expressed in Egypt and in the other Arab countries, to submit 
the following Memorandum. It has taken care that (this Memorandum) should be 
compendious and brief, preferring to postpone the necessary details for the desired 
negotiations after (its proposal) has been accepted and a start has been made for its 
implementation : 

(A) 

1. The federation of the Arab peoples is no longer a figment of the imagination of 
those concerned with the highest principles. It has, indeed, become an incumbent 
national necessity for the whole of the Arab nation, on which depends the (very) exis- 
tence of (this nation), and on which at the same time depends the definite ability to 
ward off the dangers surrounding the Arab nation and to solve the problem faced 
by it. 

2. If we are to grant (the existence) of those facts and to realize the impending dan- 
ger that is threatening the very existence of the Arabs, it becomes the duty incumbent 
on the Arab States to proceed to take the initiative of actually adopting the principle 
of federation. (They should, however), at the same time consider the probability that 
they cannot, together and at the same speed, go along the road to federation, and this 
because of (the existence of certain) temporary geographical, internal and social fac- 
tors and considerations that are peculiar to each (individual) Arab country. 

3. The view that it is necessary for all the States Members of the League to proceed, 
collectively and at the same speed, towards the cherished federation has retarded the 
cause of Arab federation, which is the aim of the Pact of the League of Arab States. 

4. It is, thus, the duty of those (Arab) States having present possibilities for the 
achievement of federation to start immediately and to go ahead with its achievement, 
provided that they be assisted by the other States until these in their turn are able to 
adhere to this federation in a natural way. 

5. There is no doubt that any federation (union) between two or more States should 



(/) The term "federation 9 ' will be used throughout this text wherever the Arabic word 
used is ittihad, though this latter word may also be translated as "union". The term 
"federation", therefore, need not be understood here in its purely technical sense, that 
is, as a system of government distinguishable from the "confederal" and "unitary" 
systems. It is not clear whether the Iraqi Memorandum is referring to the purely 
technical meaning of the term. ED. 



International Affairs: Arab Unity 



stem from the conviction of the peoples and Governments as to what constitutes the 
demands of common interests and objectives. And it shall not be permissible to pro- 
ceed with federation on non-democratic bases. We (feel) confident that the peoples of 
the Arab States are, sooner or later, heading towards this objective. 

(B) 

i . Negotiations should take place between the States which are able and willing to 
enter into federation on bases upon which it is desired to establish the federation. 
After reaching an agreement in this respect, the League of Arab States should be noti- 
fied concerning that (matter), and (the League) should in turn notify the Member 
States concerning same. 

2 The States desiring to federate should proceed to draw up a constitution for the 
federation, which should be submitted to their parliaments for approval, whereupon 
their constitutions should be amended on that basis. 

3. The federal constitution should aim at unity in foreign policy, defence, common 
economic affairs and other matters that may be agreed upon by the negotiators. The 
constitution should provide for the legislative and executive organs of the federation 

(Q 

Iraq, indeed, expresses her willingness to enter the federation, together with 
any of the (other) Arab countries desirous of this. She sincerely hopes that she will 
meet, on the part of the Member (States), a desire similar to her own and for the rea- 
lization of which she is working. 

(D) 

Until all of the States Members of the Arab League belong to the federation, the 
Arab League should continue to be an instrument for the mutual association of the 
great Arab commonwealth. 

The Iraqi delegation takes this opportunity to express to the Secretariat-General 
its highest esteem and appreciation. 



49 



II 



The League of Arab States 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 



The Alexandria Protocol 

October 7, 1944 (i) 

The undersigned, chiefs and members of Arab delegations at the Preliminary 
Committee of the General Arab Conference, viz : 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRELIMINARY COMMITTEE 

H.E. MUSTAFA AL-NAHHAS PASHA, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister 

of Foreign Affairs; head of the Egyptian delegation; 

SYRIAN DELEGATION 

H. E. SA'DALLAH AL-JABIRI, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian 

delegation; 

H. E. JAMIL MARDAM BEY, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 

H. E. DR. NAGIB AL-ARMANAZI, Secretary General of the Presidency of the 
Syrian Republic; 

H. E. M. SABRI AL-'ASALI, deputy of Damascus; 

TRANS-JORDANIAN DELEGATION 

H.E. TAWFIQ ABDUL-HUDA PASHA, Trans- Jordanianian Prime Minister and 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Trans- Jordanian delegation; 

H. E. SULAYMAN SUKKAR BEY, Financial Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs; 

IRAQI DELEGATION 

H. E. HAMDI AL-BAHJAJI, Iraqi Prime Minister and head of the Iraqi delegation; 

H. E. ARSHAD AL-'UMARI, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 

H. E. NURI AL-SA'ID, former Iraqi Prime Minister; 

H. E. TAHSIN AL-'ASKARI, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt; 

LEBANESE DELEGATION 

H. E. RIYAD AL-SULH BEY, Lebanese Prime Minister and head of the Lebanese 

delegation; 

H. E. SALIM TAQLA BEY, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 

H. E. MUSA MUBARAK, Chief of the Presidential Cabinet; 

EGYPTIAN DELEGATION 

H. E. NAGIB AL-HILALI PASHA, Minister of Education; 

H. E. MUHAMMAD SABRI ABU-'ALAM PASHA, Minister of Justice; 



(/) This Protocol was drawn up at the end of the Conference on October 7, 1944. The 
text is copied from Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (Arab Informa- 
tion Center, New York, April 1955), pp. 5-$. ED. 



53 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



H. E. MUHAMMAD SALAH-AL-DIN BEY, Under Secretary of State of the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and 

to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure 

its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations, 

And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries, 

Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal 

20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General 

Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows : 

1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join 
the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League 
of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal foot- 
ing. 

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which 
the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the 
relations between those states ; to coordinate their political plans so as to insure their 
cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression 
by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the 
Arab countries. 

The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted 
them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two members states of the 
League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. 
In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding. 

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states 
of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other 
member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contra- 
dict the text or spirit of the present dispositions. 

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the 
policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed. 

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a 
member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile 
them. 

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee 
to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the poli- 
tical question which may be the object of agreement among Arab States. 

2. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER 

MATTERS 

A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely 
cooperate in the following matters: 

(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e. commercial exchange, customs, cur- 
rency, agriculture, and industry. 

(2) Communications, i.e. railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and tele- 
graphs. 

(3) Cultural matters. 

(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, extrad - 
tion of criminals, etc. 

(5) Social questions. 



54 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

(6) Questions of public health. 

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in 
which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be repre- 
sented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for cooperation in the above 
matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration. 

C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose object will 
be to control the work of the other subcommittee, to coordinate that part of the work 
which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted 
to the various governments. 

D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work, the Preliminary 
Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step 
towards the holding of a General Arab Conference. 

3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TEES IN THE FUTURE 

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that 
Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially 
if post-war events should result in institutions which bind various Powers more close- 
ly together. 

4. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING LEBANON 

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their res- 
pect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which 
the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Leba 
non's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country an- 
nounced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese 
Chamber of Deputies. 

5. SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING PALESTINE 

A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part 
of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched 
without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World. 

The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Gov- 
ernment and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of 
Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab 
rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal 
and toward the stabilization of peace and security. 

The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its 
willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding 
of their just rights. 

The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes 
which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. 
But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can 
be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe 
by another injustice, i.e. by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various reli- 
gions and denominations. 

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments 
and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Pales- 



55 



29 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

tine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine 
it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary 
Committee in its next meeting. 

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexan- 
dria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944). 

The Covenant of the League of Arab States 

Cairo, March 22, 1945 (i) 

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic 

His Royal Highness the Amir of Transjordan 

His Majesty the King of Iraq 

His Majesty the King of Sa'udi Arabi 

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic 

His Majesty the King of Egypt 

His Majesty the King of the Yaman 

In order to affirm the close connections and numerous ties which link the Arab 
States, and being desirous of maintaining and establishing these connections on the 
foundations of respect for the independence and sovereignty of those states, and in 
order to direct their efforts towards the general good of the Arab States, the improve- 
ment of their circumstances, the security of their future, and the realisation of their 
hopes and aspirations, and in response to Arab public opinion in all quarters of the 
Arab World. 

Have agreed to enter into a Covenant for this object, and have appointed the 
under-mentioned delegates on their behalf; 

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic 
Has appointed to represent Syria: 

His Excellency Paris al-Khuri, Prime Minister, 

His Excellency Djamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

His Royal Highness the Amir of Transjordan 

Has appointed to represent Transjordan: 

His Excellency Samir al-Rifa'i Pasha, Prime Minister, 

His Excellency Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha, Minister of the Interior, 

His Excellency Sulaiman al-Nabulsi Bey, Secretary to the Government. 

His Majesty the King of Iraq 

Has appointed to represent Iraq : 

His Excellency Arshad al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

His Excellency 'Ali Djawdat al-Aiyubi, Iraq Minister-Plenipotentiary at 

Washington, 

His Excellency Tahsin al-'Askari, Iraq Minister-Plenipotentiary at Cairo. 
His Majesty the King of Sa'udi Arabia 

Has appointed to represent the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia: 
His Excellency Al-Shaikh Yusuf Ya-Sin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 

to the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia. 



(i) The above translation is that of the Arab Office, London (1945). The attention of 
the reader is drawn to the fact that the term "Pact", instead of "Covenant", has 
been used in various contexts in this book. ED. 

56 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

His Excellency Khair al-Din al-Zirikli, Councillor of the Sa'udi Arabian 

Legation at Cairo. 

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic 
Has appointed to represent Lebanon : 

His Excellency 'Abd al-Hamid Karami, Prime Minister, 

His Excellency Yusuf Salim, Lebanese Minister-Plenipotentiary in Cairo. 

His Majesty the King of Egypt 

Has appointed to represent Egypt: 

His Excellency Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, Prime Minister, 

His Excellency Muhammad Husain Haikal Pasha, President of the Senate, 

His Excellency 'Abd al-Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

His Excellency Makram 'Ibaid Pasha, Minister of Finance, 

His Excellency Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice, 

His Excellency 'Abd al - Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri Bey, Minister of Public 

Instruction, 
His Excellency 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, Miniter-Plenipotentiary at the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
His Majesty the King of the Yaman 
Has Appointed to Represent the Yaman: 

Who, after exchange of their credentials granting them plenary power, which 
have been found genuine and in perfect order, have agreed upon the following : 

Article I 

The League of the Arab States shall be composed of the independent Arab States 
signatories to this Covenant. 

Each independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the the League. If 
it be desirous of adhesion (to the League), it shall lodge a petition to this effect, to be 
deposited with the Permanent Secretariat-General and submitted to the Council at 
the first session convened after the lodging of the petition. 

Article II 

The object of the League shall be to strengthen the ties between the participant 
states, to co-ordinate their political programmes in such a way as to effect real col- 
laboration between them, to preserve their independence and sovereignty, and to 
consider in general the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. 

Likewise a further object shall be the close collaboration of the participant states, 
in accordance with the regime and conditions prevailing in each (individual) state, in 
the following matters: 

(i). Economic and financial affairs, comprising trade reciprocity, tariffs, 

currency, agricultural and industrial matters. 
(2). Communications, comprising railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts 

and telegraphs. 
(3). Cultural affairs. 

(4). Matters relating to nationality, passports and visas, execution of judge- 
ments, and extradition of criminals. 
(5). Matters relating to social questions. 
(6). Matters relating to public health. 

Article III 

The League shall have a Council to be composed of representatives of the states 
participant in the League. Each state shall have a single vote without regard to the 
number of its representatives. 

57 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The Council's function shall be the realisation of the objects of the League and 
to give effect to such agreements as may be concluded between the participant states, 
relating to the matters indicated in the previous article and elsewhere. 

A further concern of the Council shall be to decide upon methods of collabora- 
tion with the international organisations which may, in the future, be created for the 
preservation of peace and security and the regulation of economic and social relations. 

Article IV 

For each subject specified in Article II, a special committee shall be formed in 
which the states participant in the League shall be represented. These committees 
shall be responsible for formulating the bases, extent, and form of collaboration in 
the shape of draft-agreements to be laid before the Council for considertion, prepa- 
ratory to their presentation to the afore-mentioned states. 

Members representative of the other Arab countries are permitted to participate 
in the afore-mentioned committees. The Council shall define the conditions under 
which those representatives may participate, and the regulations for representation 

Article V 

Recourse to force to resolve disputes between two or more League States is inad- 
missible. If a difference should arise between them, not pertaining to the independ- 
ence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of (any of the) states (concerned), and the 
the contending parties have recourse to the Council to settle it, then its decision is 
executory and obligatory. 

In this eventuality, the contending states shall have no part in the proceedings 
and resolutions of the Council. 

The Council shall mediate in any dispute which causes apprehension of a 
state of war between one of the League States and another, or one not (belonging to 
the League), in order to effect reconciliation between the two of them. 

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be issued by majority opinion. 

Article VI 

Should aggression by a state against a member state of the League take place or 
be apprehended, it is for the state which has suffered, or is threatened with aggression 
to demand that the Council be summoned to meet immediately. 

The Council shall decide upon the appropriate measures to check this aggression, 
and shall issue a decision by unanimous assent. If the aggression emanates from one 
of the League States, the view of the aggressor state shall not affect unanimity of 
assent. 

If aggression should take place in such fashion as to render the injured state's 
Government unable to communicate with the Council, its representative at the Coun- 
cil may demand that it be convened for the purpose set forth in the fore-going clause. 
If it is impossible for the representative to communicate with the League Council, 
any of its Member States has the right to demand that it be convened. 

Article VH 

Decisions of the Council by unanimous assent shall be obligatory on all the states 
participant in the League. Decisions of the League by majority (vote) shall be obli- 
gatory on those who accept them. 

In either case, the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each state in 
accordance with its fundamental constitution. 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

Article VUI 

Each state participant in the League shall respect the existing regime obtaining 
in the other League States, regarding it as a (fundamental) right of those states, and 
pledges itself not to undertake any action tending to alter that regime. 

Article IX 

Those Arab States desirous of closer collaboration with each other, and stronger 
ties than those specified by this Covenant, have a right to conclude such agreements 
between themselves towards the realisation of these objects, as they desire. 

Treaties and Agreements previously concluded, or which may be concluded with 
any other state, by any state belonging to the League, shall not be obligatory or bind- 
ing on the other members. 

Article X 

Cairo shall be the permanent seat of the League of Arab States. The League 
Council may assemble in whatsoever place it appoints. 

Article XI 

The Council shall normally be convened twice a year, each March and October. 
Extraordinary sessions shall be convened whenever occasion demands, on the request 
of two of the League States. 

Article XII 

The League shall have a Permanent Secretariat- General, consisting of a 
Secretary-General, Assistant- Secretaries, and an appropriate staff of officials. 

The League Council shall appoint the Secretary-General by a two-thirds 
majority of the League States. In consultation with the Council, the Secretary- 
General shall appoint the Assistant- Secretaries and the principal officials of the 
League. 

The League Council shall create internal administrative machinery to deal with 
the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters of personnel. 

The Secretary-General shall hold ambassadorial status, and the Assistant- Secre- 
taries the status of Ministers-Plenipotentiary. 

The first Secretary-General to the League shall be nominated in an appendix 
to this Covenant. 

Article XIII 

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft Budget of the League, and submit 
it to the Council for approval before the commencement of each financial year. 

The Council shall allocate the proportion of the expenses to be borne by each 
League State, and can review (the relative proportions in each case) as required. 

Article XIV 

Members of the League Council, members of its Committees, and those of its 
officials specified in the internal administration, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunity during the performance of their duties. 

The inviolability of buildings occupied by bureaus of the League shall be ob- 
served. 

Article XV 

The Council shall be convened on the first occasion at the instance of the Head 

59 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

of the Egyptian Government, and subsequently, at the instance of the Secretary- 
General. 

At each ordinary meeting the representatives of the League States shall preside 
over the Council by rotation. 

Article XVI 

Apart from the conditions defined in this Covenant, a majority opinion will suf- 
fice for the Council to make effective decisions on the following subjects: 
(i). Matters (relating to) personnel. 
(2). Approval of the Budget of the League. 
(3). The creation of an internal administration covering the Council, 

Committees, and Secretariat-General. 
(4). The decision to adjourn the session of a meeting. 

Article XVH 

The states participant in the League shall deposit with Secretariat-General 
texts of all the Treaties and Agreements which they have concluded, or may conclude 
with any other state belonging to, or outside the League. 

Article XVHI 

If any of the League States contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall 
give notice to the Council of its decision to withdraw, a year before it puts the 
decision into effect. 

The League Council has the right to regard any state not fulfilling the obligations 
of this Covenant, as having ceased to belong to the League. This shall be effected by a 
decision issued by unanimous assent of the states, excepting the state indicated. 

Article XIX 

It is permissible by agreement of two-thirds of the League States, to amend this 
Covenant, in order, especially, to render the ties between them firmer and closer, 
to found an Arab Court of Justice, and to co-ordinate the relations of the League with 
the international organisations which may, in future, be created to guarantee peace 
and security. 

No amendment shall be passed except at the meeting following the meeting at 
which the proposal was (originally) presented. 

Any state which does not accept the amendment has the right to withdraw on 
its becoming effective, without coming under the provisions of the article preceding. 

Article XX 

This Covenant along with its appendixes shall be ratified in conformity with the 
fundamental laws and methods of procedure obtaining in each of the contracting 
states. 

The articles of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General, and 
the Covenant shall have effect with those who have ratified it, after the elapse of 
fifteen days from the date upon which the Secretary-General has received articles of 
ratification from four states. 

This Covenant was drawn up in Arabic at Cairo, on the 8th of Rabi* II, 1364 
(22nd March, 1945), in a single text which shall be preserved in the Secretariat- 
General. 

A facsimile copy of the original shall be delivered to each of the League States. 

60 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 



Special Appendix Relating to Palestine 

Since the close of the last Great War, the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire has 
ceased to exist over the Arab countries which were detached from it, including Pales- 
tine which became independent, subject to no other state. The Treaty of Lausanne 
declared that its fate was the affair of those in it whom it properly concerned, and, 
although Palestine was unable to gain control over its own affairs it was only on the 
basis of the recognition of its (Palestine's) independence that the Covenant of the 
League (of Nations) in the year 1919, ratified the status which it (the League 
Covenant) gave it. Its existence and de jure national independence is a matter on 
which there is no doubt as there is no doubt about the independence of the other 
Arab countries. Therefore, although external manifestations of that independence 
have continued to be obscured by over-riding circumstances, it is not admissible that 
this should be an impediment to its (Palestine's) participation in the proceedings of 
the League Council. 

Consequently, the States, signatories to the Covenant of the Arab League, con- 
sider (it fitting) that, in view of the special circumstances of Palestine, and until such 
time as this country shall enjoy de facto exercise of independence, the League Council 
shall take upon itself the responsibility of selecting an Arab delegate from Palestine to 
participate in its proceedings. 

Special Appendix Relating to Co-operation with the Arab States, Non- 
participant in the League Council. 

In consideration (of the fact) that the States participant in the League will, both 
in council and committee, deal with matters, the benefit and effect of which concerns 
the entire Arab world, and since it is its duty to cherish the aspirations of those Arab 
countries non-participant in the Council, and to work toward their realisation. 

The States, signatories to the Covenant of the Arab League, are, in especial 
degree, concerned to instruct the League Council, whenever co-opting these states 
to the committees indicated in the Covenant comes under consideration, to col- 
laborate with them to the fullest possible extent; and, moreover, to spare no effort to 
appreciate their requirements, and comprehend their hopes and aspirations; then to 
apply itself to the improvement of their status and security of their future, by all the 
political means at its disposal. 

Special Appendix Relating to the Appointment of the Secretary-General 

to the League. 

The States, signatories to this Covenant, concur in the appointment of His 
Excellency 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Bey as Secretary-General to the League of 
Arab States. 

His appointment shall be for the period of two years. The League Council shall 
later define the future constitution of the Secretariat-General. 

Statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister (F. Al-Jamali), Made 
Before the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, Criticizing Secretary- 

General ( 'Azzam ) of the Arab League 

May 3, 1949 GO 

In speaking of the Secretary-General, a distinction should be made between 'Abd 



(i ) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the 
Political Department of the Arab League, Cairo. 

61 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



al-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the struggling Arab whom we respect and esteem, and 
'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 
ar-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the struggling Arab whom we respect and esteem, and 
'Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 
who is a general secretary employed by (these) Arab States. The personality of 'Az- 
zam Pasha the politician could not and should not be absorbed by the personality of 
'Azzam Pasha the employee of the League of Arab States. It is understood that the 
secretariat of the League, as is the case in similar organizations, should be a general 
(administrative) secretariat although it is called "al-Amana (i) (Secretariat). It 
should thus keep the records and the registers, communicate to the Member States 
the decisions of each of the competent committees provided for in the Pact (of the 
Arab League), such as the Cultural Committee, the Economic Committee, etc. 

It was necessary that internal regulations for the League should be drawn up on 
this basis, namely on a basis which maintains for each of the States the character of a 
responsible government within the League and which restricts the Secretariat-Gen- 
eral to secretarial functions. 

At the second session of the Council of the League, held from November 22 till 
December 14, 1945, the Iraqi delegation, having taken note of the draft regulations 
which the Secretary-General had prepared, and having found them in conflict with 
the responsibilities of the Member States and vesting in the Secretary-General wide 
powers which interfered with the powers and responsibilities of the Governments, 
submitted a Note in which it explained the bases which should be followed in drawing 
up the regulations so that these would not interfere with the responsibilities of the 
(said) Governments. The Council of the League accepted (these) bases at the time 
and referred them to a sub-committee composed of Messrs. Jamil Mardam Bey, 
Salih Jabr and as-Sanhury Pasha. But the Secretary-General took advantage of the 
change of the Iraqi Cabinet during the following session of the Council of the League, 
and allowed a return to the previous regulations which vest in him wide powers be- 
yond those usually possessed by Secretaries-General powers which conflict with 
the responsibilities of the Governments themselves, allow the Secretary-General to 
interfere with the affairs and policy of the League, and embarrass the policy of the 
States concerned without his being responsible either to a people or to a parliament. 
For it is the Secretary-General himself and not the States conerned who, by virtue of 
these regulations, came to control and dominate the policy of the League. This, in our 
view, is the root of all evil, the reason for the confusion and the embarrassment, and 
one of the sources of disagreement among the States of the League themselves. This 
has made the League a problem in the inter- Arab relations which, before the existence 
of the League, were extremely close and sincere. Thus, the regulations referred to 
above and their conflict with the spirit and aims of the Pact, were among the main 
factors which gave rise to numerous problems among the Arab States within and 
without the League. 

The Secretary-General has in fact assumed, in accordance with the present regu- 
lations, responsibilities which in reality belong to the States of the League and their 
Foreign Ministers. 

'Azzam Pasha is thus acting as an independent head of State, (2) supreme over 

(j) The Arabic term fe al-Amana" is presumably intended to mean in this context "trust, 
object of confidence, etc." , although meaning also "Secretariat". A pun is perhaps 
intended! ED. 

(2) "Head of Government" is presumably meant here. Compare in this respect 'Azzam's 
Reply (next document). ED. 

62 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, making statements and negotiating with re- 
gard to political matters as he himself deems fit, without caring whether or not this 
policy satisfies all the Governments of the Arab States by which he is employed. 

We have no intention to review here the series of the actions of the Secretariat- 
General nor the many statements for which (the Secretary-General) is not held res- 
ponsible. Nor do we wish to discuss the questions of its employees and the mode of 
their employment, for these are matters of detail with which we are not concerned 
here. But we refer in particular, however, to an example of the actions of the Secre- 
tariat-General relating to expenditure on the Palestine Volunteers, the fact which com- 
pelled the Iraqi Government to address the following memorandum to the Arab 
countries: 

"The Iraqi Government had, on various occasions and by various means, infor- 
med the Secretariat-General that (Iraq's) present financial situation was difficult, and 
that the conditions of the Palestine Volunteers on the Iraqi front necessitated the pay- 
ment of the amounts allocated to them and that the matter required some serious 
attention. But in spite of the resolution of the Political Committee of September 13, 
1948, allotting a monthly sum of 20,000 pounds to the Palestine Volunteers on the Ira- 
qi front, and the promise of the Secretariat-General itself to rise this sum to 25,000 
pounds should the number of the volunteers increase, the Secretariat-General only 
paid 15,000 pounds per month, which is below the amount decided upon. This a- 
mount itself was not paid at the beginning of every month except after demands (for 
payment) and reminders, as if it were a favour to the Palestine refugees or even to the 
Iraqi Government itself. The (Iraqi) Legation (i) wishes to point out that the latest 
information reaching the Iraqi Government is that the Secretariat-General will com- 
pletely stop payment at the end of March. This is notwithstanding the fact that the 
amount in fact paid by the Iraqi Government for the Palestine projects is 1,104,000 
pounds of which 591,957.379 pounds were paid direct to the Secretariat-General to 
be spent on volunteers, the Palestine volunteers in particular. 

" This account does not include :- 

a What is spent by the Iraqi Government for maintaining its Army in Pales- 
tine, 
b What is spent by the Iraqi Government on the Palestine refuges in Iraq and 

in the region occupied by its forces, 

c What is spent on the Palestine refugees and on the hospitals by Iraqi nation- 
al associations, such as the United Front and the Red Crescent, 
d The losses incurred by the Iraqi Government as a result of the discontinua- 
tion of the pumping of oil and the closing of the Haifa pipeline. 
"This is estimated at one and a half million pounds up to now, at a time when Iraq 
is in the greatest need of money. 

"The attitude of the Secretariat-General with regard to expenditure on the Pales- 
tine volunteers on the Iraqi front under these circumstances is a matter which calls 
for wonderment and surprise. For how could the Secretariat-General justify its 
dilatoriness in expenditure on the volunteers on the Iraqi front when it is in fact only 
spending on Palestinians who are defending their country in a spot which is being 
defended by these fighters most tenaciously. Moreover, the amount paid to the volun- 



(i ) Presumably, the memorandum in hand was sent by the Iraqi Government through its 
legations in the various Arab States. ED. 

63 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

teers on the Iraqi front does not exceed 100,000 pounds out of an amount of over three 
million pounds received by the Secretariat-General. This necessitates an investiga- 
tion of the nature of the policy adopted by the Secretariat-General in directing the 
expenditure on the fronts insofar as concerns their needs and military importance. 

"The Iraqi Government considers that it has a clear right to demand that the 
Secretariat-General should continue to spend (money) on the Palestine volunteers on 
the Iraqi front until the (solution) of the Palestine question. It also considers that 
this is a legitimate right necessitated by the prevailing military conditions, the (gen- 
eral) interest and the equitable channelling of the expenditure of the amount received 
by the Secretariat- General and out of which Iraq paid the above-mentioned amount. 
For apparently the Secretariat-General ought to have made its decisions and direct- 
ions more consistent and compatible with reality and with the (general) interest in 
apportioning expenditure, instead of allotting to the Iraqi front about one hundred 
thousand pounds out of over three million pounds which it in fact received. 

"In view of the attitude adopted by the Secretariat-General regarding the question 
of expenditure on the volunteers on (the Iraqi) front, and as long as this mentality and 
this attitude continue within the Secretariat-General, the Iraqi Government hereby 
declares that it will not be able to co-operate with the Secretariat-General regarding 
any question whatever unless it (first) pays the amounts due to the Palestine volunt- 
eers who are now in fact in the trenches at the front, pending the settlement of the 
Palestine question. 

"The Iraqi Government, therefore, finds itself compeled to divert henceforward 
its contributions to the Arab League (direct) to the Palestine volunteers on its front." 
Although the attitude of the Secretary-General with regard to expenditure on 
the Palestine volunteers who were in the trenches on the Iraqi front is as stated above, 
we have recently read about 'Azzam Pasha's visit to Damascus and about his agree- 
ment to continue payment to the Yarmuk Army which is not at the front at present. 
We have no objection here to his decision to continue to pay. On the other hand, 
would you not agree with me that the stoppage of payments to the volunteers on the 
Iraqi front evinces a policy of a particular character ? 
Gentlemen, 

The Iraqi Government's stand with regard to the League of Arab States may be 
summarized by the following points: 

a) Complete adherence to the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab States ; 

b) Continuous efforts by diplomatic means among the Arab States for reconcil- 
ing (their) points of view and unifying (their) efforts; 

c) To make the utmost use of Article 9 of the Pact. 

d) To demand the reconsideration of the regulations of the League. 

The Iraqi Government has in fact contacted the Arab Governments and inform- 
ed them of its point of view concerning the Secretariat-General and the necessity of 
reconsidering the regulations of the League. 

As for the third basis of our foreign policy, this is (to establish) neighbourly 
relations. I can thus assure you, gentlemen, that our relations with our neighbours are 
natural relations dictated by the geographical situation: our relations with them 
should be sincere and lasting, as we are always affected by what affects them, and they 
are affected by what affects us. Neighbourliness and co-operation are therefore es- 
sential, and we shall be (always) happy to maintain sound and amicable relations with 
our neighbours. 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

Reply of the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the Iraqi 3 
Foreign Minister's Statement before the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies -^ 

May 14,1949 (i) 

EXPLANATION 

The statement made by His Excellency Dr. Fadil al-Jamali in the Iraqi Chamber 
of Deputies in the morning of May 3, 1949, concerning the foreign policy of Iraq, 
contains unfounded allegations and baseless claims. His Excellency has thus spoken 
of what he termed the problem of the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab State 
and said that the personality of the Secretary-General should not be absorbed by the 
personality of the employee who supervises the keeping of records and the communi- 
cation of decisions. (He also said) that it should have been necessary for each State to 
retain its responsibilities and that the Secretariat-General should be restricted to sec- 
retarial functions, but that the Secretary-General had drawn up projects vesting in 
the Secretariat-General wide powers which interfere in and conflict with the respon- 
sibilities of the Governments. (He further added) that the Government of Iraq had 
submitted a Note in this respect, but that the Secretary-General had taken advantage 
of the change of the Iraqi Cabinet and maintained his wide powers which enable him 
to interfere (in the affairs of the States) without being responsible either to a people 
or to a parliament. (It was also said) that in accordance with the regulations he had 
drawn up he dominated the responsibilities of the Arab States and their Foreign 
Ministers, and that his status was that of a Prime Minister of (one of) the Arab States. 

These accusations constitute a transgression unacceptable to reason and unsup- 
ported by facts. The function of the Secretary-General in any internaional institution 
is not restricted to the supervision of the keeping of records and the communication 
of the decisions, but he has to exercise the powers granted to him by the organization 
by its pact, regulations and decisions. Before his statement in the Iraqi Chamber of 
Deputies, His Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister was not known to hold an opin- 
ion contrary to this. We have the right to believe that this is also the opinion of his 
superior. 

(Even if) His Excellency Nuri Pasha (as-Sa'id) were to have a different personal 
opinion, in the past or in the future, it is the opinion of the States of the Pact which 
matters. And yet, how is it (possible) to persuade the contracting and the successive 
Iraqi Governments (2) to maintain their adherence to the opinion of His Excellency, 
should he (himself) be outside the government ? And what fault can we (impute) to the 
Secretariat-General, when we bear in mind that the powers of the Secretary-General 
are in fact less than those of the Secretaries of similar international organizations. 
Nevertheless it would perhaps be for the good of His Excellency Nuri Pasha to order 
(his) Foreign Ministry to submit to him a comparative ( study ) of the powers of the 
Secretaries-General of international organizations so that it may become clear to him 



(1 ) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the 
Political Department of the Arab League, Cairo. The text of the Reply was handed 
on May 14, 1949* by the Secretary-General of the Arab League in person to the 
Iraqi Chargd d* Affaires in Cairo (A.J. ar-Rawi) . He asked that it be also sent to 
the President of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and that it be read to the Chamber 
and also broadcast. See al-Ahram, May 15, 1949. ED. 

(2) i.e. the Government which signed the Pact of the Arab League^ as well as those which 
succeeded it. ED. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

that those who drew up the Pact and the Internal Regulations of the League of Arab 
States were not extravagant. 

It is regrettable that the (Iraqi) Foreign Minister should say that " the Secretary- 
General took advantage of the change of the Iraqi Government and maintained his 
wide powers, etc...". For, in addition to the attack on the successive Iraqi Govern- 
ment which (this statement) implies, it is obviously false, because the powers of the 
Secretary-General are the result of the resolutions of the States and not their antece- 
dents. 

The Secretary-General in fact exercises such powers as are derived from the Pact, 
the resolutions and the Internal Regulations. All these were unanimously adopted, 
and neither the Secretariat-General nor the Council of the League have ever received 
any objection concerning them from any Iraqi Government ever since the establish- 
ment of the League. Should any Iraqi Government have had anything to complain of, 
it should have submitted its complaint in this respect to the Council of the League. 
But no such thing has ever happened. In fact, exactly the contrary always happened. 
The successive Iraqi Governments used to join the Council of the League in thanking 
the Secretariat-General. The minutes of the meetings of the Council and its resolu- 
tions dissipate any doubt in this respect. 

Needless to say, the Secretary-General is responsible to the Council of the Lea- 
gue. It is that Council, therefore, which possesses the right to judge his actions and 
to request him to render account of (these) actions. Since the present Iraqi Foreign 
Minister was attending the meetings of this Council as a representative of Iraq, and 
even presided over its meetings and abided by the regulations which he now pretends 
to repudiate, it should have therefore been possible for him, under the circumstances, 
to submit to the Council whatever he deemed open to criticism, or necessitating subs- 
titution or change. But instead of that he used to acknowledge, together with (the 
other) members of the Council, his gratitude to the Secretary-General for his efforts 
and for the actions undertaken by him. The Iraqi Foreign Minister knows as much 
of this as the other members representing the Arab States. Yet he remembered that 
the Secretary-General was not responsible to a people or to a parliament although his 
responsibility to the Council of the League and even to all the Arab peoples was evi- 
dent. But to attack him in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies when the Secretary- Gener- 
al does not have the right to attend its meetings is unique and not admitted by Cus- 
tom or convention as far as the other internaional organizations similar to the League 
of Arab States are concerned. 

As to the statement of His Excellency the (Foreign) Minister that the Secretary- 
General dominates, by virtue of the regulations which he drew up, the responsibilities 
of the Arab States and their Foreign Ministers, and that his status is similar to that of 
a Prime Minister of an Arab State, this is also clearly a false statement, too. This is in 
addition to (the fact) that it constitutes an attack against all the Governments of the 
Arab States and their prominent leaders who have participated in the activities of the 
Council through all these years and thanked the Secretariat-General for its efforts. 

The Secretary-General has not taken any measures, allowed any action or assum- 
ed any functions except what was unanimously decided upon by the Council of the 
League. He does not possess any powers except those vested in him by the Council, 
and has no authority on any Arab Government. His Excellency the (Foreign) Minis- 
ter should rather have given one (single) example of the authority which the Secretary 
-General assumed by himself or of the powers to which he made a general reference 
in his statement. This would have been more becoming than the accusations which 



66 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

were directed at random or the attacks which lack proof or evidence. In this connec- 
tion, many things conflicting with the facts were mentioned in the Iraqi Chamber of 
Deputies and appeared in the Iraqi Press on other occasions. It was the duty of the 
Foreign Minister to defend the Secretary-General and to clarify the facts concerning 
what was being said, as long as the Secretary-General is responsible to the Council of 
the League and to the Iraqi Government. But he took no action and preferred to take 
part in the allegations by joining himself with these who made (them). It was open to 
the Iraqi Governement to bring the Secretary-General before the Council of the 
League to render account, had it had anything that called for an account; but just 
people should not permit it to join in expressing gratitude to him, as happened at the 
meetings of the Council of the League, and then hurl at him false accusations. 

If the Secretariat- General of the League of Arab States has continously endea- 
voured to raise its international prestige and has paid regard to its outward appear- 
ance and relations in order to bring out (the League) in a fitting role as a respectable 
international organization, there is nothing in this that it should be blamed for. 
But it would be shameful if it were to fade out among the records and the docu- 
ments ; at a time when the (Organization) of Latin American States directs all its at- 
tention to raising the prestige of its Secretary-General and to having him treated as an 
outstanding international figure at the United Nations ; it even insisted that a place 
which he would occupy as an observer of its activitiezs, be assigned to him and 
succeeded in (its request). 

The powers which the Secretary-General has exercised and is exercising with 
regard to the affairs of Palestine may perhaps be among the questions which perplex- 
ed the mind of some of the Iraqi politicians. These are not the result of the regula- 
tions of the League but (the result) of the exigencies of the Palestine question, outside 
the scope of the functions of the Secretariat-General. Both the Council of the League 
and the Political Committee had entrusted the Secretary-General with the supervision 
of the (sub)-Committee of the Financial Experts, the Military Committee in Damasc- 
us, and the Palestine Committee in order to implement (the Council's resolutions) 
and to act on its behalf in certain cases. This led some of those who were unaware of 
the real facts to consider the activities of the Secretary-General in this respect as per- 
manent powers (vested in him) by virtue of his office whereas they were temporary 
powers dictated by the exigencies of a political, military and humanitarian emergency 
in Palestine and elsewhere. 

The Council and its Political Committee have likewise adopted several resolu- 
tions whereby the Secretary-General was entrusted with matters concerning Libya, 
North Africa, Indonesia and other countries, and he was also entrusted with the task 
of getting in touch with the States (concerned) on the subject of these matters, to 
communicate the views of the Council thereon, and to endeavour to bring them to a 
successful conclusion. Certain people thought that the activities, powers, acts and 
statements of the Secretary-General were improvised, forgetting that these were all 
the result of the decisions of the high authorities who have the power to take such 
decisions at the Council of the League or its Political Committee or at the meetings of 
the Arab Prime Ministers. 

I expect any Iraqi Minister who claims otherwise to submit before the Council of 
the League his complaint regarding an action or a statement emanating from the 
Secretary-General which was not supported by a resolution (adopted) by the States 
of the League. This storm around the powers of the Secretary-General is then unnat- 
ural and may conceal (something) which it does not show clearly, particularly since it 
is recognized that the platform of criticism in matters relating to the League is the 

6? 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Council of the League which represents all the Governments (of the League) and not 
the Chambers of Deputies in the various Arab countries. 

I finally assure the esteemed Iraqi Deputies that all the decisions I rely upon in 
my activities and statements and for which I assume responsibility were unanimously 
adopted either by the Council (of the League) or by the Political Committee. It is a 
disgrace to utter words at random instead of denning the subjects of the complaint, 
submitting (such a complaint) to the competent authorities, defining the means of the 
reform sought for, and laying it before them for study and discussion in the meeting 
place of the Arab States. This is a right of all the States of the League, for they are 
entitled, in the event of an urgent necessity, to demand the convening of an extra- 
ordinary session for this purpose. 

The Iraqis are a noble people who are making sacrifices and struggling for the 
sake of unity. A controversy of this nature cannot help them to find the truth and to 
proceed towards the achievement of unity, nor is it the method of responsible men. 
For the way to (unity) is constructive work within the League. And I have the honour 
to invite those responsible to bring me to account within this (League). Yet, should to 
these want us to settle accounts within the hearing of the Iraqi people in the Iraqi 
Parliament, I put myself (at their disposal) as an Arab who is more concerned about 
the satisfaction of Iraq than for his post in the League, and submit to the Iraqi esteem- 
ed Chamber of Deputies all the statements and explanations it may require, supported 
by the known and the confidential documents. 

This is as far as concerns the general points contained in the statement of His 
Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister. As for the other allegations in the course of 
which he dealt with certain actual facts, it would be sufficient to put on record in this 
respect certain facts which are supported by figures and documents ; we do not believe 
there is room for controversy in this respect under any circumstances whatever. 

He said that the Secretariat-General should have paid the expenses of the volun- 
eers on the Iraqi front in Palestine, amounting to twenty thousand pounds a month, 
tand that the Secretariat-General, in spite of several reminders had only paid fifteen 
thousand pounds a month. He followed this by referring to the expenses incurred by 
Iraq in the Palestine war, the expenses on the refugees and the losses sustained by the 
Iraqi Government as a result of the stoppage of the flow of petrol. 

It is no concern of ours to speak of the expenses incurred by Iraq in the Palestine 
war, of what she paid to persons and organizations through means other than those of 
the League, of the expenses borne by the Iraqi Government for the refugees, and of 
the losses it incurred as a result of the stoppage of the flow of petrol, for all these (mat- 
ters) concern the Iraqi Government itself. All that could be said in this regard is that 
the other Arab Governments have born their share in the Palestine expenses and in 
spending on the refugees. Many of their interests were exposed to damage as a result 
of the war, as is natural and to be expected. However, what the Iraqi Foreign Minis- 
ter mentioned regarding the volunteers on the Iraqi front, on whom the Secretariat- 
General should have spent (money), needs clarification. 

It is a fact that no resolution was passed by the Political Committee for allotting 
twenty thousand pounds to the Palestine Volunteers attached to the Iraqi Command 
in Transjordan. For the Committee's resolution of September 12, 1948, concerning 
these volunteers, provided that the League should continue to provide supplies for 
these fighting Palestinian forces irrespective of whether they were attached to the 
Arab armies in Palestine or to the Palestine Government. 

Discussions were held with the competent persons of the Iraq headquarters in 
Transjordan to the effect that the number of the above volunteers should be one thou- 

68 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

sand, provided that the salary of each of them should not exceed ten dinars a month. 
The Secretariat-General confirmed this by official letters addressed to that command. 
After that, the Secretariat-General continued to send monthly sums exceeding this 
amount to the Iraqi Command in Amman, in spite of the fact that what it was (in fact) 
sending exceeded the actual salary of the above-mentioned forces. This was made at 
the request of the command of these forces. For the salaries for the first month after 
the formation of these forces amounted to 7,089 Palestine pounds and 217 mils. (/) 
The salaries for the second month amounted to 7,075 Palestine pounds and 985 mils, 
and for the third month thus amounted to n, 128 Palestine pounds and 984 mils, 
while the amounts remitted to the Iraqi Command to meet these salaries during this 
period totalled 25,675 Palestine pounds. 

The amounts remitted to the Iraqi Command for spending on these forces total- 
led, until April 1949, 136,538 Palestine pounds and 415 mils. In the same way, (the 
amounts) which reached the Jordanian Government to consolidate the Iraqi-Jordan- 
ian front amounted to 347,449 Palestine pounds and 595 mils. This was in addition to 
the amounts paid to the refugees in this region and to the hospitals. It is thus clear 
that all (the amounts) paid by the Iraqi Government, out of the (amount) due by it 
for the relief of Palestine, were spent on that front, and even more than those a- 
mounts (was spent). 

The statement of the Iraqi Foreign Minister mentioned that the Secretariat- 
General) was not paying these amounts except after many reminders. The fact is that 
these reminders did not relate to the payment of the amounts decided upon, but to the 
increase in these amounts in spite of the agreement reached between the Secretary- 
General and Shakir al-Wady Pasha on the necessity of economizing in spending on 
those forces. Yet the esteemed (Iraqi) Chamber of Deputies may be surprised to 
know that the complaint raised before it by the (Foreign) Minister was not sent to the 
Secretariat-General, and that (the Secretariat-General) has no official knowledge of it, 
in the same way as it will be surprised (to learn) that (the complaint) was associated 
with Iraq's (financial) contribution to the League. This is a complaint which relates 
to a function distinct from the functions of the Secretariat-General according to the 
resolutions of the Council itself. All there is to it is that the Secretary-Genera] is 
entrusted with its supervision as an independent administration outside the League. 
Moreover, the Iraqi Governent has not paid its subscriptions to the expenses of the 
Secretariat-General for two years, that is to say, before the Arab Armies entered 
Palestine. And it still owes over two hundred thousand pounds for the relief of Pales- 
tine, that is to say, to the fund of the Committee of Financial Experts which is alloca- 
ted to the affairs of the volunteers and other purposes in Palestine. 

In addition to the above, this administration has spent in the northern region of 
Palestine, namely in the region which was defended by the Iraqi, Jordanian, Syrian 
and Lebanese Armies, and for aid to these armies, 67.3%of the total amounts it receiv- 
ed from the Arab Governments for spending on the defence of Palestine. The fund 
the Committee of Experts still contains, out of these, vast sums and assets. 

As for the spending on the Yarmuk Force which is under the responsibility of the 
Arab League, and the statement that when the Secretary-General recently visited 
Syria he decided to continue spending on these forces, thus taking sides with Syria, 
the truth is that nothing of the sort happened. It was (in fact) the contrary that hap- 
pened. For upon his visit to Damascus the Secretary-General was accompanied by 



( i) A "mil" in Palestine currency is equivalent to i-ioooth of a pound. ED 

69 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the chairman of the Committee of the Financial Experts for Palestine in order to dis- 
cuss the future of the Yarmuk Force which the Secretariat-General had formed, sup- 
plied with arms and equipment, and spent(money) on. This force was at first known 
under the name of the Army of Delivrance ( i), and the chairman of the above Com- 
mittee concluded an agreement with the competent persons of the Syrian Ministry of 
National Defence for the formation of a committee for this purpose. (2) (The com- 
mittee) was then formed by Rescript (3) No. 277, of April 18,1 949, under the chair- 
manship of Taha al-Hashimy Pasha, who was in charge of that force and who had 
taken over from Major-General Ismail Safwat Pasha, and from Messrs. Muhammad 
Aly Namazy Bey, Brigadier Anwar Muhammad, Lt. -Colonel Shawkat Shuqayr, 
Captain 'Abd al-Wehhab Nizam, and Colonel Mahmud al-Hindy, as members. 

The above committee met on April 19, 1949, and the meeting was attended by 
those whose names were mentioned above, with the exception of Colonel Mahmud 
al-Hindy. It was also attended by Major-General 'Abdullah 'Atfa on behalf of the 
Commander-m-Chief of the Syrian Army and of the Armed Forces, and Mr. Ahmad 
al-Khany as a representative of the Syrian Ministry of Finance. 

The discussions covered the fate of the Yarmuk Force and its equipment as well 
as the relation between the Arab League and the Syrian Government with regard to 
what the Military Committee had received from the Syrian Government (also) with 
regard to what this Ministry had received from the Military Committee. 

After deliberation the Committee took the following decisions :- 

1 The Yarmuk Force shall remain as it is, and spending on it shall continue until 

the conclusion of the armistice between the Syrian Government and the Jews. 

2 Immediately upon the mere conclusion of the armistice referred to in the pre- 

vious clause, gradual demobilization of these forces shall begin in accordance 
with the usual military procedure, provided that they are all demobilized by 
the end of May 1949, which is the latest date at which the League can meet 
those expenses. 

3 After the completion of the demobilization of the above-mentioned Force, a 

reduced body representing the General Inspectorate, shall be maintained for 
supervising the liquidation and for preserving the equipment, arms and supplies 
which are stored in depots and which will be withdrawn from the un : ts of the 
Yarmuk Force. (The body in question shall be maintained) until such time 
as the League shall decide on the fate of such equipment, arms and supplies, provid- 
ed that that this body shall be presided over by Lt. Colonel Shawkat Shuqayr. 

4 The Committee recommends that the demobilization of the undesirable ele- 

ments should start forthwith with a view to reducing expenditure. 

5 The question of the settlement of the pending matters between the Syrian Min- 

istry of National Defence and the General Inspectorate in connection with the 
arms, supplies and equipment delivered by each of them, as well as other mat- 
ters is the concern of the League. The liquidation of these (matters) shall be en- 
trusted, upon the full completion of the demobilization, to a committee compos- 
ed of a representative of the League, a representative of the Inspectorate and a 
representative of the Syrian Government. 



(1) In Arabic, "Jaysh al-Inqadh". ED. 

(2) Presumably) for the purpose of looking after the Yarmuk Force by "supplying it with 
arms, equipping it, and spending money on 1'r." ED. 

(3) The Arabic term used here is * c qarar". ED. 



70 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

As to the assertion that certain Arab States had refused to pay their share in 
the defence of Palestine, the facts confirmed by figures, show that the Arab States 
meant in the statement (of the Iraqi Foreign Minister) have paid their full shares in 
that defence. His Excellency the Iraqi Foreign Minister is aware of this, since the 
chairman of the Committee of Financial Experts had furnished him with a detailed 
statement of what was paid by the Arab States for that purpose. It is worth noting in 
this connection that the Iraqi Government is still liable to pay the sum of 208,362.621 
Egyptian pounds of its share in the expenses of the defence of Palestine. This is in 
addition to what it failed to pay of its subscription to the budget of the Secretariat- 
General for the years 1948-1949, i.e. the amount of 84,096 Egyptian pounds. And 
this (happened) at a time when the Egyptian and the Saudi-Arabian Governments 
paid 74% of the total amounts received by the Secretariat-General and allocatedto the 
defence of Palestine, while the remainder was paid by the other five States, including 
Iraq. 

To conclude, I hope that the following facts be clear :- 

First : The Secretariat-General was not under any obligation to spend (money) 
on volunteers assisting the Iraq' Army, since the intention was to assist the 
weak armies. Nevertheless, in view of the situation in which the Iraqi 
Army found itself in the field, and considering the Iraqi Command's 
complaint of the shortage in (the Army's) number, the Secretary-General 
suggested to His Excellency Nur ad-Din Pasha, the Iraqi Commander, to 
supply him with money for the recruitment of a number of Palestinians to 
serve under the Iraqi Command. The maximum amount which the Iraqi 
Command was asking for at the time was ten thousand pounds a month, 
while the sums (in fact) spent on these forces amounted to 136,538.415 
Palestine pounds. 

Second : The volunteer force attached to the Iraqi Command was employed in sectors 
lying between the Iraqi Army and the Jewish forces and was immobilized in 
its positions. The League could not therefore employ (this force) during the 
fighting as a reserve force and a mobile guerilla, in the same manner in 
which it had employed other (forces) at the expense of great sacrifices, when 
certain Arab Armies had to be on the defensive while the Egyptian Army was, 
(in the meantime), fighting single-handed. 

Third : The Secretariat-General does expect the responsible authorities in Iraq to 
release it from its obligation concerning the expenditure on these forces and 
to show the services which (these forces) rendered (in the fight) against the 
Jews and so justify the huge amounts spent on them. 

In conclusion, I request the esteemed Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and the es- 
teemed representatives of the (Iraqi) people (i) to be sure that any difference between 
any Iraqi Minister or Prime Minister and myself will change nothing of my affection 
and deep respect for the struggling Iraqi people and the noble Hashimite Family. I 
shall never forget that I am an Arab, that I lived and was respected in Iraq, that I 
associated with its outstanding leaders, and that I am still proud of their friendship 
and comradeship. 

Though I may blame considerably the Foreign Minister for his action, yet his 
statement was not completely untrue, for it contains a fact which we should always 
bear in mind, namely, that our plight in Palestine has not come to an end yet. Let 
then everything in which we have been either wrong or right serve as a lesson which 



(i) Literally, "nation". ED. 

71 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

will help us to repel the aggression and to achieve a final victory with a view to safe- 
guarding the honour of the Arab nation with renascent Iraq, I hope, alway in its van. 
And I am none but of (the tribe of) Ghaziyya (i); were it to stray 
I would be straying; and were it to be wise I would be wise. 



Draft Statute of the Arab Court of Justice Prepared by the Three- 
Man Commission Appointed by the Council of the Arab League at its 
Twelfth Ordinary Session 

April 13, jpjo (2) 

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT 

Article i. The Arab Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the 
League of Arab States. It shall function in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Statute. An Arab State which is not a Member of the League may become 
a party to the Statute upon the recommendation of the Council of the League. 
Article 2. The Court shall consist of seven judges no two of whom may be nationals 
of the same State. 

A quorum of five judges shall suffice to constitute the Court. The judges 
shall preside in rotation as may be provided by the rules of the Court. 
Article 3. The Court shall be composed of a body of judges, with the stipulation that 
they be: 

a. Subjects of the Contracting Parties to the present Statute. 

b. Persons of high moral character. 

c. Persons who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris- 
consults of recognized competence in international law. 

Article 4. a. The members of the Court shall be elected by the Council of the 
League of Arab States, by secret ballot from a list of persons nomin- 
ated by the States which are panics to this Statute. 
b.Every State may nominate three persons, not more than two of whom 
shall be of its own nationality. Before making these nominations, each 
State shall consult its highest judicial institutions, its legal faculties, 
its lawyers' unions and other associations devoted to the study of law. 

c. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall prepare 
a list in alphabetical order of all the persons thus nominated and 
submit it to the Council of the League. 

d. In the event of more than one national of the same State obtaining 
an absolute majority of votes, the one who obtains the greater number of votes shall 
be elected. In the event of an equality of votes, the eldest shall be considered as 
elected. 



(j) Ghaziyya is the tribe of the poet who composed these lines (in Arabic) . So strong was 
his love for his tribe that he expressed himself as above. Azzam recites these lines 
here in order to exhort his readers to solidarity. ED. 

(2) The text is copied from E. Foda> Projected Arab Court of Justice (The Hague, 
1958) pp. 226-236. 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

Article 5. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4, the conditions 
under which a State which is a party to the present Statute may participate in electing 
the members of the Court shall be laid down by the Council of the League 
Article 6. The judges of the Court shall be elected for six years and may be re- 
elected; provided, however, that of the judges elected at the first election, the terms of 
three judges shall expire at the end of three years and the terms of the other four 
judges shall expire at the end of six years. 

The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the above-mentioned 
period of three years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Court itself. 

The members of the Court shall continue to discharge their duties until 
their places have been filled, except in case of resignation or deposal. 
Article 7. a. Vacancies occurring through resignation, death or any other cause* 
shall be filled by the same method as that provided by article 4. 
b. A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of 
office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of his 
predecessor's term.(i) 

Article 8. In the case of the resignation of a member of the Court, the resignation 
shall be addressed to the President of the Court for transmission to 
the Secretary-General. This last notification makes the place vacant. 
Article 9. a. The Court shall elect its President and Vice-President for one year; 
they may be re-elected, provided they are not re-elected before the 
elapse of a whole year. 

b. The Court shall appoint its Registrar and may provide for the 
appointment of such other officers as may be necessary. 

Article 10. a. The seat of the Court shall be established at 

This, however, shall not prevent the Court from sitting elsewhere 
whenever the Court considers it desirable. 

b. The President and the Registrar shall reside at the Court. The 
member shall always be available and shall be bound to hold them- 
selves permanently at the disposal of the Court. 

Article n. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he 
should not take part in the decision of a particular case, he should declare the reasons 
for this, which are to be recorded in special minutes which should be kept by the 
Court. 

The advocate for a party in dispute may recuse a judge by filing a report 
in the Court before commencing any rebuttal or defence; thereafter he shall cease to 
have this right. 

It shall also be possible to enter recusation if reasons have appeared after 
the commencement of the pleading, or if the applicant can establish that he did not 
know of these reasons until the time of filing his recusation. 

Recusation of all the judges on the bench or of so many of them as to 
leave the remaining number of judges insufficient to give judgement on such recus- 
ation or to decide the dispute if the recusation is accepted, shall not be permitted. 



(j) FouadAmoun of Lebanon has suggested that paragraph "b". should be asfollows: "The 
term of office of a member elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired 
shall be six years in accordance with the provisions of article 6." - (This notice is embodied 
within the Arabic text of the project.) 



73 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The realisation should state the reasons on which it is based, and any sup- 
porting documentary evidence should be attached. 

The judge in respect of whom the recusation is entered shall give a 
written reply within ten days from the date of filing the said recusation. 

If the reasons submitted in the recusation provide legal grounds for 
removal and the judge involved has submitted his reply within the prescribed period 
admitted them in his reply, the Court shall decide his removal. 

In other cases not provided for by the preceding paragraph, the Court shall 
consider the recusation on the day following the fixed date. It shall investigate the 
reasons on which the recusation is based and give its decision as soon as possible after 
hearing the statements of the party entering the recusation and the comments of the 
judge. 

Article 12. a. The Arab Court of Justice shall have the legal capacity to carry on 
its functions in all States which are members of the League of Arab 
States or parties to its Statue. 

b. The members of the Court and the Registrar shall have diplomatic 
immunities and privileges in every State which is a member of the 
Arab League or a party to the present Statute. 

c. The judges of the Court shall have the same precedence and privil- 
eges as those accorded in the protocol systems to ambassadors in 
States Parties to the Statute. The Registrar shall have the same prece- 
dence and privileges as those accorded to plenipotentiary ministers. 

d. The buildings occupied by the Court shall be protected and its funds 
and property, wherever it may be, shall not be subject to search 
procedure or attachment or acquisition or confiscation or any other 
similar procedure. 

e. The files of the Court and documents of all kinds whether the pro- 
perty of the Court or within its possession, shall be protected. 

f. The salaries paid by the Court to its judges and officers shall be free 
from taxation. 

g. Official correspondence of the Court shall be treated in the States 
p arties to the Statue on an equal footing with correspondence of 
foreign countries or their diplomatic missions, that is to say, in res- 
pect of priority, postage, telegrams, telephone calls, etc. ; and also in 
news items to be respect of fees for distributed to the press or 
broadcast. These official messages and correspondence shall not be 
subject to any censorship. 

h. The Secretary- General of the League of Arab States shall conclude 
agreements in respect of privileges and immunitites as referred to 
above with States non-Parties to the present Statute. 

Article 13. The judges of the Court shall, before taking up their duties, make a 
solemn declaration in open court. The form of oath shall be as follows: 

CC I swear by Almighty God to perform my duties faithfully and honestly". 
This oath shall be recorded in special minutes. The judges forming the first panel 
shall take the oath before the Council for the League of Arab States. 
Article 14. The sessions of the Court shall start on the first Monday of the month of 
November and shall end by the end of June of each year. 

The President of the Court shall have the right to call a session during 
the Court's vacation if circumstances render this necessary. 



74 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

The Court shall not be in session on the Fridays and Sundays of every, 
week or on the anniversary of the inauguration day of the League of Arab States 
or on the official holidays of the country in which the Court has its seat. 
Article 15. The Court shall appoint its Registrar from among three persons to be 
nominated by the Secretary- General of the League of Arab States. The Court shall 
appoint any other officers whom it needs on the recommendation of the Registrar. 
Article 16. Each member of the Court shall be paid a salary fixed by the Council of 
the Arab League. The General Assembly shall decide the annual remuneration to be 
given to the President and the remuneration to be given to any member of the Court 
for every day he carries on the functions of the President during the latter 's absence. 
It shall also fix the salary of the Registrar. 

The General Assembly shall fix the conditions of which retirement pensions may 
be given to members of the Court and its officers. It shall also lay down the conditions 
for recruitment, promotion and discipline of the officers. 

COMPETENCE OF THE COURT 

Article 17. Only States may be parties in cases before the Arab Court of Justice. A 
State shall have the right to present before the Court any dispute or difference be- 
tween it and any other State concerning the interests of its nationals. 
Article 18. The jurisdiction of the Arab Court of Justice shall comprise the legal dis- 
putes concerning: 

a. the interpretation of a treaty or any international obligation; 

b. any question of international law; 

c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a 
breach of an international obligation or a right established for a 
State or some of its nationals. 

d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach 
of an international obligation; 

e. all cases or disputes which the parties agree to bring before the Court. 
Article 19. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, the Arab 
League States may entrust the solution of a particular dispute to another court, by 
virtue of a special agreement. 

Article 20. If any party pleads non-competency, the Court shall decide such plea 
after hearing the statements of the parties to the dispute. The decision shall state the 
reasons on which it is based. 

PROCEDURE 

Article 21. Cases shall be brought before the Court in the form of plaints. The 
plaint shall state the party to the dispute which has raised the case, its agent in hand- 
ling the case, the other party to the dispute, the subject of the dispute, sufficient details 
of the facts, the evidence in support of the claim and the relief sought. 
Article 22. The plaint shall be accompanied by a document indicating the authority 
of the agent to represent the State, together with all the documents in support of 
the claim. 

Article 23. The Registrar of the Court shall give a copy of the plaint and enclosures 
to the State against which the case has been raised within a period not exceeding one 
week from the date of receiving the plaint. He shall also communicate immediately 
to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States that the case has been raised. 
He shall also inform the States Parties to the Statute of the Court. Any or all of 
these States shall have the right of examine, throught its agents, all the papers and 
documents of the case in the registry of the Court. 



75 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article 24. If the subject of the dispute brought before the Court concerns the 
interpretation of an agreement, some parties to which are not involved in the dispute, 
the Registrar shall inform them within the period prescribed in the preceding article. 
Article 25. The State against which the case has been raised may file in the Registry 
of the Court, within two months of being notified of the plaint, a note of its pleading 
the documents in support and a document authorizing its agent to represent it in the 
pleading. The State raising the case may also file in the Court within one month from 
the date of communication to it of the pleading of the other side, a reply in rebuttal 
of the said pleading, together with the supporting documents. 
Article 26. A certified copy of every document produced by one party shall be com- 
municated to the other party. 

Article 27. The Court may, before the hearing begins, call upon one of the parties 
to produce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note a of any refusal 
shall be made in its minutes. The President of the Court shall have the right to 
extend the times specified in Article 25, or to shorten them at the request of one of the 
parties, and shall convey his decision to the other party. The new timing shall have 
effect from the date of communication. A protest may be made against this decision, 
and the Court shall decide the issue immediately. 

Documents and written evidence to be presented by one party shall not be 
accepted after the time specified for the purpose, unless the other side consents or 
the Court so decides after hearing both parties in this regard. 
Article 28. The State against which the case has been raised shall have the right to 
raise a subsidiary case against the party raising the case or any other State in its 
first note rebutting the original claim. Such a case shall only be accepted on condition 
that it is related to the original claim and is within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Article 29. Should a State consider that it has an interest to intervene in the case, 
it may submit an application to the Court for this purpose before the conclusion of 
the pleading. The application shall be in the form laid down in Article 21. The 
Court shall decide the application and shall fix the dates necessary for the exchange of 
notes. 
Article 30. The agents of the parties to a dispute shall represent them during all 

the stages of the case and in receiving all documents and notes. 

The agent shall have a recognized address for service at the seat of the Court 
and shall inform the Registry of that address. 

The agents, counsel and advocates of the parties before the Court shall enjoy the 
privileges and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties. 
Article 31. The official language of the Court shall be Arabic. 

If any of the panics submits a statement or document or other written evidence 
in any language other than Arabic, it should be accompanied by an Arabic translation. 
Article 32. The Court shall have the power to indicate, at any stage of the case, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken. Such provisional measures, once de- 
cided upon, shall be conveyed to the parties to the dispute and to the Secretariat-Gen- 
eral of the Arab League, which shall convey them to the Council of the Arab 
League. Any party to the dispute shall have the right to protest against these measures, 
and the Court shall immediately give a decision on such a protest. 
Article 33. The President of the Court shall decide the date for the hearing. The 
Registrar of the Court shall inform the parties to the dispute, at least 15 days before 
the fixed date. 

Article 34. The hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide 
otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted. 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

Article 35. The oral proceedings shall consist of the hearing by the Court of 
witnesses, experts, agents, counsel and advocates and their cross-examinations. 
Article 36. The President may put any questions, which he deems necessary, to the 
witnesses, experts, agents, counsel and advocates, and cross-examine them. Each 
judge has the same rights, which he shall exercise through the President. 
Article 37. If the Court considers that an enquiry is necessary it shall carry it out 
itself during its sitting or may detail one of its members to conduct it. 

It shall be lawful for the Court at any time to entrust to experts, be they an 
individual or a number of individuals or an office or a committee or any organization 
which the Court shall choose, the task of giving views on technical matters presented 
before it. 

The experts shall take an oath in open Court, before they start their mission, 
that they will carry out their function honestly. 

Article 38. The Court shall decide of its own accord, or at the request of any of the 
parties to a dispute, to hear witnesses for establishing a certain fact, when that is 
essential for revealing the truth. 

The witness shall take an oath to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth. 

The statements of witnesses shall be recorded in the minutes of the case and shall 
be read to the witness, who must verify that it is a true record of his statement and 
shall sign it then and there. 

Article 39. No oral evidence shall be given to the Court other than that indicated in 
the written notes, provided that the Court may allow supplementary notes if it deems 
it necessary after hearing the case. In such circumstances the Court shall adjourn 
proceedings to another session and shall fix the dates for filing the notes. 
Article 40. Minutes of the proceedings of every session shall be prepared by a clerk 
who has taken the oath before carrying out his duties. The minutes shall be consi- 
dered a correct record of the proceedings. The clerk shall record in the minutes the 
composition of the Court, the agents of the parties, statements of witnesses and ex- 
perts, a summary of the pleading, and the decisions taken by the Court. The Presi- 
dent of the Court and the clerk shall sign the minutes of every session. 
Article 41. Notifications of the Court to any person other than the agents, counsel 
and advocates shall be made through the Government of the State in which it is 
decided to make such a notification. The Court may depute to the local courts in 
any State the task of carrying out the necessary investigations on its behalf. 
Article 42. The Court may decide to accept the withdrawal of the case by the party 
raising it at any time before the conclusion of the pleading, if none of the parties to 
the dispute has raised an objection. 

Article 43. The conduct of the Court shall be the responsibility of the President. 
Article 44. If any judge has replaced another during the stage of the oral proceedings 
fresh proceedings must be commenced. 

Article 45. The President shall declare the adjournment of the Court at the con- 
clusion of the oral pleadings. The Court shall withdraw to consider its findings and 
shall come to its decision behind closed doors. 

Article 46. No person shall take part in the findings and the deciding of the case other 
than the judges who attended the hearings. 

Article 47. If the defendant States does not appear before the Court, or fails to de- 
fend its case, the plaintiff may call upon the Court to decide in favour of the claim. 
The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in accordance 
with articles... 



77 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The Court shall give its judgement in accordance with the law, after verifying the 
authenticity of the facts. 

Article 48. The judgements shall be decided by a majority of votes. In the event of 
failure to reach a majority and of divergence of opinion, the minority group or the 
group which includes the newer judges shall join one of the two opinions of the greater 
groups, after voting for a second time. 

Article 49. The judgement shall include the names of the judges who have heard the 
pleading, taken part in deciding the case and attended when the judgement is read out. 
It shall also include the names of the parties to the dispute, their agents, the text of 
their claims and rebuttals, a summary of the defence, including the facts and legal 
arguments in support of their claims, the reports of experts, the result of any enquiry, 
the stages through which the case has passed, the reasons for the Court's decision 
and its text. The judgement shall also indicate the party who is to bear the costs. 
Article 50. The judgement shall be declared within one month from the date of con- 
cluding the pleading. The reason for the judgement and its text shall be read in open 
Court. The parties to the dispute shall be informed of the date on which the judge- 
ment is to be delivered. 

Article 51. The President and the Registrar of the Court shall sign the original 
judgement. 

Article 52. The judgement shall be binding on the parties to the dispute regarding 
the subject-matter on which decision has been given. 

Article 53. The judgement of the Court is final and cannot be contested in any way 
except through a request for revision in the cases specified in the following article. 
The judgement of the Court shall be effective immediately and each party should 
accept it. If a party does not comply with the judgement the aggrieved party may 
resort to the Council of the Arab League. The Council of the League shall make 
recommendations or take such steps as it considers necessary for putting into effect 
the judgement of the Court. 

Article 54. The request for revision of the Court's judgement shall not be accepted 
except in cases in which the Court has decided upon relief not asked for by any of the 
parties to the dispute, or where a fact has been discovered in the case, which fact was 
unknown to the party making the request for revision until the judgement of the 
Court had been given, provided that the ignorance of the said party was not due to 
any negligence on his part. 

Article 55. The request for revision shall be made within six months from the date 
of judgement in the first instance; and from the date of discovering the fact in the 
second instance. 

Article 56. The presentation of the request for revision and the decision of such 
requests shall follow the same lines as those prescribed for presentation of the plaints 
before the Court. The petition requesting revision should state the judgement and 
the reasons for which the request is made. The fact that a request has been made shall 
not have any effect on the execution of the judgement unless the Court decides other- 
wise. No request for revision shall be accepted after five years from the date of the 
judgement. 

Article 57. The parties to the dispute may request the Court to interpret any obscure 
wording of the judgement. An application therefore shall be presented by the usual 
procedure of presenting the plaint. The Court shall shorten the dates in accordance 
with the provisions of article 27-2. 

The President of the Court shall appoint a hearing for the pleading within a 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

period of one month after the exchange of notes. Judgement shall be passed im- 
mediately. 

The judgement containing the interpretations shall be considered by all parties as 
complementary to the original judgement. 

Article 58. The Court shall correct any mistakes in its judgement whether of material 
wording or arithmetical. Such correction shall be made by decision of the Court 
of its own accord or at the request of any of the parties without any pleading. The 
Registrar shall make such corrections on the original copy of the judgement, which 
copy shall be signed by the president of the Court and by the Registrar. 
Article 59. Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own 
costs. 



ADVISORY OPINIONS 

Article 60. The Council of the League of Arab States may request the Court to give 
advisory opinions on any legal questions that may arise before it or any of its com- 
mittees, provided that the subject matter under consideration is not a case before 
the Court. 

The Secretary- General may exercise the same right and ask advisory opinions 
from the Court through the Council of the League on any legal questions that may 
come before him or before any committee or institution of the Secretariat-General. 
Article 6 1 . The request for an advisory opinion shall be in the form of a note contain- 
ing full details of the subject-matter on which the opinion is requested. The note 
shall be presented to the Registrar of the Court, together with the necessary docu- 
ments. 

The Court has the right to communicate the substance of the note or of the en- 
closed documents to any State or international organization which, in the opinion of 
the Court, may be able to give information or views that will help to clarify the sub- 
ject under consideration. 

Should any State Party to the Statute have failed to receive the special com- 
munication referred to in the last paragraph, such a State may express to the Court its 
desire to submit a statement regarding the subject on which the advisory opinion is 
requested. 

Article 62. The President of the Court shall fix a time limit during which the 
States mentioned in the previous article shall present their statements if any on the 
subject. 

Article 63. The Court may allow representatives of States or institutions that have 
submitted statements to comment in writing on the statements submitted by other 
States. 

Article 64. The Court shall give its opinion and convey it to the body which requested 
it and shall also inform the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and the 
representatives of States and institutions to which the original note was conveyed. 
Article 65. The advisory opinion of the Court is not binding. The Court shall not 
be bound by it if the same question is again raised before it, nor shall those who 
requested the opinion or those who offered any information on it be under any obli- 
gation to comply with it. 

In the event of a case being raised before the Court on the same subject as that 
on which legal advice was requested, the members of the Court who took part in 
giving the advisory opinion shall not sit on the bench to decide the case. 



79 



33 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Article 66. States members of the Arab League shall bear the financial expenses of the 
Court, as shall be decided by the Council. The Court shall have an independent 
budget and shall be subject to the financial regulations that apply to the budget of 
the Arab League. The Council of the League shall decide the expenses to be paid by 
the States Parties to the Statute other than Members of the League. 

The Court shall decide the expenses to be paid by a State which is neither a 
Party to the Statute nor a Member of League but which has litigated before it. 
Article 67. The Court shall provide the necessary rules regarding the carrying out 
of its functions and rules of procedure for adjudication before it. 

The Court shall also lay down the internal regulation for its registry on the 
recommendations of the Registrar. 
Article 68. The Registrar shall publish a series of: 

a. the judgements of the Court; 

b. the legal opinions of the Court; 

c. any other decisions which the Court deems should be published. 
Article 69. Any amendment to this Statute shall be made after taking the views of 
the Arab Court of Justice and with the approval of two thirds of the members of the 
Arab League. 

The amendment shall come into effect after the necessary ratification by two 
thirds of the representatives of the Arab League in accordance with the consti- 
tutional methods in force in each State. 

Article 70. Non-Member States of the Arab League which are Parties to the Statue 
of the Court may withdraw from the Court and declare such withdrawal to the Sec- 
retariat-General of the League. The Secretary-General shall inform the States 
Parties to the Stature of such withdrawal. 

The withdrawal shall take effect after the expiration of six months from the date 
of such declaration to the Secretariat-General, provided that the Court shall con- 
tinue to have jurisdiction over cases raised before it prior to the declaration of such 
withdrawal, until a decision is given. 



U.N. General Assembly Resolution Inviting Secretary-General of 
League of Arab States to Attend Session of the General Assembly 

November i, 1950 (i) 

"The General Assembly, 

Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to invite the Secretary- 
General of the League of Arab States to attend sessions of the General Assembly as an 
observer." 



(i) Resol. 477 (V) ; adopted by 49 votes to i, with $ abstentions. 



So 



Internationa! Affairs: League of Arab States 



Address by the Secretary-General of the Arab League ( Azzam ) 2 A 
Delivered at the U.N. General Assembly on the Occasion of the ^ ^" 
Assembly's Invitation to Him to Attend its Meetings 

November j, 1950 (/) 

Mr. President, 

I am greatly pleased to be able to present from this rostrum to the General 
Assembly, on behalf of the Arab League, the most sincere expression of thanks for the 
permanent invitation extended to the League. Allow me, Mr. President, to explain to 
you and to this honorable gathering some of the significant features of the Arab 
League. 

The League is an Arab organization open to each and every Arab country attain- 
ing its independance and sovereignty. So far, the League comprises seven member 
States, six of which are members of the United Nations. We trust, however, that the 
principles of the Charter applied by the General Assembly, will bring to the member- 
ship of the League many Arab countries now aspiring to their liberty and indepen- 
dance. 

The League at present represents 50 million Arabs out of the whole Arab world 
extending from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This Arab World possesses a vast 
spiritual and cultural influence far beyond its frontiers. In fact, this influence is the 
sacred heritage that devolved upon the League from the land that has been for thou- 
sands of years a principal crossroads of the world, the melting pot of ancient civiliza- 
tions and the cradle of great religions that have inspired hundreds of millions all over 
the world. 

The Arab world, in addition of its being a melting pot of ideas, was actually a 
melting pot of human races, thus producing a people who, through centuries have 
developed and acquired a deep sense of tolerance, fair play and justice, coupled with a 
genuine attachment to fraternity and equality. 

Witr this ideal alive in the minds and hearts of our people, the Arab League has 
officially defined an Arab to be any person who dwells in our lands, speaks our lan- 
guage and shares our culture and aspirations. This goes to establish that the Arab 
League is not imbued with any religious or racial prejudice. We are confident that 
the Arab League will not betray this sacred legacy of tolerance and benevolance. 

It has always been our tradition to extend a free hand of peace and cooperation 
to those who seek cooperation honestly and peacefully. 
Mr. President, 

Arabism is wide in scope and deep in significance. The spirit it represents is 
traceable far beyond Arab lands. It is to be found, not only everywhere in the Old 
World, but it has also crossed the oceans to the New World, carried by members of 
the Mediterranean family, who share with us the heritage of the Mediterranean civil- 
izations and religions. From time immemorial, and particularly during the eight cent- 
uries preceding the discovery of America, our ancestors have lived together on the 
shores of the Mediterranean. This is why when we, Arabs, come to this Assembly and 



(x) Text courteously supplied by Mr. Wahid Do(y, formerly Private Secretary of 'Az- 
zam (Pasha) and at present Deputy Head of the Political Department of the Arab 
League, Cairo. 

8l 



35 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

meet many of the distinguished delegates of this Continent, do feel natural affinity 
towards them an affinity which certainly flows from our common legacy. 
Mr. President, 

The East, through lengthy experience of generations, has developed the golden 
rule inculcated by all its religions, that ideas can only be conquered by ideas. Violence 
has always defeated its ends. Violence or no violence, the fittest of the ideologies will 
survive. Why then not be human and tolerant ? 
Mr. President, 

I am happy to be able to speak to you to-day on behalf of the League as a whole 
and to renew the assurance for the continuation of our cooperation with the United 
Nations. The Arab League has been glad to work hand in hand with organs of the 
United Nations, such as the FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, 
the WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, and the SOCIAL and ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL. This month will witness the second conference of social research in the 
Near East, meeting in Cairo under the auspices of the United Nations and the Arab 
League. We are looking forward for closer collaboration, particularly in the social, 
economic and cultural activities. Since 1947, 1 have, on behalf of the Arab League, 
extended to the Secretary-General of the United Nations an invitation to visit our 
part of the world and to see, with us, some of our problems. It is needless to assert 
that this invitation still stands. We shall always be glad to welcome in Cairo, which is 
the seat of the Arab League, the Secretary-General and other officials and Organs of 
ihe United Nations. 

Mr. President, I would like, once more, to express to you and to the General As- 
sembly, the most sincere thanks on behalf of the League of Arab States, trusting 
that your invitation would mark an era of fruitful cooperation leading to peace, pro- 
gress and prosperity. 

Internal Regulations of the Council of the League of Arab States 

October 13, 1951 (/) 

Article I. The Member States of the League shall elect their representatives who 
compose the Council and who shall be furnished with credentials covering their 
delegation to the Council as well as with documents covering their powers, whenever 
necessary. Their names shall be communicated to the Secretary-General. 
Article 2. The delegates shall retain their representative character in the Council 
unless the Secretariat-General is notified of any changes which Member States wish 
to make in their delegations, and every new delegate shall be furnished with his cre- 
dentials and powers. 

Article 3. The credentials and the documents covering the powers (of the delegates) 
shall be delivered to the Secretary-General, who shall submit to the Council the re- 
sults of his examination thereof to be entered in the minutes of the emeeting. 
Article 4. The Secretary-General shall fix the date for the commencement of each 
of the ordinary sessions for March and October. 

Each session shall continue until all the questions on the agenda have been 
discussed, unless the Council decides to end the session before this (has been done). 
Article 5. The Council shall meet in extraordinary session within a period not 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the 
Information and Publication Department of the Arab League, Cairo. 



82 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 



exceeding one month from the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of the official 
request from the meeting. 

Article 6. In the cases of aggression referred to in Article 6 of the Pact, the meeting 
shall take place at the earliest possible time within three days from the date of the 
receipt by the Secretary-General of the official request (for the meeting). 
Article 7. The Secretary- General or any one acting for him in case of his absence 
shall send notices for convening the ordinary sessions one month at least before the 
date fixed for the opening of the sessions. 

As for the extraordinary sessions, the notice shall be sent by telegram five days 
before the date fixed for the meeting. 

Article 8. The Secretary- General shall prepare the draft agenda of the Council 
and communicate it to the Member States together with the notice of the meeting. 

The Member States may suggest within a period not exceeding 15 days from the 
date of their notification of the draft agenda the entering of new questions thereon, 
and the Secretary- General shall draw up an additional list of these questions and 
communicate it to the Member States ten days before the meeting of the Council. 

The agenda of every ordinary session shall contain a report covering the activities 
of the Secretariat-General between the two sessions and the measures taken for the 
implementation of the Council's resolutions. 

There shall be annexed to the agenda detailled memoranda on the subjects sub- 
mitted (for discussion) along with any available reports, whether submitted by the 
committees or by others. 

Article 9. The Council shall approve the agenda at the beginning of each session, 
and may add, by a decision approved by the majority, other questions not included 
thereon. 

Article 10. There shall not be included on the agenda of extraordinary session any 
questions other than those for the discussion of which the extraordinary session has 
been convened. 

The Council may by a majority of votes decide to discuss other questions. 
Article n. The meetings of the Council shall be considered legal if attended by 
representatives of the majority of the Member States. As for resolutions, these can 
only be valid if approved by a majority of the votes of the Member States of the Lea- 
gue or by a two-thirds (/) majority or by the unanimous vote of the (Member) States 
in accordance with the provisions of the Pact in each case. 

Article 12. The meetings of the Council shall be secret except in those cases when 
the Council decides by a majority of votes to make them public. 
Article 13. The meetings of the Council of the League shall be attended by the 
Secretary-General or by any one delegated by him from among his Assistants to act 
for him. 

Article 14. The presidency of the Council shall be entrusted by rotation at the open- 
ing of every ordinary session to each of the Member States according to the alphabeti- 
cal order of their names. 

The President shall continue in the exercise of his functions as President until 
the presidency is entrusted to his successor at the opening of the following session. 
Article 15. The President opens, prorogues and adjourns the meetings; he directs 
the activities of the Council; sees to it that the provisions of the Pact and of the Inter- 



(i) By "two-thirds" is meant two-thirds or more than two-thirds when unanimity is lack- 
ing. (This footnote appeom in the original (Arabic) text. ED. 

83 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



nal Regulations are applied; announces the closing of the discussion; submits a propo- 
sal for a vote; takes the steps for the formation of the committees as decided by the 
Council; notifies the Council of all messages within its competence, and supervice the 
implementation of its decisions. 

Article 16. Should the President be for any reason unable to carry out his functions 
as President, these should be assumed in his stead by any one of the representatives of 
his country according to the order in which they are accredited. When his country has 
no other representative the temporary presidency should be entrusted to the head of 
the delegation of the State which has the right to the presidency for the following 
session. 

Article 17. The Council may entrust to any of its members the study of a given 
question and the role of rapporteur on that question to the Council. 

The reports submitted on such questions shall be distributed to the members at 
least one day before the meeting during which these questions will be discussed. The 
report shall be read during the meeting or, at the discretion of the Council, the mere 
distribution of the report in the manner described above may be considered sufficient. 
The rapporteur may, however, give to the Council any such explanations as he may 
deem necessary. 

Article 18. The Council shall form at the beginning of every ordinary session the 
following committees :- 

1) The Committee for Political Affairs (i) 

2) The Committee for Economic Affairs 

3) The Committee for Social and Cultural Affairs 

4) The Committee for Administrative and Financial Affairs 

5) The Committee for Legal Affairs (2) 

It may also form other committees if necessary. 

Every delegation shall elect at the beginning of every session from among its 
members its representatives to each of these committees, and may seeek the assis- 
tance of experts and specialists. 

The Council shall refer the questions on the agenda to the committees, each ac- 
cording to its competence, for study and the submission of a report thereon containing 
their recommendations. 

The (Council) may permit the committees to travel to the Member States of the 
League should it find this necessary to ensure an exhaustive study of the questions 
referred to these committees. 

The Council may also discuss the questions entered on the agenda before refer- 
ring them to the competent committees should this be decided upon by a majority of 
votes. 

Article 19. All matters referred to the Council by the committees shall be accom- 
panied by reports, and the committee concerned shall appoint a rapporteur who will 
attend the meetings of the Council in order to furnish whatever explanations he may 
be required to submit. The rapporteur shall participate in the discussions but shall 
not participate in the voting, unless he is a member of the Council. 
Article 20. The Secretary-General may draw the attention of the Council or of the 
Member States to any question which may be prejudicial to the existing relations 
between Member States or between Member States and othen States. 



(1) Generally referred to as "The Political Committee 99 . ED. 

(2) Elsewhere referred to as "The Legal Committee 99 . ED. 



8 4 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

Article 21. The Secretary-General shall undertake the organization of the Secreta- 
riat of the Council and of the Secretariat of the committees formed by the Council. 

The Secretary-General may be assisted or superceded during the Council's 
meetings by one or more delegates chosen by him. 

The Secretary-General or his delegates may, at any time, with the approval of 
the President, submit to the Council verbal reports or statements on any question 
under discussion by the Council. 

Article 22. The Secretary-General shall supervise the drawing up of records or 
minutes of all the deliberations which take place and of all the resolutions adopted 
during the ordinary and extraordinary meetings of the Council. 
Article 23. The Secretariat-General shall receive, print and notify all the documents 
reports and resolutions; shall register, print and notify the records and minutes of the 
meetings; shall file the documents of the Council in the archives of the League; shall 
translate any of these as may be necessary; shall publish the accounts of the meetings; 
and shall, in general, undertake all the functions which the Council of the League 
may entrust to it. 

Article 24. The Secretariat-General shall undertake the preparation of these records 
and minutes, the printing and distribution thereof among the members of the Council 
with the least possible delay. Whoever wishes to correct his statements shall notify the 
Secretariat-General to this effect within the following forty-eight hours. 

After the lapse of the period prescribed for the correction of the statements, the 
Council shall adopt the records and minutes which shall be signed by the President 
and the Secretary-General. 

Article 25. The Council may decide not to draw up minutes of its meetings, in 
which case it will be sufficient to make only a record of the text of the resolution 
adopted by the Council. This record, as in the case of the minutes, shall be distribut- 
ed among the members. It shall then be approved by the Council and signed by the 
President and the Secretary-General. 

Article 26. The debates in the Council shall take place according to the following 
procedure :- 

1) The President shall submit the question in a general manner, and shall call 
upon the Secretary-General to give any explanations be may deem necessary, if 
required. 

2) The word shall be given to the rapporteur and then to chose who follow him 
according to the order in which they have asked to speak. 

3) The President shall submit to the Council the proposal for closing the 
discussion, and, if (it is) approved by the majority of the Council, announce the deci- 
sion to this effect. 

4) Draft resolutions, amendments and proposals intended to be submitted to 
a vote shall be made in writing, and the vote shall be then taken by roll-call, and the 
President shall announce the result of the voting. 

Article 27. These Internal Regulations shall not be amended unless a proposal to 
this effect is submitted and approved by the Council by a majority of votes. 

Internal Regulations of the Committees of the League of Arab States 7 Q 

October jj, 1951 (/) ^ 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the 
Information and Publication Department of the Arab League, Cairo. The above 
Regulations were approved by the Council of the League on October 13, 1951. 

85 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article i . The functions of the Committees referred to in Article 2 of the Pact of the 
League shall be regulated in the following manner: 

Article 2. Each Member State of the League shall be represented in each Commit- 
tee by one or more delegates. It shall have (only) one vote. 

One and the same person may be charged with the representation of his State in 
more than one Committee. 

The States shall notify the Secretary- General of the names of their delegates, 
and shall also specify the Committee or Committees in which (these delegates) repre- 
sent them. 

Article 3. The delegates shall retain their representative character, each in the Com- 
mittee to which he is appointed, unless replaced by their States. 
Article 4. The Secretariat-General shall assist the Committees in the performance 
of their work, in order to enable them to acquaint themselves with the subjects under 
discussion. 

Article 5. The Council shall appoint for each of the Committees referred to in the 
Pact, a chairman for a period of two years, subject to renewal. 

Should (the chairman) be absent, the Committee shall elect another to take his 
place during his absence. The Secretariat-General shall delegate one from among its 
employees to represent it in the Committees. 

Article 6. The Secretary-General shall delegate one of the employees of the Secret- 
ariat-General, specialised in the matters entrusted to each Committee, to act as 
Secretary thereto. 

Article 7. The Committees shall convene at the headquarters of the League. They 
may, with the approval of the Secretary-General, decide to meet in another of the 
League's countries, should the requirements of the work so demand. 
Article 8. Each Committee shall be convened by the Secretary-General. In fixing 
the dates of the meetings, (the Secretariat-General) shall pay due regard to the time 
needed for the reception of the summons and for the arrival of the members travel- 
ling from the farthest country to the headquarters of the League. 
Article 9. The quorum in each Committee shall be constituted by the attendance of 
the representatives of the majority of the States Members of the League. 

The resolutions shall be passed by a majority of those present. 

The meetings of the Committees shall be secret. 

Article 10. Two or more Committees may meet (jointly) for considering a given 
subject. The meeting shall be presided over by the senior chairman of the assembled 
committees. The quorum shall be constituted if the majority of delegates in each 
Committee attend the meeting. 

The resolutions shall be passed by a majority of these present. 
Article n. Minutes shall be made of the meetings of the Committees, in which a 
summary of their deliberations and the full text of the resolutions passed by them shall 
be recorded. 

Article 12. The work of the Committees in matters assigned to them by the fact 
shall be of a preparatory nature, and shall be drawn up in a form of draft agreements 
to be submitted to the Council of th League. (The Committees) may also submit to 
the Council any recommendations or suggestions that may arise in the course of their 
discussions. 

Article 13. The principal Committees may form, from among their members, sub- 
committees, each to be designated for one of the technical questions which the princi- 
pal Committee is studying. 
Article 14. Each Committee may recommend the calling of meetings of experts 



86 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

representing the States Members of the League and the other Arab countries, if 
necessary, in order to be guided by their views on matters coming within the jurisdic- 
tion of the Committee. 

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for contacting the League States for 
the implementation of this recommendation. 

Article 15. These regulations shall come into force as from the date on which they 
are approved by the Council 3 namely, October 13, 1951. 

Press Statement by the Secretary-General of the Arab League 
('Azzam), Concerning Egypt, Libya, North Africa, and Palestine 

Paris, December 4, 1951(1) 

Public opinion and international diplomacy today are gravely preoccupied with 
a number of political situations and problems throughout the world which have led 
to the present international tension the continuance of which is likely to extend vio- 
lence and unrest to new areas. Some of these problems and situations, I am sorry 
to say, not only are related to, but directly affect the lives, rights and welfare of 70 
million Arab peoples covering the whole of North Africa and a major portion of the 
Middle East. 

Such pressing problems include the present state of the Palestine refugees, the 
Anglo-Egyptian and the Libyan questions and other North African problems. The 
views of the Arab League with regard to the tragic fate of one million refugees 
remain unchanged. We only appeal again to the General Assembly to adopt at 
this session more effective ways to implement its decisions providing for the re- 
patriation of and compensation to these martyred people. 

With regard to Libya, we consider that the recommendation of the General 
Assembly for the establishment of an independent, unified and democratic Libyan 
State has not been carried out by the administrative powers. Under the auspices of 
the United Nations, the administrative powers, France and Britain, have in fact 
succeeded establishing in that country a regime, artificially representative of the will 
of the people, through which they seek to retain their present military and political 
control. It is an insult to the intelligence of man to believe that Libya can arise to the 
status of independence before it enjoys all prerequisites of sovereignty. 

In addition to these, there are other Arab problems of much greater importance 
in their bearing on the maintenance of peace and security in the Mediterranean area. 
The Egyptian question is still pending on the Security Council agenda and has been 
fully, if not perhaps always objectively reported. In Egypt, nationalism is again on the 
march with new moral and material strength. The recent violent incidents between 
Egyptian patriots and British soldiers in the Canal Zone are only a symptom of a crit- 
ical situation which may explode at any time. 

In a recent debate, Former British Minister Viscount Stansgate, after acknow- 
ledging the "patriotic" struggle now in Egypt, warned the House of Lords, cc If there 
is one fallacy that would lead this country to dishonour and shame it is the belief that 
these incidents in Egypt are students' affairs." 



(j) Text courteously supplied by Mr. Wahid Daly, formerly Private Secretary of 'Azzam 
(Pasha) and at present Deputy Head of the Political Department of the Arab League, 
Cairo. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Neither the pretext of safeguarding the Sue? Canal for free world interests nor 
the pretence of defending Egypt against an alleged Soviet aggression can ever weaken 
the determination of the Egyptian people to overthrow that foreign occupation which 
they have been subjected to for many decades. 

No sane or practical statesman in London can hope for a settlement of the Egypt- 
ian question before the evacuation of the last British soldier. 

The question of Morocco has demanded a solution for many years. This was 
recognized by President Roosevelt in 1942 at Casablanca when he promised the 
Sultan independence in return for his country's co-operation in the Allied cause. 

For the past five years, the Arab League has sought a peaceful solution of this 
problem through various means in which the intervention of a third party, the United 
States and Brazil were asked to mediate. All efforts were to no avail. The persecution, 
oppression and humiliation of the Moroccan people continued. 

Last winter, General Juin took a number of repressive steps to halt the rising 
tide of nationalism by attempting to depose the Sultan and by jailing Moroccan 
independence leaders. Since that time political events in Morocco have reached 
the critical stage and we felt that the only means of achieving a just and peaceful 
settlement would be to present the case to the United Nations and to appeal to the 
world's conscience. Now we are being asked to postpone our complaint for various 
incomprehensible reasons such as political expediency of the Western Powers, the 
"discourtesy" to our host-nation, France, and that the question is "too complex" to 
be taken up at this time. 

This attempt to deny to the Moroccan people the help of the United Nations has 
aroused indignation within and outside of the United Nations. With the support 
of the Asian and African states, we will press for the discussion of our complaint 
at this session and fight to regain for that great country the re-establishment of its 
independence which it enjoyed for a continual period of 1,200 years before the French 
protectorate was imposed in 1912. We only ask for a free and objective debate of the 
question and, if the French colonial record is as good as is alleged, then let France 
agree to this discussion. 

In reply to inquiries from reporters, I recently issued a statement regarding the 
Tunisian question, another important Arab problem. The Arab League still sincerely 
hopes the French and the Tunisian governments will reach a settlement of their dis- 
pute through direct negotiations. Naturally, if such an agreement is not reached and 
Tunisia decides on other ways to realize its national aspirations it will then be our 
duty according to our charter and the feelings of our people to extend to those Arab 
brethren our full support. It will not be our fault if the French government once more 
falls short of realizing that it can not maintain in the middle of the twentieh century 
a hundred year old colonial policy. 

Internal Regulations of the Secretariat-General of the League of 
Arab States 

May jo, 1953 (i) 

Article i. The Secretary-General shall, in the name of the League, implement the 
resolutions of the Council and shall take the financial measures within the limits of the 
budget approved by the Council. He shall also, in his capacity as Secretary-General 



( i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text courteously supplied by the 
Information and Publication Department of the Arab League, Cairo. The above 
Regulations were approved by the Council of the League on May 

88 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

of the League, attend the meetings of the Council of the League and of the Com- 
mittees, and shall perform such other duties as may be entrusted to him by these 
bodies. 

He shall be exclusively responsible to the Council of the League for all acts of the 
Secretariat-General and for the implementation of office regulations (i) in the De- 
partments and Divisions of the Secretariat-General which carry out their functions 
under the supervision and approval of the Secretary-General. 
Article 2. The appointment of the Secretary-General shall be for five years, subject 
to renewal. 

Article 3. The Secretary-General shall be assisted in the supervision of the duties 
of the Secretariat-General by Assistant Secretaries. Each one of the Member States 
shall have the right to nominate, from among its own nationals, an Assistant Secre- 
tary, whose appointment shall be made with the approval of the Council. Each of 
(these Assistant Secretaries) shall be in charge of at least one of the Departments of 
the Secretariat-General. 

Article 4. Should there happen anything necessitating the absence of the Secretary- 
General, he shall delegate one of his available Assistants to replace him. 
Article 5. The Secretariat-General shall be constituted of the following Depart- 
ments: 

1) Secretariat Department : This shall carry out (all) correspon dance concern- 
ing public affairs, not coming under the competence of the other Departments; the 
performance of die functions of the Council's Secretariat during its sessions, and 
(also) protocol affairs. 

There shall be attached to it the Archives Registry which shall be charged with 
all matters relating to the receipt and dispatch of mail; the filing and classification of 
the League's papers and official documents; the registration of out-going and incom- 
ing correspondence ; the supervision of the final disposition of matters referred to the 
various Departments, and the (sending of) reminders thereon on the dates prescribed 
by instructions. The Registry shall also keep in good order the circulation and pro- 
gress of files. 

The library, too, shall be attached to the (Secretariat-Department). 

2) Finance and Personnel Department : This shall carry out all the financial 
affairs of the League, including the preparation and control of its budget, the book- 
keeping of the accounts of the League and of the employees, the Provident Fund, 
supplies, and all matters relating to the employees financially and administratively. 

The Director of the Department shall act as Secretary to the body supervising the 
management of the Provident Fund. 

3) Political Department: This shall carry out the study of the political affairs 
relating to the Arab countries, follow up those international affairs of (special) interest 
to the Arab League, and prepare the studies and reports connected with the above. 

4) Economic and Communications Affairs Department : This shall prepare, in 
general, the studies required by the work of the Economic and Communications Com- 
mittees. 

It shall prepare the statements and statistics concerning the economic situation in 
the Member States. 

It shall prepare the studies relating to the progress and implementation of the 
commercial agreements concluded among the Member States. 

It shall furnish the appropriate Departments in the Governments of the Member 



( i) The Arabic te rm used here is "Andhimat al-'Amal" . ED. 

89 



39 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

States with economic statements and statistics, and may make suggestions on all 
(matters) relating to the economic conditions, or economic stability (of the Palestine 
refugees) in the countries of the Member States. 

It shall compile studies published in international, economic and commercial 
magazines, pertaining to the economies of the countries of the Member States. 

5) Social and Health Affairs Department : This shall carry out studies relating 
to migration, labour and labour movements, child protection, health matters and 
questions of co-operation among the Arab countries concerning these matters, 

6) Legal Department : This shall cany out the study of legal matters in general, 
and shall prepare studies relating to nationality, passports, visas, execution of judge- 
ments, extradition of criminals, and the study and preparation of the various draft 
laws, leading to the achievement of co-operation among the Member States. 

It shall discuss international legal matters likely to arise out of a given inter- 
national situation. 

It shall act as an advisory department concerning all affairs of the Secretariat- 
General. 

It shall have the right to appear before the courts in suits brought by or against 
the League. 

It shall undertake the drafting and drawing up of agreements prepared by the 
League, as well as the registration of agreements deposited by the Member States, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the Pact. 

7) Information and Publication Department: Its duty shall be the making of 
propaganda for the Arab countries, furnishing the newspapers with communique's, 
and other (documents), and (also) controlling whatever is published therein, as well 
as furnishing the League with all matters relating to propaganda and publication. 

8) Cultural Affairs Department: This shall carry out the preliminary study of 
cultural and educational matters. 

Article 6. Each Department shall have officials according to the need and necessity 
of the work, as provided for in the budget. 

Report Presented to the Council of the League of Arab States at its 
2ist Ordinary Session of March 1954, by the Three-Man Commission 
in Charge of the Preparation of the Statute for an Arab Court of 
Justice(j) 

The Council of the League of Arab States decided on April 13, 1950, in accord- 
ance with article 19 of the Pact, to establish a commission to prepare a draft Statute 
for an Arab Court of Justice and to suggest any amendments to the Pact which this 
might entail. 

The commission has studied the subject in the light of the general international 
principles and the rules adopted in the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice of the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice 
of the United Nations. The commission has also taken into consideration many studies 
of the problem, preparatory works and writings on jurisprudence. 

The commission has reached a stage in its study where it has found it necessary 
to consult the Council of the League on three political questions. Firm decisions on 
these questions are essential for the fulfilment of the mission. 

(/) The text is copied from E. Foda, Projected Arab Court of Justice (The Hague, 
PP> 225-226. 



90 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

THE FIRST QUESTION 

Jurisdiction of the Court: 

Three alternatives are possible in this question: 

a. All Member States of the League should be, ipsofauto, parties to the 
statute of the Court and within its compulsory jurisdiction. Any 
party to any dispute should be able to bring the matter before the 
Court without a previous special agreement (compromise). 

b. The compulsory jurisdiction of the Court should be limited to the 
States which make a special legal declaration that they accept that 
competence of the Court. This is the principle followed in the Inter- 
national Court of Justice's "optional clause". 

c. The jurisdiction of the Court should be limited to those cases in 
which both parties to a dispute agree to bring the case before the 
Court. 

The commission submits this question to the Council of the League for its fur- 
ther directions to assist in drafting the provisions. It is evident that the decision on 
this question has implications which might affect the sovereignty of States. 

THE SECOND QUESTION 

The Nature of the Court: 

The question is whether the Court shall retain the character of the arbitral 
practice as is the case with the International Court of Justice, or whether it will be 
a purely judicial court. 

In the arbitration system the representatives of the two parties to a dispute 
take part in the judgement. 

In the second method, international jurisdiction goes a step further towards its 
aim. As is the case with ordinary national courts, justice would be administered 
by independent judges of complete impartiality, who do not combine being justices 
and nationals of the disputant parties. 

On this point also the commission finds it essential to have the guidance of the 
Council of the League. 

THE THIRD QUESTION 

Enforcement of judgement: 

The judgement of the court should be regarded as binding on the party against 
which it has been given, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. However, it 
is of primary importance to know, first, whether there should be means to compel the 
losing party to accept the judgement, and secondly, what should these means be? 
Should they be moral, material, political, or all three together? 

It is left to the Council of the League of Arab States and to its Members to 
handle this grave decision upon which rests the value of the establishment of the 
Court. 

For these reasons the commission asks the Council of the League to give it the 
necessary directions in order that it may go forward with the task with which it has 
been charged. 

Beirut, FOUAD AMOUN, 

March> 12, 1954. Reporter of the Commission 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

AGREEMENT 

between 

THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, 

SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, 

and 

THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 

November 26, 1957 (i) 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and 

The League of Arab States, 

CONSIDERING that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization was set up for the gradual achievement, through the co-operation of the 
nations of the world in the educational, scientific and cultural fields, of the aims of 
international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United 
Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims; 

CONSIDERING that one of the purposes of the League of Arab States is, with 
due regard to the structure of each of these States and the conditions prevailing there- 
in, to secure close co-operation between its Member States in the cultural field and 
that, under Article 4 of the Pact of the League of Arab States, a Cultural Committee of 
the League of Arab States has been set up to ensure such co-operation; 

CONSIDERING that the League of Arab States is called upon to undertake 
certain tasks and activities of a regional nature in harmony with those pursued on a 
world-wide scale by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization; 

HAVE AGREED as Mows : 

ARTICLE I 
Co-operation 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the 
League of Arab States agree to co-operate with each other through their appropriate 
bodies. 

This co-operation shall extend to all matters that arise in the field of education, 
science and culture and are connected with those tasks and activities of the two 
Organizations that are in harmony. 

ARTICLE 2 
Mutual Consultation 

1. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and 
the League of Arab States shall consult each other regularly on matters of common 
interest, with a view to co-ordinating their efforts to accompolish those of their 
tasks and activities which are in harmony. 

2. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization shall 
inform the League of Arab States of any proposals which, owing to their nature and 
the cultural region in which they are to be carried out, appear likely to be of direct 
interest to the Leagre of Arab States, and shall consider any observations on such 
proposals which may be conveyed to it by the League of Arab States with a view to 
establishing effective co-ordination between the two Organizations. 

Similarly, the League of Arab States shall inform the United Nations Education- 
al, Scientific and Cultural Organization of any proposals for the development of its 
activities in matters of interest to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- 



(j) Text courteously supplied by the Political Department of the Arab League, Cairo. 

92 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

tural Organization and shall consider any observations on such proposals which may 
be conveyed to it by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization with a view to establishing effective co-ordination between the two Organ- 
izations. 

3. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the 
League of Arab States shall,, after consulting with each other, take all appropriate 
steps to ensure that the organs of each of them are kept fully informed concerning 
relevant activities of the other Organization when these organs are considering ques- 
tions which have a bearing on these activities. 

4. The appropriate steps referred to in paragraph 3 may also include an invit- 
ation to the Organization concerned to be represented at meetings when matters 
relating to its activities are to be discussed. 

5. Whenever circumstances so require, consultations shall take place between 
the representatives of the two Organizations to determine jointly the most effective 
methods of dealing with particular problems of interest to both Organizations. These 
methods may, for instance, include the establishment of joint committees. 

ARTICLE 3 
Joint Action 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the 
League of Arab States may, through special agreements, together decide upon joint 
action with a view to attaining objects of common interest. 

These special agreements shall define the ways in which each of the two Organ- 
izations shall participate in such action and shall specify the financial commitments 
that each is to assume. 

ARTICLE 4 

Exchange of Information and Documents 

Subject to such arrangements as may be necessary for the safeguarding of con- 
fidential documents or information, the two Organizations shall arrange for a full and 
prompt exchange of documents and information concerning matters of common 
interest. 

ARTICLE 5 

Statistical and Legal Information 

The two Organizations shall concert their efforts to secure the best use of stat- 
istical and legal information and to ensure the most effective utilization of their 
resources in the assembling, analysis, publication and diffusion of such information, 
with a view to reducing the burden on the governments and other organizations from 
which such information is collected. 

ARTICLE 6 

Administrative Arrangements for Collaboration and Liaison 
The Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization and the Secretary-General of theLeague of Arab States shall make 
all necessary administrative arrangements to ensure effective collaboration and liaison 
between the two Organizations. 

ARTICLE 7 

The present Agreement shall in no way affect the provisions of agreements al- 
ready concluded between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

93 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Organization and the Member States of the League of Arab States, or the provisions 
of agreements already concluded between the League of Arab States and any States. 

ARTICLE 8 
Revision and Denunciation 

The terms of the present Agreement may be altered with the consent of both 
parties. 

Either of the parties may denounce the Agreement by giving one year's notice 
to the other party. 

ARTICLE 9 

The present Agreement shall be signed by the appointed representatives of the 
two Organizations. 

It shall enter into force upon its signature. 

DONE IN TWO TRILINGUAL COPIES, in Arabic, English and French, 
the texts in all three languages being equally authentic. 
On behalf of the League On behalf of the United 

of Arab States. Nations Educational, Scientific 

and Cultural Organization. 

Signed: A. HASSOUNA Signed: LUTHER H. EVANS 

26 November 1957. 

ACCORD ENTRE L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL 
ET LA LIGUE DES ETATS ARABES 

26 May, 195$ (x) 

PREAMBULE 

Attendu que POrganisation internationale du Travail, en tant qu'organisation 
universelle, attache la plus haute importance au maintien et au developpement, dans 
le domaine social et en matiere de travail, de normes mondiales fondles sur les princi- 
pes etablis dans la Constitution de TOrganisation internationale du Travail et dans la 
Declaration de Philadelphie, et que, tout en collaborant avec les Nations Unies au 
maintien de la paix et de la securite internationale, elle demeure & l'cart de toute 
controverse politique entre nations ou groupes de nations et est & la disposition de 
toutes les nations membres pour cooperer avec elles, soit separement, soit par Pinter- 
mdiaire des organisations regionales dont elles sont membres, dans P6x6cution, a la 
lumiere des normes mondiales qui se sont dgagees de Poeuvre de POrganisation 
internationale du Travail, des t aches qui sont precisment celles en vue desquelles 
T Organisation internationale du Travail existe; 

Attendu que laLigue desEtatsArabes estdesireuse d'accroitre, en collaboration 
avec TOrganisation internationale du Travail, le bien-tee des peuples de ses Etats 
Membres; 

L'Organisation internationale du Travail et la Ligue des Etats Arabes, dsireuses 
de contribuer, dans le cadre general de la Charte des Nations Unies, la realisation 
effective dans les Etats arabes des fins de T Organisation internationale du Travail, 
sont convenues de ce qui suit: 

(i) Approved by the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization during 
is annual meeting in October 7957, and by the Council of the Arab League at its 2$th 
ordinary session, on April 27, 1958. The text has been courteously supplied by the Politi- 
cal Department of the Arab League, Cairo. 



94 



International Affairs: League of Arab States 

ARTICLE I 

Consultations reciproques 

1. L'Organisation internationale du Travail et la Ligue des Etats Arabes se 
consulteront regulierement sur les questions presentant un intert commun, en vue de 
favoriser la realisation effective dans les Etats arabes des fins de reorganisation inter- 
nationale du Travail. 

2. L* Organisation internationale du Travail informera la Ligue des Etats Ara- 
bes de tous pro jets tendant au developpement de ses activit6s regionales dans les 
territoires des Etats Membres de la Ligue et examinera toutes observations concer- 
nant les pro jets de cet ordre qui lui seraient communiquees par la Ligue des Etats 
Arabes, en vue de Petablissement d'une coordination effective entre les deux organisa- 
tions. 

3. La ligue des Etats Arabes informera TOrganisation internationale du Tra- 
vail de tous projets tendant au developpement de ses activites qui concernent des 
questions interessant 1'Organisation internationale du Travail et examinera toutes 
observations relatives a ces projets qui lui seraient communiquees par TOrganisation 
internationale du Travail, en vue de T^tablissement d'une coordination effective entre 
les deux organisations. 

4. Lorsque les circonstances Fexigeront, il sera procdde a des consultations en- 
tre des representants des deux organisations en vue d'aboutir a un accord sur les m6- 
thodes les plus efficaces a appliquer pour trailer des problemes particuliers et pour 
assurer une utilisation aussi complete que possible des ressources des deux organisa- 
tions. 

ARTICLE II 

Informations d'ordre statistique et legislatif 

1. La Ligue des Etats Arabes et I'Organisation internationale du Travail s'ef- 
forceront de realiser la cooperation la plus complete possible en vue d'eviter tout 
chevauchement inutile d'activites; elle combineront leurs efforts en vue d'obtenir la 
meilleure utilisation des renseignements statistiques et juridiques et en vue d'assurer 
le meilleur emploi de leurs ressources pour le rassemblement, 1'analyse, la publication 
et la diffusion de ces informations, afin de reduire les charges imposees aux gouverne- 
ments et aux organisations aupres desquelles de telles informations sont recueillies. 

2. La Ligue des Etats Arabes et 1'Organisation internationale du Travail se 
consulteront regulierement en vue de determiner la meilleure methode a suivre pour 
Tetablissement du texte arabe de conventions et recommandations adoptees par la 
Conference internationale du Travail et d'autres documents de TOrganisation inter- 
tionale du Travail qui presentent un intert particulier pour les Etats arabes. 

ARTICLE III 

Echange d 'informations et de documents 

1. Les documents et informations portant sur des questions d'intrt commun 
seront ^changes d'une maniere aussi rapide et complete que possible entre la Ligue 
des Etats Arabes et T Organisation internationale du Travail. 

2. La Ligue des Etats Arabes sera tenue au courant par T Organisation inter- 
nationale du Travail duprogres des travauxde cette dernierequi interessent la Ligue. 

3. L'Organisation internationale du Travail sera tenue au courant par la Ligue 
des Etats Arabes du progres des travaux de cette derniere qui interessent rOrganisa- 
tion. 



95 



Tht Arab States and the Arab League 

ARTICLE IV 

Representations rlciproques 

En vue de favoriser la realisation effective dans les Etats arabes des fins de POrga- 
nisation Internationale du Travail, I'Organisation Internationale du Travail invitera la 
Ligue des Etats Arabes a s<* fake representer aux sessions de la Conference interna tio- 
nale du Travail et la Ligue des Etats Arabes invitera 1'Organisation Internationale du 
Travail a se faire reprdsenter a ses reunions toutes les fois que seront examinees des 
questions qui mt6ressent I'Orgamsation Internationale du Travail. 

ARTICLE V 
A rrafigeftients adtmnistratifs 

Le Secretaire General de la Ligue des Etats Arabes et le Directeur General du 
Bureau international du Travail prendront les dispositions administrates voulues 
pour assurer une collaboration et une liaison effective entre les personnels des deux 



ARTICLE VI 

Entrfe en viguewr, modification et dwree 

1. Le present accord entrera en vigueur des qu'il aura iti signe par les repre- 
sentants autorises de la Ligue des Etats Arabes et de I'Organisation Internationale du 
Travail. 

2. Le present accord pourra toe modifie avec le consentement des deux parties. 

3. Le present accord pourra toe denonce par Tune ou Tautre des parties mo* 
yennant preavis de six mois donne a 1'autre partie. 

Fait a Gen&ve, le 26 Mai 1958. 
Pour rOrganisation Internationale du Pour la Ligue des Etats 

Travail Arabes : 

Signe : DAVID A. MORSE Signe : A. HASSOUNA 

Directeur General de reorganisation Secretaire Gtniral de la Ligue 

Internationale du Travail des Etats Arabes. 



Ill 

Treaties and Agreements 

Concluded Under the Auspices 

of the League of Arab States 



97 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

CULTURAL TREATY 

November 27, 1945 (i) 

Whereas... (here follows a list of the heads of the seven States Members of the 
Arab League) 

Are desirous of unifying the general tendencies of their States, of strengthening 
co-operation between them in cultural matters, of increasing intellectual affinity 
and spiritual harmony between the citizens of Arab countries, and of working towards 
the universality of education and the raising of the cultural standard of their peoples. 

Have agreed to conclude a treaty, and have designated the following as their 
Plenipotentiaries. . . 

Article i. The States of the Arab League agree that each of them shall form a local 
organization whose functions shall be to consider matters concerning cultural co- 
operation between the Arab States. Each state will be free as to how it forms this 
organization. 

Article 2. The States of the Arab League agree to exchange teachers and professors 
between their educational Institutions, according to the general and individual con- 
ditions as will be agreed to. The period of service of any teacher or professor who is a 
Government official and who will be delegated for this purpose, will be considered 
as service for his own Government, with the maintenance of his rights as regards his 
post, promotion and pension. 

Article 3. The States of the Arab League agree to an exchange of students and scholars 
between their educational Institutions, and their acceptance in the suitable classes as 
far as accommodation will allow, in accordance with the regulations of those Ins- 
titutions. 

In order to facilitate this, those States, while maintaining the basic educational 
principles adopted in their countries, will work towards harmonizing their educational 
syllabi and certificates. This will be done by special agreement between those States. 

Such facilities as may be possible will be given by each State to any other State 
which wishes to construct hostels for its students. 

Article 4. The States of the Arab League will encourage cultural, scouting and 
sports visits between the Arab countries, and in areas which the Governments allow 



(i ) This is the Editor 9 s translation of the original (Arabic) text of the Treaty as published 
by the Arab League, Cairo. The Treaty was approved by the Council of the League on 
November 27, 1945, during its Second Ordinary Session. It was signed by: 

1. Syria: on October 22, 3946. 

2. Lebanon: on October 50, 1946. 

3. Iraq: on December 4, 1946. 

4. Egypt : on May 20, 1946. 

The instruments of ratification were deposited with the Secretariat-General of the 
League by Egypt on June 18, 1947. 

Reservation: In view of the special position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yaman> 
their delegations expressed the following reservations when signing the Treaty, and they 
considered these reservations as part of the Treaty with respect to the obligation of these 
two States towards its provisions: 

"The Government of Saudi Arabia agrees to the provisions of this Treaty, 
with the exception of what it considers to be inconsistant with the Shari'a of Islam or of 
what does not conform to its local circumstances or regulations". ED. 



99 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

for the holding of cultural and educational meetings for students. Facilities will be 
given for this purpose, particularly in respect of travelling arrangements and the ex- 
penses of the journey. 

Article 5. The States of the Arab League agree on the reciprocal establishment of 
educational and scientific Institutions in their various countries. 
Article 6. The States of the Arab League will co-operate in the revival of the 
intellectual and artistic legacy of the Arabs, safeguarding and propagating it, as well 
as making it available to those who seek it, by all possible means. 
Article 7. In order to keep pace with the world's intellectual movements, the States 
of the Arab League will encourage and organize the translation of all foreign master- 
pieces whether classical or modern. They will also encourage all intellectual output 
in the Arab countries by such means as the opening of Institutes for scientific 
and literary research. They will grant prizes to distinguished men of science, 
literature and art. 

Article 8. All the States of the Arab League undertake to legislate for the protection 
of scientific, literary and artistic authorship rights for all publications in all States of 
the Arab League. 

Article 9. The States of the Arab League will work for the standardization of scien- 
tific terms, by means of councils, congresses and joint committees, which they will 
set up and by means of bulletins which these organizations will issue. They will work 
to make the Arabic language convey all expressions of thought and modern science, 
and to make of it the language of instruction in all subjects and in all educational 
stages in the Arab countries. 

Article 10. The States of the Arab League will work for the consolidation of contacts 
between libraries and museums whether scientific, historical or artistic, by such 
means as the exchange of publications, indexes and duplications of antiquities, as well 
as by the exchange of technical officials and missions for excavations by agreements 
between them. 

Article u. The States of the Arab League agree to consolidate relations and to faci- 
litate co-operation between scientists, literary men, journalists, members of the pro- 
fessions, those connected with art, the stage, the cinema and broadcasting where avail- 
able, by organizing visits for them between one country and another and by encoura- 
ging cultural, scientific and educational conferences for the purpose ; also by placing 
space, laboratories and material scientific Institutions in every Arab country at the 
disposal of the learned of other countries to demonstrate scientific discoveries; also by 
the publication of periodical bulletins regarding books or scientific research published 
in all Arab countries. Each author or publisher must send to the "Cultural Com- 
mittee" copies of his work for its library as well as for the principal libraries of each 
State. 

Article 12. The States of the Arab League agree to include in their educational syllabi, 
the history, geography and literature of the Arab countries, sufficiently to give a clear 
idea of the life of those countries and their civilization. They also agree upon the 
institution of an Arab library for pupils. 

Article 13. The States of the Arab League will work for acquainting their sons with 
the social, cultural, economic and political conditions in all Arab countries, by means 
of broadcasts, the stage, cinema and press or by any other means, also by the institu- 
tion of museums for Arab culture and civilization, as well as by holding occasional 
exhibitions for arts and literature, and of public and scholastic festivals in the various 
Arab countries. 



IOO 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

Article 14. The States of the Arab League shall encourage the establishment of Arab 
social and cultural clubs in their respective countries. 

Article 15. The States of the Arab League will take all necessary measures to ap- 
proximate their legislative trends and to unify as far as possible their laws; also to 
include the study of legislation of other Arab countries in the syllabi. 
Article 16. This Treaty shall be ratified by the signatory States, according to their 
constitutional regime, with the minimum of delay. The instruments of ratification 
shall be lodged in the Secretariat-General of the Arab League which will prepare 
a note of the receipt of each document and notify the othr contracting States. 
Article 17. Arab countries are permitted to adhere to this Treaty by notifying the 
the Secretary-General of the League who will communicate the fact to the other 
contracting States. 

Article 18. This Treaty will come into force one month after the date of the receipt 
of the instruments of ratification from two States. It shall also come into force for 
the other States who participate one month after the date of the deposit of the docu- 
ment of joining from these States. 

Article 19. Any signatory State of this Treaty is allowed to withdraw from it by 
giving notice to the Secretariat-General of the League. The notice will take effect 
six months from the date of its dispatch. 

Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Among the A 3 

States of the Arab League " J 

April 13, 1950 (i) 
The Governments of (the names of the seven original Member States follow) 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League, Cairo. The Treaty was approved by the Council of the League on April 13, 
1950, during its Twelfth Ordinary Session. It was signed on June 17, 1950, by Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yaman and Egypt. It was also signed by Iraq on February 
2, 1951, and by Jordan on February 16, 1952. 
The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Syria on October 13, 1951 

2. Egypt on November 22, 1951 

3. Jordan on March 13, 1952 

4. Iraq on August 7, 1952 

5. Saudi Arabia on August 19, 1952 

6. Lebanon on December 24, 1952 

7. Yaman on October u, 195.?. 
RESERVATION made by the Mutawakkilite Government of Yaman. 

"i. As regards the provisions of Article 2, Yaman does not consider aggression 
to be aggression against any Arab State, unless it is an aggression against that State 
itself and not because it is bound by a treaty or agreements with any other State or 
because foreign troops exist in its territories for any other reason. 

"2. Yaman has reservations with regard to the last paragraph of Article 6, 
because the Mutawakkilite Government of Yaman expects that certain circumstances 
may occur which may make it appropriate for Yaman to take a special stand of its own. 
Yaman has, therefore, decided not to consider the decisions of the joint Defence Coun- 
cil as binding on her, unless she accepts those decisions. This is because of Yaman' s 
geographical position, her general possibilities and her special considerations. 



101 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Being desirous of consolidating the ties, and of strengthening co-operation 
among the States of the Arab League, in order to maintain their independence and to 
preserve their common heritage, 

And in response to the desire of their peoples to join forces for realizing the com- 
mon defence of their existence and for maintaining security and peace in conformity 
with the principles and purposes of both the Arab League Pact and the United 
Nations Charter, and in order to reinforce stability and reassurance, and to provide 
means of welfare and prosperity in their countries, 

Have agreed to conclude a treaty to this end, and have delegated the following 
plenipotentiaries, who, having exchanged credentials which invest them with full 
authority, and which were found to be duly correct and in good form, have agreed 
upon the following: 

Article I. Being anxious to maintain and stabilize security and peace, the Contract- 
ing States hereby confirm their determination to settle all their international disputes 
by peaceful means, whether in their mutual relations or in their relations with other 
States. 

Article 2. The Contracting States shall consider that an armed aggression commit- 
ted against any one or more of them, or against their forces, to be an aggression against 
them all. For this reason, and in accordance with the right of legitimate self-defence, 
both individual and collective, they undertake to hasten to the aid of the State or Sta- 
tes against whom an aggression is committed, and to take immediately, individually 
and collectively, all measures and to utilize all means available, including the use of 
armed force, to repulse the aggression and to restore security and peace. 

And, in application of Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, the Council of the Arab League and the (U. N.) Security 
Council shall be immediately notified of the act of aggression and of the measures 
and procedures adopted concerning same. 



cc j. The Government of Yaman does not object to the provisions of Article i of 
the Military Annex. But certain special considerations may make it impossible for 
her to execute certain matters required of it. Accordingly, being desirous of accom- 
plishing whatever may be requested of it, it has decided as follows : 

"The Government of Yaman approves the provisions of Article i of the Military 
Annex, with the exception of paragraphs 4 and 6, and nothing shall be considered as 
operative except that which will be approved by the Mutawakkilite Government of 
Yaman in due time." 

DECLARATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ: 

"With regard to the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and 
Economic Co-operation among States of the Arab League, to the effect that the pre- 
paration of the means of defence, individual and collective, for resisting any armed 
aggression shall be according to the resources of each State and its needs. 

"And also with regard to the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 6 of the 
same Treaty , to the effect that, whatever the joint Defence Council may decide by a 
majority of two-thirds of the States, shall be binding on all the Contracting States, it 
is understood that the rule of this last paragraph of Article 6 shall not extend to the 
preparation of means of defence individual and collective, to resist any armed aggres- 
sion, since such a matter has a special character provided for by Article 4, mentioned 
above." ED. 



102 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

Article 3. The Contracting States shall consult together at the request of any one 
of them, whenever the territorial integrity, independence or security of any of them is 
threatened. 

In the event of the danger of an impending war, or of the emergence of an inter- 
national contingency the danger of which is apprehended, the Contracting States 
shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and efforts for adopting such preventive 
and defensive measures as the situation requires. 

Article 4. In a desire to discharge fully the above-mentioned obligations, the Con- 
tracting States shall co-operate with each other for consolidating and strengthening 
their military power. They shall participate, according to their resources and needs, in 
preparing the individual and collective means of defence to resist any armed aggres- 
sion. 

Article 5. A Permanent Military Commission shall be formed of representatives of 
the General Staffs of the Contracting States in order to organise the plans of joint 
defence and to prepare their means and methods. 

The powers of this Permanent Military Commission, including the drawing up 
of the necessary reports embodying the elements of co-operation and participation 
mentioned in Article 4 shall be defined in an Annex to this Treaty. This Permanent 
Commission shall submit its reports concerning matters falling within its jurisdiction 
to the Joint Defence Council provided for in the next Article. 
Article 6. A Joint Defence Council shall be constituted under the control of the 
Council of the Arab League, and shall have authority over all matters relating to the 
implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this Treaty. In this, it 
shall be assisted by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in the preceding 
Article. 

The Joint Defence Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Nation- 
al Defence Ministers of the Contracting States, or their representatives. 

Decisions adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the (Contracting) States shall be 
binding on all the Contracting States. 

Article 7. In order to realize the objectives of this Treaty and its aims of promoting 
reassurance, of ensuring prosperity in the Arab countries and of raising the standard 
of living therein, the Contracting States shall co-operate for the advancement of the 
economies of their countries, the exploitation of their natural resources, the facilitation 
of the exchange of their national agricultural and industrial products, and generally 
for the organisation and co-ordination of their economic activities and for the conclus- 
ion of such special agreements as may be necessary for realizing these objectives. 
Article 8. An Economic Council shall be created and shall consist of the Ministers 
of the Contracting States concerned with economic affairs, or their represent- 
atives in case of necessity, in order to make proposals to the Governments of these 
States concerning whatever it considers guarantees the realization of the aims indicat- 
ed in the preceding Article. 

The Council may, in the course of its work, seek the assistance of the Committee 
for Economic and Financial Affairs referred to in Article 4 of the Pact of the League of 
Arab States. 

Article 9. The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered as an integral part of it. 
Article 10. Each of the Contracting States undertakes not to conclude any inter- 
national agreement which may be inconsistent with this Treaty, and not to adopt in 
its international relations any course which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty. 
Article n. None of the provisions of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or be in- 
tended to affect, the rights or obligations incurred, or which may be incurred, by the 



103 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Contracting Parties by virtue of the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities 

incumbent upon the (U. N.) Security Council for the maintenance of international 

peace and security. 

Article 12. Any one of the Contracting States may, after the lapse of ten years from 

the entry into force of this Treaty, withdraw from it at the end of one year from the 

date of the notification of its withdrawal to the Secretariat-General of the League of 

Arab States. The Secretariat- General shall inform the other Contracting States of 

such notification. 

Article 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State in accordance with 

the constitutional processes in force therein. 

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of 
the League of Arab States. 

The Treaty shall come into force, in regard to every country which has ratified 
it, fifteen days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of rati- 
fication of at least four States. 

This Treaty was drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on Jwnad al-Akhira, 1369 A.H. 
(corresponding to April 13, 1950), in one original copy to be kept at the Secretariat- 
General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original shall be 
delivered to each of the Contracting States. 



MILITARY ANNEX 

Article i. The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the 
Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation among the States of the Arab 
League, shall have competence in the following matters: 

a) The preparation of military plans for meeting all anticipated dangers or any 
armed aggression that may be committed against one or more of the Contracting 
States or against their forces. The Commission shall, in the preparation of these 
plans, rely on the principles decided upon by the Joint Defence Council. 

b) The submission of proposals for the organisation of the forces of the Con- 
tracting States and for the determination of the minimum number of the forces of 
each of them in accordance with the requirements of the military exigencies and the 
possibilities of each State. 

c) The submission of proposals for increasing the capacity of the forces of the 
Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organisation and training are con- 
cerned, in order that they may keep pace with the most modern military methods and 
developments, and for the co-ordination and unification of all of these matters. 

d) The submission of proposals for the exploitation and co-ordination of the 
natural agricultural and industrial resources of the Contracting States in the interest 
of the war effort and joint defence. 

e) The organisation of the exchange of training missions and the preparation of 
plans for combined exercises and manoeuvres among the forces of the Contracting 
States; attending these exercises and manoeuvres and studying their results with a 
view to making proposals toward improving the methods of co-operation among these 
forces in the battlefield and the attaining of the maximum level of their capacity. 

f ) The preparation of the necessary data and statistics on the resources and 
military possibilities of the Contracting States and the capability of their forces in the 
joint military effort. 

g) The study of the various facilities and different forms of assistance which 



104 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

each of the Contracting States may be asked to give in wartime to the armies of the 

other Contracting States operating in their territory in application of the provisions of 

this Treaty. 

Article 2. The Permanent Military Commission may form permanent or temporary 

sub-committees from among its own members to examine any of the subjects falling 

within its competence. It may also seek the advice of experts on any of these subjects 

whenever it considers it necessary to do so. 

Article 3. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the 

results of its studies and activities to the Joint Defence Council provided for in Article 

6 of this Treaty. It shall also submit to it an annual report concerning the studies and 

activities accomplished by it during the (preceding) year. 

Article 4. Cairo shall be the seat of the Permanent Military Commission. However 

the Commission may hold its meetings in any other place it may designate. 

The Commission shall elect its Chairman from among its own members for two 
years. The Chairman may be re-elected and must be at least a "Grand Officer". 

All members of the Commission must hold the original nationality of one of the 
Contracting States. 

Article 5 . The chief command of all the forces in the field shall be vest ed in the State 
whose forces operating in the field are greater in number and equipment than 
those of each of the other States, unless the Commander-in-Chief should be elected 
in a different manner with the consensus of the Governments of the Contracting States. 

The Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in the direction of military operations 
by a Joint Council of Chiefs of Staff. 

Supplementary Protocol to the Treaty of Joint Defence and Econo- A A 
mic Co-operation (And to the Military Annex) Among the Arab T'T" 

States 

February 2 , 1951 (/) 

A Consultative Military Organization shall be formed and shall consist of the 
Chiefs of Staff of the Contracting States for supervising the Permanent Military 
Commission provided for by Article 5 of the Treaty and for directing it in all its func- 
tions as specified in Article i of the Military Annex. 

The reports and proposals of the Permanent Military Commission shall be sub- 
mitted to the Consultative Military Organization for approval before they are sub- 
mitted to the Joint Defence Council provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty. 

The Consultative Military Organization shall submit its reports and proposals 
regarding its functions to the Joint Defence Council in order that it may examine 
them and approve whichever it may consider suitable from them. 

This Protocol shall in regard to the signatory States have the same force and ef- 
fect as the Treaty and its Annex, in particular in respect of the provisions of Articles 5 
and 6 of the Treaty and Article 3 of its Military Annex. 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League, Cairo. The Protocol was approved by the Council of the League on February 
2, 195/3 during its Thirteenth Ordinary Session. It was signed on the same day by 
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yaman. It was also signed by 
Jordan on February 16, 1952. 

The instruments of ratification of this Protocol were deposited on the same date 
on which the deposit of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty took place. ED. 



105 



45 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Extradition Agreement 

September 14, 1952 (i) 

The Governments of ... (the names of the seven original Member States follow). 

Wishing to co-operate closely for the extradition of escaping offenders, and in 
execution of Article 2 of the Pact of the Arab League, have agreed upon the following : 
Article i. Each of the States of the Arab League, signatory of this Agreement for the 
extradition of offenders requested by any of the other States, undertakes to surrender 
such persons in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
Article 2. Surrender shall be obligatory when the person whose extradition is sought is 
being pursued, charged with, or condemned for, one of the offences mentioned in 
Article 3 and which has been committed on the territory of the State requesting extra- 
dition. However, in case the offence has been committed outside the territory of both 
States, that is, the one requesting extradition and the other requested to extradite, ex- 
tradition shall not be obligatory except when the offence committed outside their 
respective territories is punishable by the laws of both States, when committed. 
Article 3. Extradition shall be confined to cases where the offence committed is either 
a felony or a misdemeanour(2) involving a penalty of imprisonment for one year or a 
heavier sentence under the laws of both States, or where the person whose extradition 
is sought has been already sentenced to at least two months imprisonment. 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League) Cairo. The Agreement was approved by the Council of the League on September 
14, 1952, during its Siteenth Ordinary Session. It was signed by: 

1. Jordan on February 17, 19 53', 

2. Lebanon on February 18, 1953; 

3. Syria on April 19, 195 3; 

4. Saudi Arabia on May 23, 19531 

5- Egypt on June 9, 19531 

6. Iraq on July 27, 1955. 

The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by: 

1. Egypt on March 8, 1954; 

2. Saudi Arabia on April 5, 19541 

3. Jordan on July 28, 1954. 

RESERVATIONS: 

Egypt: 

First. - Egypt does not accept the definition of the offences in respect of which extradi- 
tion shall be obligatory and which are provided for in Article 4, namely, crimes of 
assault against monarch*, presidents of States , their spouses or their direct descendants; 
crimes of asssault against crown princes; crimes of premeditated murder, and terroristic 
crimes. 

Second. - The word "detention", mentioned in Article n, shall be replaced by "impri- 
sonment". No provisions should be made for arrest. ED. 

(2) The terms "felony" and "misdemeanour" are not the best equivalents to be used in 
this context, but they are the nearest to the original (Arabic) terms, respectively "jinaya" 
^. "junta". ED. 



106 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

However, in case the act is not punishable by the laws of the requested State, or 
if the penalty prescribed in the requesting State has no corresponding place in the 
country from which extradition is sought, then extradition shall not be obligatory un- 
less the person sought is a national of the requesting State or is a national of another 
State whose laws provide for the same penalty. 

Article 4. Extradition shall not take place in respect of political offences. The decision 
as to whether an offence is political or not shall be left to the discretion of the State 
which is being asked to extradite. However, extradition shall be obligatory in respect 
of the following offences : 

1. Crimes of assault against monarchs, presidents of States, their spouses or 

their direct descendants. 

2. Crimes of assault against crown princes. 

3. Crimes of premeditated murder. 

4. Terroristic crimes. 

Article 5. Extradition shall not take place if the person sought has already been tried 
for the offence for which his extradition is being requested brt has not been found 
guilty, or has been already punished, or if he is under investigation, or is on trial, for 
the same offence in respect of which his extradition is sought, in the State from which 
extradition is being requested. 

In case the person whose extradition is sought is under investigation or is on trial 
for another offence committed in the State which is being asked to extradite him, his 
extradition shall be postponed until the trial is completed and the penalty inflicted 
has been executed. Nevertheless, the States requested to extradite may deliver him 
temporarily to stand trial, provided that at the end of the trial and before the execution 
of the penalty inflicted he is returned to the State which permitted his extradition. 
Article 6. Extradition shall not take place if either the offence or the sentence has 
lapsed according to the laws of the requesting or requested State. However, extra- 
dition shall be granted if the requesting State does not accept the principle of the lapse 
of time and if the person whose extradition is sought is one of its nationals or is a 
national of another State which does not accept this principle. 
Article 7. Extradition may be refused by the State requested to extradite if the per- 
son whose extradition is sought is one of its nationals, provided that (that State) pro- 
ceeds to try him, and in this respect it shall make use of the investigations conducted 
by the State requesting extradition. 

Article 8. Extradition requests shall be submitted through diplomatic channels and 
shall be decided upon by the competent authorities, in accordance with the laws of 
the State concerned. 
Article 9. Extradition requests shall be accompanied by the following documents: 

a) When the request concerns a person who is still under investigation, the 
request must be accompanied by a warrant of arrest issued by the competent autho- 
rity and specifying the nature of the crime and the article by virtue of which punish- 
ment is incurred. 

Likewise, if possible, a certified copy of the text of the provision applicable to the 
crime shall, together with an official copy of the investigation proceedings, duly 
authenticated by the appropriate judicial authorities, accompany the request. 

b) When the request concerns a person already convicted, whether when 
present at the trial or in absentia, an official copy of the verdict shall accompany the 
request. 

Article 10. In all cases, the extradition request shall be accompanied by a full state- 
ment regarding the identity and particulars of the person pursued, accused or con- 



107 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Aicted. The request must also be accompanied by documents proving the nationality 
of the person sought if he is a national of the requesting State. 

All extradition documents shall be duly certified by the Minister of Justice of the 
requesting State or by some one acting on his behalf. 

Article n. By way of exception, a request for extradition may be made by post, cable 
or telephone. In such cases, the State asked to extradite shall take adequate pre- 
cautions for supervising the person pursued until the (necessary) notification is 
made concerning him. It may also, as a precautionary measure, have him arrested and 
detained, provided his detention shall not exceed thirty days. After this period he 
shall be released if the dossier requesting his extradition has not been received in due 
form, or if no request for renewing the period of his detention for another thirty days 
at the most has been made. 

The period of precautionary detention shall be deducted from that for which he 
is sentenced in the State requesting extradition. However, when the request (for ex- 
tradition) is made by cable or telephone, the authorities requested to extradite may, 
when necessary, take steps to ascertain the propriety of the request from the author- 
ities requesting the extradition. 

Article 12. Everything found in the possession of the person whose extradition is 
sought, at the time of his arrest, shall be handed over to the requesting State, together 
with anything that may be considered as proof of the crime, in so far as is permis- 
sible by the laws of the State requested to extradite. 

Article 13. If several requests (for extradition) are submitted by different States, to the 
State requested to extradite, in respect of the same person and for the same offence, 
priority shall be given to the State whose interests have been affected by the offence, 
then to the State in whose territory the offence was committed, and subsequently 
to the State of which the person whose extradition is sought is a national. 

However, if the requests for extradition concern different offences, priority 
shall be given to the State which made the first request. 

Article 14. No person may be tried by the State which requested extradition except for 
the offence for which his extradition was sought, for acts which are connected there- 
with, and for offences which he may have committed after his extradition. However 
should he be given the opportunity to leave the territory of the State to which he had 
been extradited, but has not availed himself of it within thirty days, he may be tried 
for the other offences. 

Article 15. The States bound by this Agreement undertake to facilitate the passage 
through their territories of extradited offenders and to ensure their safe custody, on 
presentation of a copy of the extradition order. 

Article 16. The State requesting extradition shall bear all expenses incurred by the 
execution of the extradition request, and shall also defray all expenses involved in 
the return of the extradited person to the place in which he was found at the time his 
extradition took place in case he was proved to have been not liable or if acquitted. 
Article 17. Sentences that involve penalties restricting freedom, such as imprison- 
ment, with or without hard labour, may, at the request of the State which issued the 
sentence, be executed in the State in which the convicted person is found, provided, 
however, that this takes place with the consent of the State that is asked to execute 
(the sentence). 

The State requesting execution shall bear all expenses involved in the exe- 
cution of the sentence. 
Article 18. Should the provisions of this Agreement conflict with those of any bi- 



108 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

lateral agreement binding any two of the Contracting States, these two States shall 
apply those provisions most suitable for facilitating the extradition of criminals. 
Article 19. This Agreement shall be ratified by the signatory States, according to their 
constitutional processes, at the earliest possible date. The instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, which 
shall draw up a protocol of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by each State 
and inform the other contracting States thereof. 

Article 20. States Members of the League, non-signatories of this Agreement may 
accede thereto by a notice to this effect to be sent by them to the Secretary-General 
of the League of Arab States, who shall notify their accession to the other States 
bound by (this Agreement). 

Article 21. This Agreement shall come into force one month after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by three of the signatory States. It shall be effective in 
regard to every other State one month from the date of the deposit of the instruments 
of ratification or accession. 

Article 22. Each State bound by this Agreement may withdraw therefrom by a notice 
to this effect to be sent by it to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. 
Withdrawal shall be considered as effective six months from the date of the dispatch 
of the notice. This Agreement shall, however, remain operative in respect of requests 
for extradition and of those for the execution of sentences that involve penalties 
restricting freedom if submitted before the expiration of the said period. 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed 
this Agreement, on behalf of their Governments and in their names. 

This Agreement was drawn up in Arabic, in Cairo, on Monday, Safar 15, 1372 
A.H. (corresponding to November 3, 1952), in one original copy to be kept at the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original 
shall be delivered to each signatory State and to each acceding State. 



Agreement Regarding the Execution of Judgments 

September 14, 1952 (/) 

The Governments of ... (the names of the seven original Member States follow). 

Desirous of facilitating, among their States, the execution of judgments in pur- 
suance of the provisions of Article 2 of the Pact of the League of Arab States, have 
Bgreed upon the following: 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League, Cairo. The Agreement was approved by the Council of the League on September 
14, 1952, during its Sixteenth Ordinary Session. It was signed by: 

1. Jordan on February 17, 795.?; 5. Egypt on June 9, 7955; 

2. Lebanon on February 18, 1953; 6. Iraq on July 27, 1955; 

3. Syria on April 19, 1955; 7. Yaman on Nov. 28, 1953. 

4. Saudi Arabia on May 23, 1955; 

The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Saudi Arabia on April 5, 19 54) 

2. Egypt on July 25, 1954; 

3. Jordan on July 28, 1954. 



109 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article i. Any final judgment deciding civil or commerial rights or requiring (the pay- 
ment of) compensation by (virtue of any sentence imposed by) criminal courts, or 
relating to personal status and rendered by a judicial court in any of the States 
of the Arab League, shall be capable of execution in the other States of the League in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 

Article 2. The appropriate judicial authority of the State requested to execute (a 
judgment) may not examine the subject-matter of the case, nor may it refuse exe- 
cution of the judgment, except under the following circumstances : 

a) If the judicial organ which rendered the judgment was not competent to 
hear the case on account of lack of jurisdiction or because of the rules of international 
jurisdiction; 

b) If the parties concerned were not properly and duly notified. 

c) If the judgment is contrary to public policy or to the general principles 
of morality in the State requested to execute. The said State shall be the one compet- 
ent to decide whether the (judgment) is one of this nature, as also the non-execution of 
anything in the (judgment) which may be contary to public policy or the general 
principles of morality. (Non-execution is also permitted) if the judgment is repugnant 
to any principle considered to be a universal international rule. 

d) If a final judgment, between the same parties and regarding the same 
subject-matter, has been rendered by one of the courts of the State requested to exe- 
cute it, or if a case is pending before these courts between the same parties and re- 
garding the same subject-matter and which has been instituted prior to the institution 
of the case before the court which rendered the judgment required to be executed. 
Article 3. With due regard to the pro visions of Article i of this Agreement, the authori- 
ty requested to execute an arbitral award given in one of the States of the Arab 
League, may not re-examine the subject-matter of the case in respect of whic v this 
arbitral award, which is required to be executed, was given. However, (this authori- 
ty) may refuse a request submitted to it for the execution of an arbitral award in the 
following cases : 

a) If the laws of the State requested to execute the award do not permit the 
settlement of the subject-matter of the dispute by way of arbitration; 

b) If the arbitral award was not given in pursuance of a valid stipulation 
or agreement for arbitration. 

c) If the arbitrators had no jurisdiction in accordance with the agreement 
or stipulation for arbitration or in accordance with the provisions of the law under 
which the arbitral award was given. 

d) If the parties were not properly summoned to appear. 

e) If the arbitral award includes anything contrary to public policy or the 
general principles of morality in the State requested to execute. This (State) shall be 
the one competent to decide whether the (award) is of this nature, as also the non- 



RESERVATIONS: 

Yaman: i. With regard to paragraph (a) of Article 2, the following reservation: 
"Yaman has no Courts at the present time, except the Islamic Shari'a 
Courts which are competent in every law-suit" 

2. With regard to paragraph (c) of Article 2, the following reservation: 
"A judgement contrary to any one of the basic principles of Islamic 
Shari'a law shall not be executed." ED. 



1 10 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

execution of anything in the (award) which may be contrary to public policy or the 
general principles of morality. 

f) If the arbitral award is not final in the States in which it was given. 
Article 4. This Agreement shall not, in any manner whatever, apply to judgments 
rendered against the Government of the State requested to execute or any one of its 
officials in respect of work done by him on account of his post only. Nor shall it 
apply to judgments the execution of which will be contrary to international treaties 
and agreements in force in the State requested to execute. 
Article 5. Requests for execution should be accompanied by the following doc- 
uments: 

1. A certified authentic copy, duly legalized by the appropriate authorities 
of the judgment required to be executed and which is attested as being 
executory. 

2. The original notification of the judgment required to be executed, or 
an official certificate to the effect that the judgment had been duly, 
served. 

3. A certificate from the appropriate authorities to the effect that the judg- 
ment is final and executory. 

4. A certificate to the effect that the parties were duly served with sum- 

mons to appear before the appropriate authorities or before the arbi- 
trators, in case the judgment, or the award required to be executed was 
given by default. 

Article 6. Judgments required to be executed in any one of the States of the Arab 
League shall have the same executory force as in the States requesting execution. 
Article 7. The nationals of the State requesting execution shall not be asked, in 
any one of the countries of the Arab League, to pay any fees, furnish any deposit, or 
produce any securities which are not required of the nationals of that country. Nor 
is it permitted to deprive them of the right to enjoy judicial aid or exemption from 
judicial fees. 

Article 8. Each State shall designate the appropriate judicial authority to which 
should be submitted requests and procedures for execution, and the (various) forms 
of demurrer to the order issued or decision taken in this respect. It shall communicate 
this to each of the other Contracting States 

Article 9. This Agreement shall be ratified, at the earliest possible date, by the sig- 
natory States in accordance with their constitutional processes. The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, 
which shall draw up a protocol of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by 
each State and shall notify the other Contracting States about same. 
Article 10. States of the League, non-signatory to this Agreement, may accede 
thereto by sending notice to this effect to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Arab States, who shall communicate this accession to the other signatory States. 
Article 1 1. This Agreement shall come into force one month from the (date of the) 
deposit of the instruments of ratification by three of the signatory States. In regard to 
each of the other States, it shall come into effect one month from the (date of the) 
deposit of its instruments of ratification or accession. 

Article 12. Any one of the States bound by this Agreement may withdraw there- 
from by sending a notice to this effect to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Arab States. Withdrawal shall be considered effective after the lapse of six months 
from the date of the dispatch of such notice. However, the provisions of this Agree- 



III 



47 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

ment shall remain effective in respect of the judgments (and awards) the execution of 
which was requested prior to the expiration of the said period. 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed 
this Agreement on behalf of their Governments and in their names. 

This Agreement was drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on Monday, Safar 22, 1372 
A.H. (corresponding to November loth, 1952), in one original copy to be kept at the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original 
shall be delivered to each signatory State as well as to each acceding State. 



Convention Concerning the Nationality of Arabs Resident ia 
Countries of Which They Are Not Nationals 

September 23, 1952 (x) 

The Governments of... (the names of the seven original Member States follow). 

In view of the mutual desire to determine the nationality of persons belonging 
by origin to one of the States Members of the Arab League and domiciled in another 
Arab State but, not having as yet acquired any specific nationality, 

Have agreed upon the following: 

Article i. Every person belonging by origin to one of the States Members of the 
Arab League, who has not acquired any specific nationality, nor has elected the 
nationality of his country of origin within the periods prescribed by treaties and laws, 
shall be deemed to be a national of his country of origin. 

This shall not affect his right to reside in the country in which he is domiciled, in 
accordance with the regulations in force therein. Nor shall this prejudice his right to 
acquire the nationality of that country, conformably with the required conditions, 
provided that if he acquires the nationality of the country of domicile, the nationality 
of his country of origin shall abate. 

Article 2. This Convention shall be ratified, at the earliest possible date, in accor- 
dance with the constitutional processes prevailing in each of the Contracting States. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the 
League of Arab' States. 

Article 3. This Convention shall come into force one month after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by three of the signatory States, and shall be operative in 
regard to each of the other States one month after the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification. 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
Leaguey Cairo. The Convention was approved by the Council of the League on 
September 23, 1952, during its Sixteenth Ordinary Session. It was signed by : 

1. Jordan on February 17, /?.?; 

2. Lebanon on Feb. j, 195 j; 

3. Saudi Arabia on May 23, 1955; 

4. Syria on June 7, 195 j; 
5- Egypt on June 9, 195 31 
6. Iraq on July 27, 1953. 

The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Saudi Arabia on April 5, 1954; 

2. Egypt on May 15, 1954. ED. 



112 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed this 
Convention on behalf of thek Governments and in their names. 

This Convention was drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on Wednesday, Safat 24, 1372 
A. H. (corresponding to November 12, 1952), in one original copy to be kept at the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original 
shall be delivered to each one of the States signatories of the Convention. 

Convention of the Arab Union For Wireless Communications and 

Telecommunications 

April 9, 1953 d) 

The Plenipotentiaries of...(the names of the seven original Member States follow) 

Have agreed upon the Convention of the Arab Union for Wireless Communications 
and Telecommunications, the provisions of which follow hereunder, by virtue of the 
powers vested in them by the International Convention for Wireless Communications 
and Telecommunications in force: 

Article I : Formation of the Union 

The Arab countries which ratify this Convention shall constitute the Arab Union 
for Wireless Communications and Telecommunications. 

Article 2: Aims of the Union 

The aims of the Union are summarized as follows: 

1. Co-operation for the organization and diffusion of wireless communications 
and telecommunications among the countries of the Union for fostering cultural and 
commercial relations. 

2. To provide for the utmost possible utilization of the wireless communica- 
tions and telecommunications which link the States of the Union. 

3. To exchange technical assistance among the States of the Union and to 
encourage scientific and practical research. 

4. Co-operation among the Departments of the Union and the unification of 
thek efforts for their common interest in the International Union in the field of 
wireless communications and telecommunications, 

Article 3 : Accession to the Union 

Arab Governments, non-members of the League of Arab States, may accede to 
this Union, provided a request is made by them to the Contracting Governments 
through the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. 

This accession vests in the acceding Governments all the rights, and imposes 
on them all the obligations, sanctioned by this Convention. 

Article 4: Withdrawal from the Union 

Each Contracting Government shall be entitled to withdraw from the Union 
whenever it pleases, by a notice to be sent by it through the diplomatic channels to 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League, Cairo. The Convention was approved by the Council of the League on April 
9> ?9*3> &t its Eighteenth Ordinary Session. It was signed by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yaman on February 12, 1953. 
The instrumets of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Lebanon on October p, 195 3', 3. Egypt on Janary 27, 1954; 

2. Joidan on Octo^t 16, 1^53, 4. Syria on June 23, 1954. ED. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, which shall undertake to 
notify the Governments of the States of the League by the same procedure. 

Such withdrawal shall not be considered final and effective until after the lapse 
of one year from the date of the receipt of the notice by the said Secretariat-General. 

Article 5 : Conclusion of Special Agreements 

Any two or more of the Governments members of the Union shall be entitled 
to conclude between them special agreements, provided such are not in conflict 
with the terms of this Convention and do not embody terms less favourable to the 
public. However, a copy of such an agreement shall be dispatched to the Permanent 
Office for its notification to the other members of the Union. 

Article 6: Arbitration 

In the event of a conflict arising between two or more members of the Union con- 
cerning the interpretation of this Convention and any protocols appended thereto, 
or concerning the responsibility which devolves on any Department as a result of the 
application of its provisions, the subject-matter of the conflict shall be settled by an 
award of arbitrators. Each one of the Departments in conflict shall select, for this 
purpose, a member of the Union not directly involved in the conflict. 

Article 7: The Permanent Office 

A Permanent Office shall be established, to be called the Office of the Arab U- 

nion for Wireless Communications and Telecommunications. It shall function at the 

seat of the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States and shall be considered as 

a medium of liaison, information and consultation for the Departments of the Union. 

The Permanent Office shall consist of: 

1. A Chairman to be elected by the Congress of the Union from among the 
officials of the Departments of the Union for a period of five years, provided 
he is a specialist in matters of wireless communication and telecommunica- 
ions. His election may be renewed. 

2. At Secretary to be appointed by the Chairman of the Office. 

3. Specialized officials to assist the Chairman of the Office, from among the 
officials of the Departments pertaining to the territory in which the Office is 
situated. 

The jurisdiction of the Office shall be as follows: 

(a) Endeavouring to unify the technical and administrative terms in Arabic; 

(b) Undertaking the preparatory work for the Congresses of the Arab Union for 
Wireless Communications and Telecommunications and the notification of their 
resolutions to the Departments of the Union; 

(c) Acting as a Secretariat for the Congresses of the Union, 

(d) Supplying the Departments of the Union with all information and suggestions 
received by it during the period intervening between two Congresses, 

(e) The dispatch of publications embodying any modifications conescerning the media 
of wireless communications and telecommunications among the States cf the Union; 

(f) The Translation of the Convention, regulations and international publications 
and their distribution among the Departments of the Union; 

(g) Notifying the Departments of the Union of any accession or withdrawal sub- 
mitted by any Arab State; 

(h) The expression of opinion on matters in dispute whenever such is required by 
the members in dispute; 

(i) The submission of an annual report to the Congress on the work of the Office 
during the year; 



114 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

(j) The preparation of the budget for the following year and its submission to the 
Congress for approval and application; 

(k) The submission of a statement of its expenditure during the year to the Congress 
or approval. 

Article 8 : Expenses of the Permanent Office 

The Departments of the States of the Union shall bear the expenses of the Per- 
manent Office in accordance with the regulations in force in the League of Arab States. 

Article 9: Congresses 

Delegates of the States of the Union shall meet once a year in the form of a Con- 
gress in order to examine the provisions of this Convention and to supplement it, to 
adopt new resolutions and to consult one another on technical problems. Each State 
shall be represented at the Congress by one or more authorized delegates who are 
specialists in matters of wireless communications and telecommunications. Each 
State shall have one vote in the deliberations. Each Congress shall appoint the meet- 
ing place of the next Congress. 

The date fixed for the meeting of the Congress may be advanced or delayed, and 
its meeting place may be changed, after the approval of the Contracting Governments. 

The Office of the Union shall invite the suggestions of the Member States three 
months before the date of the meeting of the Congress. These proposals should, 
however, reach the Office at least two months prior to the date of the meeting of the 
Congress. 

The Office shall co-ordinate and print the proposals and shall dispatch them to 
the States of the Union, provided these should reach them at least one month before 
the Congress meets. 

The Arab States shall ratify the resolutions of the Congress as quickly as possible. 
Its resolutions concerning the Convention shall be considered as an indivisible whole. 

Article 10: Official Language 

Arabic shall be the official language to be used in the Congress and in relations 
exchanged between the Departments of the Union. 

Article II. The Ensuring of Communications 

The Governments of this Union shall work for ensuring proper and adequate 
connections for wireless communications and telecommunications, and shall pay due 
regard to their safety as well as make sure of keeping to the wave lengths, frequencies 
and bases for cable relay assigned to them, in order to avoid interference with wireless 
communications and in order to organize parallel cable connections; all this (must be) 
in conformity with the terms of the Convention and international regulations. 

Article 12 : Settlement of Accounts 

Accounts between the Departments of the Union shall be settled in accorda ice 
with bases to be agreed upon. 

Article 13: Exchange of Officials and Technical Aid 

The Departments of the Arab Union shall exchange technical officials and spe- 
cialists and shall estaolish scholarships for specialization in technical administrative 
affairs in the States of the Arab League. 

Article 14: Unification of Programmes Concerning International Congress 

Proposals submittd by the Governments of the Arab Union to the international 
Congresses of wireless communications and telecommunications shall be unified, and 
a unified plan shall be pursued with regard to the said Congresses. Delegates of the 
States of the Union shall co-operate for realizing its ends, whether such concern some 
or all of the States of the Union. 



49 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article 15: Standardization of Apparati and Instruments 

In their desire to ensure the co-ordination of connections, the Departments of 
the Union shall endeavour to use apparati and instruments of uniform characteristics. 

Article 16: Rates and Exemptions 

The Departments of the Union shall provide for the unification and reduction of 
rates among themselves and for agreeing as to reciprocal exemptions. 

Article 17: Resort to the Convention and International Regulations 

With regard to anything not mentioned in this Convention, resort shall be made 
to the terms of the Convention and the international regulations in force as well as to 
the terms of special agreements in force. 

Article 18: Annexes to the Convention 

There should be appended to this Convention two Annexes, the one, for technic- 
al matters, and the other, for rates and exemptions. 

Article 19: Execution of the Convention 

The provisions of this Convention and its Annexes shall become effective after 
the lapse of three months from their approval and ratification by the Governments 
concerned. Any special agreements concluded between countries of the Arab Union 
for Wireless Communications and Telecommunications shall be cancelled if their 
terms are less favourable to the public. 

The plenipotentiaries of the States mentioned above have signed two copies of 
this Convention, one of which shall be kept at the Secretariat-General of the League 
of Arab States, and the other shall be kept at the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Af- 
fairs. A copy of it shall be sent to each of the Governments of the Contracting States. 

Cairo, Jamad al-Awwal, 27, 1372 A.H. (corresponding to February 12, 1953). 

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the League of the 
Arab States 

May jo, 1953 (i) 

Whereas Article 14 of the Pact of the League of Arab States provides that the 
Members of the Council of the League and those of (the League's) committees 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League 9 Cairo. The Convention was approved by the Council of the League on May 
10, 1955, during its Eighteenth Ordinary Session. The instruments of accession were 
deposited with the Secretariat-General by: 

1. Jordan on December 12, 1953', 

2. Egypt on March 8, 19541 

3. Saudi Arabia on April 5, 1954; 

4. Iraq on February 20, 1955; 
RESERVATIONS: 

The Republic of Egypt: 

First. Egypt does not accept the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 21, 
relating to the exemption of some of the officials of the Secretariat-General from the 
obligations of national service. It will follow, with respect to the officials mentioned 
in the said paragraph, the same provisions decided upon in the second paragraph of 
the said Article ; that is, it will be contented with the postponment of the recall for the 
national service of those officials of the Secretariat-General whose stay will be requir- 
ed by the exigencies of work. 



116 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

as well as its officials, specified in the Internal Regulations, shall enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities during the exercise of their functions; and that (further) 
the premises occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable; 

And since therefore it is indispensable to specify in a detailed manner the kinds 
of privileges and immunities referred to in the Pact, and (also) to define their scope 
and the cases of their applicability, in order to facilitate for the League the exercise of 
its functions in the territories of the Member States on bases agreed upon. 

Consequently, the Council of the League of Arab States, at its meeting held on 
on May loth, 1953, approved the following Convention and proposed that it be sub- 
mitted to the Governments of the Member States for (their) accession thereto : 

CHAPTER I 

Juridical Personality 

Article i. The League of Arab States shall possess juridical personality as regards 
the capacity: 

a) To acquire and dispose of immovable property, 

b) To contract, 

c) To institute legal proceedings. 

CHAPTER H 

Property and Assets 

Article 2. The League of Arab States, its property, whether movable or im- 
movable, as well as its assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
judicial immunity, unless the Secretary-General decides to waive it expressly, provid- 
ed, however, that this waiver shall not extend to the measures of execution. 
Article 3. The premises occupied by the League of Arab States shall be inviolable. 
Its property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall not be sub- 
ject to search, sequestration, requisition, confiscation or any similar form of compul- 
sory measures. 

Article 4. The archives and documents, of all kinds, whether belonging to, or held 
by, the League of Arab States, shall be inviolable. 
Article 5. The League may: 

1) Hold paper and other currencies, as well as have accounts in any currency 
it wants. 

2) Receive these currencies, transfer them from one State to another or within 
the same State, as well as convert them to any currency it wants. 

The League may not, in contravention of any laws in force in (a State), transfer 
from (that State) any amount of currencies subjected to special restrictions, which is 
is bigger than that which it has brought into that State. 

Article 6. In its exercise of the rights given it under Article 5, above, the League of 
Arab States shall pay due regard to any observations or recommendations made by 
Member States, in so far as (such) does not prejudice the interest of the League. 



Second. Non-acceptance of the provisions of Article 22, relating to the enjoyment by 
senior officials of the League of Arab States, together with their spouses and their minor 
children, of the privileges and immunities which are accorded to diplomatic envoys by 
intematinal law ED. 



117 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article 7. The property, whether movable or immovable, as well as the assets of the 
League of Arab States shall enjoy exemption from the following: 

a) Direct taxes, with the exception of those which are in return for services for 
public utilities. 

b) Customs duties, laws and orders prohibiting or restricting import or export 
in respect of articles and commodities imported or exported by the League for use for 
the discharge of official functions. It may not sell those (articles and commodities) 
imported by it and which are exempt from customs duties, except with the consent of 
the Gavernment concerned. 

c) Customs duties, laws and orders prohibiting or restricting import and export 
in respect of its own publications. 

Article 8. Local purchases made by the League of Arab States for its official work 
shall not be exempt from excise tax or from the duty on the transfer of ownership 

CHAPTER m 

Facilities in Respect of Communications 

Article 9. The official communications of the League of Arab States shall enjoy in 
the territory of each Member State treatment not less favourable than that accorded 
by that State to the communications and diplomatic missions of any other State in 
respect of priority and the clearance charges on mails, cables, telegrams, radiograms, 
telephone and other communications, as well as in respect of charges for the trans- 
mission of news, whether in newspapers or on the radio. These official communica- 
tions and correspondence shall not be subjected to any censorship. 
Article 10. The League of Arab States may use codes in its communications and 
may dispatch its correspondence by couriers or bags, both of which shall have the 
same privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic couriers and bags. 

CHAPTER IV 

The Representatives of Member States 

Article 1 1 . Representatives of Member States to the principal and subsidiary organs 
of the League of Arab States and to conferences convened by the League, shall , while 
exercising their functions and during their journey to and from the place of meeting, 
enjoy the following privileges and immunities : 

a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their perso- 
nal effects; 

b) Judicial immunity in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by 
them in their capacity as representatives of their States; 

c) Inviolability for papers and documents; 

d) The right to use codes in their communications and to receive their cor- 
respondence by courier or in sealed bags; 

e) The right of exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from all 
residence restrictions, procedures relating to the registration of aliens, as well as from 
all national service obligations in the country they enter or through which they pass 
in the exercise of their functions; 

f) The facilities accorded to the representatives of foreign States delegated on 
temporary official missions in respect of regulations relating to currency and ex- 
change; 

118 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

g) The immunities and facilities accorded to diplomatic representatives in res- 
pea of their personal effects; 

h) The privileges, exemptions and facilities, not inconsistent with those men- 
tioned above, accorded to diplomatic representatives, except for exemption from 
excise tax and from customs duties on articles imported other than their personal ef- 
fects. 

Article 12. Representatives of Member States in the principal and subsidiary organs 
of the League of Arab States and in conferences convened by the League, shall enjoy 
judicial immunity in respect of words spoken or written because of discharge of their 
official duties during their representation of their States in the organs of the League of 
Arab States, even after the disappearance of their representative character. 
Article 13. Where the imposition of a tax depends upon residence, periods spent by 
the representatives of Member States in the exercise of their functions at the principal 
and subsidiary organs of the League of Arab States and at conferences pertaining to it 
in one of the territories of a Member State, shall not be considered as periods of resi- 
dence in connection with the assessment of a tax. 

Article 14. Privileges and immunities shall not be accorded to the representatives of 
Member States for their personal benefit, but in order to safeguard the independent 
exercise of their functions in connection with the League. 

Consequently, Member States should waive the immunity of their represent- 
ative in all cases where it appears that immunity would impede the course of justice 
and where its waiver in respect of (these representatives) would not prejudice the 
purpose for which the immunity is accorded. 

Article 15. The provisions of Articles n, 12, and 13 are not applicable between 
representatives of Member States and the Governments of the States of which they 
are nationals or of which they are the representative. 

Article 16. The expression "representatives of Member States" mentioned in this 
Chapter shall include all representatives of Member States, their assistants, advisers 
and technical experts and the secretaries dispatched with them. 
Article 17. Permanent State delegates shall enjoy, during the period of their repre- 
senting their State in the organs of the Arab League, such (privileges and immunities) 
as are enjoyed by diplomatic representatives. 

Article 18. The Secretary-General shall notify the Governments of Member States 
of the names of representatives of the States in the Council of the League, as well as 
their permanent delegates and members of permanent committees. 

CHAPTER V 

Officials 

Article 19. The Council of the League of Arab States shall, on the basis of submis- 
sions to it by the Secretary-General, specify the categories of officials of the Secretar- 
iat -General to which the provisions of Article 20 and those of Chapter VII shall be 
applied. The Secretary-General shall periodically communicate to Member States 
the names of these officials together with an account of their functions. 
Article 20. i) Officials of the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States shall, 
regardless of their nationality, enjoy the following privileges and immunities. 

a) Judicial immunity in respect of acts performed by them in their 
official capacity. 

b) Exemption from taxation on their salaries and emoluments paid or 
to be paid to them by the League. 



119 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

2) Furthermore, officials of the Secretariat-General other than the nationals 
of the country of the seat (of the League), shall enjoy: 

a) Together with their spouses and members of their families dependent 
on them, exemption from immigration restrictions and measures rela- 
ting to alien registration. 

b) The facilities accorded to officials of their ranks who are members of 
diplomatic missions accredited to the Government concerned, in 
respect of the regulations relating to exchange. 

c) The facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in time of international 
crises, as regards their repatriation. 

d) Within one year from the date of their taking up their posts, exemption 
from customs duties on furniture and effects imported on their taking 
up first residence in the State concerned. 

Article 21. Officials of the Secretariat-General shall be exempted from the obligations 
of national service. However, as regards the nationals of each State, this exemption 
shall be restricted to those whose names appear in a list prepared by the Secretary- 
General and approved by the Government concerned. 

In case officials of the Secretariat-General other than those mentioned above are 
recalled for national service, the Government concerned shall, at the request of the 
Secretary-General, postpone, as far as it can, the recall of those officials whose stay is 
made necessary by the exigencies of their work, in order to avoid serious interruption 
of important work. 

Article 22. In addition to the privileges and immunities provided for by the two 
preceding Articles, the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries-General and senior 
officials, together with their spouses and their minor children, shall enjoy the privi- 
leges and immunities which are accorded, in conformity with international law, to 
diplomatic envoys, each according to his rank. 

Article 23. Privileges and immunities are accorded to officials to safeguard the in- 
terests of the League. The Secretary-General shall have the right, and is indeed un- 
der the duty, to waive the immunity of officials of the Secretariat-General, not speci- 
fied in the foregoing Article, in all cases where, in his opinion, the immunity would 
impede the course of justice and where it can be waived without prejudice to the inte- 
rests of the League. As to officials provided for in that Article, the immunity shall 
not be waived except with the consent of the Council. 

Article 24. The League of Arab States shall co-operate at all times with the ap- 
propriate authorities of Member States to ensure justice, secure the observance of 
police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any abuse of the privileges and im- 
munities mentioned in this Chapter. 



CHAPTER VI 

Experts 

Article 25. Experts (other than officials provided for in Chapter V) performing 
missions for the League of Arab States, in execution of a resolution to be adopted by 
its Council, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the ful- 
filment of that mission; in particular: 

a) Immunity from arrest or detention and seizure of their personal effects; 

b) Judicial immunity, even after the termination of their mission, in respect of 
acts done by them in their representative capacity; 



120 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

c) Inviolability for papers and documents. 

d) The right to use codes and to receive correspondence exchanged between 
them and the League of Arab States by means of a courier or by sealed bags. 

e) The facilities accorded to representatives of foreign States on temporary 
official missions, in respect of currency or exchange regulations. 

f) The immunities and facilities accorded to diplomatic representatives in 
respect of their personal effects. 

g) Together with their spouses and minor children, exemption from immigra- 
tion restrictions, procedures relating to the registration of aliens and obligations 
concerning national service. 

Article 26. Privileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interest of the 
League. The Secretary-General shall have the right, and is indeed under the duty, to 
waive the immunity in all cases where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the 
course of justice and where it can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the 
League. 

CHAPTER VH 

Travel Documents 

Article 27. The Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States may issue laissez- 
passer to its officials. These laissez-passer shall be recognized and accepted by Member 
States as valid travel documents for their holders, taking into account the provisions 
of the following two articles. 

Article 28. Visas are granted to holders of laissez-passer at the request of the Se- 
cretariat-General, in which it is stated that they are officials travelling for the perfor- 
mance of official work pertaining to it. 

Article 29. The grant of visas to officials shall be effected at the earliest possible 
time, paying due regard to all facilities ensuring their travelling as soon as (possible). 
Article 30. The same facilities provided for in Article 29 shall be accorded to ex- 
perts and officials who do not hold laissez-passer from the League, provided they 
submit a certificate issued by the League and establishing that they are travelling for 
the performance of work relating to the League. 

CHAPTER Vffl 

Settlements of Disputes 

Article 31. The League of Arab States shall establish an organ for settling: 

a) Disputes arising out of contracts and other disputes of a private law charac- 
ter, to which the League is a party. 

b) Disputes involving any official of the League who by reason of his official 
capacity enjoys immunity, when immunity has not been waived in his case. 

Final Provisions 

Article 32. No provisions in this Convention shall affect the authority of a Member 
State to take such measures which it deems appropriate for the maintenance of its 
territorial integrity, its security or its public order. 

Any State deeming it necessary to take such measures, shall hasten to contact the 
Secretariat-General, in so far as circumstances will permit, in order to agree upon 
the measures warranting the safeguarding of the interests of the League. 
Article 33. Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Con- 



121 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

vention shall be submitted to the Arab Court of Justice, unless both parties agree 
otherwise. 

Article 34. The Council of the League of Arab States shall submit this Convention 
to Member States of the League for accession thereto. 

Article 35. This Convention shall become effective with regard to each State as from 
the date of the deposit of the instruments of accession by that State with the Secreta- 
riat-General. The Secretary-General shall inform Member States of the deposit of the 
instruments of accession. 

Article 36. The accession of any Member State to this convention means that it has 
complied with the constitutional processes for making this Convention part of its 
internal legislation. 

Article 37. This Convention shall continue in force with regard to each acceding 
State for as long as it remains a Member State of the League. 

Article 38 The League of Arab States may conclude supplementary agreements 
for the proper application of the provisions of this Convention within the territories 
of Member States. 



Convention for the Facilitation of Trade Exchange and the Regu- 
lation of Transit Trade among States of the Arab League 

September 7, 1953 (j) 

Whereas the Governments of... (the names of the seven original Member States 
follow) 

Being eager to foster the economic ties among the States Members of the Arab 
League, and in fulfilment of the provisions of Article 2 of the Pact of the League of 
Arab States, providing for the necessity of the existence of close co-operation among 
States Members of the League in economic and financial matters, including the facili- 
tating of the exchange of trade, of customs and agricultural and industrial matters, 

Have agreed upon the following: 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League, Cairo. The Convention was approved by the Council of the League on Sep- 
tember 7, 1953) during its Nineteenth Extraordinary Session. It was signed on Sep- 
tember 7, 195 3 by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt. It was also signed by 
Saudi Arabia on September 13, 1953, and by Yaman on December 8, 1953. 
The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Lebanon on September 13, 1953 

2. Jordan on October 27, 1953 

3. Egypt on November 12, 1953 

4. Saudi Arabia on February 23, 1954 

5. Syria on June 23, 1954 

6. Iraq on December 25, 1954 

The Convention has been amended twice through the conclusion of two supplement- 
ary Conventions bearing the same title as the one under consideration and being made 
subject to the provisions of Articles 7,8 and 9 of this Convention. The first of these 
amending Conventions was approved by the Arab League's Economic Council during 
its Twelfth Ordinary Session in Cairo on December 15, 1954. It was signed on the 
same day by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Yaman. The 



122 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

Article I. 

A. Exchange of agricultural and livestock products and natural resources. 
Agricultural and livestock products as well as natural resources, listed in Annex 

A y appended to this Convention, shall be exempted from customs import duties, pro- 
vided that their origin is one of the countries of the Contracting Parties. 

B. Exchange of industrial products. 

Arab industrial products, the origin of which is one of the countries of the Con- 
tracting Parties and which are listed in Annex B, appended to this Convention, shall 
enjoy the treatment of the most favoured nation as regards customs import duties, and 
shall thus be subjected to a reduced customs tariff in the proportion of 25% of the nor- 
mal tariff in force in the importing Arab country. 

C. Agricultural, li vestock and industrial products, produced in any of the coun- 
tries of the Contracting Parties and imported by a country of another Party, shall not 
be subjected to internal duties exceeding the duties imposed on similar local products, 
or on their raw materials in the importing country. 

D. Arab countries shall, as between themselves, observe the treatment of the 
most favoured nation in respect to import and export licenses. 

E. The above shall take place without prejudice to any other privileges which 
may be provided for by bilateral agreements, already econcluded and which may be 
concluded in the future between the Arab countries. 

Article 2. Articles subject to government monopoly. 

The provisions of this convention shall not be applied to articles which are 
subject to government monopoly. 
Article 3. Goods, the import or export of which is prohibited. 

Goods, the import of which is prohibited, or will be prohibited, into the territory 
of one of the Contracting Parties, according to operative regulations therein, shall be 
liable to confiscation if imported from the other territories, unless a previous authori- 
zation bearing the customs seal, had already been obtained for their transportation 
(by way of transit) to a country other than those of the Contracting Parties. Such 
goods shall not be returned to the exporting country. 

Goods, the export of which is prohibited from one of the countries of the Con- 
tracting Parties, shall be confiscated if imported into the territory of any one of the 
other Contracting Parties. The customs authorities in the importing country shall be 
responsible for returning them to the exporting country. 
Article 4. Transit. 

The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to facilitate transit movement across 



instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : Egypt 
(September 77, 1955 ), Lebanon (January 23, 1956), Syria (February 29, 1956), 
Iraq (April 22, 1956)* and Jordan (June 3, 1956). 

The second amending Convention was approved by the Economic Council on Jan- 
uary 25, 1956. It was signed on the same date by the Arab Member States men- 
tioned above, with the exception of Yaman. The instruments of ratification were 
deposited at the Secretariat-General by Iraq (August i y 1956), Saudi Arabia 
(January u, 1957), Jordan (February 5, 1957) and Egypt (May 9, 1957). 
In view of the fact that these two Conventions deal essentially with details, as distinct 
from questions of policy, and having regard to considerations of space, it has been 
decided not to reproduce them in full. ED. 



123 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

their countries by every means of transport , according to operative rules and customs 
regulations in the country across which transit trade is carried on. 

The transportation of goods and personal effects, regardless of their origin, shall 
be considered transportation by way of transit across the territory of any one of the 
Contracting Parties, whether or not transported by other means of transport, and be 
they deposited or not in warehouses, and irrespective of whether or not a change 
takes place with regard to their loading, if the transportation constitutes a complete 
transportation that begins and ends outside the boundaries of the country which is 
being crossed by transit. 

Likewise, the transportation of cattle and livestock across one of the Contracting 
Parties to the country of another Party shall be considered transportation by way of 
transit, and this, in conformity with the regulations in force. 

Goods and personal effects dispatched by way of transit by any one of the Parties 
to the country of another Party shall be accompanied by a manifest, to be drawn up 
by the owner cf the transport means or his accredited representative and to be marked, 
in due form, by the customs authorities of the country of origin. It shall be duly ac- 
cepted by the country of destination upon the passage of the goods and effects across 
the boundaries of the other Contracting Party and after the customs authorities of 
this latter country have made sure of the good condition of the customs lead (stamp) 
affixed to the goods and of the means of transport, and this, in conformity with the 
regulations in force. 

Article 5. Goods liable to deterioration, and dispatched by way of transit across the 
territory of any of the Contracting Parties to that of a third state, must be exported or 
withdrawn from the customs within thirty days of their entry into the customs area. 
Should this not take place, the goods must be confiscated and sold by public auction 
or destroyed according to the regulations in force. 
Article 6. Ratification of the Convention. 

The States signatory of this Convention shall ratify it, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes, at the earliest possible date. Instruments of ratification shall 
be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, which shall 
draw up a protocol of the deposit of the intruments Contracting States thereof. 
Article 7. States Members of the Arab League, non-signatories of this Convention, 
may accede thereto by means of a notification on their part to be sent to the Secretary- 
General of the League of Arab States, who shall notify the other States bound by this 
Convention of their accession thereto. 

Article 8. This Convention shall come into force a month after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by three of the signatory States, and shall take effect as 
regards each of the other States a month after the deposit of the instrument of its 
ratification or accession. 

Article 9. This Convention shall be effective for one year from the date of its coining 
into force, and shall be automatically renewed, year after year, unless one of the Con- 
tracting Parties should notify the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States in 
writing and at least two months before its expiry, of its desire to amend or not to re- 
new. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall communicate this to 
the other States bound (by this Convention). It shall remain operative in regard to 
the other Contracting Parties, and its provisions shall continue to be operative in 
respect of applications for importing or exporting goods, which had been made before 
the expiration of the said period. 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow, have signed 
this Convention on behalf of their Governments and in their names. 



124 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

This Convention was drawn up in Arabic, in Cairo, on Dhu al-Hijja 28, 1372 
A.H. (corresponding to September 7, 1953), in one original copy to be kept at the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original 
shall be delivered to each signatory State as well as to each acceding State. 



Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions <T T 
and the Transfer of Capital Among States of the Arab League J 

September 7, 1955 (/) 

The Governments of... (the names of the seven original Member States follow). 

Being desirous of organizing the settlement of payments of current transactions 
and of laying down rules for the transfer of capital among them; 

Have agreed upon the following: 
Article i. The Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions. 

1. Each of the Governments of the Contracting States shall, within the limits of 
its possibilities and in accordance with the regulations applicable in its territory and 
regarding the transfer of foreign currencies and import, work for the facilitation of 
the transfer of payments of current transactions enumerated in the attached list No. I, 
in favour of the other Contracting States, and shall accord to these payments the most 
favoured treatment possible. 

2. If the procedure of the transfer of foreign currencies applied by all or some 
of the Contracting States imposes restrictions on the transfer of payments of current 
transactions to the other Contracting States, and (if) the situation of the balance of 
payments of a Contracting State does not permit the transfer of the payments of 
current transactions in foreign currencies acceptable to another interested State, then 
in this case the (debtor) State shall undertake to grant to residents in the other (credi- 
ditor) Contracting States the following facilities at least: 

a) The right to utilize their credit accounts for the settlement of all payments of 
current transactions mentioned in list No. i, payment of which fallsdue in the terri- 
tory of the debtor country, as well as for the settlement of the value of all the imports 
into the country of residence of the account owner from the territory of the debtor 
country where the debtor country allows export to all countries. 

b) The right to transfer a part or the whole of their credit accounts to residents 
in any of the Contracting countries or another country. 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as pitblished by the Arab 
League, Cairo. It was approved by the Council of the League on September 7, 1955, 
during its Nineteenth Extraordinary Session. It was signed on September 9, 195.?, 
by Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt. It was also signed by Saudi Arabia on 
September 13, 1955, and by Yaman on December 8, 1953. 

The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Lebanon on September 17, 195 3', 

2. Jordan on October 27, 19 5 3', 

3. Egypt on November 12, 195 3\ 

4. Saudi Arabia on February 23, 19 541 

5. Syria on June 23, 1954-, 

6. Iraq on December 25, 1954. ED. 



125 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

c) The right to utilize their credit accounts for settling the payment of the value 
of any goods they may purchase in the territory of the debtor country for the purpose 
of exporting them to any one of the Contracting countries or to another country where 
the debtor country allows export to all countries. 

d) If the procedure followed in the debtor country imposes a settlement of a 
part of the value of certain items of goods in a specified foreign currency, then the 
owner of the credit account shall be entitled, in the two cases provided for by the pre- 
ceding paragraphs (a) and (c), to settle only in foreign currency a part of the value 
within the limits of the best rates allowed by the debtor country in similar cases, and 
the remaining part shall be settled to the account of the crediting country. 

Article 2. Transfer of Capital. 

1. Arab Governments acceding to this Convention shall permit the transfer of 
capital to enable their subjects and residents to participate in development projects to 
be agreed upon by the interested parties within the limits of the regulations laid down 
by each State for the protection of its own capital, or that (capital) which had been 
transferred to it, from leaking out of the Arab States acceding to this Convention. 
The Governments of the States to which capital had been transferred shall guarantee 
its exploitation for the above-mentioned purposes . 

2. Capital transferred from an Arab country to another Arab country in accor- 
dance with the provisions of Article 2 of this Convention shall not be subject to any 
duties or exceptional taxes imposed for the purpose of precluding this transfer. 

3. Each of the Governments of the Arab countries shall permit Arab capital 
coming to it, after the signature of this Convention, to revert to its country of origin. 
Article 3. The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable to any bilateral 
convention in force between any two Contracting countries, or to any current transac- 
tion relating to the exchange of trade and services of a kind specified in the provisions 
of this Convention and the list attached thereto. The operation of current transactions 
not involving the transfer of currencies between one country and another of the pre- 
viously contracting countries shall remain in all cases considered to be more in the 
interests of the debtor, as provided for by this Convention. 

Article 4. Ratification of the Convention. 

This Convention shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their 
constitutional processes at the earliest possible date. The instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, which 
shall draw up a protocol of the deposit of ratification by each State, and shall notify the 
other Contracting States about it. 

Article 5. States of the Arab League, non-signatories of this Convention, may ac- 
cede to it by a notice to be sent by them to the Secretary-General of the League of 
Arab States, who shall notify the other Contracting States of such accession. 
Article 6. This Convention shall come into force one month after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by three signatory States, and shall be deemed binding in 
regard to the other States one month after the deposit of their instruments of ratifica- 
tion or accession. 

Article 7. Any State bound by this Convention may withdraw therefrom after the 
lapse of five years from its becoming operative, by a notice to be sent by it to the 
the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. Withdrawal shall be considered 
effective a year after the date of the dispatch of the notice regarding same. 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed this 
Convention on behalf and in the name of their Governments. 



126 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

This Convention was drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on Dhu al-Hijja 28, 1372 A. 
H. (corresponding to September 7, 1953)3 m o 116 original copy to be kept in the cus- 
tody of the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the 
original shall be delivered to each of the States which have signed it or acceded thereto. 

List No. i 
OF PAYMENT OF CURRENT TRANSACTIONS. 

1. Value of goods exported for a contracting country to another contracting 
country, together with the expenses of their loading and insurance. 

2. Commercial profits and dividends of immovable and movable capital revert- 
ing to a contracting country and invested in the other contracting countries. 

3. Expenditure of diplomatic and consular missions and of official delegations. 

4. Expenses for travel and for going to summer resorts, for tourism in general, 
for pilgrimage, medical treatment and commercial transactions. 

5. Residence and study expenses for students, salaries and emoluments of of- 
ficials, experts, and members of the professions, and the pensions of pensioners. 

6. Settlements due to Post, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, and to 
transport organizations. 

7. Insurance premiums, insurance indemnities, and the return of insurance 
(premiums). 

8. Sums due for patents and copyrights. 

9. Sums due for the release of films, and sale of and subscription to newspapers, 
magazines and periodical publications issued in one of the contracting countries. 



Nationality Agreement 

April 5, 19S4W 

The Governments of... (the names of the seven original Member States follow) 

Desiring to co-operate closely in matters of nationality, in execution of the provi- 
sions of Article 2 of the Arab League Pact, 

Have agreed upon the following provisions, approved by the Council of the 
League of Arab States at its meeting held on April 5, 1954, during its Twenty- First 
Ordinary Session, when (the Council) called upon Member States to accede thereto : 
Article i. Any person who possesses the nationality of any Arab Member State, 
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, be deemed to be an Arab. 
Article 2. An Arab woman acquires by marriage the nationality of her Arab hus- 
band and thereby her former nationality shall abate, unless she applies for the retent- 
ion of her (original) nationality in the marriage contract or in a later notice made with- 
in six months from the date of her marriage contract. 

In the event of withdrawal of her new nationality by the Government of the State 
of (her) husband in accordance with prevailing laws, the wife shall regain her former 
nationality. 

Where the husband is stateless, the original nationality of an Arab woman is not 
affected by her marriage to him. 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League^ Cairo. The Agreement was approved by the Council of the League on April 5 , 
1954, during its Twenty-First Ordinary Session. It was signed by : 



127 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article 3. On the marriage coming to an end, an Arab woman shall have the right to 
return to her country of origin in order to take up residence therein, and shall also have 
the right, when taking up residence, to recover, if she so applies, her former nationali- 
ty, losing thereupon the nationality she had acquired by marriage; provided, however, 
that in this regard the requirement of residence in her country of origin may, with 
the consent of the Government of such country, be dispensed with. 
Article 4. Minors shall follow the nationality acquired by their father, provided, 
however, that those born before such new nationality is acquired may revert to their 
father's original nationality within one year from the completion of eighteen Grego- 
rian years. 

Article 5. A foundling acquires the nationality of the country in which he is born 
and, until the contrary is established, shall be deemed to have been born in the country 
where he was found. 

A person born of an Arab mother in an Arab country, but whose paternity is not 
established in law, shall follow his mother's nationality. Where, however, it is proved 
in law that he is of an Arab father and has not yet completed eighteen Gregorian years, 
he shall take his father's nationality, whereupon his former nationality shall abate. 
Article 6. A national of one Member State of the Arab League shall not, except 
with the approval of his Government, acquire by naturalization the nationality of 
another Member State of the League; on his so acquiring the new nationality his for- 
mer nationality shall abate. 

Article 7. Any Arab born in any Arab League State other than his own may, subject 
to the consent of the Governments of the two countries concerned, and during the 
first year from the date on which he completes eighteen Gregorian years, opt for the 
nationality of the country in which he was born, and when he so opts his former 
nationality shall abate. 

Article 8. A person having the nationality of more than one of the Member States 
of the Arab League may opt for one or the other within two years from the date of 
the coming into force of this Agreement; and where the two years elapse without such 
option having taken place, he shall be deemed to have opted for the nationality more 
recently acquired, provided that where there is more than one nationality acquired at 
one and the same time, he shall be deemed to have opted for the nationality of the 
country in which he is domiciled, whereupon all other nationalities shall abate. 
Article 9. Any decision taken by the Government of any Arab League State confer- 
ring its nationality on a national of another Arab State, or withdrawing its nationality 
from him, must be communicated to the Government concerned within six months. 
Article 10. This Agreement shall be ratified by the signatory States, in accordance 



1. Jordan on June 8, 1954; 

2. Egypt on November 9, 1954; 

3. Iraq on May 12, 1955. 

The instruments of ratification were deposited at the Secretariat-General by : 

1. Jordan on July 28, 19541 

2. Egypt on February j, 1955. 

RESERVATIONS: 

Egypt : "A minor shall opt for nationality , in conformity with Articles 4 and ?> 
when he reaches the age of twenty-one, reckoned in Gregorian years* instead of eighteen" 
ED. 



128 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

with their constitutional processes, at the earliest possible date. Instruments of rati- 
fication shall be deposited at the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, 
which shall draw up a protocol of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by each 
State and shall communicate it to the other Contracting States. 
Article u. This Agreement shall come into force two months from the date of the 
deposit by three States of their instruments of ratification, and shall be operative 
in regard to each of the other States two months from the date of the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 

Article 12. States of the Arab League, non-signatories of this Agreement, may accede 
thereto by notice to be sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 
who shall communicate such accession to the signatory States. 
Article 13. Any State bound by this Agreement may, by a notice to be sent to the 
Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, withdraw therefrom. Such with- 
drawal shall take effect six months from the date of the transmission of the notice. 

In testimony whereof, the Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed this 
Agreement on behalf of their Governments and in their names. 

This Agreement was drawn up on Monday, Sha'ban 2, 1373, A.H., correspond- 
ing to April 5, 1954, in one original copy to be kept at the Secretariat-General of the 
League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original shall be delivered to each 
Contracting State. 

Convention for the Amendment of the Convention 

for the Settlement of Payments of Current 

Transactions and the Transfer of Capital 

Among States of the Arab League 

December 15, 1954 (i) 

The Governments of... (names of the seven original Member States follow 
Referring to the Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transac- 
tions and the Transfer of Capital, approved by the Council of the Arab League on 



53 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as published by the Arab 
League 3 Cairo. It was approved by the Economic Council of the League on December 
*5> J 954i during its Second Ordinary Session in Cairo. It was signed by: 

1. Jordan on December 75, 19541 

2. Syria on December 75, 1954; 
j. Iraq on December 75, 1954; 

4. Saudi Arabia on December 75, 1954; 

5. Lebanon on December 75, 1954; 

6. Egypt on December 75, 7954; 

7. Yaman on December 75, 7954. 

The instrument of ratification were deposited with the Secretariat-General of the 
League by : 
7. Egypt on September 17, 7955; 

2. Lebanon on January 23, 7956; 

3. Syria on February 29, 7956; 

4. Iraq on April 22> 7956; 

5. Jordan on June j, 7956. ED. 

129 



54 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

September 7, 1953; and to Article 8 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic C0- 
operation among States of the Arab League; 

And acting on the decision of the Arab Economic Council during the meeting it 
held on Rabi* ath-Thani 19, 1374 A.H., corresponding to December 15, 1954, 

Have agreed upon the following: 

Article i. The phrase "or another country", mentioned at the end of para, (b) of 
Article i, shall be deleted. 

Article 2. The words "economic development" shall be inserted between brackets 
after the words "development enterprises" mentioned in para, i of Article 2. 
Article 3. This Convention shall be ratified by the Contracting States, in accord- 
ance with their constitutional processes, at the earliest possible date. The instruments 
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab 
States, which shall draw up a protocol of the deposit of ratification by each State and 
shall notify the other Contracting States about it. 

Article 4. This Convention shall be considered as a supplementary part of the 
Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer of 
Capital, signed on September 7, 1953. It shall also be subject to the provisions of 
Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the said Convention. 

The Plenipotentiaries whose names follow have signed this Amendment on be- 
half of their Governments. 

Done in Arabic in Cairo on Wednesday, Rabi* ath-Thani, 1374 A. H., cor- 
responding to December 15, 1954, in one original to be kept in the custody of the 
Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States. An authentic copy of the original 
shall be delivered to each of the States which have signed it or acceded thereto. 

Agreement for the Establishment of the Arab Financial 
Institution for Economic Development 

June 3, 1957 (/) 

The Governments of... (names of nine Member States follow) 
being desirous to fulfil the provisions of Article Two of the Pact of the League of 
Arab States regarding (the) consolidation of (their) economic ties and co-operation 
among them for the purpose of developing the economies and the resources of their 
countries have agreed on the text of this Agreement as approved by the Economic 
Council (of the League) in its Resolution No. (88), adopted in its meeting of Monday, 
5 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1376; corresponding to June 3, 1957. 

( j) The above agreement owes its origin to a resolution passed by the Conference of Arab 
Ministers of Finance and Economy (2$th to 3ist May, 1953), according to which the 
Secretariat-General of the Arab League was entrusted with the task of formulating a plan 
for the establishment of an "Arab institution for economic development". In December of 
the same year the Economic Council of the League discussed the draft of the agreement as 
prepared by the Secretariat-General (following consultations with the World Bank). On 
June 3, 1957, the Council approved the draft agreement, which has since been signed by 
Jordan (June 3, 1957), Iraq (April 17, 1961), Saudi Arabia (June 3, 1957), Lebanon 
(January //, 1957), Libya (January 125/957 ) United Arab Repubic (June 3, 1957), and 
Yaman(Janary 14, ipjtf.On March 5, 1959, the United Arab Republic deposited the 
intruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the Arab League. In addition, 
on January 3, 1961, Jordan addressed a Note to the Secretariat-General stating that it 
had earmarked the necessary funds for meeting its contribution to the Institutions. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia informed the Secretariat-General on July 5, 1961, that it was 
willing to pay the advance io%ofits share as required by Article 44 of the Agreement. 
Text (>M4ti&* Applied by the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, Cairo. ED. 

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International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

Article One: 

There shall be an Arab institution called the Arab Financial Institution for 
Economic Development. 

PART ONE 
PURPOSES OF THE INSTITUTION 

Article Two: 

The purposes of the Institution shall be the economic development of its Arab 
member countries by encouraging the steady growth of productive projects under- 
taken by governments, organizations, and individuals. Such encouragement shall 
be manifested either by granting these projects loans, guaranteeing loans granted 
to them, participating in them, or preparing technical studies for them. Any assist- 
ance extended by the Institution for such projects shall be given only upon guarantees 
by the governments in whose territories the projects are located. 

In order to achieve these objectives, the Institution shall undertake the following: 

1. To assist in financing productive projects which contribute to the economic 
development of the member countries whether such projects were in the initial 
stage or in the stage of expansion or improvement by raising and investing the 
necessary funds through granting loans or partial subscription of the capital of some 
of the projects. 

2. To promote the investment of private capital, foreign and local, in such a 
way as to insure the best utilization of the economic potentialities in the member 
countries, relying in this on technical and managerial experience. 

3. To work for the purpose of attracting private capital, foreign and local, for 
investment in productive projects in the member countries, and to create favorable 
conditions for this purpose. 

PART TWO 
MEMBERSHIP AND CAPITAL 

Article Three: 

The members of the Institution shall be: 

1. Member States of the Arab League. They shall be considered founding 
members. 

2. Any other Arab state or Arab country which signs this Agreement and whose 
admission to membership is approved by the Board of Governors. 

Article Four: CAPITAL 

1 . The capital of the Institution shall be the equivalent of twenty million Egyp- 
tian pounds. The Egyptian Pound shall be evaluated according to its value in relation 
to gold as fixed by the International Monetary Fund at the time of the signing of this 
Agreement. 

2. The capital stock shall be divided into 2,000 shares, each having the value 
of ten thousand pounds. 

Article Five: INCREASING THE CAPITAL 

The Institution may increase its capital under the following conditions: 
i. An increase may be decided by the absolute majority of votes cast if such 

an increase were designed for the issuance of shares covering the initial subscription 

of an Arab country joining the Institution. 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

2. In all other cases not mentioned in Para.i of this Article, the increase shall 
be decided by a three-fourths majority of votes cast. 

3. In case an increase is decided according to Para. 2 of this Article, each mem- 
ber shall be given a suitable opportunity to subscribe, in accordance with the terms 
defined by the Institution, a proportion of the increase of stock equivalent to the pro- 
portion which its stock theretofore subscribed bears to the capital stock of the Ins- 
titution, but no member shall be obligated to subscribe any part of the increased 
capital. This proportion, however, may be increased or decreased provided the ab- 
solute majority of the votes cast approve of the change. 

4. Only members of the Institution may subscribe shares of the capital stock, 
and these shares may not be given to anyone other than members. 

Article Six: SUBSCRIPTION 

1. Each founding member shall subscribe a number of shares proportionate 
to its share of the budget of the League of Arab States. The portion to be subscribed 
by other members shall be determined by]the Institution in accordance with Para, i 
of Article Five. 

2. Shares subscribed by the founding members and members joining later 
shall be issued at par value. 

3. 75 per cent of the value of the shares subscribed by a member shall be paid 
in gold or in currency convertible into gold upon request from the Institution desig- 
nating the place of payment. The remaining 25 per cent shall be paid in the currency 
of the member country. The Institution, however, may, if necessary, ask that Arab 
currencies be converted into foreign currencies. 

4. 25 per cent of the value of the shares subscribed by a member shall be paid 
as an initial subscription when this Agreement becomes effective according to the 
provisions of Article Forty-one. Payment shall be made in gold or in currencies 
convertible into gold to the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States. 

5. In case of accession of an Arab state or country to this Agreement after its 
coming into effect, the new member shall pay against its specified portion an amount 
proportionate to that paid by the remainder of the members. 

Article Seven: LIABILITY 

1. No member shall be liable, by virtue of its membership, for obligations of 
the Institution which are not within the limits prescribed in this Agreement. 

2. Every member shall remain liable for the unpaid portion of its shares. 

Article Eight: DISPOSAL OF SHARES 

Shares of the Institution may not be pledged or encumbered in any manner 
whatever; and they shall be transferable only to the Institution. 

Article Nine: ASSETS OF THE INSTITUTION 

1. The assets of the Institution shall comprise, in addition to the subscribed 
capital, reserve funds and funds which may be borrowed by the Institution through 
issuing securities and obtaining credit at international organizations such as the Inter- 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the International Finance 
Corporation or other finance organizations. 

2. The Institution shall determine the terms of the securities which it issues. 

3. The value of the securities issued by the Institution should not exceed, at 
any given time, twice the amount of the capital without a special authorization from 
the Board of Governors, in which case three fourths of the votes are necessary for 
effecting the increase. 

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International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

PART THREE 

OPERATIONS OF THE INSTITUTION 
Article Ten: LENDING AND PARTICIPATION 

i. The Institution may undertake the following operations in the countries 
of the members subscribing the capital: 

(a) To make loans to productive projects undertaken by governments, 
organizations, or individuals in the member countries. 

(b) To make loans to development banks,whether industrial or agricultural. 

(c) To participate partially in corporations undertaking constructive or 
productive operations on a regional level or on a large local scale, pro- 
vided that the total amount representing the Institution's participation 
in the different projects does not, at any time, exceed 20 per cent of 
the total amount invested in loans. 

Article Eleven: MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS 

The Institution may undertake the following operations: 

1. To borrow funds and give the necessary guarantees for such borrowing, if 
required, in local and foreign markets. 

2. To guarantee the securities in which it has invested its funds for the purpose 
of facilitating their sale. 

3. To buy and sell securities it has issued, guaranteed, or in which it has 
invested. 

4. To invest funds which are not needed in securities of its choice and to invest 
savings, retirement, and similar funds in first-grade securities. Conditions stipulated 
in other paragraphs of this Article for other operations shall not be applicable to the 
investments mentioned herein. 

5. To undertake any other operations connected with the purposes of the Ins- 
titution as set forth in Article Two. 

6. The Institution shall establish a department for technical and economic 
research to serve in fulfilling its objectives and to assist the member countries in 
completing surveys of their economies and in co-ordinating their development. 

Article Twelve: GUARANTEES 

1. All lending operations assumed by the Institution in the interest of a govern- 
ment, an organization, or individuals, should be guaranteed by the government of 
the state or country in which the project is undertaken. 

2. The Institution has the right, when financing a non-governmental project, 
to ask for special guarantees in addition to the governmental guarantee mentioned 
in Para, i of this Article. 

Article Thirteen: LIMITATIONS OF FINANCING 

1. The Institution may not undertake a financial operation which, in its view, 
could be accomplished, on reasonable terms, through private capital in the state or 
country concerned. 

2. The Institution shall not finance any project in the territory of any member 
without permission from the government of the said member. 

3. The Institution has the right to stipulate that its funds be spent on the pur- 
poses specified for them. 

4. The Institution may not undertake the management of any project in which 
it has invested funds. 

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The Arab States and the Arab League 

5. The Institution shall define the terms it sees fit for financing any project, 
taking into consideration the requirements of the project, the risks involved, and the 
terms usually available to individual investors undertaking similar financing oper- 
ations. 

6. The Institution should ascertain, through its experts, the feasibility of any 
project before financing it. 

7. The Institution should endeavor for the continuous circulation of its funds 
by selling to individuals whenever possible, and on satisfactory terms, securities 
in which it has invested. 

8. The Institution may float loans in the territory of any member after obtain- 
ing permission from its government for the purpose of financing any of the operations 
specified in this Agreement. If the project is located in the territory of another mem- 
ber, the member in whose territory the loan is floated shall be under obligation, if so 
requested by the Institution, to transfer the funds raised to the country where the 
project is located. 

Article Fourteen: CURRENCIES FOR LOANS 

1. The Institution shall pay to the borrower the value of the loans in currency 
other than the currency of the borrowing state or country, as is needed by the bor- 
rower for carrying out the project for which the loan has been granted. 

2. The Institution may make loans in the currency of the member country in 
whose territory the project is located, provided that the borrower is an economic 
development institution - governmental or non-governmental - and after making 
s ure that the necessary funds cannot be raised locally. 

Article Fifteen: EXCHANGE OF CURRENCY 

i. The Institution shall be empowered to dispose, as it considers best and 
without objection from the member states, with the gold and funds in hand as well 
as with funds obtained from profits, cost of loans, amortization, commissions, fees, 
and charges by purchasing foreign currencies or gold ingots. 

Article Sixteen: DEBT PAYMENT 

Contracts for loans granted by the Institution shall be made in accordance with 
the following provisions: 

1. The Institution shall determine the cost of loans granted by it as well as 
the commission, methods of payments, maturity, dates of payments, and any other 
conditions connected thereto. 

2. Contracts of loan should specify the type of currency in which due payments 
should be made to the Institution. The borrower may, however, subject to the agree- 
ment of the Institution, pay the amount of his debt in gold or in a currency other 
than that specified in the contract. The Institution shall endeavor as far as possible 
to recover its loans in the same currency in which they were made. 

3 . Upon request from the borrower and subject to the approval of the guarantee- 
ing government, the Institution may change the terms of a loan contract if it is 
satisfied with the validity of the request and provided that such a request does not 
harm the interest of the Institution or its members. 

4. Subject to the approval of the guaranteeing government and with the con- 
sent of the borrower, the Institution may modify the terms of payment of a loan or 
extend its duration. 

Article Seventeen : EVALUATION OF CURRENCY 

i. In case a member country is not a member of the International Monetary 



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International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

Fund, the currency of the said member shall be evaluated according to gold at time 
of subscription by a decision of the Board of Governors. 

2. In case the par value of a member's currency relative to gold depreciated by 
more than 5 per cent, the member shall pay to the Institution, within a period to be 
fixed by the Institution, an additional amount of its own currency sufficient to com- 
pensate for the depreciation affecting the value of the currency of such member which 
is held by the Institution. 

3. Whenever the par value of a member's currency relative to gold increases by 
more than 5 per cent, the Institution shall return to such member, within a period to 
be agreed upon with the Institution, an amount of that member's currency equal to 
the increase in the value of the currency of such member which is held by the Insti- 
tution. 

Article Eighteen: PROHIBITION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY 

The Institution and its employees shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political orientations 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be rel- 
evant to and the basis of all decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed im- 
partially in order to achieve the purpose of the Institution. 

PART FOUR 

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Article Nineteen: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

The Institution shall be composed of a Board of Governors, General Director, 
(Chairman of the Executive Board), the Executive Board, Permanent Council of 
Advisers, Loan Committees, and the employees necessary for carrying out the 
operations defined by the Institution's regulations. 

Article Twenty: BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

1. The Board of Governors shall consist of one governor and one alternate 
governor appointed by each member of the Institution. Each governor and each 
alternate shall serve for a period of five years, subject to the pleasure of the member 
appointing him, and may be reappointed. The alternate may not vote except in the 
absence of the governor. The Board shall elect, annually, one of the governors as 
Chairman. 

2. The Board of Governors shall be considered as the general assembly of the 
Institution. All executive powers shall be vested in it; and it may delegate to the 
Executive Board authority to exercise any of its powers except the following: 

(a) Admission of new members; 

(b) Increasing the capital; 

(c) Suspension of a member; 

(d) Deciding appeals from interpretations of the provisions of this Agree- 
ment; 

(e) Concluding agreements for cooperation with other international or- 
ganizations, other than informal agreements of a temporary and ad- 
ministrative character; 

(f) Permanent suspension of the Institution's operations and distribution 
of its assets; 

(g) Determining the distribution of the net income of the Institution. 

3. The Board of Governors shall hold at least one annual meeting as requested 

135 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

by the Executive Board or by threee members having one quarter of the total votes. 

4. A majority representing not less than two thirds of the votes shall constitute 
a quorum for any meeting of the Board of Governors. 

5. The Board of Governors may if it deems such action advantageous es- 
tablish the necessary rules whereby the Executive Board may obtain the approval of 
the members of the Board of Governors on a specific question without calling a 
meeting of the Board. 

6. The Board of Governors and the Executive Board each within the limits 
of its authority may adopt such rules, regulations, and procedures as may be neces- 
sary to conduct the business of the Institution. 

7. Governors and alternates shall serve as such without compensation from 
the Institution. The Institution shall, however, pay them reasonable expenses incur- 
red in attending meetings. 

8. The Board of Governors shall determine the remuneration to be paid to 
the members of the Executive Board and their deputies and the salary and terms of 
contract of service of the General Director (Chairman of the Board). 

Article Twenty-one: VOTING 

1. In calculating votes taken at meetings of the Board of Governors, each mem- 
ber shall have 25 votes, regardless of the number of shares held, plus one vote for 
each share held. 

2. Except as otherwise specifically provided, all matters before the Board shall 
be decided by the absolute majority of votes. 

Article Twenty-two: GENERAL DIRECTOR (CHAIRMAN OF THE 
BOARD) AND STAFF 

1. The Board of Governors shall appoint a General Director of the Institution 
who shall not be a governor or an alternate or a member of the Executive Board or 
a deputy. In the case of the General Director's temporary absence, the Board of 
Governors shall appoint someone to act for him during his absence. 

2. The General Director shall be Chairman of the Executive Board, but shall 
have no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division of votes. He may 
attend the meetings of the Board of Governors and participate in the deliberations but 
shall not have the right to vote. 

3. The General Director shall be the head of the staff of the Institution and 
the supervisor responsible, under the direction of the Executive Board, for the con- 
duct of all the Institution's operations. He shall undertake the technical and admi- 
nistrative organization within the Institution, and he shall have the power to appoint 
and dismiss the experts and the staff in accordance with the Institution's regulations. 

4. The General Director and the employees of the Institution owe their alle- 
giance entirely to the Institution and to no other authority. They shall refrain from 
exerting any influence motivated by any other factor on the work of the Institution 
and shall show no partiality to any side or nationality. 

5. In appointing the officers and staff, the General Director shall try insofar as 
possible to recruit personnel from the various member countries of the Institution, 
provided that there shall be no deviation from the principle of securing the efficiency 
and technical competence necessary for efficient operation. 

Article Twenty-three: EXECUTIVE BOARD 

I. The Executive Board shall be responsible for the conduct of all the Ins- 
titution's operations in general and shall exercise the powers delegated to it by the 
Board of Governors. 

I3 6 



International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

2. The Executive Board shall be composed of four full-time Directors elected 
by the Board of Governors. They shall be Arabs with recognized knowledge and 
ability, and they shall be elected for a term of two years, which could be renewed. 

3. Members of the Executive Board shall be elected as follows: 

(a) Each governor shall nominate one director and one deputy director. 

(b) The Board of Governors shall elect, by majority vote from among the 
candidates, four directors and a deputy for each of them. 

(c) Each governor shall cast all the votes to which he is entitled in the 
Board of Governors for one of the candidates for directors. 

(d) Each director shall be entitled to cast, in the Executive Board, the 
number of votes he had obtained in his election by the Board of Gover- 
nors. 

(e) Deputies shall help the directors in their work and may attend the 
meetings of the Executive Board. A deputy may not vote except in the 
absence of the director for whom he is acting. 

(f) Directors and deputies shall continue in office until their successors 
are elected. If the office of one of them becomes vacant for more than 
ninety days, a successor shall be elected for the remainder of the term 
by the governors who elected the former director, provided the Board 
of Governors approves the selection. The succeeding director shall 
have the same number of votes held by his predecessor. 

(g) A quorum of the Executive Board shall be effected by the presence of 
the General Director or his deputy and at least two members repre- 
senting two thirds of the votes. 

(h) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all decisions of the Executive 

Board shall be taken by an absolute majority of the votes cast. 
Article Twenty-four: PERMANENT COUNCIL OF ADVISERS 

1. There shall be a Permanent Council of Advisers composed, initially, of 
three persons selected by the Board of Governors after consultation with the Execu- 
tive Board. The advisers shall be selected from different fields of specialization, and 
the Board of Governors may, if necessary, increase their number. 

2. Advisers shall be appointed by contract for a renewable term of three years. 
The Chairman of the Executive Board shall act on behalf of the Board of Governors 
in contracting with advisers. 

3. The Council of Advisers shall hold its meetings under the chairmanship of 
the General Director (Chairman of the Board) or any one director designated by him. 
The advisers shall attend the meetings of the Executive Board on invitation; they 
may participate in the deliberations but shall not vote. 

Article Twenty-five. LOAN COMMITTEES 

1. There shall be formed committees to prepare the necessary reports on 
requested loans according to the provisions of this Agreement. 

2. Each committee shall include an expert selected by the governor represent- 
ing the member in whose territory the project is located and one or more members of 
the technical staff of the Institution to be appointed by the Chairman of the Executive 
Board. 

Article Twenty-six: HEADQUARTERS 

The principal office of the Institution shall be in Cairo. The Institution may 
establish, by a decision of the Board of Governors and according to its needs, branch 
offices or agencies in any other city. 

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The Arab States and the Arab League 

Article Twenty-seven: REPORTS AND STATEMENTS 

The Institution shall publish an annual report containing statements of its ac- 
counts, and it may publish reports on its activities regarding various projects or any 
other reports connected with the realization of its purposes. These documents and 
statements shall be circulated to all members. 

Article Twenty-eight: DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS 

1. Ten per cent of the annual net profits of the Institution shall be allocated 
to the general reserves account; and the Board of Governors may set aside another 
percentage for the purpose of forming supplementary reserves. The remaining funds 
shall be distributed to the members in proportion to the number of shares they hold. 

2. The Institution shall pay to each member its share of the profits in its own 
currency. If that currency is not available, or available but not in adequate quantities, 
it shall be paid in other currency acceptable to the member. 

PART FIVE 
WITHDRAWAL 

SUSPENSION OF MEMBERSHIP - SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS 

Article Twenty-nine: WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERS 

No member may withdraw from the Institution before five years of membership. 
Any member may withdraw from the Institution by transmitting a notice in writing 
to the Institution at its principal office. Withdrawal shall become effective on the 
date such notice is received by the Institution. 

Article Thirty: SUSPENSION OF MEMBERSHIP 

1. If a member fails to fulfill any of its obligations to the Institution, the Ins- 
titution may suspend its membership by decision of a majority of the Board of 
Governors. The member so suspended shall completely cease to be a member after 
a year from the date of its suspension unless a decision is taken by majority of votes to 
restore the member to good standing. 

2. While under suspension, (a) member shall not be entitled to exercise any 
rights under this Agreement except the right of withdrawal, but shall remain subject 
to its obligations as defined in Article Thirty-one. 

Article Thirty-one: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS 
CEASING TO BE MEMBERS 

1. When a member government ceases to be a member, it shall remain liable 
for its obligations to the Institution so long as any part of the loans or guarantees 
contracted before it ceased to be a member are outstanding; but it shall cease to incur 
liabilities with respect to loans and guarantees entered into thereafter by the Institu- 
tion and to share either in the income or the expenses of the Institution. 

2. At the time a government ceases to be a member, the Institution shall ar- 
range for the purchase of its shares and the settlement of its accounts. The purchase 
price of the shares shall be the value shown by the books of the Institution or the 
paid-up value, whichever is less. 

3. The payment for shares repurchased under this Article shall be governed by 
the following provisions: 

(a) Any amount due to the government for its shares shall be withheld by 
the Institution as long as this government, any organization, or indivi- 

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International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

duals in its territory remain liable, as borrower or guarantor to the 
Institution, and such amount may, at the option of the Institution, be 
applied on any such loans and liabilities. In any event, no amount due 
to any member as a result of the repurchase of the shares shall be paid 
until six months after the date upon which the government ceases to be 
a member. 

(b) The Institution may pay to the government in return for its shares a 
portion of the funds withheld equivalent to the amounts paid by the 
government in settlement of its liabilities to the Institution. 

(c) Payments shall be made in the currency of the country ceasing to be 
a member or, at the option of the Institution, in gold or in currency 
convertible into gold. 

(d) If losses are sustained by the Institution, by virtue of operations under- 
taken by it under this Agreement, and if such losses exceed the amount 
of the reserve provided against losses on that date, such government 
shall be obligated to repay upon demand the amount by which the 
repurchase price of its shares would have been taken into account when 
the repurchase price was determined. 

Article Thirty-two: SUSPENSION OF THE INSTITUTION'S OPERA- 
TIONS AND LIQUIDATION OF ITS ASSETS 

1. The Executive Board may, in extraordinary circumstances, suspend, tem- 
porarily, operations in respect of loans, guarantees, and participations, pending an 
opportunity for further consideration and action by the Board of Governors. 

2. The Institution may suspend permanently its operations by decision of the 
Board of Governors taken by a three - fourths majority of votes. After such decision, 
the Institution shall forthwith cease all activities, except those necessary for the rea- 
lization, and conservation, of its assets. 

The Institution as well as the mutual rights and obligations of the Institution and 
its members under this Agreement shall remain standing pending final settlement of 
the Institution's obligations and distributions of its assets. During this time, no mem- 
ber may withdraw or be suspended. Distribution of the assets to members shall be 
made only according to the provisions expressed in this Part of the Agreement. 

3. No distribution of the Institution's assets shall be made to its members on 
account of their subscription of the capital stock of the Institution until all liabilities 
to creditors have been discharged. Distribution of the assets to its members shall be 
made on the basis of the proportion of the shares held by each member. Such dis- 
tribution shall be made in cash or other assets at the time and in currencies which 
the Institution deems suitable. It is not necessary that the members' shares of the dis- 
tribution be uniform in regard to the type of assets distributed or the kind of currency 
paid against the distributed assets. 

4. Any member receiving assets distributed by the Institution in accordance 
with the provisions of this Part (Part Five) shall enjoy the same rights with respect 
to such assets as the Institution enjoyed prior to their distribution. 

PART SIX 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE INSTITUTION 

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES 
Article Thirty-three: LEGAL PERSONALITY 

i. The Institution shall possess legal personality, and, in particular, the capacity : 
(a) To contract; 

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The Arab States and the Arab League 

(b) To acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; 

(c) To institute all legal proceedings. 

2. Actions may be brought against the Institution in a court of competent juris- 
diction where its principal office is located. Organizations and individuals, however, 
may bring action against the Institution at the place of the dispute if it has in such 
place an office or an agent authorized to accept litigations and notices. 

3. No actions may be brought by members or persons acting or deriving claims 
from members. 

4. All property and assets of the Institution in the member countries shall, 
wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure or 
execution before the delivery of final judgment against the Institution. 

5. Property and assets of the Institution, in the territory of the members and 
by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expro- 
priation, or any other form of seizure by executive or legislative action. 

6. The Institution's papers, record books, and documents shall enjoy full 
immunity. 

Article Thirty-four: FREEDOM OF ASSETS FROM RESTRICTIONS 

To the extent necessary to carry out the operations provided for in this Agree- 
ment, all property and assets of the Institution shall be free from all restrictions, 
regulations, control, and moratoria of any nature. 

Article Thirty-five: 

The official communications of the Institution shall be accorded by each member 
the same treatment that it accords to the official communications of other members. 

Article Thirty-six: IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF OFFICERS 
AND EMPLOYEES 

All governors and their alternates, directors and their deputies, officers, and 
employees of the Institution: 

1. Shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them 
in their official capacity; 

2. Shall be accorded, if not nationals of the state in whose territory they per- 
form their work, the same immunities and privileges accorded to the officers of the 
Secretariat of the League of Arab States in regard to immigration restrictions, alien 
registration requirements, military service obligations, and exchange restrictions; 

3. Shall be granted the same treatment in respect of traveling facilities as is 
accorded to the officers of the Secretariat of the League of Arab States. 

Article Thirty-seven. EXEMPTION FROM TAXES IN MEMBER 
COUNTRIES 

1. The Institution, its assets, property, income, and its operations and trans- 
actions provided for in this Agreement, shall be exempted from all taxes and customs 
duties. The Institution shall also be exempted from liability for collection or payment 
of any tax or duty. 

2. The Director General (Chairman of the Board), members of the Executive 
Board and their deputies, officers and employees shall enjoy, in respect of taxes and 
duties, all the privileges enjoyed by the officers of the Secretariat of the League of 
Arab States. 

3. Shares of the Institution shall be exempt from all taxes and duties whether 
at time of issue or in circulation. 

4. No taxation of any kind shall be levied on any obligation or security issued 

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International Affairs: Treaties and Agreements 

or guaranteed by the Institution (including dividends, commissions, and similar 
benefits thereon) by whomsoever held : 

(a) If the taxation was levied against such obligation or security solely 
because it is issued or guaranteed by the Institution; or 

(b) If the sole jurisdictional basis for such taxation, is the currency or 
place in which such obligation or security is issued, made payable or 
paid, or the location of any office or place of business maintained by 
the Institution. 

Article Thirty-eight: AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT 

1. Any member, governor, or member of the Executive Board may propose 
amendments to this Agreement by communicating the proposed amendment to the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors, who shall bring it before the Board at the ear- 
liest opportunity. If the proposed amendment is approved by the Board, the Ins- 
titution shall consult all the member states on it, and if it is accepted by three fourths 
of the member's votes, the Institution shall certify the amendment by a formal com- 
munication addressed to all members. The amendment shall be registered with the 
Secretariat of the League of Arab States. 

2. Notwithstanding Para.i of this Article, acceptance by all members is requir- 
ed in the case of any amendment modifying 

(a) The right to withdraw provided in Article Twenty-nine of this 
Agreement ; 

(b) The limitation on the liability of the members in respect of the unpaid 
portion of their shares in accordance with Article Seven of this Agree- 
ment; 

(c) The provisions of Para. 3 of Article Five of this Agreement concerning 
increase of capital. 

3. Approved amendments shall enter into force for all members three months 
after the date of the Institution's communication unless a shorter period is specified 
by the Board of Governors. 

PART SEVEN 
INTERPRETATION AND ARBITRATION 

Article Thirty-nine: INTERPRETATION 

1. Any disagreement on the interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement 
arising between any member and the Institution or between any members of the 
Institution shall be submitted to the Board of Governors whose decision on the sub- 
ject shall be considered final. 

2. In any case where the Executive Board has given a decision regarding the 
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement, any member may appeal the 
decision to the Board of Governors whose decision on the matter shall be final. 
Pending the result of the appeal the Institution may act on the basis of the decision 
of the Executive Board. 

Article Forty: ARBITRATION 

In case a disagreement arises between the Institution and a state or a country 
which has ceased to be a member, or between the Institution and a member during the 
permanent suspension of the Institution's operation, such disagreement shall be sub- 
mitted to arbitration by a tribunal of three arbitrators, one appointed by the Ins- 

141 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

titution, another by the country involved, and a third selected by the other two. The 
decision of this tribunal shall be final. 

If the two arbitrators do not arrive at an agreement regarding the thkd arbi- 
trator, the matter shall be referred to the representative of the Middle East at the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (i) who could act as a third arbitrator or 
select one, without objection from either party. 

PART EIGHT 

FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article Forty-one: 

This agreement shall come into force one month after the deposit of instruments 
of ratification by states whose total subscriptions comprise not less than 75 per cent of 
the capital set forth in Article Four of this Agreement. 

Article Forty-two: RATIFICATION, DEPOSIT, AND ACCESSION 

1. States signing this Agreement shall ratify it according to their constitutional 
systems, at the earliest possible time, and shall deposit the instruments of ratification 
with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States which shall prepare a notice 
for the deposit of such instrument by each state and shall transmit it to the other con- 
tracting states. 

2. Member states of the League of Arab States and other Arab countries not 
signing this Agreement may accede to it upon approval by the Board of Governors, in 
accordance with Article Three, by transmitting a notice to the Secretary General of 
the League of Arab States who shall inform the other states which are parties to this 
Agreement of their accession. 

Article Forty-three: 

Each government shall become a member of the Institution as from the date of 
the deposit on its behalf, with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, 
of the instruments of ratification or accession. 

Article Forty-four: 

At the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, each state signing this 
Agreement shall pay 10 per cent of the value of the shares subscribed by it. This pay- 
ment shall be credited on account of the payment of 25 per cent of the shares' value 
to be made in accordance with Para. 4 of Article Six of this Agreement. The General 
Secretariat shall transmit these funds to the account designated by the Board of 
Governors in its first meeting. 

Article Forty-five: 

The Secretary General of the League of Arab States shall call the first meeting 
of the Board of Governors. 



(i) What is presumably meant here is the Permanent Court of Arbitration. ED. 

142 



IV 

Arab League Resolutions 



International Affairs: The Arab States 



Arab Countries Not Represented on the League 

Resol. 63- Sess. 4- Sched. 5- June u, 1946, p.i6 (i) 

The Council, 

Having examined that (part) of the statement of the (Heads of) Arab States(2) 
concerning the Arab countries not represented on the League, 

Has resolved to recommend that the Governments of the Arab States should 
work for (securing) the freedom of those Arab countries which are still outside the 
League so that they will attain their independence and be integrated into the Arab 
homeland, of which theyTform a part. 



The Present Financial Position of the Secretariat-General 

Resol. 1 38 5 - Sess. 27- Sched. 8- September 4, 1957, p. 347 

The Council has taken note of the contents of the Secretary-General's memo- 
randum concerning the present financial position of the Secretariat-General. The 
Council urges Member States, who have not yet paid their shares in the League's 
budget, to pay (these shares) urgently before the end of the current month of Sep- 
tember. The Council also authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary 
steps to convene the Political Committee for dealing with the situation whenever 
necessary. 



(1) This resolution and the following resolutions have been translated by the Editor from 
the official (Arabic} texts of the resolutions as they appear in the Arab League's Majmu'at 
Qararat Majlis Jami'at ad-Duwal al-Arabiyya (Collection of the Resolutions of the 
Council of the League of Arab States)) June 4, 1945 - November 17, 1957. The titles of> 
together with the references to these resolutions are verbatim translations of the respective 
official Arabic texts. Pagination refers to the relevant pages of the Majmu'at mentioned 
above. These resolutions dating after November 17, 1957 have been obtained privately 
in mimeographed form y from the Secretariat-General of the Arab-League ED. 

(2) That is, the statement issued at the end of the Conference of Arab Kings and Presi- 
dents at Inshas. See Doc. No. 139. ED. 

145 



International Affairs: International Relations 



The Arab League as a Regional Organization C H 

Resol. 290 Sess. 12- Sched.4 - April i, 1950, pp. 61-62. + I 



The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
With reference to the proposal and accompanying Memorandum of the Secre- 
tariat-General concerning the treatment of the League of Arab States as a regional 
organization within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and 
that the following steps should be taken to achieve this objective: 

A. The Governments of the Arab States Members of the United Nations 
should request that this subject be placed on the agenda of the next (session of) the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 

B. The Arab States Members of the United Nations should make represen- 
tations for the acceptance of this request at the said session of the General Assembly, 
and should prepare the ground for this through representations to be made by them 
to the Secretariat - General and to friendly States Members of the United Nations. 

This is the gist of the proposal submitted by the Secretariat-General (of the 
League) concerning its subject matter and the means leading to its realization. 

The Committee has examined this proposal and has seen fit to agree to it. It 
has also seen fit to recommend that each Arab State should take the steps which it 
considers appropriate for its realization. 

The Committee has taken the following decision concerning this proposal: 

The Political Committee approves the proposal in principle and recommends 
that Member States should take appropriate steps (regarding same). 



Arab League States 9 Quota in the United Nations Secretariat r Q 

Resol. 286 - Sess. 13- Sched. 4- April i, 1950, p. 61. J U 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee : 
To agree that the Arab League States which are Members of the United Nations 
should be considered as a single regional unit for the purpose of their quota in the 
United Nations Secretariat and its Specialized Agencies, and that the matter should 
be arranged among them as follows: 

1. Every Arab State should take full advantage of the quota of those posts 
alloted to it. 

2. Those Arab States which do not fully utilize their quota may relinquish it in 
favour of any other State of the League which it may choose. In this case, it shall 
have the right of reclaiming its right at any time it sees fit in the future. 

3. Any posts which remain (unfilled) after that shall be submitted by the 
League Secretariat-General to the Member States. 



The Arab League and the Cause of World Peace C Q 

Resol. 332- Sess. 13- Sched. 3-2 February 2, 1951, pp.jo-ji. <-/ * 

In these most difficult circumstances through which the peoples of the world 
are passing and which constitute a most serious threat to humanity, the League of 

147 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Arab States finds it incumbent upon itself to reaffirm its firm adherence to the cause 
of universal peace, its keen interest in the maintenance of international security, and 
its great hope that the efforts made for the solution of the great complicated inter- 
national problems by peaceful means will lead to the desired end. 

The Arab States, in these circumstances, reiterate the expression of their faith 
in the United Nations and in the peaceful and noble objectives embodied in the Char- 
ter to which have adhered the majority of the peoples of the world, which they have 
undertaken to respect and with the provisions of which they have (also undertaken) to 
comply. Indeed, had these provisions been respected and had they been faithfully 
and scrupulously implemented by all, it would have been easy to solve conflicts 
amicably and to eliminate the mischiefs and tensions prevailing in the international 
atmosphere. 

For the Charter sets for the (U.N.) Organization the highest principles and de- 
lineates the greatest objectives, as well as calls for, in the firmest and strongest terms, 
adherence to the path of right, justice, freedom, human tolerance and international 
brotherliness with a view to saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war 
and directing Man's activities towards social reform and raising the standard of 
living of all peoples. 

(The Charter) insists on the prohibition of war and on the call for the main- 
tenance of peace, as it also embodies detailed provisions for the settlement of inter- 
national disputes by peaceful means. 

It grants all nations the legitimate right of self-defence, individually and col- 
lectively. 

It stresses the principle of non-discrimination with regard to sovereignty be- 
tween the strong and the weak, as it also provides for complete equality among all 
Members. 

There is no doubt that these noble principles, foremost amongst which is the 
principle of sovereign equality, are the most honest way of curing the ills of mankind 
and of saving the peoples of the world from their sufferings. 

But these high principles and great objectives will lose their value if the Con- 
tracting Parties deliberately neglect and ignore them when issuing their decisions 
or when implementing these decisions in such a way as to ensure the achievement of 
justice amongst all. 

The realization of the principle of sovereign equality will not come about while 
the Great Powers are persisting in the policy of interference, in all formst and ways, in 
the affairs of small states. 

In view of all this the Arab League, functioning as it is in the Middle East 
with its sensitive geographical position, takes the opportunity of the meeting of its 
Council to urge all states and peoples to realize the gravity of the situation in order 
that they may not spare any effort possible for passing this gloomy crisis peacefully. 

The Arab League is keen on declaring that it will for its part consider its irre- 
vocable motto to be adherence to the principles of the United Nations and working 
impartially within its scope for the elimination of the frightful spectre of war. 

Needless to say the Arab States cannot discharge the serious international 
obligations imposed by the Charter of the United Nations upon all nations, except 
through their obtaining their full national rights, or (through) the settlement of their 
national problems in conformity with the principles of freedom, justice and equality; 
(they require) also to be speedily provided with the military and economic means 
necessary for enabling them to defend themselves and to contribute their share to the 
maintenance of universal peace within the scope of the Charter. 

148 



International Affairs: International Relations 

The General International Situation 

ResoL 571- Sess. 18- Sched. 4-9 May 9, 1955, p. 129. 

The Council has approved the following decision of the Political Committee: 
The Political Committee of the League of Arab States has reviewed the general 
international situation, and considers that the States of the Arab League are prepared 
to contribute their full share to establishing peace and security on the solid basis of 
justice, freedom, and sovereignty, in conformity with their commitments under the 
Pact of the League of Arab States and the (Charter of) the United Nations. The 
States of the Arab League realize their duty to defend their countries against 
any danger threatening them, and will endeavour, within the organizations 
which they have established, to complete all means of defence. Whilst reaffirm- 
ing their right to defend their security and safety, and to adopt the course neces- 
sitated by their national interests, they consider that their present plight is due to 
(the fact) that a number of Arab problems remain unsolved on the basis of right and 
justice. 

Therefore, the Committee considers that all Arab problems should be equitably 
solved first, the Egyptian and Palestinian questions being the most important. 

Co- Operation between the States of the Arab League and the States 

of the Asian- Afrian Bloc 

ResoL 605 - Sess. 20- Sched. 6- January 21, 1954, pp. 139-140. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee has examined the existing close ties between the 
States of the Arab League and the other States of the Asian- African bloc . It has (also) 
reviewed the (various) stages of sincere co-operation ever predominant in this bloc, 
particularly in the treatment of the questions submitted to the United Nations at its 
various sessions. 

The Political Committee, in order to consolidate (further) these ties, has 
decided as follows: 

1. The Arab States should reinforce their diplomatic representation in the 
States of the Asian-African bloc. 

2. (There should be) an exchange of political missions with a view to consoli- 
dating the ties of friendship and co-operation in the political field, as well as (conso- 
lidating) cultural and economic relations. 

3. The Secretariat-General (of the League) is requested to study all means 
necessary for consolidating relations between the States of the Arab League and the 
Asian- African bloc, including the convening of periodic meetings at a high level. 

The Committee considers that the States of the League should adopt this same 
course in regard to relations with the States of the Latin American bloc. 

The Asian- African Conference To Be Held in Djakarta 

ResoL 829- Sess. 22- Sched. 6- December n> 1954, pp. 196-197. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has studied the subject of the Asian-African Conference 
planned to be held in Djakarta at the beginning of next year. It has seen fit, in prin- 

149 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

ciple, to recommend the following, though final decision (concerning this subject) 
should be postponed until after the meeting of the Colombo States at the end of 
this month: 

First. The Arab States should participate in this Conference with strong dele- 
gations that should include (members) having political, economic and cultural 
(experience). 

Second. Efforts should be made for placing on the agenda of the Conference 
consideration of the Arab questions, foremost among which being the question of 
Palestine and such international questions as combating colonialism, opposing racial 
discrimination and the regulation of armaments, atomic energy, and so on. 

Third. The Secretariat-General should send a delegate to attend the Confe- 
rence and follow its work in co-operation with the Arab delegates. 

Fourth. Representations should be made to the States organizing the Con- 
ference particularly Indonesia, so that these may support Arab policy. 



Posts in the Secretariat of the United Nations 

ResoL 1018- Sess. 24- Sched. i- October i, 1955, p. 245. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Committee: 
The (Political) Committee has reviewed the present position concerning the 
posts of the United Nations Secretariat, and has found that the share of the Arabs 
of these posts is inadequate. It has agreed that recommendations be made to the 
Arab delegations to endeavour to obtain the assignment to an Arab citizen of a post 
of Assistant Secretary-General. It has also recommended that endeavours be made 
to secure to the Arabs in the various organs of the Secretariat additional posts com- 
patible with Arab commitments to the United Nations. 



150 



International Affairs : Egypt 

The Support of Egypt's Decision to Nationalize the Suez Canal 

(Company) 

Resol. 7/pp- Sess. 25- Sched. 5- August i2 y 1956, pp. 293- 94. 

The Council of the League of Arab States resolves to approve the following 
decision of the Political Committee: 

The Political Committee of the League of Arab States has studied the situation 
which followed the Egyptian Government's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal 
(Company), 

and has resolved upon the following : 

1. The Arab States uphold the Egyptian Government's decision to nationalize 
the Suez Canal Company, which is an Egyptian joint-stock company, the Canal 
being an integral part of Egypt. 

The Committee considers this action on the part of the Egyptian Government as 
an act of national sovereignty. 

2. The Arab States declare their unity of feelings and purpose towards 
Egypt, as they also declare their solidarity with her regarding all the measures she 
has taken. 

3. The Arab States call for the denunciation of the pressure and threats to 
which Egypt is being subjected, and consider that the best means for the settlement 
of international disputes is the peaceful means provided for in the United Nations 
Charter. 

4. The Committee will continue its meetings to study all the questions re- 
lating to the situation and to take the necessary resolutions in this respect. 



The Solidarity of the Arab States with Egypt 

Resol. 1200 - Sess. 25 - Sched. 6 - August ij, 1956, p. 294. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Commit- 
tee: 

The Political Committee has continued its meetings and studied with interest the 
comprehensive statement made by President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir in the name of the 
Egyptian Government on August 12, 1956, in the evening, on the subject of the natio- 
nalization of the Suez Canal Company, which is an Egyptian joint-stock company. 

The Committee received (the statement) with appreciation and admiration, and 
it was the object of its satisfaction, since it was compatible with the spirit and the pur- 
poses of the resolutions adopted by the Council of the League in its meeting of August 
12, 1956, in the morning. 

The (Committee) has adopted the following decisions: 

i. The Political Committee reaffirms its full support of the Egyptian Govern- 
ment's declaration of its faith in doing everything in its power for the preservation of 
world peace, its (determination) to keep to its commitments under the United Nations 
Charter and the Bandung Conference resolutions recommending the solution of 
international problems by peaceful means ; (the Political Committee) also supports the 
Egyptian Government's readiness to collaborate with the Governments of the other 
signatory States of the 1888 Convention of Constantinople for convening a conference 
of these States and of the other States whose ships pass through the Suez Canal, in 
order to review the Convention of Constantinople and to consider the conclusion 



66 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

of an agreement among all those Governments, reaffirming the freedom of navigation 
through the Suez Canal. 

2. The Political Committee considers that the offer made by Egypt is in confor- 
mity with the principles of international right, bears the character of good faith, and 
contains a sincere assurance to all the States of the world for the preservation of the 
freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. 

3. The Arab States affirm their solidarity with Egypt in the maintenance of her 
sovereignty and the safeguarding of her national rights, and consider any aggression 
against the sovereignty of any (one) Arab State as an aggression against the sovereignty 
of all the Arab States. 



The Attitude of Certain Western States towards Egypt's Decision 
to Nationalize the (Suez) Canal Company 

Resol. 1 201- Sess. 26- Sched. i- October 15, 1956, p. 295. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee of the League of Arab States has studied the new 
events which have taken place in connection with the Suez Canal problem, as well as 
the developments which have resulted therefrom since the last two meetings (of the 
Committee), on August 12, and 13, 1956. 

The Political Committee has unanimously agreed that the present crisis in 
connection with the Suez Canal concerns all of the Arab States and implies an attempt 
to seize the Canal by means of military pressure on Egypt and other Arab States, a 
course which threatens the peace, security and sovereignty of the Arab States. 

The Arab States, notwithstanding their desire for peace and their readiness to 
take positive steps to reach a peaceful settlement which does not conflict with Egypt's 
national sovereignty and the national interests of the Arabs and which is in conformity 
with the United Nations Charter, are determined to defend their legitimate rights and 
to repel aggression. 

Egypt has taken large positive steps and submitted reasonable proposals for reach- 
ing a peaceful settlement. (This has) in particular (included) the means proposed by 
her for the formation of a negotiation commission representing all the various points 
of view, and her proceeding to make diplomatic contacts for reaching agreement on 
the formation of the commission and (the determination of) the time and place of 
its meeting. The (Political) Committee has also noticed that no negotiations have so far 
taken place with Egypt, who is the owner of the Canal and has a natural right of 
sovereignty over her territory. 

For these reasons the Political Committee has decided upon (the following) : 

1. The solution advocated by the British Prime Minister, aiming at the forma- 
tion of what he has termed the Suez Canal User's Association is unreasonable, 
because it conf lias with the principles of the United Nations and is likely to lead to 
the disturbance of world peace. 

The resolutions of the Bandung Conference, to which all the twenty-nine Mem- 
ber States were committed, disapprove of the aggressive measures which serve as 
basis for the Western proposal for the formation of this Association; and the accep- 
tance to participate in this (Association) is considered as a repudiation of these reso- 
lutions and a deviation from the principles of the (Bandung) Conference. 

2 . The deprecation of the method of threats and (that of) political, economic 



152 



International Affairs: Egypt 

and military pressure to which both Britain and France have resorted to reach their 
goal, (a course) which has given concern to all the Arab States. 

3. To support Egypt's appeal for the creation of a negotiation commission and 
to demand the acceptance of the principle of negotiation and the settlement of the 
dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 

4. To appeal to all (concerned) to comply with the means provided for in the 
United Nations Charter and to utilize (these means) to the full in order to reach a 
peaceful settlement. 

5. To support the Note addressed by the Egyptian Government to the Security 
Council on September 17, 1956. 

The Situation after the Withdrawal of the Forces of Aggression A 7 

from Egyptian Territory 

Resol. 129 j- Sess. 17- Sched. 2- March 2i 3 1957, p. 321. 

The Council of the League has discussed the new events that have taken place since 
the meeting of the Political Committee last January, and the steps taken with regard 
to the withdrawal of all the forces of aggression from Egypt and the Gaza Strip. 

1 1 has also heard the statements made by the head of the Egyptian delegation in 
connection with the problems of the Suez Canal, the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of 
'Aqaba. 

It has further reviewed the stand (taken by) the United Nations, such as has been 
repeatedly confirmed by its resolutions for the absolute and unconditional with- 
drawal of the aggressors, as well as (the United Nations) opposition to the aggressors' 
obtaining any gain as a result of their aggression. 

The Council has unanimously resolved upon the following: 

1. The Council reaffirms the support by Member States for Egypt's stand with 
regard to her insistence on her full sovereignty over the Suez Canal, which is an 
integral part of her territory, together with all the rights resulting from such sove- 
reignty. (The Council also reaffirms support of) Egypt's guarantee of the freedom of 
navigation through the Canal on the basis of the 1888 Constantinople Convention 
and the principles communicated by the Government of the Republic of Egypt 
to the States (concerned) on the i8th instant. 

2. The Member States fully support Egypt's stand with regard to the Gaza 
Strip, in compliance with the Armistice Agreement. 

3. Insistence on all the natural and legitimate rights of the Arabs to their ter- 
ritorial waters. 



153 



International Affairs : North Africa 

The North African Questions /- Q 

Resol 523 - Sess. 18 Sched. 3 - April 9> 1953> P- 114-115. O O 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Commit- 
tee: 

The Political Committee has heard the delegates of the sister Arab countries of 
North Africa, and has formed a subsidiary committee composed of the head of the 
delegation of the Lebanese Republic, the Under- Secretary of the Egyptian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary-General (of the League) in order to 
study fully the situation in North Africa. The subsidiary committee has drawn up a 
report embodying its recommendations in this regard, which (report) has been ap- 
proved by the Political Committee and which reads as follows : 

1. The subsidiary committee sees fit to recommend to the Arab Governments 
that they should make diplomatic representations, particularly to the Government of 
the United States of America. (For) it is (well) known that the American Government 
has supported the inclusion of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions on the agenda of 
the United Nations' (General Assembly) and has been in the forefront of States which 
supported the two resolutions mentioned above. (/) The Arabs are looking to Amer- 
ica in the hope that it will exert its efforts to induce France to respect the two (said) 
resolutions of the United Nations and to proceed to implement them in conformity 
with the spirit of the Charter. There is, in addition, (the fact that) the (friendly) rela- 
tions between America and France and the co-operation that exists between them, 
and binds their vital interests, will enable the American Government to induce 
France so that (the latter) may respond to the will of the United Nations and so con- 
tribute to the firm establishment of peace in the world in the interest of all. 

The committee (also) considers that it would be advisable for the Arab Govern- 
ments to request the Governments of the Asian- African bloc to make a similar repre- 
sentation. 

2. The committee considers that it would be advisable for the delegates of the 
Arab States to co-operate with those of the Asian bloc in order to submit the necessa- 
ry complaint concerning the Tunisian and Moroccan questions to the Security Coun- 
cil. This is because France has given no indication of (its intention) to implement the 
two resolutions of the United Nations, (particularly) since the situation in North 
Africa has of recent date been growing increasingly delicate and tense. 

The committee further considers that the permanent representatives at the 
United Nations should be left (free) to choose the opportune time for submitting 
the complaint and for (formulating it) in the legal form they consider suitable. 

In any case the subsidiary committee is of the opinion that the Political Com- 
mittee should resume (its) study of the questions of North Africa in order to acquaint 
itself with the developments of these questions and in order to consider the (possibil- 
ity) of their submission to the United Nations (General Assembly) at its next session 
in the light of the findings of the Security Council and the extent to which the two 
(said) resolutions of the United Nations have been implemented. 

3. With regard to Algeria, however, the committee recommends that this sub- 
ject should be raised before the Third Committee of the United Nations at its next 
session, and that the Secretariat-General (of the League) should prepare detailed 



(i) That IS) those providing for the inclusion of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions on 
the agenda o. the General Assembly. ED. 



155 



70 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



studies on the various affairs of Algeria and make these available to the Arab delega- 
tions when this question is raised. 

The committee recommends that representations be made forthwith to the 
Commission on Human Rights in order to prepare for the consideration of this 
question and make it possible to raise it before the Third Committee. 

4. The Secretariat-General (of the League) should be invited to work for the 
unification of the efforts of the (various) organizations and (political) parties which are 
working in the service of the North African questions. 



The Algerian Question 

Resol. jojj- Sess. 24- Sched. 3- October 14, 1953, p. 250. 



The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has reviewed the situation in Algeria and the (stages 
of) development it has reached ever since the Algerian people rose like one man to 
demand their legitimate right of self-determination, and it recommends the following: 

1. To continue support of the Algerian people in their demands to exercise 
their right of self-determination. 

2. To commend the decision, at its present session, of the United Nations 
General Assembly to discuss the question of Algeria, and to consider this decision 
compatible with the provisions and principles of the United Nations Charter re- 
cognizing the right of self-determination of peoples. (The Political Committee fur- 
ther) hopes that the discussion of this question by the United Nations will bring 
about a solution that will ensure for the Algerian people the realization of their natural 
and legitimate demands. 

3. The situation now prevailing in Algeria, the repressive measures committed 
by the French authorities therein, and the assistance received by these authorities 
from NATO forces, constitute a threat to security and peace in this region. 

Therefore, the (Political) Committee considers that the Arab Governments 
should, in collaboration with the friendly Governments, exert (their) efforts to put 
an end to this situation and to (secure) a recognition of the right of self-determination 
for the Algerian people. 

The Question of Morocco 

Resol. 1036- Sess. 14- Sched. 3- October 14, /955>p. 250. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has considered the question of Morocco and has re- 
viewed its latest developments. The (Committee) has noticed that the hesitation of 
the French authorities in accepting the demands of the Moroccan people is considered 
a denial of their right of self-determination and is likely to aggravate the obtaining 
situation in Morocco, (a fact) which constitutes a threat to international peace. 

(The Political Committee) has therefore resolved to recommend the following: 

1. To continue the support of the Moroccan people in their national demands, 

2. To seek the realization of the Moroccan people's demands for liberty and 
independence. 



156 



International Affairs: North Africa 

The Attitude of the French Authorities towards the Offer of Arab H 1 
Assistance to the Distressed People of Algeria and Morocco ' * 

Resol. 1037- Sess. 24- Sched. 3- October 14* 1955, p. 250. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has learned with much regret that the French authorities 
have refused to allow the Iraqi Red Crescent Mission and the International Red 
Cross to offer Iraqi and Lebanese assistance and aid to the distressed people of Algeria 
and Morocco. 

The Committee considers that this refusal constitutes a denial of established 
humanitarian principles. 

The Committee, therefore, deprecates this attitude on the part of the French 
authorities, and recommends that the necessary efforts should be made to secure 
the arrival of all aid (offered) by the Arab States to the distressed peoples of Algeria 
and Morocco. 

The Support for the Algerian People and the Deprecation of France's 

Aggression 

Resol. 1108- Sess. 25- Sched. i- March 29, 1956, p. 269. 

The Council of the League of Arab States declares its full support of the Algerian 
Arab people and its sincere sympathy with them in their present plight, at a time 
when these defenceless and noble people are being exposed to a devastating and ag- 
gressive war which lacks (the element of) well-matched strength and is unjustfiiable. 

(The Council) also deprecates the acts of aggression committed by the French 
authorities against Algeria (because it is) demanding its right of liberty and self- 
determination and is looking forward to carrying out its duty, to exploiting its resour- 
ces for the improvement of the standard of its people and to honouring its inter- 
national obligations. 

(This) deprecation is all the greater because NATO is allowing its forces, which 
were created in the name of the defence of liberty and the firm establishment of 
peace, to be employed in combating free (peoples), threatening security and gravely 
violating the principles of the United Nations Charter. 

It had been hoped that France would recognize the right of the (Algerian) people 
to freedom and sovereignty, after she (France) had been given the opportunity, 
during the tenth session of the United Nations (General Assembly), to comply with 
the principles of right and justice, and when the Asian-African bloc, standing as it 
was in support of the Algerian people in their just demands, had agreed that the 
question of Algeria should not be considered at the previous session of the United 
Nations (General Assembly). 

The Council of the League is fully confident in the triumph of the Algerian 
cause and of all the causes of the Arab Maghrib(i}> as well as in the triumph of the 
cause of freedom everywhere. It is also convinced that colonialism is vanishing, and 
is (further) determined to support the Arabs in Algeria and the (other parts of the) 
Arab Maghrib by all means possessed by the Arab States Members (of the League). 



(/) That w, the Western sector of the Arab World (comprising Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco)* as constrasted with the Mashriq, i.e. the Eastern sector ED. 



157 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



7 7 The Question of Algeria 

' ResoL 1131- Sess. 25- Sched. 4- April 12, 1956, pp. 274-275. 



The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

A. The Submission of the Algerian Question to the Security Council: 

The Political Committee recommends that the Governments of the Member 
States should send instructions to their delegates at the United Nations, stressing 
(their) steadfast support of the Algerian question through various means, including 
the submission of the question to the Security Council. (The Member States) should 
also make known (to the Council) the suggestions made by their delegates in connec- 
tion with the efforts which the (Member) States of the League should make in this 
respect. (The Member States) should (further) support their delegates* plan of 
solidarity with the delegates of the Asian-African bloc, in compliance with the 
Bandung resolutions and in the service of justice and world peace. The Political 
Committee authorizes the delegates to take whatever (measures) they may deem 
necessary concerning the subject. 

B. Diplomatic Representations: 

The Political Committee recommends that the Member States should continue 
with their diplomatic representations to the Bandung States, those of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, and others, for the support of the Algerian people's rights and the 
arrival at a just settlement which will realize their natural and legitimate claims to 
liberty, and their right of self-determination. The Committee authorizes the Secre- 
tary-General of the League to take whatever action he may deem necessary for 
reaching such a settlement. 

C. Assistance to Algeria: 

The Political Committee recommends that the Member States should continue 
their assistance to Algeria. 

D. The Question of the Political, Economic and Cultural Boycott of France: 
In view of the deterioration of the situation in Algeria, to an extent which may 

compel the Arab States, in spite of their diplomatic representations, to decide on the 
boycott of France, the Political Committee has decided to form a technical (sub-) 
committee from among the delegates of the Member States to undertake the study of 
the question of the political, economic and cultural boycott of France; (the subcom- 
mittee) should submit its report to the Council, at the earliest possible opportunity, 
before the end of the present session. The Member States should communicate to the 
Secretariat-General the names of their delegates immediately, and should facilitate 
the task of the (sub-) committee by supplying it with all the information and expla- 
nations it may require. 

7,4 Annual Budget for Aiding Algeria 

ResoL 1539- Sess. 30- Sched. 7- October 18, 1958 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee has examined the subject of allocating an annual 
budget of 12 million pounds (i) for aiding Algeria. 



( j) Presumably referring here to Egyptian pounds. ED. 

158 



International Affairs: North Africa 

It has also taken note of the statement of the representative of the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic, and of the statements of the delegations of 
Member States, explaining the attitude of their Governments over this subject and 
the extent of the willingness of each of them to make an expeditious contribution to 
the desired budget. 

The Committee recommends the following: 

1. That an annual budget of 12 million pounds (/) be fixed for aiding Algeria; 

2. That those States which have expressed their readiness to make an ex- 
peditious financial contribution, namely, the United Arab Republic, the Iraqi Re- 
public, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, should proceed to pay their shares which 
will be fixed after the new revision of the allocation, on fair basis, of the shares of 
Member States. 

Until such time as the above is decided upon, the aforesaid three States shall 
agree to make an advance payment, to be debited to their shares, for aiding the 
Government of Algeria. They shall also agree among themselves on he proportional* 
share to be paid by each of them. 

3. That the Governments of those Member States which have not yet paid 
their shares in the provisional budget of Algeria, namely, two million pounds, should 
pay these shares and should also pay their shares in the annual budget, in order to 
enable the Algerian Liberation Movement to continue in the realization of its legi- 
timate national objectives. 



( j) Presumably referring here to Egyptian pounds. ED. 

159 



International Affairs: Palestine 



The Boycott of Zionist Goods and Products 7 5 

Resol. 16- Sess. 2- Sched. n- December 2, 1945, p. 6. 



The Council has examined the state of affairs complained of by all of the Arab 
countries, and also the Zionist danger which is threatening them. (It has moreover 
examined) the endeavours of the Zionists to centralize in Palestine an industry which 
depends on Jewish funds collected and donated for a political purpose and which 
takes advantage of (certain) circumstances arising out of the War for the creation of 
a big reserve (fund) which will enable it to survive notwithstanding the difficulties 
that may confront it, (all) this being in order to realize the National Home and the 
Jewish State in Palestine. As this is the political objective of industrial, commercial 
and other enterprises in Palestine, and as Zionist objectives cannot be realized except 
by the exploitation of the markets in the Arab countries, the Arab countries will be 
bound to defend themselves in a peaceful manner in order that Palestine will 
remain an Arab (country). 

Therefore, the Council of the League decides: 

1. Jewish products and manufactured (goods) in Palestine shall be (con- 
sidered) undesirable in the Arab countries; to permit them to enter the Arab coun- 
tries would lead to the realization of the Zionist political objectives. Accordingly, 
until these objectives are changed, the Council of the League decides that every State 
of the League should, before January i, 1946, take measures which they consider fit 
and which will be in conformity with the principles of administration and legislation 
therein, such as making use of import licences in this respect in order to prevent 
these products and manufactured (goods) from entering (these) countries regardless 
of whether they have come directly from Palestine or by any other route. (These 
States should) also oppose Jewish industry by all possible means. 

2. The Council of the League calls upon those Arab peoples not represented 
on the Council of the League to collaborate and co-operate with the States of the 
League concerning this decision, so that the institutions, organizations, merchants, 
commission agents, and individuals in these (States) will refuse to deal in, distribute, 
or consume Zionist products and manufactured (goods). 

3. A committee consisting of the States represented on the League should be 
formed in order to co-ordinate and supervise the implementation of this decision, 
and also to study the plans and proposals which may be submitted to it for realizing 
the objectives of the Arabs and for protecting them against the danger of Zionist 
economy. 



The Representation of Palestine on the Council of the League 

ResoL 17- Sess. 2- Sched. 12- December 4, 1945* pp. 6-7. 

The Council resolves that there should be one or more representatives of 
Palestine, provided that the number of the (members of) the Palestine delegation 
does not exceed three. The delegation shall participate in all of the activities of the 
Council in accordance with the provisions of the Palestine Annex of the Pact of the 
League of Arab States . 

It shall be understood that the participation of the Palestine delegation means 
that it shall have the right to vote on the Palestine question and on those (matters) 
which Palestine can be bound to implement. 



77 



78 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The manner of selecting the (Palestine) delegates shall take place through 
nomination by the Higher Arab (Executive) Committee and then appointment by the 
Council of the League. Should nomination be impossible, the whole matter should be 
referred to the Council. 



The Higher Arab Executive Committee 

Resol. 82- Sess. 4- Sched. 7- June 12, 19463 p. 21. 

The Council approves the following recommendations of the Internal Com- 
mittee: 

1. After long consultations with our Palestinian brethren during which va- 
rious proposals were submitted to the (Internal) Committee by many persons and 
quarters, and after these (proposals) were carefully and scrupulously studied, (the 
Committee) recommends to the Council of the League that it should accredit the 
following persons as constituting the "Higher Arab Executive Committee of Pales- 
tine" which the Arab League had decided to establish in Palestine, namely, Jamal 
al-Husayni, Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi, and Emile al-Ghouri. 

2. The Committee considers that, in order to organize the work (of the said 
Executive Committee), Jamal al-Husayni should be the Vice-President of the said 
Committee, and that Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi should be its Secretary. 

3. The Committee considers that (after effecting this new arrangement) the 
League should have the right to expect that the two existing organizations in Palestine, 
namely, the Higher Arab Committee and the Higher Arab Front, should appreciate 
the necessity of this new arrangement and should consider the (Executive Committee) 
as the one representing all of the Arabs of Palestine and (the one) speaking in their 
name and uniting all their efforts and endeavours for the sake of Palestine. For this 
(reason), it is no longer of any use that these (two existing Palestinian organizations) 
should continue to function now that the Higher Arab Executive Committee has come 
into being. 

4. Should any member of the Higher Arab Executive Committee withdraw or 
for any reason find it impossible to participate in the said Committee, the "Palestine 
Committee" should then have the right to choose another member in his place. 

5. In submitting these proposals to the Council of the League, the (Internal) 
Committee takes pleasure in expressing its admiration for the spirit of true pa- 
triotism, sacrifice and fidelity demonstrated by those Palestinian personages with 
whom it has come into contact, and it sincerely thanks them for their honourable 
stand, itself consistent with the gravity of the present situation, and wishes them 
success. 



Boycott of Zionist Products and Goods 

Resol. 70- Sess. 4- Sched. 6- June 12, 1946, pp. 18-19. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Internal Committee: 

When discussing the boycott, the Committee heard detailed statements made 

by Ahmad Salim Bey, Chairman of the Permanent Boycott Committee. After 

deliberation, the Committee suggests to the Council that it should recommend to the 

(Arab) Governments the adoption of the following measures: 



162 



International Affairs: Palestine 

First. The establishment of boycott offices in each State of the League for 
local supervision; these offices should be in constant touch with the Permanent Boy- 
cott Committee in Cairo and with other boycott committees. 

Second. The agreement of the Governments of the Arab States on the materials 
and commodities required by the Palestine Arabs which can be exported by each 
of (these States) as shown in the attached list. 

Third. The allocation of 50 per cent of the value of confiscated goods to guides 
and officials in order to encourage the communication of secret information about 
the smuggling of Zionist goods and products. 

Fourth : A ban on the exportation of raw materials or those which help Zionist 
production. 

Fifth. Agreement to recognize the certificates (issued) by the body proposed to 
be established in Palestine for looking after the question of boycott. 

Sixth. Agreement that customs departments should take measures necessary 
for ascertaining the nationality of imported goods, such as (requiring) certificates of 
nationality and certificates of manufacture. 

Seventh. Boycott of Zionist services in Palestine, such as banks, insurance com- 
panies, factory agencies, commercial houses, means of transport, and works con- 
tractors and experts. 

The Committee considers that the boycott should not only be passive, but should 
also be positive, that is to say, the Arabs, whether Palestinians or belonging to the 
countries of the Arab League, should establish industries having sound economic 
bases to replace Zionist industries, so that the Arabs of Palestine may rely on Arab 
production without suffering any harm on account of the boycott of Zionist goods. 
The time is now favourable for fruitful and serious work. 

The Committee further draws attention to (the fact) that the boycott (of 
Zionist goods) should not be confined to governmental action only, but should also 
be (undertaken) through the people.Thus, necessary propaganda should be conducted 
in order to convince the Arab peoples of the necessity of boycotting Zionist goods, so 
that the boycott becomes the firm creed of every Arab which he may most enthusias- 
tically preach to all and which he may defend faithfully and genuinely. 

Such propaganda should be entrusted to a propaganda committee. 

(Furthermore), the Committee should not fail to draw to the attention of the 
Council that it is expected that an international trade conference will shortly be held 
in the United States for the purpose of stimulating world trade and removing present 
exceptional restrictions. The proposed principles (of this conference) include 
the refraining of Governments from fostering or organizing boycotts of Member 
States. 

The Internal Committee is desirous that the Arab States should immediately 
adopt a unified policy so that the means of implementing the boycott of Zionism will 
be retained irrespective of the principle mentioned above. 



Jewish Terrorism in Palestine 

Resol. 140- Sess. 5- Sched. 16- December 12 ,1946, p. 31. 

The Council approves the following resolution: 

The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has decided to recommend to 



163 



3 1 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the Council that it should request the Secretariat-General to dispatch a Note to the 
British Government reminding it that the Arab States had asked the British Govern- 
ment in previous Notes to stop Jewish terrorism in Palestine, the last (Note of these 
embodying) the collective request submitted by the Arab delegations at the London 
Conference. 

The gravity of this terrorism has greatly worsened of recent date, and its direct 
victims have been the Arab people of Palestine. As the Palestinian Government ( i) 
has not succeeded in suppressing (this terrorism), the States of the Arab League do 
request the British Government to arm the Arab people (of Palestine) in conformity 
with the principles which the British Government had followed in arming the Jews 
in Palestine in order to enable them to defend themselves against continuous threats. 
Moreover, the Note should make it clear that the Governments of the Arab League 
States (consider) that, in view of the aggravation of the situation in Palestine on ac- 
count of the predominance of terrorism (therein) coupled with the continued flow of 
immigration and the lack of means of defence amongst the Arabs, they will find them- 
selves in a position which they fear will lead to the Arab peoples volunteering to come 
to the help of their Palestinian brethren. 

The Council resolves that the Secretariat-General should be entrusted with the 
dispatch of this Note. 

Rejection of Palestine Partition Plan 

Resol. 142- Sess. 5- Sched. 16- December 12, 19463 p. 31. 

The Council of the Arab League reaffirms anew the determination of the States 
of the Arab League to continue defending the rights of the Arabs of Palestine until 
(these) rights are restored to their owners. The Council of the League will not yield, 
nor will it go back upon (its) rejection of any plan likely to lead to the partition of 
Palestine or the establishment of a Zionist bridgehead therein. Moreover, it will 
spare no effort to do everything warranted by the circumstances for maintaining the 
Arab character of Palestine and for considering it a vital part of the larger Arab 
homeland. 

Defending Palestine 

Resol. 181- Sess. 7- Sched. 3- October 9, 1947, p. 40. 

The Council approves the following resolution: 

The special subsidiary committee composed of the heads of delegations has 
examined the question entrusted to it by the Council of the League, namely the 
study of measures to be taken to defend Palestine in the light of recent developments, 
the general situation and the anticipated possibilities, taking into consideration the 
British Government's declaration concerning the policy which that Government had 
decided to pursue in Palestine (in its capacity) as Mandatory Power. After reviewing 
all the phases (of that matter) and the previous decisions, .whether|taken by the Council 
of the League or by the Political Committee, the (subsidiary committee) has unan- 
imously decided to submit to the Council the following recommendations concern- 
ing questions which have to date been thoroughly studied: 

i. The subsidiary committee considers that the secret decisions of Bludan, 
which should have been implemented upon the acceptance of the report of the Anglo- 



( /) Presumably, the British Mandatory Government in Palestine. ED. 

164 



International Affairs: Palestine 

American Committee of Enquiry and upon the commencement of the implementation 
of that report, still stand and must be carried out in the event of the application of any 
solution which is likely to encroach on the right of Palestine to be an independent 
Arab State. 

2. With regard to the British Government's recently announced decision that 
it was determined to give up its mandate over Palestine and to withdraw its military 
forces as well as its administrative machinery therefrom,the (subsidiary) committee 
considers that, in view of the presence (therein) of Zionist forces and their terrorist 
organizations that threaten the safety of the Arabs in Palestine, the States of the 
Arab League have to take military precautions on the frontiers of Palestine. For 
this purpose the (subsidiary)committee suggests that the Council should recommend 
to the Arab States that they proceed to take such military precautions, provided that 
the States adjoining Palestine agree among themselves concerning facilities for 
participation and co-operation in (the performance of) this duty. 

3. The (subsidiary) committee suggests - in pursuance of the previous deci- 
sions to extend effective help to the Arabs of Palestine - that the Council should re- 
commend to the League States that they proceed to give material and moral assis- 
tance to the Arabs in Palestine in order to strengthen them and back them up in 
defending themselves and their existence, and that the Arab States immediately make 
available the necessary funds, provided that a special committee shall take the res- 
ponsibility for the expenditure of these funds. 



Demanding the Return of the Palestine Refugees to Their Homes o ^\ 

Resol. 231 - Sess. 10 - Sched. i - March 17, 1949, p. 50. O Z* 

The Council considers that the lasting and just solution of the problem of 
efugees would be their repatriation and the safeguarding of all their rights to their 
properties, lives and liberty, and that these should be guaranteed by the United 
Nations. It recommends to the representatives of the Arab States and Palestine that 
they consult together, whether in their capacity as a committee (composed) of the 
delegations of the Arab States or as a Political Committee of the Council of the 
League, before meeting the Conciliation Commission in Beirut on March 21, in 
order to co-ordinate their plans vis-a-vis that (Commission). 



Peace with Israel 

Resol. 292 -Sess. 12 - Sched. 4 - April i, 1950, p. 62. 

Acting on the basis of Article 2, sect, i, of the Pact of the League of Arab States, 
and on the Annex relating to Palestine, 

And having regard to the vital importance attached by all the Arab League 
States to the question of Palestine, 

And as these States have worked together throughout the (various stages of) 
development of this question on account of the common danger to which the League 
States have been exposed in (their) defence of Palestine and of themselves, 

The Council of the League of Arab States unanimously resolved, at its fourth 
meeting during the Twelfth Session on April i, 1950, that: 

First: No State (Member) of the Arab League may negotiate or actually con- 
clude a separate peace (treaty) or any (other) political, military, or economic 

165 



84 



85 



86 



The Arab States and The Arab League 

agreement with Israel. A (Member) State which does take any such course shall 
be considered to have withdrawn from the Arab League forthwith in accordance with 
Article 1 8 of its Pact. 

Second: The Political Committee shall be requested to propose measures to be 
taken against the State guilty of such a violation. 



Ships Carrying Contraband Goods and Immigrants to Israel 

Resol. 300-Sess. 12-Sched. 5-April 8, 1950, pp. 63-64. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
It shall be forbidden to provision or carry cargo on ships on which are impound- 
ed contraband goods or which carry Jewish immigrants to Palestine. 

It shall (also) be forbidden to provision or carry cargo on ships which are 
known to carry immigrants or contraband goods to Israel. The (Arab) Governments 
shall exchange information about suspect ships in order to place them on joint 
blacklists. 



The Policy of the Arab States Towards the Question of Palestine 

Resol. 320-Sess. i2-Sched. 6- April 13, 1950, pp. 67-68. 

The Council has examined the policy of the Arab States towards the question of 
Palestine in its present condition, and, save for the dissenting vote of the represen- 
tative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, has unanimously decided upon the fol- 
lowing: 

First. To reaffirm the decision taken by the Political Committee on April 12, 
1948, with the unanimity of Member States, which provides that the entry of the 
Arab armies into Palestine for the purpose of saving it should be viewed as a tem- 
porary measure free from any of the characteristics of occupation and division of 
Palestine, and that following its liberation it should be handed to its owners so that 
they may rule it as they please. 

Second. To consider this decision as effective and expressive of the present 
policy of the Arab States in this respect. 

Third. Should any Arab State violate this decision, it shall be considered as 
having repudiated its obligation and the provisions of Article 2 of the Pact (of the 
League) and (those of) the Special Annex relating to Palestine. 

Fourth. Should this violation take place, the Political Committee should be 
called to meet and take the necessary measures in accordance with the provisions of 
the Pact. 



Separate Peace with Israel 

Resol. 314- Sess. 12- Sched. 6- April 13, 1950, p. 66. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
In pursuance of the resolution of the Council of the League of April i, 1950, 
which reads as follows: 



1 66 



International Affairs: Palestine 



First: No Member State of the Arab League may negotiate or actually conclude 
a separate peace (treaty) or any (other) political, military or economic agreement with 
Israel. Any State which takes any such course shall be considered to have with- 
drawn from the League forthwith in accordance with Article 18 of the Pact of the 
League. 

Second : The Political Committee shall be requested to propose the measures 
to be taken against the State guilty of such a violation. 

The Political Committee sees fit to suggest the following: 

(a) Every Member State, upon learning that a violation had been committed 
against the resolution of the Council of the League of April i, 1950, shall at once in- 
form the Secretariat-General (of such a violation). 

In that case, and upon learning directly of the occurence of such a violation, 
the Secretariat-General shall at once call a meeting of the Political Committee to 
settle the question in the light of the facts available. 

(b) The Political Committee shall request the State accused of the violation of 
the said resolution of the Council of the League to reply to the charge brought against 
it. If (this State) fails to attend at the appointed time or refuses to clarify its position, 
the Political Committee shall, under all circumstances, continue its investigation of 
the matter and (then) issue its decision on the basis of the facts available to it. 

The decision of the Political Committee shall be valid and effective if approved 
by four Member States. The State accused of the violation shall have no vote. 
Should the decision issued by the Political Committee establish the violation (in 
question), the violating State shall, as a consequence, be considered as having with- 
drawn from the League of Arab States, and the following measures shall, therefore, 
be taken: 

1. (a) The severance of political and consular relations with the State (in 
question). 

(b) The closing of common frontiers with (that State) and the suspension 
of economic,, commercial and financial relations therewith. 

(c) The banning of all financial or commercial contact, direct or indirect, 
with its nationals. 

2. Every State shall inform the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab 
States of the measures taken by it in this respect. 

3. Member States shall collaborate in offering mutual assistance to carry out 
the above-mentioned measures. 



Co-Operation between the Arab States and U.N.R.W.A. 

ResoL 325- Sess. 12- Sched. 7- June 12> 1950, p. 69. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
As the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees 
had requested the Arab Governments to co-operate with it in the discharge of its 
responsibilities, the matter was submitted to the Political Committee which unani- 
mously decided at its meeting held on June 16, 1950(1) and with the consent of 
Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, the representative of the Arabs of Palestine, to recommend to 
the Arab States that they should cooperate with the said Agency, provided that every 



(i) The date mentioned should presumably be June 12> 1950. ED. 

167 



89 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

State should declare its reservations to the said Agency in respect of the final set- 
tlement of the Palestinian problem and the right of the refugees to return to their 
homes and to be compensated for their funds and properties. 

Israeli Aggressions in the Demilitarized Zones and against Syria 

Resol. 3 S3- Sess. 14- Sched. 3- May 18) 1951 p. 75. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 

The Council of the League of Arab States, 

Having considered the Memorandum submitted by the Syrian Government to 
the Political Committee on May 14, 1951, setting out the acts (of aggression) which 
took place in the demilitarized zone and in the adjacent Syrian territory, 

And as the continuation of Zionist provocations and aggressions, together with 
the condonation of the Zionists' violations of the Armistice Agreements and of the 
resolutions of international organizations is likely to endanger the integrity of the 
Arab States, 

1. Resolves to support wholly the rightful stand of Syria, which is in confor- 
mity with the Armistice Agreement (between Syria and Israel), as well as to be ready 
to stand by and support (Syria) by all (possible) means in order to repel the aggres- 
sion, in the same manner it would support any (other) State Member of theArab 
League whenever exposed to any Zionist aggression. 

2. Resolves to call upon the Arab States signatory of the Treaty of Joint 
Defence and Economic Co-operation in order to speed up its ratification. 

3. Until this ratification takes place, the Council resolves that it is necessary 
for the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of the States signatory of the Treaty of Joint 
Defence and Economic Co-operation to meet in order to draw up the necessary de- 
fensive plans for every contingency at a place and early time to be fixed by the Govern- 
ments of those States by agreement among themselves. 

4. As the international measures and resolutions have not as yet (proved to be) 
adequate for warding off the danger from the integrity of the Arab countries, the 
Arab States should undertake the study of all possibilities with a view to adopting 
the necessary stand and (taking) joint measures vis-a-vis those States which contribute 
to exposing the (Arab countries) to danger. 



The Attitude of the Arab States towards International Conferences 
and Organizations in Which Israel Participates 

Resol.3$6- Sess. 14- Sched. 4- May 19, 1957, pp. 76 - 77. 

The Council approves the following report of the Political Committee: 
The subsidiary committee (i) has reviewed this subject in the light of practical 
considerations and previous studies, and it recommends the following, considering 
that the term "conferences" mentioned in this report is meant to connote congresses, 
meetings, circles and so on: 

First: With regard to international conferences, whether convened by a state 



(i) That is, the subsidiary committee appointed by the Political Committee. ED. 

168 



International Affairs: Palestine 



or by an international organization, the policy followed at present should be sanction- 
ed, namely, that the Arab States should not refrain from attending these conferences 
solely because Israel is participating in them or may be invited to them. 

But if such conferences are held in any Arab country, no entry visas should be 
granted to Israeli representatives for attending same, as has been the practice(hitherto). 

Second. With regard to regional conferences convened by one country acting on 
its own initiative, the Arab States should refrain from participating in (such) confer- 
ences if Israel is (also) invited to (attend) same. 

Third. As for regional conferences convened by an international organization 
or regional office, the policy should be the same as in the second paragraph (above). 

Fourth. As for membership in regional organizations and offices, a distinction 
should be made in this respect between (the following two cases) : 

(a) It is practically impossible to change the existing situation in the case of 
regional organizations and offices which are already existing and to which Israel 
already belongs, such as the Regional Office of the United Nations Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization and the Regional Office of the World Health Organization in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. There is, therefore, no need for the Arab League States to 
refuse membership of these regional organizations and offices, nor to refuse partici- 
pation in their work merely because Israel is one of their members. 

But if any one of these regional organizations or offices has a seat in any one of 
the League States, great care should be taken that no Israeli national (be allowed) to 
be an official or employee of (such an organization or office), and that no direct 
communication between that seat and Israel (be allowed) to take place, whether by 
air, post, cable, or any other (means). 

(b) As for regional organizations and offices which do not yet exist but which are 
meant to be established, such as the Economic Commission for the Middle East, each 
case should be examined individually, since the collaboration of the Arab States and 
their determination not to co-operate with these organizations and offices, if joined by 
Israel, may induce the authorities (of these organizations and off ices) to refuse the par- 
ticipation of (Israel) in same. 

In case this objective is not realized, the Arab States should proceed to subs- 
titute for such a regional organization or office a regional organization which they 
should set up independently and by co-operation with friendly states desirous of this. 

Fifth. In general, if any conferences are held in non-Arab States, in which 
Israel is participating, the Arab delegates at these conferences should not have con- 
tacts nor should they co-operate with the Israeli delegates. 

Sixth. If the aim of (such) conferences is the conclusion of an international 
agreement, the Arab delegates should make a clear reservation that their acceptance 
of such an agreement and its ratification by their Governments do not in any way 
mean recognition of Israel, and will not lead the Arab States to deal with (Israel) 
concerning anything regulated by such agreement. 



The Question of Transferring the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Q A 

to Jerusalem 

Resol. 427- Sess. 16- Sched. 3- September 74, 1952 5 p. 9^. 
The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 



169 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The Political Committee has decided that the Arab Governments should con- 
tinue their diplomatic representations for opposing the transfer of the Israeli Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs to Jerusalem, and that the Arab delegations at the United Na- 
tions should be asked to raise this matter when the subject of Palestine is submitted. 

The Council has also taken note of the following reservations made by the dele- 
gate of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: 

The Hashemite Government of Jordan strongly opposes the internationaliza- 
tion (of Jerusalem) in all its forms and methods and will continue to adhere to this 
policy. 

Q 1 The Palestine Refugees 

^ A Resol. 462- Sess. 16- Sched. 5- September 23, /P5-2, />. pp. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has studied the subject of (Palestinian) refugees, as 
it has also reviewed their conditions and the means of (finding) solutions to these. 
It has made the following recommendations: 

1. The Political Committee recommends to the Arab Governments that they 
should continue their various representations to safeguard the rights of the Palestine 
Arabs and to ask for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, parti- 
cularly those relating to the return of the refugees to their country and their indem- 
nification for their properties and for the damage incurred by them. 

2. The Political Committee recommends to those States where refugees reside 
that they should, each according to its possibilities, agree to undertake projects which 
would lead to an improvement in their shelter and (which would provide) employment 
for them as well as ameliorate their conditions in general. Such projects should be 
financed by funds which U.N.R.W.A. will be willing to expend in this respect, pro- 
vided that agreements concluded with U.N.R.W.A. concerning such projects should 
not embody any stipulation for permanent residence, (and provided) that the full 
right of the refugees to return to their country and receive compensation for their 
properties, in conformity with the United Nations resolutions, is maintained. 

The Committee is of the opinion that in order to achieve this, efforts should 
be made to place the refugees in the Arab part of Palestine and in the neighbouring 
Arab countries where it is possible for them to be absorbed and where they can find 
the means of residence and livelihood so that they may regain their former life and 
strengthen their position for the future. 

3. The Political Committee recommends to the said Governments that they 
should hold consultations among themselves in order to decide on and provide for 
the transfer of the number of refugees which exceeds the absorptive capacity, and 
should agree among themselves as to the conditions for this (arrangement) within 
the possibilities of the two parties (concerned) and in conformity with the wishes of 
the refugees. 

In view of this the Political Committee is of the opinion that the projects men- 
tioned above should begin first in Palestine and thereafter in the neighbouring regions 
or in other places in accordance with the absorptive capacity and the practical possibi- 
lities of these regions. 

4. The Political Committee recommends to the Arab Governments that they 
should make joint representations to the United Nations to increase the sums allo- 
cated to refugees under such conditions. 



170 



International Affairs: Palestine 

5. The (Political) Committee recommends that a technical report be prepared 
by duly qualified and experienced persons on the absorptive capacity of the Palesti- 
nian and Arab areas referred to (above). 

6. The Political Committee recommends that the League States and the 
other Arab countries should collaborate regarding the responsibilities falling upon 
States on account of the refugees residing in them. The Palestine Office of the Secre- 
tariat-General (of the League) should contact the Governments concerned in order 
to study and determine the scope of these responsibilities so as to apportion them 
among the Arab countries, each according to its possibilities and its budget. 

The Committee considers that the refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the 
Gaza Strip (placed) under the supervision of Egypt have placed a heavy burden on 
these States. It is therefore necessary to redouble the efforts and sacrifices, and all the 
Arab countries, whether Members of the League or not, should all contribute (to this 
project), provided that such (contribution) be commensurate with each (State's) 
national income and economic capacity. For expenditure on the refugees and for the 
sake of the Palestine cause is based not only on considerations of neighbourhood 
or bloc-formation within the Arab League, but also on the principle of comprehensive 
Arab solidarity over an Arab issue such as that of Palestine. 



The All-Palestine Government 

Resol. 473- Sess. 16- Sched. 5- September 23, 1952, p. 102. 

In view of the cessation of the activities of the All-Palestine Government as a 
result of the present conditions, the Head of the Government shall represent Palestine 
on the Council of the League of Arab States, and the sum of 1500 Egyptian Pounds, 
out of the funds under the control of the financial experts, shall be allocated to him 
to cover the expenses of his office for the year 1952. 



Regional Conferences Attended by Israel 

Resol. 463- Sess. 16- Sched. 5- September 23, 1952, pp. 99-100. 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
The Committee has perused the Memorandum of the Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, preferred to it by the Council at its meeting of September 10, 1952, 
concerning the participation of some non-governmental Arab bodies in regional con- 
ferences attended by Israel. It has decided that the participation of non-govern- 
mental Arab bodies in conferences in which Israel takes part should be in accordance 
with the principles laid down by the Council of the League on May 19, 1951, and 
which concern participation of the Arab Governments in conferences to which Israel 
is invited. 



The Projects Relating to River Jordan and Its Sources 

Resol. 600- Sess. 20- Sched. 4- January i, 1954, p. 137. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has perused the report drawn up by the Arab 



171 



92 



95 



96 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Technical (sub-) Committee (charged with) studying the projects of utilizing the wa- 
ters of River Jordan and its tributaries. It has also heard the statements made by 
the rapporteur of that (sub-) Committee. 

It has become clear to the Political Committee from all the above that the 
engineers of the Arab States have succeeded in laying down the bases for a useful 
project that would ensure right and justice, (i) 

The Political Committee has therefore decided to entrust the aforesaid Arab 
(sub-) Committee with ( the task of ) completing its studies for submitting the 
project in its final form (to the Political Committee) at the earliest possible time . 

American Financial Grants to Israel 

ResoL 757- Sess. 21- Sched. 4- April 5, 1954, p. 182. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee recommends that the Governments of the Member 
States make all diplomatic representations with a view to explaining the damage 
that will result from the persistence of America in providing Israel with aid and in 
enabling it to attack Arab villages situated on the Armistice lines. In particular, 
the Committee recommends that the Arab diplomatic missions in Washington be 
asked to pursue their representations with the American State Department and with 
leaders of Congress and the American Press, in order to make them realize that all aid 
(granted) to Israel will but increase its power of aggression and encourage it to 
continue to ignore the resolutions of the United Nations. 

Supervision of the Implementation of the Convention Regarding 
German Reparations to Israel 

Resol. 758- Sess. 21- Sched. 5- April 5, 1954, p. 182. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee requests the Egyptian Government to pursue its 
representations with the German Government in order to secure its agreement to 
support a special commission to supervise goods delivered to Israel in accordance 
with the Convention between Israel and Germany on reparations in fulfilment of the 
promise made by the representatives of the German Government in this respect. 



( j) In view of the confidential character of this project, it has not been possible to obtain 
an authentic copy of it. However, in view of the visit paid to the Arab countries (and 
Israel) by Mr. Eric Johnston, President Eisenhower's special envoy to the Arab countries, 
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with these countries on the waters of River 
Jordan, the Political Committee of the Arab League met in Amman on October 21, 1953, 
in order to discuss the purpose of the visit and its relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
It was then decided that the Arab Governments should be left free as to whether or not to 
receive Mr. Johnston, provided that, if they did receive him, they should inform him that 
any proposal aiming at benefiting Israel would be rejected by the Arab States. See 
T.A. Bakri and I. Shukrallah : The League of Arab States and the Problems Handled 
by It, 1945-1957 (in Arabic', in mimeographed form, Secretariat-General, League of 
Arab States, Cairo, April 1957} p. 59. ED. 



172 



International Affairs: Palestine 

Aggression of Israel against the Armistice Regions of Palestine 

Resol. 7^5- Sess. 27- Sched. 5- April 6, 19543 pp. 188-189. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee examined the subject of repeated aggressions against 
the Arab villages situated throughout the Armistice regions of Palestine. 

The Committee has been informed of the measures taken by the Arab military 
authorities to enable the inhabitants of frontier villages to preserve their country and 
to live in security and peace in their homes. 

The Arab delegates have affirmed, in the name of their Governments; that they 
will act in unison in repulsing any aggression that may be committed against them, 
and, that they will do their duty, exerting the maximum effort in order to rein- 
force the foundations of peace and to repulse every aggression whaetver its source. 



Israel's Diversion of River Jordan Q o 

Resol. 832- Sess. 22- Sched. 6- December 1 1, 7954, p. 797. 7 O 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The (Political) Committee has heard and taken into consideration the obser- 
vations of the delegation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on this subject, as 
it has (also) taken into consideration the observations of the other delegations. It has 
(further) learnt of the readiness of Syria to submit a complaint to the Security 
Council, and has welcomed this measure concerning such an important and urgent 
question. It has indicated the necessity of co-operation among Member States in this 
regard by diplomatic and other means, as (also) of making use of the views of the 
technical committee, with a view to endorsing the Arab point of view should Jordan 
and Syria consider this appropriate. 



The Preservation of the Properties of the Palestine Refugees QQ 

Resol. 1030 - Sess. 24 - Sched. 3 - October 14 , 1955, P. 248. ^ -* 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has recommended the approval of the view taken by 
the permanent delegates of the Arab States regarding the adoption of a unified Arab 
policy, based on the following principles, for the preservation of the Arab properties 
in Palestine, pending the final solution of the Palestine problem: 

1) The fate of the properties of the Arab refugees, (treated) as a special item on 
the agenda of the General Assembly, must be considered in a manner different from 
that (followed) at present. 

2) The Conciliation Commission should be contacted to support the demands of 
the refugees regarding all matters relating to their properties. 

3) The Arab States should most vigorously declare their distrust in the Israeli 
Custodian of Absentees 1 Property, and (also declare him) to be incompetent to man- 

173 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

age the properties of the Arab refugees in accordance with the provisions of inter- 
national law. They should also demand insistently the appointment of a neutral 
custodian or a custody commission for the management of the properties on behalf 
of the refugees, and should hold the United Nations responsible for these properties 
and ask it to supervise and control the work of the Israeli Custodian, pending the 
appointment of a neutral custodian. 

4) To demand payment of the rents of Arab properties and of any other proceeds 
for the past and future periods, pending the solution of the Palestine problem. 

5) To demand that the sale of Arab properties by the Israelis should cease imme- 
diately, and that all sales already concluded be cancelled. 

6) The refugees should be represented in the work of the determination and 
delimitation of the properties, which (work) is being carried out at present by the 
Conciliation Commission. (This is) in order that they may be assured that their in- 
terests are safeguarded, and so that the United Nations committees entrusted with 
this task may draw upon their experience. 

7) Upon the determination of the properties , the refugees should be given the 
opportunity of examining the schedules and of objecting thereto. 

8) When the work reaches the stage of assessing (the value of) the properties, 
this (function) should be carried out by a committee of experts, on which the 
refugees should be represented ; and the assessment should be made on the basis of the 
market value of the properties in November 1947, i.e. on the date of the General 
Assembly Resolution for the partitioning of Palestine. Also, properties similar in value 
and location in the neighbouring Arab countries should be taken into consideration. 
As for those who do not wish to return (to Palestine), there should be added to 
the value of their properties an amount corresponding to the legal interest as from 
May 1948 until the date of payment. 

9) The (Conciliation) Commission should be asked to set up an organ which will 
investigate the refugees' losses in movable property, such as household effects, store 
stocks, agricultural and industrial machinery and equipment, and other (items). 



1 00 A * The Grant of Loans to the Palestine Refugees on Their Usurped 
Properties in Israel 

B. The Agreement for the Release of the Funds and Schedules of the 
Palestine Arabs 

C. A Proposal for the Formation of a United Nations Agency for 
Taking Care of the Palestine Refugees 9 Properties in Israel, and 
of Another Committee to Claim Their Rights and Make Com- 
pensation for Their Losses 

D. The Projects of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 
and Those of the Other International Organs for Settling the 
Palestine Refugees 

Resol. 1031 - Sess. 24 - Sched. 3 - October 14 , 7955, p. 249. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee considers that the Secretariat-General of the League 



174 



International Affairs: Palestine 

should seek the assistance of a group of experts to study these question, in preparation 
to their reconsideration by the Political Committee, 

The (Committee) has also agreed that the Secretariat-General should continue its 
discussions, in collaboration with the League's Permanent Office in New York and 
with the permanent Arab delegations at the United Nations, with a view to protecting 
the interests of the refugees and preserving their properties. 

The Question of Commercial Treaties between Israel and 101 
Foreign States, and the Unification of the Measures Which Should 
Be Taken by All the Arab States in Connection with This Question 

Resol. 1075 - Sess. 24 - Sched. 4- October 15, 1955, p. 260. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Eighth 
Conference of the Liaison Officers (for the boycott of Israel) : 

The Economic Committee has heard the statement of the delegate of the Cen- 
tral Boycott Office on this subject, and, after discussion, considers that the recom- 
mendation should be modified according to the following text: 

Considering that it has appeared necessary to find effective means to verify the 
authenticity of the Certificates of Origin covering goods exported by certain foreign 
countries to the Arab countries, and in particular from those countries having com- 
mercial treaties, or who are dealing with Israel. 

The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Governments of the Member 
States (of the League) should send instructions to their missions in foreign countries 
on the necessity of paying more heed to the verification of the authenticity of the 
origin of the goods exported by these countries to the Arab countries, especially 
those kinds (of goods) similar to those imported from Israel by the foreign countries 
mentioned. (The Government of the Member States) should also ask their respective 
missions in each of these countries to hold joint discussions together, with a view to 
agreeing on practical suggestions which will ensure the required verification, and to 
submitting to the Secretariat- General a joint report thereon. 

The Zionist Attempts to Compel the Jews in Foreign Countries 

to Migrate to Palestine 

Resol. 1334- Sess. 27 - Sched. 5- March 30, 1957^.332. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee : 

The (Political) Committee has studied the Memorandum of the Secretariat- 
General regarding Zionist attempts to compel the Jews in foreign countries to migrate 
to Israel for the realization of Israel's expansionist ambitions. 

(The Political Committee) recommends that Member States should continue 
their representations to the States concerned to prevent this migration and so foil 
Israel's aggressive aims, safeguard world peace and preserve security in the Middle 
East. 

Israel's Attempts to Compel Its Resident Arabs to Exchange Their 
Properties for Properties of Jews Residing in the Arab States 

Resol. 1336- Sess. 27- Sched. 5- March 30, 1957, p. 333- 
The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 



175 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

The (Political) Committee recommends the approval of the following recom- 
mendation of the Legal Committee: 

The Committee has discussed the report prepared by the Permanent Legal Com- 
mittee regarding Israel's study of a plan which will permit its resident Arabs to ex- 
change their properties in Israel for the properties of Jews residing in the Arab coun- 
tries. 

The (Committee) considers that Article i of the Unified Code applies to all kinds 
of transactions, including the case of the disposition of estates, and that it also applies 
to all persons (parties to the) transaction regardless of their residence. 

But as Article 7 of the Code in question does not cover those cases where the 
estates subject of the transaction are confiscated, the Committee recommends that 
each Member State should provide, in its legislation governing the boycott of Israel, 
for the penalties to be applicable in the event that the property is disposed of. 



176 



International Affairs: Oman 

Application of the Imama of Oman for Admission to the League 1 f\A 

of Arab States * ^ 

ResoL 1020-Sess. 24-Sched. 3- October 14, 1955, p. 246. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee : 

The Political Committee has considered this question, and has recommended 
that the Council of the League should adopt the following resolution regarding this 
(question) : 

The Council of the League of Arab States, desirous of facilitating the way to the 
independent Arab countries to join the League of Arab States, welcomes the applica- 
tion of the Imama (i) of Oman to join its membership. The Council decides to request 
those Member Arab States, who have not yet expressed their views on this question, 
to formulate their point of view regarding this (question), provided they submit 
their views to the Council of the Arab League at its next session, so that it may take a 
decision regarding the admission of the Imama to the League. 

The Imama of Oman ] S 

Resol. ii27-Sess. 2$-Sched. 4- April 12, 1956, p. 274. 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Com- 
mittee: 

The Political Committee has studied the memorandum of the Secretariat- 
General on (the subject of) the Imama of Oman. It entrusts the Secretary-General 
with the formation of a three-member mission representing the League, in order to 
get acquainted with the situation in the region of Oman and to make the necessary 
representations to the authorities therein, and to submit a report on the results of its 
representations to the League's Council at its forthcoming session. 

The Committee recommends that Member States should co-operate in facilitat- 
ing the task of the mission. 

The Question of the Imama of Oman 1 A/T 

ResoL 1207- Sess. 26- Sched. 3- October 22, 1956, p. 297. 1 U 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee has reviewed the question of the Imama of Oman and 
the development of events therein since the British aggression against its indepen- 
dence and sovereignty. 

The (Committee) has found fit to recommend the following: 

1) That Member States should continue their efforts until the Imama of Oman 
recovers its rights and liberty. 

2) That the Governments (of the) Member States should direct their delegates 
to the United Nations to refer, at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, 
to this question and to what the Imama of Oman is suffering at present. 

3) That the Secretariat-General should continue its efforts for the implementation 
of the resolution (adopted by) the Council of the League of its session of April 12, 1956. 



(j) The Protectorate of Oman (Sultanate of Muscat and Oman) is referred to here as 
Imama on account of the title of "Imam" attributed to its Head. ED. 



177 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

1 Q7 Th e Question of the Imama of Oman 

* ^ ' Resol. 1376 - Sess. 27- Sched. j- August 12, 195 7, p. 343. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee of the Council of the League of Arab States has 
studied, at its twenty-seventh Ordinary Session, the Secretary-General's report on the 
question of Oman and the foreign aggression against it, as well as the memorandum 
of the Government of Saudi Arabia on the subject. It has also heard Oman's 
representative in Cairo. 

It has resolved as follows: 

1) The intervention of the British armed forces in Oman is a flagrant aggression 
against its independence, sovereignty and the integrity of its territory. 

2) That Member States should take unanimous joint action demanding an ur- 
gent meeting of the Security Council in order to consider this question and to put an 
end to the British armed forces' intervention against Oman, considering that (such 
intervention) constitutes a threat to peace and security in the Middle East and con- 
flicts with the provisions of international law and the United Nations Charter. 

3) Urgent representations should be made by the Arab States to the Members 
of the United Nations for the support of Oman in its just cause. 



178 



International Affairs: Yaman and Protectorates 

The Question of the Protectorates 1 Q8 

Resol 64- Sess. 4- Sched. 5- June u, 1946, p. 16. 

The Council supports Yaman in her stand over the Protectorates in the 
dispute between her and the British Government, concerning which an agreement 
has been reached, according to which the discussion of (the question) has been post- 
poned till the future, when friendly negotiations concerning it will take place with the 
British Government in conformity with the treaty between it and Yaman. 

The Yamanite - British Negotiations 1 QQ 

Resol. 291- Sess. 12- Sched. 4- April i, 1950, p. 62. ^ 

The Council approves the following decision of the Political Committee: 
The Political Committee, having heard the statements of the representative of 

the Yamanite Government, has decided to propose the following resolution to the 

Council: 

The Council has considered the development of the Yamanite-British nego- 
tiations and their recent outcome, namely, that both parties are determined to enter 
into direct negotiations in London at an early date to be fixed by agreement between 
them. The Council welcomes this step and hopes that the forthcoming negotiations 
will lead to a settlement of the problems the solution of which is of interest to the 
Arab States Members (of the League), provided that (such solution) safeguards the 
legitimate rights of Yaman. (The Council) recommends to the States Members of the 
Arab League that each State should work in the manner it sees fit for the success of 
these negotiations and for reaching a friendly and satisfactory settlement. 

Aggression by the British Authorities against the Yamanite Regions 1 1 f) 

Known as the Protectorates 

Resol. 598 - Sess. 20 - Sched. 4 - January 19, 1954, pp. 136-137. 

The Council of the League of Arab States, 

Having heard the detailed statements made by His Excellency the head of the 
delegation of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yaman concerning the aggression of the 
British authorities against the Yamanite regions known as the Protectorates, as well 
as against Shabwa area. 

And having perused the recommendation of the Political Committee in this 
respect, 

Resolves as follows: 

First. To approve the proposals formulated by the subsidiary committee estab- 
lished for studying this subject and which have been sanctioned by the Political 
Committee. 

Second. That the Council denounces the acts of violence and repression 
which are being committed by the British forces, and declares that the Arab League 
States fully support the Mutawakkilite Government of Yaman in its legitimate stand. 

Third. That the Council declares that it is going ahead, with extreme concern, 
in making various representations for the reinforcement of the present stand of Yaman. 

Fourth. To dispatch a mission in the name of (the Council) to Yaman at the 
earliest possible date in order to express to His Majesty the Imam, King of the Muta- 

179 



m 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

wakkilite Kingdom of Yaman, the readiness of the League of Arab States to support 
Yaman by all means which will bring about support for sister (Yaman) as is called 
for by the Pact of the League and (by) Arab fraternity. 

The Report of the League's Mission to Yaman 

Resol. 753 - Sess. 21 - Sched. 2 - April 3, 7954, p. 180. 

The Council of the League of Arab States, 

Having studied the report submitted by the League's mission to Yaman on 
March 31, 1954, in pursuance of the League's resolution of January 19, 1954, 
Resolves as follows: 

1. The Council of the League expresses its thanks to the said mission as well as 
its full appreciation for its efforts. 

2. The Council approves the report of the mission of the League of Arab States 
to Yaman. 

3. The Council of the League of Arab States reaffirms its full support of Ya- 
man in her legitimate stand over the question of the southern regions. 

4. The policy approved by the Council in its resolution of January 19, 1954, at 
its previous session, should be maintained. 

5. The Council of the League of Arab States appeals to the Sultans and Chiefs 
of the southern and eastern regions of Yaman not to commit themselves to the 
(course) set for them, (namely) to be bound by any agreement or regime that may be 
inconsistent with their national Arab spirit and which may alienate them from their 
association with their Arab brethren, and in particular Yaman. 

6. The Council of the Arab League reaffirms its readiness, in conjunction with 
the Government of Yaman, to give the necessary aid ( to the Sultans and Chiefs 
mentioned above) so as to strengthen them and safeguard their Arab character. 

7. The Council of the League requests the Secretary-General to continue (his) 
efforts by keeping in constant touch with the Government of Yaman in order to rea- 
lize the objectives of this resolution, as well as to submit a detailed report about the 
development of this question to the Council of the League at its next session. 

8. The Secretary-General is authorized to call an urgent meeting of the Coun- 
cil should the need therefor arise. 



112 



British Aggression on Yamanite Territory 

Resol. 1328 - Sess. 27 - Sched. 5 - March 30, 1957, p. 331. 

The Council resolves to approve the following recommendation of the Political 
Committee: 

The Political Committee has examined the Secretary-General's report on the 
British aggression on Yamanite territory, and heard the statement of the head of the 
delegation of Yaman regarding the present situation and the recent events. 

The Committee, while expressing its great concern about the British authorities' 
persistent aggressive acts, recommends the following: 

First : The sending of a mission to Yaman representing the Member States and the 
Secretariat-General in order to investigate the acts of aggression. 
Second : The formation of a sub-committee composed of the heads of the delegations 
of Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Egypt, and of the Secretary -General, in order to 
follow up the developments of the situation with the Yamanite Minister in Egypt, 
and to suggest the effective means to face (these developments). 



180 



International Affairs: Yaman and Protectorates 

The Report of the League's Mission to Yaman 

Resol. 1373 - Sess. 27 - Sched. 6 - April 24, 1957 

The Council resolves to approve the following decision of the Political Commit- 
tee: 

The Political Committee has studied the report of the League's Mission to Ya- 
man in April 1957, and has expressed its thanks to the Mission for its fruitful efforts. 

The (Committee) has resolved upon recommending the following to the Member 
States: 

First. That Member States should continue to support the Government of the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yaman in its stand with regard to the Anglo- Yamanite 
dispute, and to proceed with the measures decided upon during the Council's meeting 
in March 1957. 

Second. That assistance should be given to the distressed people and refugees 
from Southern Yaman, and that urgent relief should be extended to them through the 
Arab Red Crescent and Red Cross organizations. 

Third. That the military proposals of the Mission should be referred for study to 
the Military Secretariat which should make the necessary recommendations to the 
Member States regarding them. 



181 



V 



Inter - Arab States Disputes 



International Affairs : Positive Neutrality 

Mr. President, 
Secretary General, 
Honourable Delegates, 

First, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you for the confidence which has 
been placed in you by the General Assembly in electing you to this high post, and I 
wish you the fullest measure of success in carrying on the greatest traditions of your 
office that has been established by your distinguished predecessors. 

May I also take the opportunity to congratulate all new nations on their independ- 
ence and on their admitting in the U.N. Having won your freedom, may you preserve 
it forever and may you prosper continuously every passing year. It is also mind- 
inspiring to stand in the Assembly of the U.N; I pray God that I may be worthy of 
the time and of the place. I pray that I may also be worthy of the Arab people, that 
I may, in spirit and in word, express their aspirations and their resolve to contribute 
to peace and justice in the world. Our country is the land of peace, the cradle of re- 
ligion and of civilisation itself. 

It was our country from which the Arab message of Universal Peace and good- 
will was proclaimed. Also it was the Prophet of our people who long ago introduced 
into the world the doctrine that all human beings are equal under God. 

With such a tradition we are determined to contribute to the world of the future 
as we have to the world of the past. 

It was our determination to do so, to revive the spirit of our ancestors, that led 
to the great Arab Revolt: the revolt deep-rooted in the principles of peace, equality 
and freedom that are the very heart of this land and of Arab Nationalism. They are also 
the foundations on which the U.N. was built. So as a representative of the Arab 
people, I have come to this Assembly, to contribute what I can, and to state our posi- 
tion on the issues which are the subject of discussion before this august body. 

There are four reasons why I am here today: 

First, I was deeply concerned over what seemed to be an obvious attempt to wreck 
the U.N. 

Second, I wanted to be sure that there was no mistake about where Jordan stands in 
the conflict of ideologies that were endangering the peace of the world. 
Third, As a head of a small nation, I felt that it was my duty to the other small nations 
of the world, particularly to the new members of the U.N., to share with them of our 
experience in preserving the freedom for which we fought so hard. 
Fourth and finally, I felt it was my duty to express my views on three vital problems in 
the Middle East affecting the peace of the world, namely: 

1. The growing tension between Jordan and the U.A.R., 

2. The independence of Algeria, 

3. And the still unsolved problem of Palestine. 

It is needless to affirm that the U.N. presents the only hope of peace and freedom 
to humanity. It is of major significance to all the small nations of the world. 

Yet almost from the very birth the Soviet Union has sought to destroy the United 
Nations, to hamper its deliberations, to block its decisions, and by rowdy tactics and 
petulant walk-outs to demean the representatives of the Security Council and the 
General Assembly. 

The most recent illustration of this attitude toward the U.N. has been a perform- 
ance at this session and the attempt to weaken the powers of the Secretary-General, 
and the proposal to move the site of the World Organisation Headquarters. 

These are only slightly concealed attempts to destroy the U.N. itself. May I add 
that I heartily endorse the decision administered to Mr. Khrushchev by the vote of the 

983 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

General Assembly in its endorsement of the speedy and effective measures taken 
by the Secretary-General and his staff in handling the tragedy of the Congo. No one 
who has followed deliberations in the_General Assembly in the past two weeks can 
fail to be aware of the significance of this meeting. The problems on the agenda are 
not new problems, but as they had been long unsolved, they have so grown in magni- 
tude that their continued existence threatens not the peace of the world but its very 
life. I have no major plan for the solution of these problems. 

As a country which owns jao nuclear weapons and which may suffer from nuclear 
weapons, Jordan merely beseeches the. Powers to resume their labours to find a for- 
mula which would not only save mankind but us too. There are other problems too. 
The world will be in deadlock if it did not realise that almost on every vital issue that 
confronts this body the nations of the world are being offered a choice ; and there is no 
secret about what that choice is. It lies between becoming part of the Soviet Empire 
subservient ultimately to the dictates of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, or 
standing as a free nation with sole external allegiance to the U.N. itself. That is the 
choice, and that is there for each and every nation to decide, and, may I say, at once 
and with all the strength and conviction at my command, that Jordan has made its 
choice. We have given our answer in our actions and I am here to reaffirm our stand 
to the nations of the world. We reject Communism. The Arab people will never bow 
to Communism. Communism will never survive in the Arab world because if it ever 
did it would have replaced Arab Nationalism. There will cease to be an Arab nation 
and an Arab world. 

I believe that Arab Nationalism is too deep-rooted in the love of God, love of 
freedom and the concept of the equality of all before God to ever be supplanted by a 
system which denies the importance of these ideals. 

Moreover it's my firm belief that all nations which believe in God should 
meet in counter-attack against the common challenge to their very existence repre- 
sented by Communism. 

Not even the emotional power that comes from love of country or the material 
existence offered by material well-being, or f he spiritual strength to be drawn from 
the concept of freedom none of these singly or alone can meet the threat to peace 
presented by the totalitarian system of Communism. Not until those who honestly 
believe in God and in His dictates of love, equality and social justice unite to translate 
their ideal into action, will Communism be defeated and peace restored to earth. In 
the great struggle between Communism and freedom there can be no neutrality. How 
can we be neutral in our attitude towards peace and justice? There are two 
philosophies : one of these cherishes these concepts and the other denies and fights 
them. In taking our stand in the free world we do not forget the long struggle for 
liberation nor do we ignore the injustices being committed by some members of the 
Free World. 

But in the setting sun of the old imperialism we are not blinded to the new impe- 
rialism of Communism: one far more brutal, far more tyrannical and far more danger- 
ous to the ideals of free people, to the concept of nationalism, that this world has ever 
known. While we reject the doctrine of neutralism for ourselves we respect the right 
of any nation to choose its own course of action. But we are wary of what appears in 
some instances as the use of neutralism to exploit division between the free world and 
Communism, and we are also wary of the danger in some cases of Communist 
expansion under the guise of neutralism. 

I come now to the problem of the Middle East : so vital to the peace of the world 
and hence of major concern to the U.N. in our part of the world. Added to the prob- 

984 



International Affairs: Positive Neutrality 

lems of Algeria and Palestine there now exists a situation of which the General 
Assembly should be aware. I will not dwell upon it in unhappy details, but to do so 
might include another disguised threat of intense conflict; but to let it go unnoticed 
by the U.N., would be equally dangerous. I feel therefore that I must discuss the 
tension which exists bevween Jordan and the U.A.R. With other and more world- wide 
problems facing the General Assembly it may seem, to some, rather presumptuous to 
introduce what may appear to be a local dispute. I think that the issue was not entirely 
local and as the world has already now learned no country of ideal... 

Moreover the principles underlying it, as well as those which must be used to end 
it are applicable throughout the world. And, as new independent nations find their 
freedom in increasing number, the expected application of these principles becomes 
of increasing importance. For me to remain silent, then would be to encourage a 
situation which could destroy the Arab Nation and in the process lead to the involve- 
ment of the major powers and then produce a world conflict. It all began several 
years ago and at a time when Jordan had completely achieved its independence. 
Since then new and most formidable threats to its freedom in the form of Communist 
penetration into our region. Our warning to the people of Jordan and to the Arab 
nation as a whole was the cause of Jordan being subjected to abuse, subversion and 
external pressure of many kinds. 

They grew in intensity to the extent that we can only believe that the aim of our 
sister Arab state is our destruction. Its government, which we have supposed would 
be as strongly dedicated to the goal of Arab Unity as Jordan is. In fact so menacing 
was the U.A.R. attitude towards Jordan, so constant were its attacks on us, that on 
August 21, 1958 the General Assembly of the U.N. in its third extraordinary session 
endorsed an Arab League Resolution by which the U.A.R. pledged itself to cease its 
campaign against us. Unhappily she did not honour her pledge. The attacks were 
resumed; incitements to overthrow our Government and assassinate our leaders were 
daily broadcast over their government radio; borders between us were closed to dam- 
age our economy; and convicted traitors to Jordan were encouraged, or at least 
permitted to engage in subversive acts against us. 

The situation once again became so grave that the Arab League, of which the 
U.A.R. and Jordan are members, passed a resolution calling upon its members to 
refrain from all activities that would disturb "Fraternal Relations". The day follow- 
ing the close of that session, Jordan's Prime Minister, Hazza Al Majali, was killed (by 
a bomb placed in his desk) along with eleven others, including a child of ten. 

I will restrain myself and I assure you, it is with great difficulty that I do so 
from saying any more on this subject. I would like only to add that I find considerable 
significance in the fact that our troubles with the United Arab Republic date from the 
time that I denounced the growing menace of Communism in the Arab world. More- 
over, I detect a significant parallel between the tactics that have been used against 
Jordan and those employed by Communism the world over. 

It is no secret that the policy of the Soviets is to split friend from friend, to divide 
nation from nation, in order to achieve its own goal of total world domination. The 
U.A.R., in seeking to dominate our part of the world, has adopted, as part of its policy 
of "neutralism", some of the methods of the country of which it is most fondly 
neutral. Should they succeed, either as a neutral or as an openly avowed Communist 
ally, they will destroy the very basic aims of the Arab nation. 

These aims may be difficult to be understood in another country outside of the 
Arab world, possibly because we are inapt at defining them clearly to others, or per- 
haps because our ideals, as yet unattained by us in our world and having been at- 

985 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

tained by others in theirs, have been forgotten by them. 

Nevertheless we have set forth our ideals in joint effort. They were partly 
embodied in the Arab Resolution of 1958 and in the Resolution of the Arab League 
meeting in Shtoura to which I have just referred. To both of them, the U.A.R. had 
been a party and both of them have been consistently violated by them. 

The point I want to make is this : as the creation of the U.N. suggests, our hope 
for more freedom, more cooperation, and what you often refer to as a better world, 
and even survival, lies in the adherence to mutually agreed upon ways of dealing with 
one another, then we must find better ways than we now have to bring our combined 
weight of opinion quickly and effectually to bear upon whatever nation transgresses 
these agreed upon inter-relationships. I do not suggest that there is anything new in 
this idea. It is simply the idea of government by law applied to the actions of sovereign 
nations; buttomeas a leader of a small nation, much beset by outside pressure, it is a 
concept which is worthy of re-emphasizing at this time for I believe it is in the success- 
ful application of this idea that the survival and progress of mine and so many other 
small nations in the end will be decided. 

The U.N. is the only instrument which is capable of applying this idea success- 
fully, and should it fail in general to fulfil this responsibility, the small nations will be 
forced to use all their means to solve their problems. This will be the worst kind of 
retrogression toward the kind of "might makes right" which we have been fighting 
for so long to leave behind us. 

Before I go on to the subject of Algeria and Palestine, a final word about the 
U.A.R. evidence. While Jordan will naturally welcome any U.N. support of its posi- 
tion, which it believes to be based on the principles on which progress toward a bettei 
relation between nations must rest, Jordan does not expect or request any U.N. 
special or immediate response to what I have said. If we can collectively define and 
carry out better means than we now have to assure the integrity of smaller nations 
and to guarantee their ability to improve their life, free of outside interference, well, 
I believe we will have progressed. If what I have said contributes to this end then 
it will have been worth saying. 

The tragedy of Algeria remains grave, and shows signs of becoming graver. Here 
again, the problem is that of refusing to recognise the right of the people to determine 
their own future. This is the very essence of freedom. The United Nations cannot 
afford to take a passive position in this matter any more than it was passive about 
Korea or about Hungary. 

In one sense, the problem is far more serious because a party to it is a member of 
the free world. The appeal to France to uphold what she seems to have neglected, her 
own tradition for liberty, freedom and equality, must be no less vigorous because she 
is a member of the Free World. In fact, it must be more so because of it. 

There is no doubt that a large and impressive number of the French people are 
wholeheartedly in favour of permitting our Algerian brothers the choice of their 
future. May the French Government soon reflect by its actions the same belief, and 
extend to the Algerians the right of self-determination promised by the President of 
France. By such action, France will win back its place among nations who will fight 
for freedom. There will never be a better world, if principles continue to be compro- 
mised. We must put an end to useless bloodshed. Enough wrong has been done and 
the road of ignoring the continuation of wrong is a dangerous one. The people of 
Algeria are entitled to their right of self-determination. 

The third of the three problems in the Middle East is Palestine. The world's con- 
science seems to have closed its eyes in a rather shameful manner, and for far too long 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

Egyptian-Sudanese Dispute: First Egyptian Communiqu 1 1 A 

February 17, 1958 (/) 

Agreement had been reached with regard to the political boundaries separating 
Egypt and the Sudan, by virtue of the provisions of Article i of the Convention of 
1899, (to the effect) that the term "Sudan" should be made to extend to the whole of 
the territory lying south of latitude 22 . 

The Provisional Constitution of the Sudan, which was promulgated in 1953, 
recognized this Convention, by providing, in Article 2, that "the Sudanese territory 
shall comprise all the regions which were comprised by the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
immediately before the implementation of this Constitution". 

In order to facilitate the administrative services to the tribes in the frontier re- 
gions, the Egyptian Minister of the Interior in 1899 issued a decision (qarar) provid- 
ing for the placing of some Egyptian regions, north of latitude 22, under the Anglo- 
Egyptian condominium, while keeping them under Egyptian sovereignty. Then 
(another) decision was issued by the Egyptian Minister of the Interior in 1902, plac- 
ing some (Egyptian) regions, north of latitude 22, under Sudanese administration, 
and (other) regions, south of latitude 22, under Egyptian administration, while keep- 
ing them under Sudanese sovereignty. 

With the (attainment of the) independence of the Sudan 1956, the condomin- 
ium came to an end. The Egyptian Government, upon the request of the Sudanese 
Government, considered it (was appropriate) to settle the outstanding problems 
between the two countries ; this was to be done after the situation had become stable 
in the Sudan. 

Egypt has always, in her relations with the Sudan, avoided everything that 
might have led, directly or indirectly, to increasing (the Sudan's) burdens, par- 
ticularly since it was (then) striving to discharge its responsibilities as an independent 
State, postponing all outstanding questions between the two countries to an appro- 
priate occasion, on which the Sudan would be ready for such problems. 

But the Sudanese Government announced the distribution of electoral districts; 
this distribution covered the Egyptian territories north of latitude 22 a course 
which was inconsistent with the Convention of 1899, and which is considered to be 
an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty. The Egyptian Government, accordingly, 
sent a memorandum to the Sudanese Government, dated February i, 1958, directing 
(its) attention to (the fact) that these regions are Egyptian territory and that the 
Government of the Sudan has no right to include them in the Sudanese electoral dis- 
tricts. (The memorandum) also drew attention to the Convention of 1899, and asked 
for the abolition of the (then-existing) administrative arrangements and a return to 
political boundaries. 

But in view of the Sudanese Government's failure to reply to the memorandum, 
the Egyptian Government submitted (another) memorandum,dated February 13, (in 
which) it asked for a quick reply. It made it clear that the circumstances of the Egyp- 
tian plebiscite necessitated the expeditious settlement of this question, in order to en- 
able the citizens of these regions to cast their votes. 

But in view of the Sudanese Government's failure, once again, to reply, the Egyp- 
tian Government submitted a new memorandum, dated February 16, (in which) 



(/) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Ahram, 
February i8 3 1958. 



185 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

it informed the Sudanese Government that it would send to these regions plebiscite 
committees (for the plebiscite) which would take place on the 2ist instant, and these 
would be (assisted) by a frontier police post. 

In the morning of February 17, the Prime Minister of the Sudan got in touch 
with the Egyptian Minister of the Interior, and expressed his desire for the postpone- 
ment of (the settlement of) the question of boundaries between Egypt and the Sudan 
until after the forthcoming Sudanese elections. 

At the same time, Sudanese forces moved into the Egyptian region an act 
that is considered to be a flagrant violation of the Convention of 1899 and of Egyptian 
sovereignty. 

The Egyptian Government instructed its Ambassador in Khartoum to request the 
Sudanese Government to withdraw the Sudanese forces from the Egyptian territory 
to behind the political boundaries, i. e., latitude 22, in order to preserve the (friendly) 
ties between the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples. 

But the Government of the Sudan, which had (frequently) asked for the preser- 
vation of the secrecy of these negotiations from their very beginning, and which had 
asked for the prevention of their leakage to the Press, issued, suddenly and without 
prior consultation with the Egyptian Government, a statement this evening (Monday), 
which it entitled "The Intervention of the Egyptian Government in the Sudanese 
Borders". In its statement, it disregarded the international agreements, and alleged 
that the reason for this (Egyptian) stand was the discovery of minerals in the region, 
This (it alleged notwithstanding the fact that) all permits issued in this region had 
been issued by the Egyptian Government with the knowledge of the Sudanese Go- 
vernment; that there is only one Egyptian mine, for manganese, in this region, operat- 
ed by an Egyptian company, with the permission of the Egyptian Government, in 
pursuance of the right of sovereignty, and that all was ( taking place ) with the 
knowledge of the Sudanese Government. 

The Egyptian Government is, however, desirous of (maintaining the cordial) 
relations Unking the Egyptian people with the Sudanese people, and wishes to end 
the problem between the two countries in a friendly way. 

1 | S Egyptian-Sudanese Dispute: The Sudanese Communiqul 

A 1 ^ February i8> 1958 (i) 

After an urgent meeting (held) yesterday evening, February 17, 195 8, the Foreign 
Minister, accompanied by the Sudanese Ambassador to Cairo, left Khartoum for 
Cairo to have discussions with President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir. The Council of 
Ministers wishes to inform the Sudanese public opinion about the letters and memo- 
randa exchanged, in the last (few) days, between the Republic of the Sudan and the 
Republic of Egypt, concerning the boundaries between the two countries. 

i. On the first day of the current month of February, the Permanent Under- 
secretary of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a memorandum, dated 
January 29, 1958, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Egypt. 
(This memorandum) referred to the division of constituencies for the Sudanese House 
of Representatives, and demanded that (the Sudanese Government) should take the 
necessary steps to hand over the administrative affairs of the following two zones to 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat, 
February 20, 195$. 



186 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

the Egyptian Government(i) : 

(a) The zone forming part of the north-eastern desert of the Sudan, on the Red 
Sea, and comprising the area of Halaybi and its vicinity. 

(b) The zone lying on the Nile, north of latitude 22 without any definition 
(by the Egyptian Government) of a specific area but which seems to comprise the 
Sudanese territory extending north of the town of Wadi Haifa, including the villages 
of Sarra, Diri and Pars. 

2. At the time the Egyptian memorandum demanded the handing over to it of 
the two aforementioned zones, it expressed its readiness to hand over to the Sudan a 
desert zone (lying) on the Sudanese north-eastern frontiers, which had been cut off 
from the Sudan and attached to Egypt, during the modification of the boundaries 
between the two countries, shortly after the occupation of the Sudan. 

3. Before the preparation of the reply to this memorandum was completed, the 
Sudanese Government received news that a detachment of the Egyptian Army had 
been sent to the Halaybi region and its vicinity. The Deputy Foreign Minister sum- 
moned the Ambassador of the Republic of Egypt in Khartoum and inquired of him 
about the news.The Ambassador dismissed (this news) as unlikely, and promised to in- 
quire from his Government about it. After this, the Deputy Foreign Minister requested 
him to deliver a verbal message to the Government of the Egyptian Republic, to the 
effect that the Government of the Sudan hoped that the news was not true, but that it 
feared that the news would, if true, have an adverse effect on the relations between the 
two countries. 

The (Deputy) Minister added that (his Government) could not agree to the ces- 
sion of a part of the Sudan, on the basis of copies of letters exchanged half a century 
ago. The request for a quick answer, in this circumstance for parliamentary elec- 
tions are being held, and therefore the Ministers are outside Khartoum is a matter 
which makes a quick decision not feasible, as the matter needs discussion and investi- 
gation. 

4. That was on the nth of this February. On the I3th, the Egyptian Ambas- 
sador in the Sudan delivered to the (Sudanese) Prime Minister another Egyptian 
memorandum, dated February 9, in which the Government of Egypt informed the 
Republic of the Sudan that, owing to the referendum concerning (the establishment 
of) the United Arab Republic and the election of the President on the 2ist of this 
February, it had decided, in exercise of its established powers, and in pursuance of 
the principles of sovereignty, to enable the inhabitants of the two regions mentioned 
to vote in this referendum. 

The Egyptian Ambassador asked for the reply of the Government of the Sudan 
to this second memorandum, and denied, in the course of the meeting, the dispatch 
of a detachment of the Egyptian Army to the zones claimed by Egypt. The Prime 
Minister, and the Ministers who were then with him, replied (by saying) that the 
present boundaries, which are shown in maps and well-known to all, are the (very) 
boundaries on the basis of which the Sudan obtained her independence. He also 
(said) that those boundaries had existed for 60 years, without being challenged by 
anyone. Egyptian elections had (always), until the latest of them and (until) the re- 
ferend- m on the person of the Egyptian President, taken place on the basis of exclud- 
ing those zones, considered as Sudanese territory. 

The last Sudanese elections including those on self-government which took 
place in February 1953, in accordance with the Egyptian-British Agreement and un- 



(i) Literally, "Administration". ED. 

I8 7 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

der the supervision of an international commission, on which Egypt was represented 

took place on the basis that the zones mentioned are also Sudanese. Their inha- 
bitants (in fact) took part in the Sudanese parliamentary elections. 

When the Sudan obtained her independence the first reservation she made to 
the two Condominum States was that she would not be bound by any treaties or 
agreements concluded on her behalf before independence, unless these were (first) 
submitted to her and approved by her. (This was made clear) in the statement of the 
former Prime Minister in the Sudanese Parliament on January i, 1956. 

Had the Government of the Egyptian Republic had any special point of view 
regarding the frontiers, it would have hastened to put it forward, either before inde- 
pendence or when it received the letter sent to President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir by the 
former Prime Minister on January 3, 1956. 

As the matter is not so easy that it can be settled before the 2ist of this February 
and the time not opportune for reaching a decision regarding it, and as we cannot 
accede to the Egyptian point of view, we think it will be preferable, for the good 
of the friendly relations between the two countries, to postpone discussion of this 
matter until after the Sudanese elections. (Accordingly) no referendum may be held 
by Egypt in any zone that constitutes a part of the Sudan. And it will be better to 
postpone the question, for study and negotiation between the two countries, until 
after the 27th of this February, which is the date of the Sudanese elections. 

5. Only three days after this meeting, that is, on the i6th of this February, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Sudanese Ambassador in Egypt 
that the Egyptian Government had sent electoral committees, accompanied by guards 
from the Frontier (Police) Force, to the territory claimed by Egypt, for the purpose 
of the referendum. (The Ministry also said) that (these committees) would be in the 
places assigned to them on the date fixed for holding the referendum, namely, the 
2 ist of this February. 

6. On Monday morning, February 17, the Council of Ministers held a meeting 
to study the matter. The Council's attention was especially drawn to the following 
facts : 

a. The Republic of Egypt has not raised this question since the occupation of 
the Sudan in 1899. It is raising it now, when all Sudanese people and Government 

are preoccupied with the parliamentary elections, after the discovery of mines in 
the north - eastern zone, and after it had become clear, in the course of the recent Nile 
waters negotiations, that the Sudan would ask for compensation for the inundation of 
the region north of Haifa with the High Dam waters. 

b. The occasion of holding a referendum for the Egyptian people, which the 
Egyptian Government used as a pretext in its memorandum, was not the first occasion 
for a referendum in Egypt, before or after the Revolution. Nor has there ever been 
any referendum held in that region. 

c. Whereas the first Egyptian memorandum claims what might be understood 
as an objection to the participation of the inhabitants of that region in the forthcom- 
ing Sudanese elections, the second memorandum bases its claim on the necessity of 
the participation of those Sudanese, considered as Egyptian subjects, in the referen- 
dum (held) for the Egyptian people. 

d. The time-limit given to the Sudanese Government for deciding this import- 
ant issue did not exceed 16 days, namely, from the ist to the i6th of February. 

e. The second memorandum puts the Sudanese Government before an ac- 
complished fact, for (that memorandum) expected nothing (more) and (expressed no 
readiness for) negotiation. 

188 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

f. The verbal notification of the Sudanese Government about the sending of 
electoral committees, together with a few of the Frontier (Police) to the region, im- 
plies a confirmation of the news which had reached the Sudanese Government, but 
which was denied, first, by the Ambassador of the Egyptian Republic, and denied 
again, when this notification was made. This, indeed, is a matter which reaffirms 
Egypt's determination to face the Sudan with an accomplished fact. 

g. The Republic of Egypt did not want to appreciate the circumstances of the 
absence of the Ministers in their constituencies. It also rejects the request of the Su- 
danese Government to postpone the discussion of the question until rfter the Sudan- 
ese elections. 

In view of the above, the Sudanese Council of Ministers has decided to take the 
measures (necessary) for maintaining the sovereignty of the Sudan over her territory 
and for preserving her independence. These measures will, however, at the same 
time make room for a friendly understanding between the two sister countries. The 
(Council of Ministers) has, therefore, decided upon the following steps : 

1. The Sudanese Prime Minister will telephone President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir 
and reiterate the Sudan's request that Egypt should discontinue the measures taken 
by her in the region which she claims, and will also emphasize the Sudan's readiness 
to negotiate with Egypt regarding the matter. 

The telephone call was made, but owing to the fact that it was not possible to 
speak to President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, the Prime Minister spoke with Mr. Zakariy- 
ya Muhyiddin, the Egyptian Minister of Interior, who was kind enough to promise 
to convey the conversation to the President of the Egyptian Republic, and also to 
convey (to him) his reply. 

2. The Arab League and the representatives of the sister Arab States in Khar- 
toum, should be informed of the details of the situation. 

3. A delegation presided over by the Sudanese Foreign Minister should be 
sent directly to Cairo in order to negotiate with the Egyptian Government. 

4. Direct contact should be made with the Opposition and with Sudanese 
public opinion (in this connection), which (contact) should be continued whenever 
any new developments take place, in order to make known the real truth and to fore- 
stall rumours and intrigue. 

Finally, the Government of the Sudan still cherishes the hope that prudence and 
common-sense will prevail, in order to maintain the friendly and brotherly relations 
obtaining between the two countries and to which the Government of the Sudan is 
truly and sincerely dedicated. 

Egyptian Sudanese Dispute: Second Egyptian Communiqu \ \ (\ 

February 79, 195$ (i) 

Contacts have recently been made between the Egyptian and Sudanese Govern- 
ments, by the Sudanese Foreign Minister and the Sudanese Ambassador to Cairo, 
concerning the frontier zones between Egypt and the Sudan. 

The Egyptian Government, being anxious that all (concerned) should refrain 
from taking any action which may prejudice the point of view of either Government, 
or undermine the prospects of finding a friendly solution, through negotiations that 
may start immediately after the formation of the new Sudanese Government, pro- 
posed to the Sudanese Government that neither of the two Governments should hold a 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Ahram, 
February 20, 1958. 

189 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

plebiscite or elections inside these zones, pending (the outcome) of the (proposed) 
negotiations. 

The Egyptian Government regrets that the Sudanese Government has rejected 
this proposal. 

117 Egyptian-Sudanese Dispute: Third Egyptian Communiqu 

A A ' February 21, 195$ (j) 

In deference to the ties which bind the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples, the 
Egyptian Government has decided to postpone the settlement of the question of 
boundaries between the two countries until after the Sudanese elections, but that 
negotiations for the solution of outstanding questions between the two countries 
should start after the designation of the new Sudanese Cabinet. 

In taking this decision, Egypt, who has closely collaborated with the Sudan for 
the sake of liberty and independence, only intends to forestall those with ulterior 
motives, who have exploited the opportunity (of the conflict) in order to mar the 
eternal ties between the two brotherly peoples. Egypt, moreover, will not respond to 
the provocations which have tried to make the situation appear as an armed interven- 
tion (in) or invasion of Sudanese territory, at a time when (Egypt) had nothing on 
the southern frontiers other than the familiar frontier patrols. 

The Egyptian Government once more declares that the Egyptian armed forces 
have not been created in order to invade the Sudan but to stand always in support 
of the Sudan against the common enemy. 

m Lebanese Complaint to the Security Council against 
the United Arab Republic 

May 22, 1958 (i) 

Complaint by Lebanon bringing to the attention of the Security Council a situation 
and a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security; the said situation and dispute arising from the inter- 
vention of the United Arab Republic in the affairs of Lebanon through the infiltration 
of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and pro- 
perty by such bands, the participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of 
terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of 
arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established 
authorities, the waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Re- 
public calling for strikes, demonstrations and the overthrow of the established au- 
thorities in Lebanon, and other provocative acts. 



(j) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in Al-Ahram, 
February 22, 195$. 

(2) The text above, courteously supplied by the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Beirut, was approved by the Lebanese Council of Ministers on May 22, 1958, when it 
met especially in order to discuss Lebanon's relations with the United Arab Republic. 
It then decided, inter alia, to request the Lebanese representative at the United Na- 
tions to lodge a complaint, with the above text, to the Security Council. ED. 



190 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

Arab League Draft Resolution Concerning Lebanon's Complaint 1 1 Q 

against the United Arab Republic * 1 ^ 

June 4, 1958 (i) 

The Council of the League of Arab States, at its extraordinary session held in 
the City of Benghazi, 

Having studied the complaint lodged by the Republic of Lebanon against the 
United Arab Republic, 

Having also heard the statement made by each of the two delegations that 
that of the Lebanese Republic and that of the United Arab Republic, 

Having, further, felt the desire of each of the two parties to settle the dispute by 
peaceful means, within the Arab League and in pursuance of the letter and spirit of 
the Pact of the League of Arab States, 

And being anxious to eliminate the causes and factors disturbing the cordial 
atmosphere among the sister Arab States, 

Has resolved as follows : 

First : All (activities) likely to disturb, in any way, the cordial atmosphere 
among States Members (of the League) should cease; 

Second: The Government of the Republic of Lebanon should withdraw 
its complaint from the Security Council ; 

Third : An appeal should be addressed to the various Lebanese factions for 
stopping disturbances and disorders and for working towards the settlement of (their) 
internal conflicts by constitutional peaceful means; 

Fourth : The dispatch of a commission to be appointed by the Council of the 
League of Arab States from amongst its own members, in order to appease sentiments 
and to implement the resolution of the Council. 

Lebanese Government's Response to the Arab League Draft 1 Of) 
Resolution Concerning Its Complaint against the United 

Arab Republic 

June 5, 195$ (2) 

1. The (Arab) League is evading the issuing of a resolution concerning interference 
and contents itself with substituting (for such a resolution) a resolution calling for 
reaching an understanding, although the Lebanese Government and its delegation 
insist on a resolution on the substance of the complaint. 

2. The (proposed) stoppage of broadcasts and propaganda serves no (useful) pur- 
pose, since the text of the paragraph relating to this subject contains nothing that 
makes such a stoppage obligatory. 

3. The commission which the Arab League intends to dispatch has no governmental 
executive character, and its studies, investigations and contacts will, accordingly, be a 
waste of time. 

(/) This draft resolution was submitted on June 4, 1958, by the Libyan delegation at the 
extraordinary session of the Council of the Arab League, held in Benghazi, Libya, 
for hearing the Lebanese complaint. Translated by the Editor from the original 
(Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat (Beirut), June 5, 1958. ED. 
(2) The text of this response is the Editor's translation of the original (Arabic) text as it 
appears in al-Hayat (Beirut), June 6, 795$. The above response is that of the 
Lebanese Council of Ministers. ED. 

191 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

191 U.N. Security Council Resolution Concerning Lebanon's Com- 
plaint against the United Arab Republic 

June n, 1955 (i) 

The Security Council, 

Having heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interfer- 
ence by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of 
the representative of the United Arab Republic, 

Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as 
to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other 
materiel across the Lebanon borders; 

Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end; 

Requests the observation group to keep the Security Council currently informed 
through the Secretary-General. 

1 9 9 President Camille Chamoun's Statement Explaining His Govern- 
L LL merit's Request for the Landing of the American Sixth Fleet in 
Lebanon 

July 15, 1958 (2) 

My Lebanese Brothers : 

Only a few months ago your beloved (3) country the eternal and beloved 
Lebanon was a land of beauty and felicity, prosperity, freedom and love. In it all 
citizens were equally enjoying its heavenly graces and reaping the fruits of their own 
work and noble efforts, keeping the gates of their (country), homes and hearts wide 
open to every honourable guest and to every dear Arab brother. 

Lebanon was admired by those who loved her, envied by those who hated her. 
Her enemies, the greedy and the malicious, those ungrateful to God and to the nation, 
those hired by money and arms; misguided, ignorant people conspired against the 
peace and security of Lebanon, against her liberty and happiness, and against her 
(very) being. They persisted in their aggression and (their) mutilation, in (their) 
destruction and killing, under the guise of a feeble pretext for which, as soon as it 
became invalid, they would fabricate a substitute. 

They had thought that Lebanon was built on sand and would soon collapse, but 
their expectations were frustrated and their thoughts belied. The Armed Forces 
the Army, the Gendarmerie and the noble fighters acquitted themselves magnifi- 
cently, in spite of the (Government's) policy of tolerance, mildness and patience; 
Lebanon was as solid as the rocks of her own mountains. 

Lebanon resorted to the League of Arab States, but as (the League) failed to 
adopt an equitable, explicit and effecive decision which would stop (Lebanon's) neigh- 
bours from interfering in her affairs and prevent them from misleading her sons, from 
directing and supporting them against her lawful authority through propaganda, 



(1) The text is copiedfrom Yearbook of the United Nations, 195$ ,/>. 49. The resolution 
was passed by 10 votes to none, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining. ED. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original Arabic text as it appears in al-Hayat, 
July 16, ipjtf. 

(j) The Arabic word used here is al-mufadda, literally meaning "that for which one is 
willing to die.' 9 ED. 

192 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

money, arms and men Lebanon was compelled to resort to the U.N. Security 
Council. Whereupon the Council sent its observers. 

But these observers, too, failed. (This was) because of their small number, their 
inadequate equipment, and (the fact that) they were not allowed by the rebels to reach 
the roads and areas of smuggling and infiltration, let alone the ease with which they 
were deceived and the inability of their authority properly and fully to achieve the 
aim of their being (here), as has been demonstrated in practice even by their own 
admission. It was, therefore, inevitable (that we should) resort to a more useful and 
effective measure. 

People of Lebanon: 

Continued aggression against Lebanon, by the feeding, with propaganda, money, 
arms and men, of the present revolution against her existence, makes it incumbent 
upon the lawful Lebanese authority to resort once more to the U.N. Security Council, 
asking for the implementation of the guarantees provided for in the United Nations 
Charter, particularly Article 51 of that Charter. 

The Charter of the United Nations was created in order to guarantee justice and 
equality among states, great and small, strong and weak, and to preserve their sover- 
reignty and prevent aggression against them. Lebanon has the right, in the face of 
the danger threatening her sovereignty and, indeed, her existence, to make use of the 
safeguards of this Charter. 

Lebanon has respected the rights of Arab brotherhood to the utmost limit pos- 
sible. She has been the object of false and fabricated accusations, of hostile and mali- 
cious campaigns. She patiently bore with (all of these), kept silent, and did not reta- 
liate against those who had contrived them, whether with uglier (accusations and 
campaigns) or with similar ones even though (she had) the right to do so. She made 
sacrifices for the sake of Arabdom, day after day, month after month, and year after 
year. (This she did) while her enemies, and those who coveted the undermining of 
her sovereignty and the destruction of her very existence, persisted in carrying out 
their ulterior designs, untiringly and undespairingly. 

That Lebanon should accept the imposition upon herself of the will of others, 
which (will) would deprive her of (her) freedom and sovereignty, and even of (her 
own) existence, is the great sacrifice which every Lebanese loyal to his country would 
reject. 

Lebanon will be faithful to her own existence and her own self, as well as loyal to 
her Arab brethren. She will never hold a brotherly people responsible for the acts of 
an ambitious ruler. She will forget offence, but will remember favours, for we shall 
all pass away: only our countries will survive. 

People of Lebanon: 

In these grave and awe-inspiring moments the fate of Lebanon the most 
beloved country will be decided. Your President and your Government have asked 
for the implementation of the safeguards of the United Nations Charter, in order that 
Lebanon the eternal and beloved Lebanon may be again what she has always 
been : the land of beauty and felicity, prosperity, freedom and love, in which all citi- 
zens will equally enjoy her heavenly graces and reap the fruits of their own work and 
noble efforts, keeping the gates of their (country), homes and hearts widely open to 
every honourable guest and to every dear Arab brother. 

Let those who are loyal (to Lebanon) be steadfast for the sake of Lebanon, and 
let those who have been misled and are tampering with (the affairs of Lebanon) for- 
sake their mischief for the sake of Lebanon, for we shall all pass away; only Lebanon 
will survive. Long live Lebanon. 



193 



194 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

President Eisenhower's Statement on the Landing of American 
Troops in Lebanon 

Washington, July 75, 1958 (i) 

ce Yesterday morning, I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent 
plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security 
and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and independence 
of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all of 
the members of the Lebanese Cabinet. 

"President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States 
response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without, were to 
be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yesterday in Baghdad 
whereby the lawful government was violently overthrown. In answer to this appeal 
from the Government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of 
United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to 
encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. 
These forces have not been sent as any act of war. They will demonstrate the concern 
of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem 
vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by eco- 
nomic assistance. We shall act in accordance with these legitimate concerns. 

"The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meet- 
ing of the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations Charter recognizes 
there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of 
the Charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security 
Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated 
as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. 

"The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take mea- 
sures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is 
apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occuring 
nearby more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in 
Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support in the United Nations measures 
which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will enable the United 
States forces promptly to be withdrawn. 

"Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has 
traditionally had the most friendly relations.There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Ameri- 
cans and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles 
of the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our 
concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend 
itself against indirect aggression." 

President Eisenhower's Message to Congress on Lebanon 

July 75, 1958 (2) 

On July 14, 1958, 1 received an urgent request from the President of the Repub- 
lic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon. President 
Chamoun stated that without an immediate showing of United States support, the 
Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. This request by President 

(7) Text courteously supplied by the American Embassy, Beirut. 

(2) The text is copied from Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 9 (1958), pp. 268-270. 

194 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

Chamoun was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanese Ca- 
binet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States Marines 
has now arrived in Lebanon. This initial dispatch of troops will be augmented as 
required. United States forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances permit. 

Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations Secur- 
ity Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the permanent representa- 
tive of the United States reported to the Council the action which this Government 
has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could soon take fur- 
ther effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon. We will continue 
to support the United Nations to this end. 

United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by 
their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's 
territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United 
States national interests and world peace. 

About two months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly 
along the border with Syria, which with Egypt forms the United Arab Republic. 
This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus 
and Soviet radios, which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language. The insur- 
rection was further supported by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money 
and by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities. The 
avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted Govern- 
ment of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate 
the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic. 

Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view 
of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security Coun- 
cil on June 1 1, 1958, decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose of insur- 
ing that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The Secretary 
General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the area to rein- 
force the work of the observers. 

It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United Na- 
tions observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personnel and military 
equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for hope that the 
situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with the continuing 
integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from without was being 
brought under control. 

The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14 when there was a vio- 
lent outbreak in Bagdad, in nearby Iraq. Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to 
the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office individuals 
comprising the lawful government of that country. We do not yet know in detail to 
what extent they have succeeded. We do have reliable information that important 
Iraqi leaders have been murdered. 

We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq 
demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat 
without further evidence of support from other friendly nations. 

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the develop- 
ments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council 
are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have 
considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard 
American citizens in Lebanon, of whom there are about 2,500. Pending the taking of 
adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant 



195 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right the right of all 
nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their indepen- 
dence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has 
taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence. 

It is clear that events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent indirect 
aggression from without and that such aggression endangers the independence and 
integrity of Lebanon. 

It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. 
I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risks 
involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international 
law upon which peace and a stable international order depend. 

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and 
peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States. 
Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American peo- 
ple, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I believe 
that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of Lebanon's 
grave peril. As we act at the request of a friendly Government to help it to preserve 
its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we 
are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of 
the United States depend. 

President J. 'Abd an-Nasir's Speech on Lebanon and Iraq 

July i6> 1958 (i) 

The occupation of the Lebanon by American forces constitutes a danger to peace 
in the Middle East, a grave violation of the United Nations Charter and a flagrant 
threat to the Arab countries that refused to bow down to imperialism and resolved to 
pursue an independent policy. 

It is obvious that the American government have taken the Lebanese revolt, 
which has been going on for seven weeks now, as a pretext for the occupation of the 
Lebanon, and to threaten the independent countries of the Middle East, and that 
America's embarkation on such a grave aggression on the plea of an alleged interven- 
tion attributed to the United Arab Republic, an allegation which was officially denied 
by the United Nations through the first report of the Observers' Group which had 
been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of investigating the situation 
in Lebanon, uncovers America's intentions towards the independent Arab countries, 
and its attempts to subjugate as well as dominate them. This is even a farce, which, if 
it ever indicates anything, definitely points to America's disregard for the United 
Nations Charter, even for the very existence of this organization and the value of its 
actions, as is clearly seen from her violation of its resolutions, and her obstruction of 
its march. 

As to the situation in Iraq, said President Abdel-Nasser, the Government of the 
United Arab Republic declares that any aggression on the Arab Republic of Iraq 
would be considered an aggression on the United Arab Republic at the same time, 
and that in such a case the United Arab Republic will carry out all its obligations 



(/) The text is copied from President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches & Press Inter- 
views during the Year 1958 (Directorate-General, Information Department) Cairo, 
1958), p. 155. 



I 9 6 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

towards the Arab Republic of Iraq, in accordance with the provisions of the Arab 
Collective Security Pact. 

Letter from President Camille Chamoun to President Eisenhower \ r )(\ 
Concerning the Landing of American Troops in Lebanon 

July 21, 1958 (i) 

I wish to express to you on my own personal behalf and on behalf of Lebanon, 
and through you to the Government and people of the United States, our profound 
gratitude for responding to my call for help, based on a decision by the legitimate 
Government of Lebanon, through the landing of United States forces in Lebanon 
to help us defend our independence and integrity in conformity with Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. 

I want to assure you, Mr. President, that we are both happy and honored to find 
ourselves side by side with the great American nation defending not only our indepen- 
dence and integrity against direct aggression, but the high principles in which the free 
world believes and by which it lives. 

CAMILLE CHAMOUN 



President Eisenhower's Reply to Letter of President Camille Cha- 
moun Concerning the Landing of American Troops in Lebanon 

July 25, 1958 (2) 

I wish to thank you for your message of July 21 in which you express personally 
and on behalf of Lebanon gratitude for the United States' affirmative response to 
Lebanon's call for assistance. The purpose of our action was to help your country 
preserve its independence, in accord with the inherent right of nations to co-operate 
for self-defense. Our countries have long enjoyed close and friendly relation and I 
look forward to further co-operation between the American people and the people 
of Lebanon in furthering the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter 

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 

U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Lebanon and Jordan 1 

August 21, 1958 (3) 1 ^ 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item "Question considered by the Security Council at its 
838th meeting on 7 August 1958", 

Noting the Charter aim that States should "practice tolerance and live together 
in peace with one another as good neighbors", 

Noting that the Arab States have agreed in the Pact of the League of Arab States 
to "strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and 
to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all 
the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and 



(j) The text is copied from Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 9 (i9$8\ p. 270. 

(2) The text is copied from Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 9 (1958} p. 270. 

(3) The text is copied from Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958, p. 50. 

197 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the realization of their aspirations and hopes", 
Desiring to relieve international tension, 

A. 

1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the pro- 
vision of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that "Each Member State 
shall respect the systems of government established in the other Member States and 
regard them as exclusive concerns of these States ", and that "Each shall pledge to 
abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government" ; 

2. Calls upon all Member States to act strictly in accordance with the principles 
of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggres- 
sion, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual 
benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these 
principles; 

B. 

Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Gov- 
ernments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind 
Section A of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in 
upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and 
Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the 
foreign troops from the two countries; 

C. 

Invites the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this 
context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view 
to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further 
economic growth in these countries; 

D. 

1. Requests Member States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution; 

2. Invites the Secretary-General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first 
such report to be made not later than 30 September 1958. 

1 9 Q Tunisian Memorandum to the Arab League 

October Ji, 1955 (j) 

The Tunisian Government considers necessary the existence of certain funda- 
mental conditions which are indispensable for the successful functioning of the 
League of Arab States, and for its fulfilment of the mission for which it was 
established. 

Among the most important of these conditions are frankness, good mutual re- 
spect, and non-interference by any Member of the League in the affairs of another 
(Member), in compliance with Chapter VIII of the Pact of the League of Arab States. 

On (the basis of) these fundamental principles the Tunisian Government decided 
to join the League of Arab States. It considers the lack of (application of these princi- 
ples) in the past as the basic reason for the obstruction, over many years, of the progress 
of the League. This is because this absence (of the principles mentioned) has resulted 
in the creation of an atmosphere, among the Members of the League, devoid of confi- 
dence and good faith. 

No enterprise or organization can ever be a flourishing and well-founded concern 
if those who are undertaking this enterprise or running this organization keep quarrel- 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Jarida 
(Beirut), October i8> 1958. 

I 9 8 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

ing, or if any of them acts in a manner that offends the dignity or safety of his col- 
leagues. 

The Government of the Tunisian Republic takes pleasure in asserting once 
more, at this sitting, its loyalty to the principles of the League of Arab States, and its 
genuine wish to strengthen it, support it, work within it, and protect it from anything 
that may undermine its dignity or hinder its progress. 

In conformity with this spirit, the Government of the Tunisian Republic consi- 
ders itself in duty bound to unmask, regretfully and perforce, the causes making the 
carrying out of its responsibilities, inside the League, impossible. 

The relations between the Tunisian Government and the Government of Egypt 
later the Government of the United Arab Republic have so deteriorated that 
co-operation between these two Governments has become impossible. For Tunisia 
has completely lost her trust in the United Arab Republic, and has come to detect 
dubious possibilities in (the latter 's) attitudes. The Tunisian Government cannot 
possibly co-operate, within a regional organization such as the League of Arab States, 
with a State in which it has no confidence, a State, indeed, which has openly provoked 
and interfered in its affairs. 

What other result could there be, save wasting time and losing opportunities, 
if relations based on lack of good faith are established ? 

This conflict goes back in origin to two essential reasons : 

First : Interference by the Egyptian Republic and later the United Arab 
Republic in purely Tunisian affairs. 

Second: Adoption by the Egyptian Republic and later the United Arab 
Republic of a group that conspires against the republican system in Tunisia, and 
intrigues against those who are in charge of it. 

In both cases the Government in Cairo used the same agents, led by a criminal 
by the name of SalehbinYusuf(/)whowas (once) about to destroy Tunisia's indepen- 
dence in its infancy, and who incited an internal mutiny, to which hundreds of citi- 
zens fell victim. For this, the Supreme People's Court in Tunisia sentenced him to 
death. His (evil) mind, therefore, led him (to turn) to defy the symbol of Tunisia's 
sovereignty, by engineering plots for the assassination of His Excellency the President 
of the Tunisian Republic. 

But the Government in Cairo, notwithstanding the opposition of the Tunisian 
Government, and in spite of the recognized diplomatic traditions and customs in force 
in States that are collaborating with, and linked to each other, has considered it fit 
to adopt him, give him freedom of action, and apply to him the law of political asy- 
lum. (In doing this), it disregarded the proposals continuously put forward to it by 
the Tunisian Government, and the persistent and repeated representations made by 
it, in the hope that this conflict would be settled and the harm prevented (from being 
inflicted upon) Tunisia, by mutual agreement. 

The Tunisian Government has not attempted to settle (officially) its dispute with 
the Government in Cairo this year except after having found it impossible to find 
any (more) devices, and after having exhausted all peaceful means (which devices 
and means) have always been met by the United Arab Republic with indifference, 
postponement and delay. 

The Government in Cairo has been seeking to excuse itself by (the fact) that the 



(i) While this manuscript was in the press, Saleh bin Yusuf was reported assassinated in 
August^ 1961 while he was in Germany undergoing medical treatment. ED. 



199 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

man concerned (i) is a political refugee, who has the right of receiving due care 
and protection (from Egypt), that (the Egyptian) Constitution does not permit it to 
expel him from its territory, and that it has prohibited him from (carrying on) any 
political activity, in accordance with the provisions of laws in that respect. 

The Tunisian Government considers these explanations to be useless pretexts, 
being certain that the Government in Cairo is well aware of their invalidity. This is 
because : 

1 . The Government in Cairo has not treated the so-called Saleh bin Yusuf only 
as a political refugee, nor has it protected him as a person (seeking) asylum and sever- 
ing his connections with politics. Rather, it has treated him as one opposing the policy 
of the Tunisian Government, and has maintained him as a tool by which it may, one 
day, be able to impose its policy and aims on the Tunisian Republic. 

2. The so called Saleh bin Yusuf has not observed the limits of political asylum 
nor has he (confined himself to) those of political opposition; his despair, rather, drove 
him to incite a mutiny inside Tunisia, in 1955-1956, aiming at satisfying his lust for 
power and furthering his personal ambitions. 

3. The Government in Cairo is well aware, according to the documents in its 
possession, and of which we are submitting a whole file to the League's Secretariat, 
that Saleh bin Yusuf overstepped the rights of political asylum, by having engineered 
six plots in Libya and Cairo, during the years 1956, 1957, 1958, for the purpose of 
assassinating His Excellency the President of the Tunisian Republic and overthrow- 
ing the republican regime in Tunisia. 

4. The Government in Cairo is well aware who the responsible Egyptian sour- 
ces are ; and that these have been constantly, up to this moment, encouraging Saleh 
bin Yusuf to undertake his criminal endeavours and (to lead) his malicious opposition 
to the Tunisian Government, whether by money allocated monthly to him by the 
Egyptian Intelligence Service, or by arms, which have been found in the possession 
of Saleh's agents, or by money secretly sent from Cairo to a group in Tunisia. 

5. The Government in Cairo is aware that it has (in fact) itself been encourag- 
ing'Saleh bin Yusuf to oppose the Tunisian Government, by having retained the Tu- 
nisian section in the Arab Maghrib Office (2) until the end of March 1958, notwith- 
standing the fact that Tunisia has an Embassy in Cairo, open since July 1956. 

6. The Government in Cairo well knows how some responsible Egyptian (sour- 
ces) have tolerated (the activities) of Saleh bin Yusuf. For his Tunisian agents were 
being granted Egyptian travel documents, in spite of their Tunisian nationality, and 
the Tunisian Embassy was not informed about this. It was (in fact) these agents who 
were charged to assassinate the President of the Tunisian Republic. 

7. The Government in Cairo also knows, following its (own) investigations and 
by its (own) admission, how the plots, which Saleh bin Yusuf had been engineering and 
of which Tunisia has been complaining to Cairo, were not imaginary or fanciful, but 
were real facts, of the responsibility for which certain Egyptian official sources can- 
not be easily acquitted. 

8. The Government in Cairo also knows how certain senior responsible Egyp- 
tians openly supported Saleh bin Yusuf in his opposition to the Tunisian State, and 



(j) That is, Saleh bin Yusuf. ED . 

(2) This is the Off ice established in Cairo after the end of the Second World War by a 
number of Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan nationalists for the purpose of combat- 
ing the French and Spanish regimes in Arab North Africa. ED. 



200 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

how the controlled Egyptian Press put its columns at his disposal, and the Broadcast- 
ing Station its microphones. 

However, in spite of all the above, Tunisia wishes to repay the United Arab Re- 
public in kind. Indeed, His Excellency President al-Habib Burqiba interrupted his 
holidays in August 1956, shortly before the tripartite aggression against the (Suez) 
Canal, in order to threaten the French Prime Minister that Tunisia would standby 
Egypt should any aggressor commit an aggression against her. 

Tunisia (also) took her well-known stand beside Egypt during the (Suez) Canal 
crisis, and did not hesitate later on, when she was asked to intervene, to mediate in 
order to prevent the passage of the Israeli ship which Israel had decided to force 
through the Canal, in defiance of Egypt. There is no question but that our interven- 
tion had its effect, for the ship did not pass through the Canal. 

The Tunisian Government also refused to accept (some) Egyptian political refu- 
gees, who had risen in revolt against the Egyptian republican regime, and who wanted 
to make of Tunisia their abode and their home. (This the Tunisian Government did) 
although these were neither criminals nor conspirators. 

The Tunisian Government (moreover) informed the Government in Cairo of a 
plot which the Tunisian Police had uncovered and which was aimed at the assassina- 
tion of the President of the United Arab Republic during one of his itineraries abroad. 

(There are) also other numerous stands (of this nature which have been taken by 
the Tunisian Government)* 

The Tunisian Government has further, for a long time, tried to settled the con- 
flict by reaching an understanding directly with the Government in Cairo. Thus, His 
Excellency President al-Habib Burqiba sent Dr. as-Sadiq al-Muqaddam as a friendly 
envoy to the Arab countries in April 1956, only a week after the proclamation of 
Tunisia's independence. He met the President of the Egyptian Republic and talked 
to him about the matter. He also contacted the responsible Egyptian (sources), and 
broached the question with them. 

In June 1956, His Excellency the President (of Tunisia) also dispatched Mr. 
al-Bahi al-Adgham, the Secretary of State for Presidential Affairs and Defence, on 
the occasion of the celebrations of the Evacuation Day in Egypt. (There) he reached 
an understanding with President 'Abd an-Nasir over the same subject which he ex- 
pounded at length. 

Then came (the appointment of) Dr. as-Sadiq al-Muqaddam as Ambassador 
(in Cairo) for a whole year, during which several visits were paid (to Cairo) by Tuni- 
sian responsible officials, such as the late 'Ali al-Balhawan. Throughout this year 
many attempts were made to settle the problem, whether with His Excellency the 
President, with those in power or with those politicians (outside the Government). 

Then came (the appointment of) Mr. at-Tayyib as-Sahbany as Ambassador for 
a year also, during which the same attempts were again made. During it, a special 
visit was paid by Dr. as-Sadiq al-Muqaddam, the Secretary of State for Foreign Af- 
fairs, and talks were held on the same subject with the President, with members of the 
Government, and with leaders of public opinion. 

None of this, however, bore any fruit. In fact, the Government in Cairo kept 
making promises, one after another, and inventing one excuse after another, although 
the matter was extremely clear; it was neither complicated nor equivocal. 

The Government of the Tunisian Republic finds no way of understanding the 
secret behind these postponements, other than what has been explained at the outset 
of this Memorandum. 

Tunisia considers this dilatoriness, intransigence, slander and indifference as 



2OI 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

causes for suspicion and mistrust. And she considers these as an encroachment on her 
dignity and sovereignty. Nor can she find any justification for the adoption by the 
Government in Cairo of a man who has been discovered to be an agent, a criminal and 
an engineer of six plots for the assassination of the President of a sister State; the 
truth about (these plots) has been established in accordance with the file presented to 
the (Arab) League, and the real truth about them has not been questioned by anyone. 

In view of the above, the Tunisian Government concludes, after a long period of 
waiting and patience, that the attitude of the Government of the United Arab Repub- 
lic has become one of open hostility, incompatible with diplomatic traditions and 
with what (/) should prevail among sister-States comprised in the same organization; 
for (this hostility) is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Pact of 
the League of Arab States. 

(It) hopes that the League of Arab States may find to this problem a solution 
that will allow Tunisia to occupy her seat among the League Members and enable 
her to play her part, as soon as possible, and to work in collaboration (with the other 
Members) within the League of Arab States. 

| 1 A Reply by Mr. 9 Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, Head of the U.A.R. Delegation 

1 J V October u, 195* (2) 
Mr. Chairman, 

A few days ago the United Arab Republic welcomed, in this hall, most truly and 
sincerely, Tunisia's admission to the League of Arab States. 

She gave that welcome while expressing the hope, entertained by the Arabs 
everywhere, that the admission of Tunisia to the Arab League was a step forward 
towards strengthening the Arabs, bringing them together, and consolidating their 
Arab League. 

We gave that welcome and expressed that hope while (at the same time) refuting, 
indeed, denouncing what foreign news agencies had announced a few days earlier and 
then reiterated, namely, that (certain) designs were being engineered within the Arab 
League against the United Arab Republic. 

We gave the welcome while (at the same time) we refuted and denounced (the 
reports) which news agencies had been echoing, for we considered these as (merely) 
cheap intrigue contrived between two sister (States). But, hearing today what we have 
heard from the head of the delegation of the Tunisian Republic at the very first 
meeting at which sister Tunisia is represented - we felt that the walls of this hall 
echoed much of what we had heard. We have heard (today) something corroborating 
the allegation echoed by news agencies, (allegations) which have no just foundations. 
Mr. Chairman, 

The head of the Tunisian delegation has spoken about frankness. We (for our 
part) frankly and clearly say that we reject everything said this morning within the 
confines of this hall against the United Arab Republic. This is the frankness to 

(1) In the Arabic text, appearing in al-Jarida, October 18, 19583 the words "and with 
what..", above, till the end of the paragraph, have been erroneously printed at the 
end of the last paragraph in this document (ending with "League of Arab States") 
but have now been put back in their proper place, as is obviously necessitated by the 
context. ED. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Ahram, 
October 12, 1958. 



202 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

which we are accustomed. We reject (what has been said), and feel it is not a good 
omen for the future. 

What we heard today leads one to believe that the Arab League is about to 
become an instrument for destruction and not construction, disunity and not unity. 

And in order not to make the head of the Tunisian delegation - the delegation of 
the sister Tunisian Republic - feel any tendency or desire (on our part) to dominate 
(the League) and to impose our point of view, the delegation of the United Arab 
Republic can only withdraw from this meeting. 

Arab League Resolution on the Relations between Tunisia i ^ i 

and the United Arab Republic 1 *) 1 

Resol. 1498- Sess. 30- Sched. 3- October /j, 1958(1) 

The Council of the League of Arab States held its second public meeting during 
its thirtieth ordinary session, and heard the statements of the delegations of Member- 
States concerning the situation arising from the statement made by the head of the 
delegation of the Tunisian Republic at the previous meeting especially held to welcome 
, it, on October n, 1958. These were the delegations of the Hashimite Kingdom of 
the Jordan, the Republic of the Sudan, the Iraqi Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, the Lebanese Republic, the United Kingdom of Libya, the Mutawakkilite 
Kingdom of Yaman, and the Kingdom of Morocco. 

The meeting was then held in camera, and during it the Council continued the 
discussion of the subject. It also took cognizance of the Note (addressed) by the head 
of the delegation of Tunisia to the Secretary-General, embodying his protest against 
his having been prevented from continuing the reading of his second statement at the 
previous meeting. 

It unanimously resolves upon the following: 

First. The Council approves the action of the President (of the Council) in 
preventing the head of the delegation of the Tunisian Republic from continuing the 
reading of his second statement, and it expresses (its) gratitude to the President of 
the Council for this judicious stand which prevented the widening of the rift. 

Second. The Council condemns and rejects everything contained in the speech of 
the head of the delegation of the Tunisian Republic, which may be offensive to the 
League of Arab States or derogatory to any one of its Member-States. It considers 
the second statement which the head of the delegation of Tunisia began to read as if 
it had never existed. It also excludes from the documents of the Council those 
(documents) distributed among members at the request of the head of the Tunisian 
delegation, being statements made by him at the Press Conference which he held in 
the evening of October n, 1958. 

Third. (The Council) requests that (its) President and the Secretary-General 
get in touch with the head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic in order to 
communicate this resolution to him, together with everything that took place at this 
meeting, and in order to invite (him) to resume his participation in the meetings and 
(partake) in the activities of the Council. 



(/) This resolution was passed by the Council of the Arab League. For source, see footnote 
(/), p. 145. ED. 



203 



The Arab States and the Arab League 



Arab League Invitation to Tunisian Delegation to Resume 
Participation in League Sessions 

Resol. 1499- Sess. 30- Sched. 5- October 15, 795$ (i) 

The Council of the League of Arab States resolves to inform the Government of 
the Tunisian Republic of the view of the Council concerning what took place at its 
meeting held on October 11, 1958, as well as to invite it to (allow) its delegation to 
resume participation in the work of the present session of the Council. 



J 33 

l ^^ 



Arab League Political Committee Resolution on the Situation 
in Iraq 

April 7,1959(2) 

The Political Committee of the League of Arab States met in Beirut from April 2, 
1959, to April 7, 1959, in implementation of the unanimous resolution adopted by the 
Council of the League of Arab States (Resol. 1552- Sess. 4), dated March 31, 1959 
enclosed. 

The Committee, regretting the failure of the Government of Iraq to attend this 
important meeting in (these) grave circumstances in the life of the Arabs, has decided 
to go ahead with its deliberations in order to deal with the situation referred to above. 

In view of the sincere desire to eliminate everything calculated to mar the 
tranquil relations among the sister Arab States, with a view to consolidating solidari- 
ty among them for the sake of realizing the higher Arab interests. 

And having heard the statements made by the delegations of the States repre- 
sented at the meeting, has decided upon the following. 

First. The necessity for (all) the Arab States to adhere to the policy of non- 
alignment and non-subservience which is the policy which safeguards the indepen- 
dence and sovereignty of the Arab States, thereby warding off various external in- 
fluences and currents. 

Second. The Committee expresses its eagerness to strengthen the national 
bonds which bind the Arabs together and which enjoin solidarity and the unity of 
Arab ranks in harmony with the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab States. 

Third. The Committee condemns any external influence, from whichever 
direction it comes, which aims at the division of the Arabs and the by-passing of their 
right to self- determination, which leads to impairing their beliefs, their national causes 
and their ideals, or which brings about the deterioration of the relations between the 
Arab States. 

Fourth. The Committee appeals to the Iraqi Government to act in harmony 
with the Arab States by adhering to the decisions adopted at this meeting in defer- 
ence to co-operation and solidarity among all the Arabs and for the sake of their 
higher interests. 



(/) For source, see footnote (i), p. 145. ED. 

(2) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat 

(Beirut), April 8> 1959. 



204 



International Affairs: Inter- Arab States Disputes 

Fifth. The Political Committee finally entrusts to a subsidiary committee the 
task of co-operating with the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States for 
studying all the means that would ensure the realization of the above-mentioned 
objectives, and for submitting proposals to the Political Committee which will exa- 
mine them when (they are) presented (to it). 

The Political Committee, while waiting (to receive) these proposals^ considers 
its meetings as not concluded. 



205 



VI 

Other Inter- Arab Treaties, 
Agreements and Relationships 



207 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Mecca (Protectorate) Agreement: 'Asir and Hijaz, Najd and Its 

Dependencies 

October 21, 1926 (i) 

Praise be to God alone! 

Between the King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies; and the 
Imam Sayed al-Hassan ibn AH al-Idrisi. Desiring a complete understanding and with 
a view to the preservation of the existence of the Arab countries, and to the strength- 
ening of ties between the Princes of the Arab peninsula, the following agreement 
has been reached between His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its 
dependencies, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdul-Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud and His Lordship 
the Imam of Asir, the Sayyid al-Hassan ibn Ali al-Idrisi :- 

Art. i. His Lordship the Imam Sayyid al-Hassan ibn Ali al-Idrisi acknow- 
ledges the ancient marches described in the treaty of the loth Safar, 1339, made 
between the Sultan of Nejd and the Imam Sayyid Mohammad ibn Ali-Idrisi, and 
which were at that date subject to the House of Idrisi, as being in virtue of this agree- 
ment under the suzerainty of His Majesty the King of Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its 
dependencies. 

2. The Imam of Asir may not enter into political negotiations with any Govern- 
ment or grant any economic concession to any person except with the sanction of His 
Majesty the King of Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies. 

3. The Imam of Asir may not declare war or make peace except with the sanction 
of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies. 

4. The Imam of Asir may not cede any part of the territories of Asir described in 
article i. 

5. The King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies, recognises the 
rulership of the present Imam of Asir, during his lifetime, of the territories defined in 
in article i, and thereafter (extends the same recognition) to whomsoever the House 
of Idrisi and the competent authorities of the Imamate may agree upon. 

6. The King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies, agrees that the 
internal administration of Asir, the supervision of its tribal affairs, appointments and 
dismissals, for example, pertain to the rights of the Imam of Asir, provided such ad- 
ministration is in harmony with Sharia law and justice according to the practice of 
hoth governments. 

7. The King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies, undertakes to 
pel all internal and external aggression which may befall the territories of Asir as 

defined in article i and this by agreement between the two contracting parties accord- 
ing to the circumstances and exigencies of interest. 

8. Both parties agree to adhere to this agreement and to carry out its obligations. 

9. This agreement will be effective after confirmation by the two high contract- 
ing parties. 

10. This agreement has been drawn up in Arabic in two copies, of which one will 
be preserved by each of the two contracting parties. 

11. This agreement will be known as "the Mecca Agreement." 



(i (/) The text is found in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 155 pp. 379- 3$o / 
also in J.C. Hurewitz* Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. //, pp. 148- 
149. ED. 



209 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Nile Waters Agreement between Britain and Egypt 

May 7, 1929 (i) 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AHD BRITISH GOVERN- 
MENTS IN REGARD OF THE USE OF THE WATERS OF THE RIVER 
NILE FOR IRRIGATION PURPOSES. 

Cairo, May 7, 1929 

The elaborate report of the 1925 Nile Commission referred to in the Notes, is not 
here reproduced. It was published by the Government Press Cairo> in 1948, and by the 
Stationery Office of the British Government in 1929 (Cmd. 334$). 

The 1948 publication also contains , under the title of "Nile Waters Agreement' 9 a 
statement of Working Arrangements for Controlling Irrigation in the Sudan for the year 
1929, signed on March 20, 1929, by the Egyptian Minister of Public Works and the 
Irrigation Adviser of the Sudan Government. 



No. i. 
MOHAMED MAHMOUD PASHA TO LORD LLOYD 



Prlsidence du Conseil des Ministres, 

Cairo, May 7, 1929. 
Excellency, 

In confirmation of our recent conversations, I have the honour to communicate 
to your Excellency the views of the Egyptian Government in regard to those irrigation 
questions which have been the subject of our discussions. 

The Egyptian Government agree that a settlement of these questions cannot be 
deferred until such time as it may be possible for the two Governments to come to an 
agreement on the status of the Sudan, but in concluding the present arrangements, 
expressly reserve their full liberty on the occasion of any negotiations which may pre- 
cede such an agreement. 

2. It is realised that the development of the Sudan requires a quantity of the Nile 
water greater than which has been so far utilised by the Sudan. As your Excellency is 
aware, the Egyptian Government has always been anxious to encourage such develop- 
ment, and will therefore continue that policy, and be willing to agree with His Majes- 
ty's Government upon such an increase of this quantity as does not infringe Egypt's 
natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricul- 
tural extension, subject to satisfactory assurances as to the safeguarding of Egyptian 
interests as detailed in later paragraphs of this note. 

3. The Egyptian Government therefore accept the findings of the 1925 Nile Com- 
mission, whose report is annexed hereto, and is considered an integral part of the 
present agreement. They propose, however, that, in view of tnc delay in the construc- 
tion of the Gebel Aulia Dam, which, under paragraph 40 of the Nile Commission's 
Report, is regarded as a counterpart of the Gezira scheme, the dates and quantities of 
gradual withdrawals of water from the Nile by the Sudan in flood months as given in 
article 57 of the Commission's Report be modified in such a manner that the Sudan 



(/) The text is copied from Documents on the Sudan, 1899-1953 (Egyptian Society of 
International Law), brochure No. 14 (March, 1953)- PP- 5-9- 

210 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

should not withdraw more than 126 cubic metres per second before 1936, it being 
understood that the schedule contained in the above-mentioned article will remain 
unaltered until the discharge of 126 cubic metres per second is reached. These quan- 
tities are based on the Nile Commission's Report, and are therefore subject to revi- 
sion as foreseen therein. 

4. It is further understood that the following arrangements will be observed in 
respect of irrigation works on the Nile: 

i) The Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation service in the Sudan, his 
staff, or any other officials whom the Minister of Public Work may nominate, shall 
have the full liberty to co-operate with the Resident Engineer of the Sennar Dam in 
the measurement of discharges and records to satisfy the Egyptian Government that 
the distribution of water and the regulation of the dam are carried out in accordance 
with the agreement reached. Detailed working arrangements agreed upon between 
the Minister of Public Works and the Irrigation Adviser to the Sudan Government 
will take effect as from the date of the confirmation of this note. 

ii) Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irriga- 
tion or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile and 
its branches or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in the Sudan or 
in countries under British administration, which would, in such a manner as to entail 
any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the quantity of water arriving in 
Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower its level. 

iii) The Egyptian Government, in carrying out all the necessary measures re- 
quired for the complete study and record of the hydrology of the River Nile in the 
Sudan, will have all the necessary facilities for so doing. 

iv) In case the Egyptian Government decide to construct in the Sudan any works 
on the river and its branches, or to take any measures with a view to increasing the 
water supply for the benefit of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local au- 
thorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding local interests. The construc- 
tion, maintenance and administration of the above-mentioned works shall be under 
the direct control of the Egyptian Government. 

v) His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland shall use their good offices so that the carrying out of 
surveys, measurements, studies and works of the nature mentioned in the two preced- 
ing paragraphs is facilitated by the Governments of those regions under British 
influence. 

vi) It is recognised that in the course of the operations here contemplated uncer- 
tainty may still arise from time to time either as to the correct interpretation of a ques- 
tion of principle or as to technical or administrative details. Every question of this 
kind will be approached in a spirit of mutual good faith. 

In case of any difference of opinion arising as to the interpretation of execution of 
any of the preceding provisions, or as to any contravention thereof, which the two 
Governments find themselves unable to settle, the matter shall be referred to an in- 
dependent body with a view to arbitration. 

5. The present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting the control 
of the river, which is reserved for free discussion between the two Governments in 
the negotiations on the question of the Sudan. 

I avail, etc. 

M. MAHMOUD,President 
Council of Ministers 



211 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

No. 2. 
LORD LLOYD TO MOHAMED MAHMOUD PASHA 

The Residency, Cairo, 

May, 7, 1929. 
Sir, 

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the note which your Excellency has 
been good enough to address to me to-day. 

2. In confirming the arrangements mutually agreed upon as recited in your Excel 
lency's note, I am to express the gratification of His Britannic Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that these discussions 
have led to a settlement which cannot fail to facilitate development and to promote 
prosperity in Egypt and the Sudan. 

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concur in your Excel- 
lency's view that this agreement is, and should be, essentially directed towards the 
regulation of irrigation arrangements on the basis of the Nile Commission Report, and 
has no bearing on the status quo in the Sudan. 

4. In conclusion, I would remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment in the United Kingdom have already acknowledged the natural and historical 
rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile. I am to state that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment in the United Kingdom regard the safe guarding of those rights as a fundament- 
al principle of British policy, and to convey to your Excellency the most positive as- 
surances that this principle and the detailed provisions of this agreement will be ob- 
served at all times and under any conditions that may arise. 

I avail, etc, 
LLOYD, High Commissioner 

\^\f\ Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage between Transjordan and 
1 J ^Saudi Arabia together with Protocol on Arbitration and Schedule 
"Appended to the Treaty 

Jerusalem, July 27, 1933(1) 

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. 

His Highness the Amir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, Amir of Trans- Jordan of the one 

part, 

and 

His Majesty King Abdul- Aziz Ibn Abdur-Rahman Al Feisal Al Saud, King of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of the other part, being desirous of consolidating their 
mutual relations by the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage, have 
appointed as their plenipotentiaries for this purpose: 

His Highness the Amir of Trans- Jordan, 

His Excellency Taufiq Bey Abdul Huda, Acting Chief Minister of the Amara of 
Trans- Jordan; 

His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 



(/) H.M.S.O. (London), Cmd. 4691(1934). Ratifications exchanged at Cairo, December 
21, 1933. ED. 



212 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

His Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
Government of His Majesty; 

who, having communicated to each other their powers, found in good and due order, 
have agreed as follows : 

Article i. Permanent peace and firm and inviolable friendship shall prevail between 
the Amara of Trans-Jordan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

The two High Contracting Parties undertake to use their utmost endeavours to 
preserve these relations and to settle in a spirit of peace and friendship all disputes and 
differences which may arise between them. 

Article 2. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to preserve good 
relations with the other Party and to endeavour by every means in his power to pre- 
vent the use of his territory as a base for unlawful acts or preparations therefor, in- 
cluding raiding, which may be directed against the peace and tranquility of the ter- 
ritory of the other Party. 

If it should appear to either of the two High Contracting Parties that the steps 
which he has taken may be insufficient to prevent the persons engaged in the unlawful 
activities mentioned in the first paragraph from giving effect to them in the territory 
of the other Party, he shall notify the other Party of them and of the measures which 
he has taken to put a stop to their being carried on. 

Article 3. The two High Contracting Parties shall appoint special officials in the zones 
in the neighbourhood of the frontier who shall be responsible for the organization 
of general co-operation and for carrying out the measures necessary to ensure the ap- 
plication of the provisions of this Treaty and the two Governments shall notify each 
other of the names of the persons appointed for this purpose. 

These officials or such persons as may be acting on their behalf shall have the 
right to communicate with each other for the purpose of co-operation and with a view 
to the settlement of questions arising from time to time on the frontier or between the 
tribes. They shall exchange information immediately regarding any incidents occur- 
ring on the side of either which may affect the maintenance of security on the other 
side. 

Article 4. Whenever the competent authorities specified in Article 3 learn of prepar- 
ations being made in their territory by an armed person or by armed persons with the 
object of committing acts of robbery or plunder or raiding or any other unlawful act 
of such a nature as to disturb the peace on the frontier between the two countries,each 
competent authority shall be obliged to warn the other thereof. 

If it should appear that the warning sent to the competent authority will not arrive 
in time to admit of warning being given to those liable to be injured by the aggres- 
sion, warning must be given in addition to the nearest official and, in case of its being 
impossible to reach him, to the tribes threatened. 

In circumstances of urgent necessity warning may be given by any official acting 
on behalf of the competent authority of the Party in whose territory the preparations 
are taking place. 

Article 5. If the competent authority of either of the two High Contracting Parties, 
or any person acting on behalf of such authority, should learn of the commission in his 
territory of any act of robbery or plunder or raiding or any other unlawful act of such 
a nature as to disturb the peace on the frontier between the two countries, he shall have 
the right to notify the competent authority of the other Party and in circumstances 
of urgent necessity he shall inform the nearest official of such other Party. The person 
so notified shall thereupon take the necessary steps with a view to the immediate rest- 
oration in their entirety of all stolen and plundered objects out of what is seized in the 

213 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

possession of the aggressors, in the event of their entering the territory in which he is 
employed. 

If the aggressors be Beduin subjects of the country which they have entered the 
necessary measures shall be taken to put them on trial in that country. If they be 
Beduin subjects of a third party, they shall be called upon to leave the country which 
they have entered under threat of being put on trial if they do not leave it. If they be 
Beduin subjects of the other Party, in whose territory the raiding has taken place then, 
after the restoration of the plunder found in their possession, as stated in the first 
paragraph, their arms shall be confiscated and handed over to their Government and a 
quantity of their property sufficient to make good the losses and damage which they 
have caused as a result of their raiding shall likewise be confiscated and handed over 
to their Government. They shall then be warned that they must return fo their coun- 
try of origin and, if they do not do so, they shall be prevented from remaining on the 
frontier and shall be put on trial for the crimes which they have committed. If it be 
assured that they will maintain peace and tranquillity subsequently they shall be al- 
lowed to remain remote from the frontier; otherwise they shall be expelled from the 
country in which they have taken refuge. 

Article 6. In order to give effect to the provisions of this Treaty and with a view to 
the maintenance of good relations generally on the frontier between the two countries, 
the officials appointed in pursuance of Article 3 of this Treaty shall meet at least once 
every six months, and at more frequent intervals in case of neccessity to settle quest- 
ions relating to the frontier zones and to the tribes settled therein. 
Article j. The special officials appointed in pursuance of Article 3 shall, when con- 
sidering matters within their competence in accordance with the usage and custom 
prevailing in the frontier zone, observe the general rules set forth in the schedule to 
this Treaty and shall apply the said rules as far as possible for a period of one year 
from the entry into force of this Treaty. After the expiration of this period, it shall be 
permissible for the said officials to submit at any time to the High Contracting Parties 
any suggestions for the amendment of these rules. The High Contracting Parties shall, 
on receipt of such suggestions, exchange views as to whether the matter requires 
amendment. The rules shall remain in force until the two Parties agree upon the 
discontinuance of their application or upon their being amended. 
Article 8. All decisions taken in mutual agreement between the officials appointed in 
accordance with Article 3, in regard to questions arising on the frontier or between 
the tribes, shall be recorded in writing and signed by both officials at the time of 
the agreement and shall forthwith become operative and executory. 

Matters on which the officials are unable to agree shall be referred to the Govern- 
ments of the High Contracting Parties with a view to settlement by agreement be- 
tween them. Effect shall be given by the competent authorities of the two High Con- 
tracting Parties to all decisions taken as a result of such agreement within three months 
from the date on which the final decision is taken. 

The operation of Article 6 of the Hadda Agreement shall be annulled during the 
period of validity of this Treaty. 

Article 9. The tribes of the two Parties which habitually frequent both sides of the 
frontier for purposes of grazing or "musabala" shall be free to move about from place 
to place in the two countries, unless either of the two Governments should find it 
necessary to restrict this freedom of movement in the interests of public order or for 
reasons of economic necessity. 

Nothing in this Article shall affect the maintenance of the established rights de- 
fined in Article 4 of the Hadda Agreement. Similarly, nothing in this Article shall 



214 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

disturb the enjoyment of the rights specified in Article 13 of the Hadda Agreement in 
any respect whatsoever or for any reason whatsoever. 

Article 10. It shall not be lawful for either of the High Contracting Parties to compel 
subjects of the other Party to enlist in any of his armed forces, whether regular or ir- 
regular. 

It shall not be lawful for either of the High Contracting Parties to permit the 
subjects of the other Party to be employed in his armed forces as from the date of the 
entry into force of this Treaty unless they have previously acquired the nationality of 
the Party under whom they wish to serve and have notified their readiness to renounce 
their original nationality if this be prescribed in the Nationality Regulations of their 
country of origin, it being understood that their Government of origin shall be free, 
when they enter their territory, to take any measures against them which may be laid 
down in their laws. 

The names of persons naturalized and enlisted after the entry into force of this 
Treaty shall be notified through the diplomatic channel to the Government of their 
country of origin. 

Article 1 1. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent any of his 
officials from crossing the frontier between the two countries without the permission 
of the other Party for any reason whatsoever and by any means whatsoever, with the 
exception of crossing by frontier officials and messengers with a view to maintaining 
the co-operation defined in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Treaty. 
Article 12. Subject to the observance of the provisions contained in the Hadda Agree- 
ment regarding the movement of tribes, pilgrims and merchants, the two High Con- 
tracting Parties mutually undertake to refrain from authorizing foreigners resident in 
their countries or setting out therefrom, or subjects of the two High Contracting Part- 
ies, to cross the frontier of the country of the other Party for the purpose of travel, 
exploration, hunting or any other purpose, without having obtained previous permis- 
sion from the competent authority of the Party concerned, and to discourage their 
intention of doing so. They shall not be responsible for the safety of such persons if 
their entry was effected without previous permission. 

Article 13. All differences which may arise between the two High Contracting 
Parties regarding the interpretation or execution of the provisions of this Treaty or 
other provisions contained in the agreements determining the relations between the 
two Parties shall be settled in agreement between them by reference to arbitration, 
which shall be conducted in accordance with the Protocol appended to this Treaty. 
Article 14 This Treaty has been drawn up in duplicate in the Arabic language. The 
two High Contracting Parties shall ratify it and shall exchange instruments of ratifi- 
cation as soon as possible. It shall come into force as from the date of the exchange 
of the instruments of ratification and shall be valid for a period of five years begin- 
ning with that date. 

If neither of the two High Contracting Parties gives notice to the other Party six 
months before the expiration of the period of five years that he wishes to terminate the 
Treaty, it shall remain in force and shall not be held to have terminated until after six 
months from the day on which one of the two Parties shalll have given notice of its 
termination to the other Party. 

IN FAITH WHEREOF the two Plenipotentiaries aforesaid have signed this 
Treaty at Jerusalem on the fifth day of the month of Rabi-ath-Thani in the year 
1352 of the Hijra, corresponding to the 2yth day of the month of July of the year 
1933 A.D. 



215 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

TAUFIQ ABUL HUDA 

Delegate of the Amara of Trans-Jordan. 

FUAD HAMZA, 

Delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

PROTOCOL ON ARBITRATION 

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. 

In pursuance of Article 13 of the Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage, 
which we have signed this day in our capacity as plenipotentiaries of His Highness 
the Amir Abdullah Ibn Hussein, Amir of Trans-Jordan, and His Majesty King 
Abdul-Aziz Ibn Abdur-Rahman Al Feisal Al Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, we have in virtue of the powers conferred upon us, agreed that, in any case 
referred to arbitration in conformity with the said Treaty, the arbitration shall be 
conducted in accordance with the following Articles. 

Article i. The arbitration shall be conducted by two arbitrators, of whom each of 
the High Contracting Parties shall select one, under the presidency of a third person 
appointed in the manner set forth in Article 3 of this Protocol. 
Article 2. If the two High Contracting Parties shall have agreed to refer any dif- 
ference whatsoever to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Article 13 of 
the Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage signed this day they shall draw up a joint 
memorandum on the matters which it is desired to settle by arbitration. A President 
of the Board of Arbitration shall then be appointed in accordance with Article 3 of 
this Protocol and a copy of the joint memorandum on the matters which it is desired 
to settle by arbitration shall be forwarded to him. Each Party shall forward to him 
within a period not exceeding one month from the date of his nomination a memoran- 
dum of the arguments in support of his case. Each of the two High Contracting Par- 
ties shall be entitled to forward to the President any other memorandum relative to 
his contention at any time within a period of three months of his nomination. Each 
Party shall be bound to forward to the other Party all documents which he may 
forward to the President. 

Article 3. The President of the Board of Arbitration shall be appointed by agree- 
between the two Parties within two months of the date of the agreement to refer the 
matter to arbitration. 

Article 4. The President of the Board of Arbitration shall invite the Board to meet 
at a place which he shall select after consultation with the two High Contracting 
Parties and on a date which he shall appoint after similar consultation, provided that 
the period intervening between his nomination and this date shall not be less than 
three months and shall not exceed six months. The Board of Arbitration shall give 
its decision within three months of the above-mentioned date. 
Article 5. The Board of Arbitration shall be free to determine the procedure to be 
followed. The two High Contracting Parties undertake to afford it all possible facili- 
ties and assistance for which it may apply with a view to the performance of its task. 
Article 6. Each of the two High Contracting Parties may appoint one or more per- 
sons to expound his point of view in regard to the questions in dispute before the 
Board of Arbitration. 

Article 7. The two High Contracting Parties definitely undertake to accept as bind- 
ing and to give effect to the decisions rendered by the arbitrators on the questions 
referred to them. The arbitrators may, in case of necessity, adopt their decision by 
a majority. 

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International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Article 8. Each of the two Governments shall pay the salary and expenses of the 
arbitrator appointed by it and one-half of the salaries and expenses of the President, 
clerks and other persons of whose assistance the arbitrators may have need. 
Article 9. This Protocol shall come into force as from the date of the exchange 
of copies thereof ratified by the two High Contracting Parties. It shall remain in force 
for the duration of the Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage concluded between 
them on this date. The two High Contracting Parties shall prolong its operation 
until the decision has been rendered in any case refetrred to arbitration in accordance 
with it before the termination of the operation of that Treaty. 

IN FAITH WHEREOF, we have signed this Protocol at Jerusalem on the fifth 
day of the month of Rabi-ath-Thani, in the year 1352 of the Hijra, corresponding 
to the 2yth day of the month of July of the year 1933 A.D. 

TAUFIQ ABUL HUDA, 

Delegate of the Amara of Trans-Jordan. 

FUAD HAMZA, 

Delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

SCHEDULE 

referred to in Article 7 of the Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage. 

i. Certificates for the Return of Loot. 

On each occasion on which loot is returned in conformity with the provisions of 
the Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage, with a view to its being delivered to the 
owners thereof, the special official appointed in accordance with Article 3 of the said 
Treaty shall give the person taking delivery of the loot an official certificate in the 
following form signed by him:- 

I, the undersigned, certify as follows :- 

(i) That the property and animals now returned constitute to the best of our 
knowledge resulting from our investigations, all the loot which the aggressors captur- 
ed in the incident which occurred at on the between members 

of the and tribes, 

with the exception oi the following, which it has not been possible to recover, 

(ii) That the property and animals now returned comprise all that we have re- 
covered from the aggressors up to this date, in its entirety, and, by way of compen- 
sation for objects certified to be impossible of recovery in kind and to be missing, 

namely, 

the following, which are forwarded^ 

and I certify that these are of the same equivalent value as the missing objects which 
it has not been possible to recover and, further, that all possible measures are being 
taken for the recovery of any other loot which has not been recovered from the ag- 
gressors and that, when recovered, it will be returned to you accompanied by a fur- 
ther certificate. 

(Signature) 

2. Wisaqa. 
It shall not be permissible to detain livestock or property on either side of the 

217 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

frontier in order to enforce the return of other looted livestock or property believed to 
be unlawfully held on the other side of the frontier. This shall not affect the right of 
the authorities on each side of the frontier to make use of this means to enforce the 
restoration of livestock or property unlawfully held in their own territory only. 

3. Araif. 

Animals found in the possession of the subjects of one of the Parties may not be 
impounded by an official of the other Party on the ground that they are claimed as 
Araif, except in the case of such animals forming part of the loot taken in a raid, in 
respect of which the responsible official on the other side has not certified that com- 
plete restitution has been made. In any such case, animals may be detained, subject 
to ultimate agreement being arrived at regarding them between the two Parties. 

No claim shall be entertained for the return of animals alleged to be Araif taken 
in raids which have been the subject of final settlement between the two Parties. 

4. Blood Money. 

Each of the parties shall collect from a homicide, being his subject, blood money 
in respect of a slain person belonging to the other side, provided that the person slain 
was not guilty of premeditated aggression. The blood money shall be calculated at the 
rate of ten she-camels between two and four years of age, unless the relatives of the 
homicide and the slain person agree that there is an established custom between them 
for the payment of the blood money on some other basis. 

5. Compensation for Losses. 

Persons guilty of premeditated criminal acts of aggression, such as raiding or rob- 
bery, shall be obliged to make good all losses suffered by the victims as a result of 
the aggression, as for example animals which have been killed in fighting or have been 
looted and died or have been lost while in their possession. The special officer 
appointed in conformity with Article 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Bon 
Voisinage^whois responsible for the collection and return of the loot, shall likewise 
collect from the aggressors out of their property objects equivalent in value to those 
losses and shall deliver them together with the loot, as required by paragraph i of this 
Schedule. The off icial of the country whose subjects were the victims may collect 
any evidence which he considers appropriate regarding the losses and forward it to 
the official of the other party engaged in collecting the loot. 

6. Khidma. 

On the return of the looted property or animals nothing shall be deducted there- 
from by way of Khidma, recompense, wages of herdsmen, or expenses. If the Party 
collecting the loot has incurred such expenditure, he is free to recover it out of the 
property of the aggressors. The recompense, however, of a person who has found 
stray camels and taken charge of them until application is made by their owner shall 
be calculated at the rate of one gold pound for every five camels, provided that the 
finder has given notice of his having found them at the time of its occurrence and has 
not attempted to conceal it. 

7. Definition of Beduin. 

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship and Bon 
Voisinage, every person arrested while taking part in a raid committed by nomadic 
tribes shall be deemed to be Beduin, unless he proves the contrary in a competent 
quarter. 

218 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

The 5th Rabi-ath-Thani 1352, corresponding to the 27th July, 1933. 

TAUFIQ ABUL HUDA, 

Delegate of the Amara of Trans-Jordan. 

FUAD HAMZA, 
Delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia. 

Treaty of Taif (Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood) between 1 O n 

Saudi Arabia and Yaman A J I 

May 20, 1934 (i) 

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate! 

His Honourable Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz Abdurrahman-al-Feysal-al- 
Saudj King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, on the one part, and His Honourable 
Majesty the Imam Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of the Yemen, on 
the other part; 

Being desirous of ending the state of war unfortunately existing between them 
and their Governments and peoples; 

And of uniting the Islamic Arab nation and raising its condition and maintaining 
its prestige and independence; 

And in view of the necessity of establishing firm treaty relations between them 
and their Governments and countries on a basis of mutual advantage and reciprocal 
interest; 

And wishing to fix the frontiers beetween their countries and to establish relations 
of good neighbourship and ties of Islamic friendship between them and to strengthen 
the foundations of peace and tranquility between their countries and peoples; 

And being desirous that there should be a united front against sudden mishaps 
and a solid structure to preserve the safety of the Arabian peninsula: 

Have resolved to conclude a treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood 
between them ... and agreed upon the following articles :- 

1. The state of war existing between the Kingdom of the Yemen and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be terminated as from the moment of signature of this 
treaty and there shall forthwith be established between Their Majesties the Kings 
and their countries and peoples a state of perpetual peace, firm friendship, and ever- 
lasting Islamic Arab brotherhood, inviolable in whole or in part. The two high con- 
tracting parties undertake to settle in a spirit of affection and friendship all disputes 
and differences which may arise between them, and to ensure that a spirit of Islamic 
Arab brotherhood shall dominate their relations in all states and conditions. They call 
God to witness the goodness of their intentions and their true desire for concord and 
agreement, both secretly and openly, and they pray the Almighty to grant them and 
their successors and heirs and Governments success in the continuance of this proper 
attitude, which is pleasing to the Creator and honourable to their race and religion. 

2. Each of the two high contracting parties recognises the full and absolute 
independence of the Kingdom of the other party and his sovereignty over it. His 



(i) The text is found in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 137 (1934)* pp. 670- 
685 ; a/so in H.M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the 
Near and Middle East, pp. 393-399. ED. 



219 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz-bin- Abdurrahman-al-Feysal-al-Saud, King of the 
Saudi Arabian Kingdom, acknowledges to His Majesty the Imam Yahya and his 
lawful descendants the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of the Yemen 
and his sovereignty over it, and His Majesty the Imam Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hami- 
duddin, King of the Yemen, acknowledges to His Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz and 
his lawful descendants the full and absolute independence of the Saudi Arabian King- 
dom and his sovereignty over it. Each of them gives up any right he claimed over 
any part or parts of the country of the other party beyond the frontiers fixed and de- 
fined in the text of this treaty. His Majesty the Imam King Abdul Aziz abandons by 
this treaty any right of protection or occupation, or any other right, which he claimed 
in the country which, according to this treaty, belongs to the Yemen and which was 
(formerly) in the possession of the Idrisis and others. His Majesty the Imam Yahya 
similarly abandons by this treaty any right he claimed in the name of the Yemeni 
unity or otherwise, in the country (formerly) in the possession of the Idrisis or the 
Aidh, or in Najran, or in the Yam country, which according to this treaty belongs to 
the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. 

3. The two high contracting parties agree to conduct their relations and 
communications in such a manner as will secure the interests of both parties and will 
cause no harm to either of them, provided that neither of the high contracting parties 
shall concede to the other party less than he concedes to a third party. Neither of the 
two parties shall be bound to concede to the other party more than he receives in 
return. 

4. The frontier line which divides the countries of the two high contracting 
parties is explained in sufficient detail hereunder. This line is considered as a fixed 
dividing boundary between the territories subject to each. 

(The paragraph defining the frontier line is here omitted.) 

5. In view of the desire of both high contracting parties for the continuance 
of peace and tranquillity, and for the non-existence of anything which might disturb 
the thoughts of these two countries, they mutually undertake not to construct any for- 
tified building within a distance of 5 Idiom, on either side of the frontier, anywhere 
along the frontier line. 

6. The two high contracting parties undertake immediately to withdraw 
their troops from the country which, by virtue of this treaty, becomes the possession 
of the other party, and to safeguard the inhabitants and troops. 

7. The two high contracting parties each undertake to prevent their people 
from committing any harmful or hostile act against the people of the other Kingdom, 
in any district or on any route ; to prevent raiding between the Bedouins on both sides; 
to return all (property) which is established by legal investigation, after the ratification 
of this treaty, as having been taken; to give compensation for all damage, according 
as may be legally necessary, where crimes of murder or wounding have been com- 
mitted; and severely to punish anyone proved to have committed any hostile act. 
This article shall continue operative until another agreement shall have been drawn 
up between the two parties as to the manner of investigating and estimating damage 
and loss. 

8. The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to refrain from 
resorting to force in all difficulties between them, and to do their utmost to settle any 
disputes which may arise between them, whether caused by this treaty or the interpre- 
tation of all or any of its articles or resulting from any other cause, by friendly re- 
presentations; in the event of inability to agree by this means, each of the two parties 
undertakes to resort to arbitration, of which the conditions, the manner of demand,and 



220 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

the conduct are explained in the appendix attached to this treaty. This appendix 
shall have the force and authority of this treaty, and shall be considered as an integral 
part of it. 

9. The two high contracting parties undertake, by all moral and material 
means at their command, to prevent the use of their territory as a base and centre for 
any hostile action or enterprise, or preparations therefor, against the country of the 
other party. They also undertake to take the following measures immediately on re- 
ceipt of a written demand from the Government of the other party :- 

(1) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of the Govern- 
ment which receives the application to take measures, he should, after the matter has 
been legally investigated and established, receive a deterrent punishment which will 
put an end to his actions and prevent their recurrence. 

(2) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of the Govern- 
ment making the demand for measures to be taken, he should be immediately arrested 
by the Government applied to and handed over to the Government making the de- 
mand. The Government asked to surrender him shall have no right to excuse itself 
from carrying out this demand, but shall be bound to take adequate steps to prevent 
the flight of the person asked for, and in the event of the person asked for being able 
to run away, the Government from whose territory he has fled shall undertake not to 
allow him to return to its territory, and if he is able so to return, shall arrest him and 
hand him over to his Government. 

(3) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of a third 
Government, the Government to which the demand is made and which finds the 
person in its territories shall, immediately and directly after the receipt of the demand 
of the other Government, take steps to expel him from its country, and to consider 
him as undesirable and to prevent him from returning there in future. 

10. The two high contracting parties agree not to receive anyone who has 
fled from the jurisdiction of his Government, whether he be great or small, official 
or non-official, an individual or a group. Each of the high contracting parties shall 
take adequate and effective administrative or military measures, etc., to prevent these 
fugitives entering within the borders of his country. If one or all of them succeed in 
crossing the frontier and entering his territory, he shall be bound to disarm the 
refugee and to arrest him and hand him over to the Government of the country from 
which he fled. In the event of his being unable to arrest him, he shall take adequate 
steps to drive him out from the country which he has entered into the country to 
which he belongs. 

11. The two high contracting parties undertake to prevent their Amirs, 
Amils and officials from interfering in any way whatsoever, either directly or ind- 
directly, with the subjects of the other party. They undertake to take full measures 
to prevent the occurrence of any disturbance or misunderstanding as a result of such 
actions. 

12. Each of the two high contracting parties recognizes that the people of all 
areas accruing to the other party by virtue of this treaty are subjects of that party. 
Each of them undertakes not to accept as his subjects any person or persons who are 
subjects of the other party except with the consent of that party. The subjects of each 
of the two parties, when in the country of the other party, should be treated in ac- 
cordance with local law. 

(Art. 13 provides for an amnesty to be announced by the contracting parties 
for all crimes and hostile acts committed by subjects of the other party and for all 
crimes committed by their own subjects, who may have joined themselves to the other 



221 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

party. Art. 14 obliges each party to return all property of those of its subjects whom 
it pardons. The two parties also undertake not to retain any of the goods and chattels 
which belong to the subjects of the other party.) 

15. Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes not to intermeddle 
with a third party, whether it be an individual, a group, or a Government, or to agree 
with him in any matter which may injure the interests of the other party, or which may 
harm his country, or which may raise problems and difficulties, or which may expose 
its welfare, interests or existence to danger. 

1 6. The two high contracting parties, who are bound by Islamic brotherhood 
and Arab origin, announce that their two nations are one nation, that they do not wish 
any evil to anyone, and that they will do their best to promote the interests of their 
nation, in the shade of tranquillity and quietness, and will exert their best endeavours 
in all ways for the good of their countries and their nation, intending no hostility 
to anyone. 

17. In the event of any external aggression on the country of one of the two 
high contracting parties, the other party shall be bound to carry out the following 
undertakings :- 

(1) To adopt complete neutrality secretly and openly. 

(2) To co-operate mentally and morally as far as possible. 

(3) To undertake negotiations with the other party to discover the best way 
of guaranteeing the safety of the country of that party and of preventing its being 
harmed, and to refrain from any act which might be interpreted as assisting that ex- 
ternal aggressor. 

1 8. In the event of insurrection or hostilities taking place within the country 
of one of the two high contracting parties both of them mutually undertake as follows :- 

(1) To take all necessary effective measures to prevent the aggressors or the 
rebels from making use of their territories. 

(2) To prevent fugitives from taking refuge in their countries, and to hand 
them over or expel them if they have entered, as explained in articles 9 and 10 above. 

(3) To prevent his subjects joining the aggressors or rebels, and to refrain 
from encouraging or supplying them. 

(4) To prevent assistance, supplies, arms and ammunition reaching the ene- 
my or the rebels. 

19. The two high contracting parties announce their desire to do everything 
possible to facilitate postal and telegraphic services, to increase the communications 
between the two countries, and to facilitate the exchange of commodities and agri- 
cultural and commercial products between them ; to undertake detailed negotiations, 
in order to conclude a customs agreement to safeguard the economic interests of their 
two countries, by unifying customs duties throughout the two countries, or by special 
regulations designed to secure the advantage of the two sides. Nothing in this article 
shall restrict the freedom of either of the two high contracting parties in any manner 
until the conclusion of the agreement referred to has been accomplished. 

20. Each of the two high contracting parties declares his readiness to autho- 
rise his representatives and delegates abroad, if such there be, to represent the other 
party, whenever the other party desires this, in any matter or at any time. It is 
understood that whenever representatives of both parties are together in one place 
they shall collaborate in order to unify their policy to promote the interests of their 
two countries, which are one nation. It is understood that this article does not res- 
trict the freedom of either side in any manner whatsoever in any of its rights. Simi- 



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International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

larly it cannot be interpreted as limiting the freedom of either of them or of compelling 
either to adopt this course. 

21. The contents of the agreement signed on the 5th Shaban, 1350, shall 
in any case be cancelled as from the date of ratification of this treaty. 

22. This treaty shall be ratified and confirmed by Their Honourable Majes- 
ties the two Kings within the shortest possible time, having regard to the common in- 
terest of the two sides in this. It shall come into force as from the date of the exchange 
of the instruments of ratification, except as regards what has been laid down in 
article I, relative to the ending of the state of war immediately after its signature. It 
shall continue in force for a period of 20 complete lunar years. It may renewed or 
modified during the 6 months preceding its expiry. If not so renewed or modified by 
that date, it shall remain in force until 6 months after such time as one party has given 
notice to the other party of his desire to modify it. 

23. This treaty shall be called "the Treaty of Taif ". It has been drawn up in 
two copies in the noble Arabic language, each of the two high contracting parties 
being in the possession of one copy... 

Written in the city of Jedda on the 6th day of the month of Safar, 1353. 

Arbitration Covenant Appended to the Treaty of Taif 
between Saudi Arabia and Yaman 

May 20, 1934 (i) 

Whereas Their Majesties the Imams King Abdul Aziz, King of the Saudi Ara- 
bian Kingdom, and King Yahya, King of the Yemen, have agreed in accordance with 
Article 8 of the treaty of peace, friendship and good understanding, known as "The 
Treaty of Taif", signed on the 6th Safar, 1353, to refer to arbitration any dispute or 
difference which may arise out of the relations between them, their Governments and 
countries, when all friendly representations fail to settle it, the two High Contracting 
Parties undertake to effect arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles: 
Article i. Each of the two High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept reference 
of the question in dispute to arbitration within one month of the date of receipt by the 
other Party of a demand for arbitration. 

Article 2. The arbitration shall be undertaken by a committee composed of an equal 
number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the two Parties. A 
chief arbitrator shall be selected by mutual agreement between the two High Con- 
tracting Parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a 
person, and if either Party accepts the person nominated by the other Party, the 
person in question shall become chief arbitrator. If even this cannot be agreed upon, 
the chief arbitrator shall be chosen by ballot,on the understanding that the ballot shall 
only be drawn on persons acceptable to both Parties. The person chosen by ballot 
shall become the head of the arbitration committee, and entitled to settle the case. 
If, however, agreement cannot be arrived at on the persons acceptable to both Parties, 
negotiations shall be carried on until the two Parties agree on this point. 
Article 3. The selection of the arbitration committee and its chief shall be completed 
within one month of the date of the end of the month fixed for the reply of the Party 



(i) The text is copied from United Nations Systematic Survey of Treaties for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1928-1949), Lake Success (October, 1948). 



223 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other Party. The arbitration 
committee shall meet at a place to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one 
month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this 
Article. The arbitration committee shall give its award within a period not exceeding 
one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this 
Article. The arbitration committee shall give its award within a period which, in 
any case, should not exceed one month as from the expiry of the period fixed for the 
meeting to take place. The award of the arbitration committee shall be given by a 
majority of votes, and shall be considered binding on the two Parties. Its execution 
immediately after its issue and communication shall be considered obligatory. Each 
of the two High Contracting Parties may appoint a person or persons, as he desires, 
to defend his case before the arbitration committee and to produce the necessary 
evidence and arguments. 

Article 4. The charges in regard to the arbitrators of each Party shall be chargeable 
to their respective Parties. The charges of the chief arbitrator shall be chargeable to 
both Parties equally, as well as the expenses of the other investigations. 
Article 5. This covenant shall be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty of Taif 
signed this day, the 6th Safar, 1353, and will remain in force during the period of the 
validity of the treaty. Written in Arabic, in two copies, of which each of the two 
High Contracting Parties is in possession of one. 

Statement by the Heads of Arab States at the End of the Conference 
of Inshas, Egypt 

May 29, 1946 (j) 

Their Majesties, Excellencies and Highnesses, Heads of the States (Members) 
of the Arab League, represented by their persons or by their representatives, have 
conferred in the special Conference held in Zahrat Inshas on the 2 8th and 29th of May, 
1946, at the invitation of His Majesty King Faruq, King of Egypt and of the lands of 
Nubia, Sudan, Kordofan and Darfour. Those present were: His Excellency Mr. 
Shukri al-Quwwatly, President of the Syrian Republic; His Royal Highness Prince 
Sa'ud, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and His Royal Highness 
Prince Sayf al-Islam 'Abdulla, son of His Majesty Imam Yahya, King of Yaman. 

Following deliberation on general questions and also on those relating to Arab 
affairs, they found themselves in complete agreement that the Arab States Members 
of the (Arab) League steadfastly desire (to have) lasting peace with all the (other) 
nations of the world, and that they have to do all in their power for the sake of up- 
holding peace. They consider that one of the best ways to (achieve) that is true co- 



( i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in M. 'Izzat 
Darwaza: Hawl al-Haraka al-'Arabiyya al-Haditha (Concerning the Modern Arab 
Movement)) vol. 4 (Sidon, Lebanon), pp. 52-54. The reader's attention is drawn to the 
fact that no reference whatever is made in the above Inshas Statement, as reproduced by 
Darwaza, op. cit., to the participation of King 'Abdulla of Transjordan in that State- 
ment. However, it is a fact that King 'Abdulla did attend the Inshas Conference and also 
signed the above Statement. See al-Ahram, May 30, 1946. See, also, Darwaza, op. cit., 
p. 52 (the passage introducing the above statement). ED. 



224 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

operation with the United Nations, its consolidation and respect, and the fostering of 
confidence in it. 

They then discussed all aspects of the Palestine problem. They took the view 
that it is a question which concerns not only the Arabs of Palestine but all the Arabs. 
They (also considered) that Palestine is an Arab (country) whose Arab character 
should be preserved by all Arab States and peoples, that it is not possible tor these 
States to agree in any way to any further (Jewish) immigration which they regard as 
a flagrant violation of the White Paper (i) with which British honour has been bound 
up. 

They earnestly hope that the friendly relations (existing), on the one hand, be- 
tween the Arab States and peoples, and, on the other, the two friendly democratic 
States, will not be disturbed by (these States) insisting on the recognition of measures 
that infringe on the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. (This they maintain) in view of 
their desire to perpetuate this friendship and to avert any reaction that may arise on 
account of (such measures) and that may lead to disturbances which will probably 
produce the worst (possible) effect on world peace. 

As for their other conclusions, they have entrusted the Secretary- General of the 
League of Arab States with the task of transmitting to the Council of the League 
the results of then* discussions, deliberations and directions with regard to this matter, 
so that (the Council) may adopt the best measures for the protection of the future of 
this country, so dear to the hearts of all Arabs. 

They then examined the question of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. They found 
themselves in complete agreement that the independence of this country (Libya)(2) 
is natural and just. (They also considered) that their Governments were agreed that 
(this independence) was necessary for the sake of the security of Egypt and the Arab 
countries, and that the League of Arab States, the Pact of which provides for looking 
after Arab affairs and interests, should prepare for this independence and duly nurse 
it at the outset with a view to (making it possible) for an Arab government to be 
established in that country. (The League ) should also assist it morally and materially, 
until it becomes capable of carrying out its responsibilities, internally and externally, 
as a member of the League of Arab States. 

Some members of the Conference proposed that consultations should be had 
on the Egyptian question. After deliberation, (the conferees) found themselves in 
agreement that the realization of Egypt's national claims, the achievement of her full 
sovereignty and the evacuation of British forces therefrom, is imperative. (They also 
agreed) that the problem of Egypt is (also) a general problem for (all of) them, and 
that they stand in support of her just claims and will support her by all (means) 
within their power. They have been satisfied with the statement which the British 
Government had proceeded to make, and which Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister, delivered 
on May yth in the House of Commons, and in which he announced the determination 
of his Government to withdraw its land, naval and air forces from Egyptian territory. 
This (statement) has had the best effect on (the conferees) as well as on their Govern- 
ments and peoples. They hope that the British Government will inaugurate by this 
(statement) a new era in its relations with sister-Egypt, which relations they hope 
will be established on the strongest foundations of friendship and confidence between 
two equal states. They know that this friendship and this confidence constitute the 



(1) That is, the British Government's White Paper of 1939. ED. 

(2) "This country", in this context) apparently means Libya, comprising as it does 
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fazzan. ED. 



225 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

greatest cause of stability and peace in this part of the world. 

They then examined the affairs of the other Arab countries, and many of the 
grievances which had been submitted to them concerning (these countries). They 
found themselves in agreement on the necessity of working for (the attainment of) 
their freedom, and have left it to the League of Arab States to undertake the realiza- 
tion of the wishes of their peoples and (to assure) their participation in the League of 
Arab States. 

Finally they wish to take the opportunity of this meeting to send, as brothers 
acting in solidarity and in unity, to their peoples the best wishes for their welfare, 
happiness and glory, and to declare their full confidence in a prosperous and noble 
future, worthy of the glorious Arab past. 

Their Majesties, Excellencies and Royal Highnesses then decided to express 
their immense gratitude to their brother, His Majesty King Faruq,for having provided 
them with the opportunity of this historic meeting, which they hope willl lead to the 
good of their countries and the consolidation of their League. 

Zahrat Inshas, Jamadi al-Akhira 27, 1365 (A.H.) 
corresponding to May 29, 1946. 

140 Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between the Hashimite King- 
dom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq 

April 14* 1947 W 

( Unofficial Translation) 

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF 
TRANSJORDAN, and HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ. 

In view of the bonds of brotherhood and national unity that bind them together 
and in order to protect the security of the two countries, and as dictated by the need 
for firm co-operation between them and complete mutual understanding on matters 
affecting the interest of the two kingdoms, and pursuant to the terms of Article IX 
of the Covenant of the League of Arab States, We have agreed to conclude a Treaty of 
Brotherhood and Alliance between them and have appointed for this purpose two 
plenipotentiary representatives : 

For His Majesty the King of Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan : 

His Excellency Samir Pasha al-Rifa'i, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 

For His Majesty the King of Iraq: 

His Excellency Doctor al-Sayyid Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 

Who, after exchanging credentials and finding them in good and due form, have 
entered into an alliance and covenant on the basis of the following articles. 
Article i. Relations of eternal brotherhood and alliance shall exist between the 
Hashimite Kingdom of Transjordan and the Kingdom of Iraq, and both High Con- 
tracting Parties shall consult with each other whenever circumstances demand fulfill- 
ment of the purpose intended by the preamble to this Treaty. 
Article 2. Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges itself mutually not to come 
to any mutual understanding or agreement with a third party on any matter that may 
injure the interest of the other High Contracting Party or its kingdom or its interests 
or that may be of such nature as to expose the safety of its kingdom or its interests to 
dangers or injuries. 



(i) The text is copied from Middle East Journal, vol. i (1947), pp. 449-451. 

226 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Article 3. The two High Contracting Parties pledge themselves to resolve by friendly 
negotiation all disagreements that may arise between them. 

Article 4. If any dispute between one of the High Contracting Parties and a third 
power leads to a situation that may result in the danger of occurrence of war, the two 
High Contracting Parties shall then unite their efforts to settle that dispute by peace- 
ful means in accordance with the international pacts that may be applicable in that 
situation. 

Article 5. (a) In the case of occurrence of aggression against one of the High Con- 
tracting Parties by a third power in spite of the efforts made in accordance with the 
terms of Article 4 above, and likewise in the case of occurrence of a sudden aggression 
where there is insufficient time to apply the terms of the said Article 4, the High Con- 
tracting Parties must consult on the nature of the measures that must be taken to unite 
their efforts to repel and ward off that aggression. 

(b) As acts of aggression shall be considered : 

1. Declaration of war. 

2. Occupation by the armed forces of a third power of the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties even without a declaration of war. 

3. Attack by the land, sea, or air forces of a third power against the country of 
one of the High Contracting Parties or against its land, sea, or air forces even 
without a declaration of war. 

4. Direct or indirect aid to or support of an aggressor. 

(c) As acts of aggression shall not be considered : 

1. Resort to the right of legitimate defense, i.e., resistance to any of the acts of 
aggression as defined above. 

2. Action taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

Article 6. In the case of occurrence of disorders or insurrection in the country of one 
of the High Contracting Parties, each pledges itself mutually as follows : 

(a) To take every possible measure or step : 

1. To render it impossible for the rebels to utilize its territory against the in- 
terest of the High Contracting Party. 

2. To prevent its subjects from participating in the disorders or insurrection 
or from helping or encouraging the rebels. 

3. To prevent the direct or indirect arrival from its country of any kind of 
assistance for the rebels. 

(b) If the rebels take refuge in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties 
this (/) High Contracting Party must disarm them and turn them over to the second 
party. 

(c) If the situation requires the taking of joint measures or steps to put down the 
disorders or rebellion, the High Contracting Parties shall consult on the method of 
mutual assistance that should be followed for this purpose. 

Article 7. The High Contracting Parties shall co-operate in unifying military'tech- 
niques in their countries by an exchange of military missions to learn the 
techniques followed in the two kingdoms and to utilize military establishments and to 
train there-in. 

Article 8. Diplomatic and consular representatives of either High Contracting Party 
may assume the representation of the interests of the other High Contracting Party, 



(i) Text reads: "the other". (M.EJ) 

227 



141 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

whenever that is requested in a foreign country wherein that party does not have re- 
presentatives. 

Nothing in this is to be construed as affecting in any way whatsoever the right of 
that party to appoint independent representatives if it so desires. 
Article 9. Special permanent committees possessing executive power shall be appoint- 
ed who shall consist of representatives of the two kingdoms and who shall be compe- 
tent to implement and execute practical mutual assistance between the High Contract- 
ing Parties in all the matters stipulated in Article 2 of the Covenant of the League of 
Arab States as well as to carry out the requirements of the provisions of Articles 5,6, 
and 7 of this Treaty. 

Article 10. Nothing in this Treaty shall violate the rights and obligations arising from 
the treaties made with any other power by either of the High Contracting Parties. 
Article 1 1. This Treaty shall be considered to be in force from the date of exchange of 
the documents of ratification. 

Article 12. This Treaty shall be in force and considered valid for a period of ten 
years from the date of its coming into effect. And if one of the High Contracting Part- 
ies does not notify the other of its desire to terminate it one year before the date of its 
expiration, it shall be considered as automatically renewed for other periods of five 
years each. Either High Contracting Party may, at the end of the first period or at 
the end of any of the subsequent periods of renewal, request re-examination and 
modification of this Treaty with a view to increasing the mutual assistance and to 
strengthening the alliance beyond what is stipulated therein. 
22nd of Jumada al-ula 
(April 14, 1947) 



Statement by the Public Relations Officer, Khartoum, Concerning 
the Modifications of the Nile Waters Agreement 

October 18, 1952 (/) 

A communique was issued in December 1950 which said that technical discus- 
sions between representatives of the Sudan and Egyptian Government were proceed- 
ing on the raising of Sennar reservoir level, the construction of a dam on the Fourth 
Cataract near Merowe, and the Sudan's further requirements in Nile Waters. These 
discussions were interrupted and prolonged by other events but, happily, agreement 
has now been reached. Stated simply, it has been agreed: 

i) that the Sudan can raise the level of water in Sennar reservoir by one metre 
subject, until the construction of the proposed Lake Tana dam, to special conditions 
in the case of very low years: 

(The Egyptian technical authorities consented last year to a partial raising of 
thirty centimetres in anticipation of this agreement). 

ii) that Egypt can build the Fourth Cataract dam and the Sudan will give all 
possible help, as in the case of Jebel Auliya; 

iii) that when the necessary data have been collected there will be technical dis- 



(i) The text is copied from Documents on the Sudan, 1899-1953 (Egyptian Society of 
International Law\ brochure No. 14 (March. 1953), p. 9. 



228 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements* Relationships 

cussions to decide the respective shares of the Sudan and Egypt in the additional wat- 
er available on the completion of new projects, including the Fourth Cataract dam: 
the Sudan will begin to benefit from the first project to be completed : the shares in 
cost will be agreed for each project in proportion to the shares in benefit: the shares 
in the Lake Tana project remain as originally agreed, half to Egypt and half to the 
Sudan. 

In addition, agreement has been reached on means of making available to the 
Sudan surplus "flood" water which can be stored. Investigations are now being made 
to establish how much can be stored in the Jebel Auliya reservoir without affecting 
existing pump schemes, saqias, etc. In consequence of this agreement an additional al- 
location of water has already been made to the Pumps Control Board. 

Statement by Major Salah Salim, 
Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, at a Press Conference 

Cairo, January 16,1955(1) 

This is a suitable opportunity to meet and inform you of the attitude of the 
Egyptian Government concerning the recent important events in the Arab world. 
You know that ever since the beginning of its revolution Egypt has shown her devo- 
tion to the Arab cause and her profound faith in fruitful and positive co-operation 
between the Arab States. These States had extremely bitter experiences in the first 
and second world wars and in the loss of martyrised Palestine and they have now 
begun for the first time in their modern history resolutely to rid themselves of foreign 
domination in order to rebuild their life and regain their moral stature. Our foreign 
policy was based from the beginning on complete co-operation for the glory and unity 
of the Arab nation, since this is the only way to put an end to the trials and disasters 
which we suffered in the past through the disunity and divisions of the Arab leaders. 
This policy of ours aimed at developing the individual nature of the Arabs and their 
independent international existences as a strong cohesive unit which would pursue an 
independent foreign policy after getting rid of foreign domination for good. This 
requires the strengthening of the Arab League and the agreement of all its members 
on a united and independent foreign policy accepted by all, not subject either directly 
or indirectly to foreign influence. 

Egypt was also keenly desirous that the defence of these Arab States should come 
from their own ranks, so as to serve the Arabs and their interests alone. Egypt wanted 
the collective security pact, a purely Arab pact, to be given active life after having 
remained so long on paper. Egypt considered that these objectives forming a united 
independent foreign policy, animating the(Arab collective security pact, and strengthen- 
ing the stature and individuality of the Arab League were the only way to revive the 
Arab nation and attain the unity dear to the hearts of all Arabs. This was no casual 
policy of the Egyptian Government ; it was drawn up a long time ago after long dis- 
cussion and full consultation with all the Arab leaders. Egypt was not content with 
explaining this point of view at the meetings of the Arab League, but sent me to the 
sister Arab countries to meet their authorities and explain this point of view to their 
leaders. Following these visits, Egypt found complete accord between her policy and 



(i) Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.\ January 21, 7955, pp. 46-47. The text 
is copied from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.U.P., 1958}, pp. 313-315. 



229 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the policy of all the Arab States a policy which gives true expression to the hopes 
and ideals of the Arab peoples. 

The Government of Iraq has now announced its intention of concluding a sepa- 
rate alliance outside the Arab States, before the Arab pact sees the light of day and 
without consultation with any of the other Arab Governments. This is a serious de- 
velopment which may threaten the existence of the Arab League and expose Arab 
nationalism to grave dangers. This is all the more so since the responsible represen- 
tatives of the Arabs agreed at their last meeting that a meeting of Foreign Ministers 
should be held to pave the way for a meeting of the Arab Premiers as soon as possible. 
What is the meaning of all these meetings, what is the meaning of a pact of all the 
Arab States, and what is the meaning of a League of our Governments if any one of 
us who wishes to takes on his own the most serious and important decisions without 
consultation or agreement with the rest? If our League is not based on the principle 
of unifying the policy of its member States, for what purpose was it established and 
where is it going? Are we to leave foreign policy aside and neglect our defensive pact 
and confine the work of this League, on which our peoples have placed all their hopes, 
to the coordination of educational and cultural programmes ? What would be the mean- 
ing of all past and present efforts under this big name, the League of the Arab States? 
Egypt has not once taken up a unilateral attitude even regarding the settlement of her 
most delicate affairs and problems. All will recall the evacuation of the Suez Canal and 
how Egypt informed all the Arab Governments of every phase of this issue and agreed 
with them on the means of settlement. 

Egypt still has faith in the road she has taken, that of co-operation with her Arab 
brethren to the extreme possible limit and eliminating every vestige of foreign in- 
fluence. The Egyptian Government has consequently decided to call an urgent meet- 
ing of the Premiers of all the Arab States which have signed the Arab collective- 
security pact. It hopes that this meeting will be held in Cairo on 22nd Januarty to 
discuss these vital principles. We hope that God will guide the leaders of the Arabs 
so that they may avert a crisis which may expose the future of their peoples to a great 
danger. God is the guide to good fortune. 

1 A *1 Statement by Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Representative to the 
" United Nations to the Chamber of Deputies. 

February 6, 1955 (i) 

When Premier Nuri Said asked me to go to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, I 
regarded his call as an invitation to perform a national duty and I accepted it im- 
mediately. I departed for Damascus and upon my arrival there I visited the Pre- 
sidential Palace and met Hashem al Atasi, the President. I explained the whole 
problem to him in general since he does not have responsibility in this field. I 
later called on the Prime Minister Paris al-Khouri, and in the presence of Faidhi al 
Atasi, Foreign Minister, we discussed the issue in detail. In the afternoon I visited 
the Syrian President again and later I flew to Lebanon on the same mission. There 
I met the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The discussions may be summed up in the following points. 

i. Iraq's continued eagerness to serve the Arab cause and its full adherence to 
the Arab League Charter and the ACSP.(2)I told them that this is Iraq's permanent 
policy. 

(/) Iraqi Government Press Release. The text is copied from Documents on Interna- 
tional Affairs, 1955 (O.U.P. ipitf). pp. 315-323. 
(2) Arab Collective Security Pact. (D.I.A.) 

230 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

2. Iraq's special situation with respect to its neighbors and the international 
necessity for cooperation with such neighbors for the purpose of self-defense in ac- 
cordance with articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter. I also explained to 
them that this was the policy of the late King Faisal, the founder of Iraq, and is still 
being used to serve Arab policy and the Arab people in their various states and areas 
to maintain neighborly relations. 

3. The third objective of my visit was to find a means to purge the Arab atmos- 
phere and to maintain full understanding because the discussion of these issues in 
such a tense and clamorous atmosphere was impossible, especially since Iraq was not 
represented at the conference of Arab Prime Ministers convoked by Gamal Abdul 
Nasser. 

It is worth mentioning that in both the Syrian and Lebanese capitals I noticed a 
favorable reaction towards the policy and situation of Iraq. I waited there for a few 
days for Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, Deputy Prime Minister, who came on a special er- 
rand to Lebanon. On the evening of the second night of my stay in Lebanon, the 
President summoned me to his house and reiterated the necessity of sending some- 
body to represent Iraq in Cairo. I relayed this to the Prime Minister and waited for 
his answer. It came on Wednesday when his physicians advised him not to go because 
of his health. The Prime Minister then authorized me to go to Cairo. I agreed for 
I felt it to be a national duty, for at this time, when the Arabs are in a quandary and 
are at the crossroads, it is necessary for them to choose the right road for the future. 
Yes, the Arabs are passing today into a critical phase of their history. They either 
choose an affirmative realistic policy or a deadlock and continued weakness. 

With this spirit I went to Cairo and with me were Burhanuddin Bashayan, Depu- 
ty Foreign Minister, and Khalil Ibrahim, D.G. of Guidance and Broadcasting. On 
the evening of my arrival I had a meeting with Salah Salem at the Mena House in the 
presence of Najib al Rawi, Iraqi Ambassador and Sami al Solh, the Lebanese Prime 
Minister. For three hours we reviewed the Arab position in general. 

I found that Salah Salem was well aware of Iraq's special situation and I thought 
that the crisis was over after I had explained to him what Iraq wanted to conclude, 
and after he had said, "This is a simple matter" and, "This is a natural type of co- 
operation between two neighbors". I asked what was all the uproar for? He said 
that instead of calling it an alliance, call it cooperation. Instead of James, call him 
Mohammad. I said, we do not care what it's called but we want cooperation in order 
to preserve the safety of Iraq. The object is to cooperate with our neighbors, which is 
a natural thing. The next morning we attended the Arab Prime Ministers conference. 
I must mention here that the meeting had been postponed to the next day since our 
presence came as a surprise. The next day we attended the meeting and Gamal Abdul 
Nasser asked Salah Salem to illustrate to the Iraqi delegation what had happened 
during the preceding meetings, while we were absent. He did, and we found that the 
problem was centered on Iraq's desire to conclude an agreement with Turkey. Later, 
I took the floor and spoke for one and one-half hours explaining to our brothers the 
international situation, Iraq's policy, its attitude towards Turkey and what was ne- 
cessary for the Arabs to do. I was followed by my colleague Bashayan who read to 
them the proposed Turco-Iraqi agreement. 

All were taken by surprise and one of them said "This is a natural and simple 
matter. All that we have is merely a c tempest in a tea cup'." (Sadiq al Bassam inter- 
jected, "Who said this?" Dr. Jamali replied, Faris al-Khouri, Prime Minister of 
Syria). Emir Faisal, Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, said that the case is simple and 
asked why hadn't we informed them before. 



231 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

After all these explanations, I was satisfied that the crisis was over and the meet- 
ing ended. When we returned in the afternoon. Dr. Mahmud Fawzi opened the dis- 
cussion by a concentrated and strong attack. He was followed by Gamal Abdul- 
Nasser and later Salah Salem. This lasted for about three hours or nearly four hours. 
The gist of those attacks was that Iraq wanted to cause a split in Arab ranks; Iraq 
wanted to hand the Arabs over to the imperialists ; Iraq wanted to hand Palestine 
over to the Jews permanently ; Iraq wanted to violate the resolution of the Arab 
Foreign Ministers ; Iraq wanted to enslave the Arabs and make them submissive, 
etc. ; all sorts of allegations and accusations. 

I wish that the meeting of this conference had been public so that every Arab 
could have been present and known what was going on. As my reply to the accusation 
was long and it was rather late in the evening, I requested Gamal Abdul Nasser to 
postpone the meeting to the following day to give me ample time to reply. I now wish 
to tell you abut the major points which were contained in my reply to those attacks and 
the logic with which the Iraqi mission was faced. I thanked the gentlemen for the 
sincere and noble feelings expressed in their speeches and their anxiety about Arab 
unity. I assured them that Iraq was no less anxious on this account than they were. 
I thanked the gentlemen for their feelings regarding the independence of the Arab 
states and stressed again that Iraq was also eager for that independence. I thanked 
them for their feelings about Arab unity and reiterated that Iraq also feels that unity 
of the Arab states is necessary. I welcomed their views and advice about Palestine and 
told them that Iraq still suffers the same pains they feel and will continue to work for 
the Palestinian cause. 

These noble feelings, I went on, are sacred to us all and we live for them and 
abide by them. I told them that there are other theories which they expressed on the 
international situation and the proper approach to defense which we do not approve, 
such as when they told us that in case we act jointly, we must adhere to article (3) and 
design our policy accordingly. 

I said, "What is the purpose in designing such a policy?" I said that in their 
view the plan would result in no country being allowed to take care of its own interests, 
but it would always have to obey the"General Headquarters' 'of the Arab countries 
(the Arab League). I told them that an approach can be made to the problem in two 
ways : the first one is the method used by international dictatorial organizations. I have 
witnessed many projects being carried out in Soviet countries, and when Vishinsky 
used to propose an idea no satellite country could object to it. This is one kind of ap- 
proach. The second is what we see taking place between the Commonwealth coun- 
tries, the NATO countries or between other democratic countries, such as the Scandi- 
navian countries. There is one approach used by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Such an approach cannot be imposed on one party by another. Therefore, any plan 
cannot be interpreted as imposing an idea on another country irrespective of the 
vital interests contained in it. To plan means planning what can be planned and 
agreeing on what can be agreed upon. This what I understand by the words. 

I was told that the Arab Foreign Ministers had met and had attempted to design 
a foreign policy. They said that the Arab countries should act in accordance with 
three alliances, the ACSP: the Arab League Charter and the United Nations 
Charter, but the Foreign Minister of Iraq had made a limited reservation. I told 
them that we adhere to these three alliances and we do not want reservations. The one 
made by the Foreign Minister is not needed. In case you agree and approve these 
alliances, Iraq will not need any more reservations because articles 51 and 52 of the 
UN Charter are very clear. Article 51 provides for self-defense and the other provides 



232 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

for regional organizations. I told them that no general alliance can separate Iraq from 
its neighbors and Iraq cannot live alone without its neighbors, Iran and Turkey. 
Article 52 is very clear in this regard. I also told them that the Arab League is a na- 
tional organization rather than a regional one. In case we want to consider it a re- 
gional organization we must accept Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and even Afghanistan in it. 
Therefore as article 51 is very clear there is no need for the reservation of the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister if you adhere to the United Nations Charter. I told them that the 
resolutions of the Arab League are not binding unless they are unanimous, except for 
the countries accepting them in accordance with article 7. 

We turned to the international situation and I told them that there are three 
views on this subject: to walk by the side of the East, i.e. communism; to hold to 
neutrality; or, to cooperate with the West. 

You say that we do not want to go with the communists that is final. But we 
cannot remain neutral, which is impractical even if we want to do it because the ques- 
tion of being neutral is not for us to decide but for the conflicting parties. Therefore 
cooperation with the West is inevitable.. What does cooperation with the West mean ? 
In your interpretation such cooperation can be made without coming in contact with 
the West and without understanding. The Arabs can sit and wait patiently until the 
West needs them some day and then supplies them with military equipment and eco- 
nomic aid without any obligations. 

I told them that the international situation is very tense and requires two things 
from us: (i) arming; (2) regional organization. The source of arms is the West so long 
as we do not want to cooperate with communism. The West will not supply these 
arms for the sake of our black colored eyes, but only if we come to an understanding 
with it. We cannot obtain arms from the West without agreements. The Foreign 
Ministers were told, "Wait and the West will give you arms. The West will need you 
and give you arms without commitments". Certain Arab countries got in touch with 
the United States and Britain in this regard and they found that their information 
was wrong and that the West would not give arms freely. We in Iraq kept negotiating 
for more than a year to obtain arms. As to the regional organization, this requires co- 
operation of all the Arab countries with their neighbors, Iran and Turkey. I told 
them that the communist danger is greater than you may imagine it to be. It is attack- 
ing us from within and without and it has no precedent in history. It is a political, 
spiritual and social pestilence inflicted on humanity today. This disease cannot be 
treated with slow methods such as those now being used by the Arab countries. I 
told them that Iraq had realized the communist danger and had suffered from it. I 
said that the communist danger can be treated by two methods : one, by erecting an 
international dike just as the type that saves us from the floods. This dike we have 
realized in Iraq. If it is not strong there could be a gap in it capable of ultimately de- 
molishing it. This will expose the free world to communist invasion. I also told them 
that the free world had such a barrier extending from Norway to Pakistan and that we 
in Iraq are included in this barrier. I described the internal threat of communism 
as stagnant water gathering in ditches and depressions which need to be filled up in 
order that we eliminate the sources of these pests. 

Therefore to combat communism requires great efforts internally and externally. 
I referred to past injustices of the West towards the Arabs and said that the West 
today is facing a common danger with us. If we can prove to the West that we have a 
constructive and affirmative policy, its attitude towards us will change. But if we 
remain idle, the West will overpower us, meddle with our rights and interests. It is 
up to us to take a position towards the West, namely, either to surrender like a lazy 



233 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

people or be an energetic one that wishes to live. We should adopt a policy like that 
designed by Turkey. We must learn how Turkey acquired its strength from the 
West. We should not isolate ourselves and ignore everything positive. We have an 
obligation to shoulder if we want to win the West to our side. We should make use 
of propaganda in the West and diplomacy in the Western capitals. 

I asked them how Palestine was lost. It had been lost for two basic reasons: one, 
because we deluded ourselves by underestimating the power of our opponent and by 
thinking that the Jews were not powerful. The highest official in the League said that 
with 300 soldiers or North African Volunteers we could throw the Jews into the sea. 
The war started and His Excellency then said that with 3,000 North African Volun- 
teers we could throw them into the sea. The second reason was that we thought 
that we were strong enough to face the world but the fact was that we did not estimate 
our own strength correctly. This then was the issue of Palestine. It seemed a trifling 
thing at the time but we did not know that behind the Jews of Palestine stood World 
Zionism with its resources in every major country. I reminded them of our position at 
BLUDAN(j) Sadiq al Bassam was among the Iraqi delegation and how we faced 
them with these facts and requested them to take the required action. I asked, "What 
was your answer?" We asked you to take precautions and Hamdi alPachachi had even 
proposed an allotment of two million dinars for Palestine but your answer was not 
even fifty thousand. We told you let us use the threat of withholding the oil Iraq 
had actually embargoed hers but you did not pay any attention and the conse- 
quence was the loss of Palestine and the tragic aftermath. This is a proof that lack of 
preparation and shortsightedness about the Arabs and international situation will 
bring about another tragedy unless we prepare ourselves with haste to save the loss of 
other parts of the Arab homeland. 

I later turned to our relations with Turkey (here Burhanuddin Bashayan read 
Gamal Abdul Nasser's introduction to his book "TURKEY AND THE ARAB 
POLICY") and I told them that we must recognize what Turkey's attitude in the 
UN was when the resolution for partition of Palestine was taken and how it support- 
ed our views. Turkey did not stand alone by our side but brought over Greece too 
which was being influenced by America to vote against us. I told them that the Turks 
are our brothers with whom we have living ties and that Iraq's traditional policy was 
established to recognize those relations and act to strengthen them. 

After all these explanations they were satisfied that Iraq's proofs were sound but 
they said that the dispute does not concern Iraq and Turkey or agreement with 
Turkey but basically a political question; namely, is it permissible for an Arab League 
member to conclude a treaty without the approval of the other Arab countries. I said 
yes. Any country of the Arab League may conclude a treaty in accordance with arti- 
cle II of the ACS Pact and article 7 and paragraph 2 of article 9 of the Arab League 
Charter stipulates that any country may conclude a special agreement without com- 
mitting the other countries. 

The conferees then attempted to obtain a unanimous resolution on this subject 
at first but they failed. They appointed a committee to issue a joint communique, but 
the committee failed to reach agreement on its final form. We attended one meeting 
when they wanted to pass a joint resolution not to join the Turco-Iraqi agreement 
and this move too was a failure. They later returned to the Iraqi reservation and 
demanded that Iraq either agree to freeze articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter and 

( j) Where the Council of the Arab League met in 1946 to consider the situation in Palestine. 
(D.I.A.) 



234 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

article 7 and paragraph II of article 9 of the Arab League Charter and article n of the 
Joint Defense Pact or make new reservations. I told them that all these pacts had been 
approved by Parliament and that there are parliamentary procedures for such things, 
but that I could make a reservation which would suffice. They said that the one made 
by the Foreign Minister was intended to refer to an Anglo-Iraqi treaty similar to what 
Egypt had done. I said I can then give you a new reservation as follows : 

"Iraq with assurance of its commitments in accordance with the Arab League 
Charter and the Joint Defense Pact has the right to take any additional measures it 
deems necessary for its safety." 

Is there in this reservation anything that conflicts with the Arab League ? After 
I made the reservation there was a storm of protest. After this reservation Gamal 
Abdul Nasser said he wished to withdraw his proposal for the strengthening of the 
Arab Collective Security Pact and that Egypt would announce its withdrawal from 
the Arab Collective Security Pact if Iraq insisted on this reservation or if it signed the 
the Turco-Iraqi agreement. 

This is what happened in fact. I told them that our objective is Arab safety and 
unity. If you are really anxious to maintain this why don't you express your anxiety 
over Iraq's safety. They said that the Arab Collective Security Pact is enough to 
secure Iraq's safety. I then asked them to show me how the Arab armies can get to 
our northern and eastern borders. I told them that they were military men. They 
said wait a bit. In Egypt now there are three incomplete divisions. When they are 
built up we shall have five or six divisions and we can send four divisions to Iraq. I 
asked through which road these divisions would come to Iraq and from where would 
they get the required arms. They replied : cc Do not buy arms from the West; we can 
supply you with them." After I heard all this I told them that in Iraq there are 
military men with no less experience than themselves and no less anxious for Arab 
interests. I told them not to burn their ships and cut the ropes. Let Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, who is a military man just like Nuri Said, come to Baghdad and negotiate 
with us. 

The meeting ended and the conferees decided to send a mission to Baghdad 
consisting of Sami al Solh, Faidhi al Atasi, Walid Salah and Salah Salem. 

Here starts the third chapter. It is worth mentioning that the atmosphere was 
more excitable than it should have been for discussions. I had told them that unless 
the tense atmosphere was relaxed and nerves put at ease, discussions could not be 
resumed. I said that the press, propaganda and the radio should change their present 
attitude. Last year I went to Egypt to explain Iraq's situation and its need for arms 
and a regional organization. Our Egyptian brothers said that Iraq could get arms from 
America and requested me to postpone talcing any action regarding the regional or- 
ganization until the Suez dispute ended. 

Upon my return to Iraq the "Voice of the Arabs" began to attack us unjustly 
every night. I sent a verbal message to Gamal Abdul Nasser asking him if that was the 
"Voice of the Arabs" or the "Voice of Israel". That radio station disunited the world 
of the Arabs. It attacked Lebanon, Syria and Libya. It is attacking us now. Any dis- 
cussions will not be successful unless all admit Iraq's needs and the reality of its 
strategic position. Secondly, it is not permissible that the conferees meet under a 
complete military dictatorial atmosphere. Law must dominate the atmosphere and 
the provisions of the Arab League Charter and the Arab Collective Security Pact 
must be admitted. These pacts must be respected. I may repeat the words of Pre- 
mier Faris al-Khouri, "Let it be a tempest in a tea cup". The tempest will pass. 
The Arabs will return to their normal common sense and will adopt a far-sighted pol- 



235 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

icy. They will look at the future with a realistic and positive spirit and not with a 
negative destructive one. 

THE PRIME MINISTER: 

When we were informed of the arrival in Baghdad of the Arab Prime Ministers 
who came to effect an understanding as I have stated before we welcomed them 
and afforded them the opportunity to meet anyone they wished. We added to the 
Iraqi group which was to talk with the mission people from outside the Cabinet. They 
were: His Excellency, Towfick As-Suwaidi; His Excellency, Saleh Jabr; His Ex- 
cellency, Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali; in addition to the Deputy Prime Minister, the Acting 
Foreign Minister and certain officials, as well as the Chief of the General Staff. Our 
intention in forming the Iraqi group in that manner was to let everyone know that the 
Iraqis as a whole, with the exception of every few of them, support the policy adopted 
by Iraq since its inception which is based on two pillars : We are Arabs and we co- 
operate with the Arabs, and with them we share happiness and calamity. At the same 
time we have neighbors. We maintain special relations with them and a special situa- 
tion which requires us to get along with them. This right is assured to us in the Arab 
Collective Security Pact and the Arab League Charter and it is in accordance with 
the policy followed by the Arab states thus far. 

Dr. JAMALI CONTINUED: 

I told you that the Arab Prime Ministers failed to reach agreement on the final 
form of the joint communique. The opposition came from Lebanon; Syria and the 
other countries abstained from giving their views with the exception of Saudi Arabia, 
which was very clear in taking a negative position. The Yemen seemed very wise and 
far-sighted. I told them that if we wish to ignore the fact that each country has its 
special position and that Iraq's special circumstances must then be ignored, what was 
their view regarding the Dhahran airbase, the Suez Canal, the Jordanian Treaty and 
the bases in Libya. These are all special conditions. The Saudi Prime Minister rose 
and told us that his country can take over the Dhahran airbase any time it pleases. I 
told him if that is the case please take it tomorrow and hand it over to the Arab 
Collective Security Pact States. 

1 4 A Statement by Major Salah Salim at a Press Conference, on the 
Conference of Arab League Representatives 

February 7, 7955 (/) 

The Arab world is now standing at a crossroad : it will either form an indepen- 
dent and' cohesive unit with its own structure and national character, or else each 
country will' pursue its own course. The latter would mean the beginning of the 
downfall of Arab nationhood. Our policy in Egypt, as declared by our Premier 
Gamal Abd al-Nasir,is based on two important principles, Egyptian nationhood and 
Arab nationhood. Abd al-Nasir has said: "We look at our country and act in the 
light of our own interests, but at the same time we feel that we are bound by a vital 
link, Arab nationhood, which was not as important to Egyptian Statesmen in past 



(/) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), February u, 1955, p. 29. The text is copied 
from^ Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.J7.P., 1958), pp. 323-324. 

236 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

eras as it is now". 

It was to discuss these matters and the dangers threatening us that we invited 
the Arab Premiers to the Cairo conference. After 15 sessions lasting over 75 hours 
we achieved no result, because the different Arab countries could not definitely ex- 
press their views on the problem resulting from Iraq's agreeing to enter alliances out- 
side the collective security pact. Egypt made its views quite clear. It submitted a pro- 
posal for the unification of our ranks by an agreement on a unified Aiab policy and 
full military co-operation. This meant that Egypt was ready to place its army at the 
service of the Arabs and of Arab aims, under a purely Arab command made up from 
all the Arab countries' armies. Thus their training, plans and command would be 
unified. This unified Arab army would be a shield to protect the Arabs. Egypt's pro- 
posal also provided for comprehensive co-operation in the economic field, with each 
Arab country complementing the shortages in the other Arab countries. The Arab 
countries would also have a unified economic programme, covering also their capital 
resources. But, I regret to say, we heard the opposite view from Iraq with regard to 
foreign policy and defence, and we heard no views on the matter from the other Arab 
countries. So the conference ended. 



Communique Issued by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atassi 
on Syrian Policy at the Arab League Conference 

February 8 y 1955 (/) 

Our policy at the recent Arab Premiers' conference in Cairo was based on two 
main points, which constitute our basic foreign policy as agreed on by the Govern- 
ment and by Parliament : not to join any alliance and not to side with either of the 
two Arab "camps". In addition, we exerted every effort to maintain Arab unity and 
co-operation and to prevent the Arab League from weakening or breaking up. 

During the Cairo conference Jordan put forward the following proposal: 

(1) Implementation of the recommendations of the Arab Foreign Ministers. 

(2) Not to join the proposed Iraqi-Turkish alliance. 

(3) Not to agree to the reservations of Iraq. 

(4) The countries that agree to the above three points without reservation 
should join in establishing a peacetime joint military command, which would 
expand into a general command during a war. 

The Iraqi delegation announced that it would withdraw if this proposal were dis- 
cussed. It is obvious that this proposal, if accepted, would have led to the expulsion 
of Iraq from the joint military command envisaged during peace and war, and would 
have created a new situation among the Arab States, and one quite at variance with 
the situation obtaining since the establishment of the Arab League and the collec- 
tive security pact. 

At this stage I again emphasised what I had stated several times before regarding 
the position of Syria towards alliances. I declared that I would not bear the responsibi- 
lity resulting from the acceptance of the Jordanian proposal, and that while I was 
in Cairo I could not approve the creation of a new situation among the Arab States 



(i) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), February u, 1955, p. 35. The text is copied 
from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.t/.P., 195$), pp. 324-325. 



237 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

at variance with the present situation based on constitutionally approved agreements. 
I asked the conference to adopt the Lebanese proposal for the suspension of discus- 
sions until the Beirut meeting on loth February. As neither the Jordan nor the Leba- 
nese proposal was adopted, Egypt asked for the immediate termination of the confer- 
ence with the pro vison that any Arab State might call for a further meeting if necessary. 
The Syrian delegation acted in accordance with the policy, declared in the recent 
statement of the Council of Ministers, of not siding with either of the two Arab 
"camps" ; and it made every effort not to allow any rupture or increase of tension. 
This aspect of Syrian policy in the Arab field has been emphasised by all recent 
Syrian Governments. 



Statement by Paris al-Khouri, Syrian Prime Minister, on the Arab 
League Conference 

February 9, 1955 (i) 

The newspapers have published reports on the discussions which took place and 
the resolutions which were adopted at the Arab Premiers' conference in Cairo. Some 
newspapers have attributed to the Syrian delegation to the conference an attitude 
which is not compatible with the facts. This requires us to explain to the press and to 
the public the discussions which took place during the conference. 

The basic issue for the Cairo conference was the prospective new pact between 
Iraq and Turkey, and the attitude of the member States of the Arab League toward 
this pact. Discussions dealt with the foreign policy of the Arab States and its relation- 
ship to this pact. A proposal on the basis of this policy was moved for discussion, 
and the delegates approved the following paragraph regarding alliances: 

"The foreign policy of the Arab States is based on the Arab League Charter, the 
treaty of joint defence and economic co-operation between the Arab States and the 
Charter. This policy does not approve of concluding other alliances." 

Seven of the conferring States Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia and the Yemen approved this paragraph. Syria was the first to approve and 
vote for this clause. The States which approved it have clearly shown that they do not 
approve of Iraq concluding this new coalition. Thus to say that Syria supported 
Iraq's attitude is untrue. 

Iraq accepted this paragraph, but with the reservation that, while confirming her 
obligations under the Arab League Charter and the treaty of joint defence between 
the member States of the Arab League, Iraq reserves the right to take any additional 
measures to guarantee her own safety. Another clause was also approved by the 
seven conferring Arab States Syria being the first of them to do so stating they 
would not join the projected Iraqi-Turkish pact. These were the questions which 
were the subject of such long discussion and debate during the conference. On these 
Syria adopted a clear attitude in conformity with the Syrian Government's state- 
ment of policy. Newspaper reports to the contrary are untrue. 



(i) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.\ February n 3 1955, pp. 35-36. The text is 
copied from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.L7.P., /95#), p. 325. 



238 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Communique on Talks between Syria and Egypt 1 AH 

Damascus, March 2, 1955 (i) 

The Syrian Premier, Sabri al-Asali, and the Syrian Foreign Minister and acting 
Defence Minister, Khalid al-Azm, and the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, 
Maj. Salah Salim, met in Damascus between 26th February and 2nd March 1955. 
Since complete agreement exists between the Syrian and the Egyptian Governments 
on foreign policy, the two sides discussed the present Arab situation and exchanged 
views on means for strengthening the Arab structure politically, militarily and eco- 
nomically. The two Governments agreed on the following means to achieve their 
objectives: 

(1) Not join the Turkish-Iraqi alliance or any other alliances. 

(2) To set up a joint Arab defence and economic co-operation pact, based on 
the following principles: 

(a) Member States will join in repulsing any aggression which may be 
launched against any member state. 

(b) A joint command will be set up with a permanent HQ to super- 
vise the training of the military forces which will be placed by each 
State at the disposal of that command, and to supervise their arming, 
organisation and distribution according to the joint defence plan. 
This command will also co-ordinate arms industries and ensure the 
necessary communications for military purposes. 

(c) No member State will conclude international military or political 
agreements without the consent of the other member States. 

(d) Member States will work to strengthen their economies. To pave 
the way for comprehensive economic unity the two parties will : 

(i) establish an Arab Bank to issue Arab currency; a technical com- 
mittee will be set up to draw up the outlines of this project, in 
preparation for its approval; 

(ii) revise the Arab trade system and further strengthen it by exempt- 
ing local products and industries from custom duties, or by re- 
ducing these duties to the lowest possible level; 
(iii) encourage the establishment of limited liability companies under 
joint Arab capital to undertake extensive agricultural and industrial 
projects and air and sea transport, insurance and other activities; 
(iv) set up an Arab economic council to direct and supervise this econo- 
mic policy. 

(3 To contact the Arab Governments with a view to submitting the principles 
and basic points mentioned in this communique, and to call upon the Arab States 
which approve them to hold a conference at which the relevant provisions will be 
drawn up for approval; these provisions wil be implemented as soon as they are ap- 
proved. This conference is to be held during March 1955, and is to include Premiers, 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Finance and Economy and Chiefs of 
Staff. 



(/) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B. B. C.), March n, 1955, pp. 36-37* The text is 
copied from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.7.P.,/95#), pp. 326-327. 



239 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

1/10 Communiqu^ on Talks between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
iT*O March 6, 1955 (i) 

On 5th March 1955 a meeting was held in Riyadh, under the chairmanship of 
HM King Saud, between the Saudi Premier and Foreign Minister, Amir Faisal, the 
Syrian Foreign Minister and acting Minister of Defence, Khalid al-Azm, and the 
Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Maj. Salah Salim. At this meeting the points 
agreed on by the Syrian and Egyptian Governments in the joint communique signed 
by Syria and Egypt on 2nd March were discussed. HM King Saud, in the name of the 
Saudi Arabian Kingdom, has completely agreed to the contents of that joint com- 
munique without any reservation; and his Majesty expressed his great desire to hasten 
the holding of the conference called for in the communique so as to achieve the as- 
pirations and objectives of the Arab nation. God is the giver of success. 



1 4Q J ^ Statement on the Syrian-Iraqi Talks 

-* ' ^ Baghdad^ March 19, 1955 (2) 

Between I4th and i8th March meetings and discussions were held between the 
Syrian Foreign Minister, Khalid al-Azm, and the Iraqi authorities headed by the 
Premier, Nuri al-Said. During these talks opinions on all Arab affairs were exchanged 
with complete frankness and good will. The Syrian delegation expressed its sincere 
and brotherly feelings towards Iraq and the other Arab countries, and its earnest 
desire that sincerity, understanding and concord should prevail among all of them, 
so that the supreme Arab interests can be safeguarded. 

In reply, the Iraqi delegation expressed its appreciation of these noble sentiments 
and reiterated its own feelings of brotherhood for the Arab countries, and particularly 
for Syria, whose neighbourly relations and mutual interests with Iraq are well known. 
The Iraqi delegation explained its foreign policy and its relations with its neighbours 
and friends. It affirmed that it continues to place the interests of the Arab countries 
above everything else, and their safety in the face of the Zionist and Communist dan- 
gers. It also affirmed that it fully adheres to the provisions of the Arab League 
Charter and the Arab collective security pact. 

The Syrian delegation has studied the statement of the Iraqi side, and has 
obtained the clarifications it required. It is now fully acquainted with the Iraqi point 
of view, which it has promised to submit to its Government, for the latter to do 
whatever it may think fit in order to unify ranks and achieve the desired under- 
standing among the Arab countries. 

The two delegations expressed their mutual wish for continued joint efforts to 
make the Arab community stronger than it has been. 



(1) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.)> March n } 1955, pp. 57. The text is 
copied from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.LT.P., 1958), p. 327. 

(2) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), March 22, 1955, p. 28. The text is copied 
from Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (O.C7.P., /95#), pp. 327-328. 



240 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

The Syrian Government's Statement on Its 1 CA 
Attitude towards Turkey A J ^ 

Damascus) March 22, 1955 (i) 

The Syrian Government has, on numerous occasions, made unequivocally clear 
its desire to maintain normal relations with its neighbour, Turkey. It (has also made 
it clear) that, in the policy it is following in its (inter-) Arab relations, it has never 
thought of antagonizing (Turkey). Rather has it wanted its relations to be, side by side 
with those of (its) sister Arab States, steered in the direction required by the national 
interests of the Arab nation, that of the preparation of lawful measures, not inconsis- 
tent with the United Nations Charter, for (the purposes of) self-defence and avoid- 
ance of the dangers of aggression. 

In spite of all the assurances officially given by the Syrian Government to the 
representative of Turkey, the Syrian Government has received two memoranda, 
harshly-worded and paying no regard whatever to the natural right of Syria, as a 
sovereign and independent State to pursue the policy dictated by her national 
interests. 

The Turkish Government has expressed in these two memoranda its belief that 
the Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi (Arabian) Communique (2) was directed against it, not 
against Israel, and that Syria's participation in the new Arab Pact necessitated the 
reconsideration by Turkey of her policy towards Syria, and of the relations obtaining 
between the two countries. 

Following that, the Syrian Minister to Ankara submitted to the Turkish Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs a Memorandum in which he expressed once more the non- 
aggressive principles on which Syrian policy is based. He drew attention to the fact 
that the Syrian Government was, in particular, not at all satisfied with the contents 
of the last Turkish Memorandum, either with regard to (its) substance or to its 
wording, which was not consistent with the practices customarily observed in ad- 
dressing independent governments. 

When the Turkish Foreign Minister received the Memorandum of the Syrian 
Minister to Ankara, he did not raise any objection to it, and the conversation that 
took place between him and the Syrian representative was normal and pleasant. But 
on the following morning the Syrian Minister to Ankara was hurriedly summoned to 
meet the Turkish Prime Minister, in the presence of his Foreign Minister. He was 
(then) informed that the Syrian Memorandum could not be accepted by the Turkish 
Government. In justification of that, (certain) reasons were given which the Syrian 
Government does not believe genuine. Following that, the Turkish Government 
made a statement in which it included the (conversation here referred to), and asserted 
its belief that the Government of Syria was showing hostility to the Turkish Govern- 
ment for no reason. 

The Syrian Government, while reaffirming that it desires to maintain normal(^) 
relations with Turkey and that it has no hostile intentions towards her, cannot but 
express its disapproval of these erroneous interpretations of its policy and intentions. 
It is also astonished and amazed at the style chosen by the Turkish Prime Minister 
for expressing the attitude of his Government towards the substance of the Syrian 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat, 
March 23, 1955. 

(2) See Doc. No. 148. ED. 

(3) The Arabic word used here is "tabi'iyya", literally meaning "natural". ED. 



241 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Memorandum. (This style is all the more strange) since it is contrary to the calm 
manner in which the Syrian Government had received the two Turkish Memoranda, 
in spite of their style and contents, because of its desire to retain normal relations 
with Turkey 

The Syrian Government declares that in spite of all these provocative conditions, 
it will remain true to its policy of solving peacefully its problems with Turkey, and 
at the same time continue to implement its ministerial programme, on the basis of 
which it won the confidence of the Chamber. (This it will do), believing that its 
policy of trying to safeguard the integrity of the homeland and to purify the Arab 
atmosphere is dictated by the supreme national interests of the Arab nation. 

Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact 

October 20, 1955 (i) 

Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact 

October 27, 1955 (i) 

(M.E.JSs Editor's Note : The text of these two pacts is identical on most points. An unoffi- 
cial translation of the Egyptian- Syrian Pact in printed below. Where variant readings 
occur , the wording of the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact is given in a footnote.) 
Article I. The two contracting countries affirm their keen desire for lasting security 
and peace and their determination to settle all their international differences by peace- 
ful methods. 

Article 2. The two contracting countries consider any armed attack on the territory 
or forces of one of them as an attack on them both. Consequently, and in exercise 
of the right of individual and collective self-defense, they undertake to extend speedy 
assistance to the attacked country and to take immediately all measures and use all 
means at their disposal, including armed force, to repel the attack and restore security 
and peace. 

In accordance with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, the League Council and the Security Council shall be imme- 
diately informed of the attack and the measures taken to deal with it. 

The two contracting countries pledge that neither of them shall conclude a uni- 
lateral peace settlement or any kind of agreement with the aggressor without the con- 
sent of the other country. 

Article 3. The two contracting countries shall, at the request of either, consult with 
each other whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner 
affecting the security of the Arab area in the Middle East, or the territorial integrity or 
independence or security of any or either country.(2) In the event of an imminent 
threat of war or a sudden international emergency of a menacing nature, the two con- 
tracting countries shall immediately take the preventive and defensive measure re- 
quired by the situation. 
Article 4. In the event of a sudden attack on the borders or the forces of cither of the 



(1) The text is copied from Middle East Journal, vol. 10 (1956), pp. 77-79. 

(2) In the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact the text is as follows: 

The two contracting countries shall) at the request of either, consult with each other 
whenever serious tensions develop in international relations in a manner affecting the 
territorial integrity or independence of either country. (M.E.J.} 



242 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

contracting countries, they shall immediately determine the measures needed to put 

the provisions of this agreement into effect in addition to the military measures taken 

to meet such an attack. 

Article 5. For the fulfillment of the purposes of this agreement, the two contracting 

countries have agreed to establish the following organizational machinery : A supreme 

council - a war council - a joint command. 

Article 6. (a) The Supreme Council shall be composed of the Foreign and War 

Ministers of the two contracting countries. 

(b) It shall be the official authority from which the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Joint Command shall receive all directives relating to military policy. It shall have 
the power to appoint or dismiss the Commander-in-Chief. 

(c) At the suggestion of the War Council, it shall organize the Joint Command, 
define its terms of reference and its duties and make any amendments therein upon 
the recommendation of the War Council. The Supreme Council shall have the right 
to set up any committees or subsidiary or provisional councils whenever such a step is 
deemed necessary. 

(d) The Council shall be empowered to examine the recommendations and deci- 
sions of the War Council on matters outside the jurisdiction of the Chiefs of Staff. 

(e) The Council shall issue rules of procedures for its meetings and for the func- 
tions of the War Council. 

Article 7. (a) The War Council shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the two 
contracting countries. 

(b) It shall serve as the Supreme Council's advisory body. It shall submit 
recommendations and directives in connection with military planning and all the 
duties assigned to the Joint Command. 

(c) The War Council shall make recommendations on war industries and on 
communications facilities required for military purposes, including their coordination 
for the benefit of the Armed Forces in the two contracting countries. 

(d) It shall prepare statistical and other data on the military, natural, industrial, 
agricultural, and other resources and potentialities of the two contracting countries 
and on everything related to their joint war effort. It shall submit to the Supreme 
Council proposals for the exploitation of these resources and potentialities for the 
benefit of the war effort.( /) 

(e) The War Council shall study the programs drawn up by the Joint Command 
for training, organizing, arming, and equipping the forces at its disposal. It shall also 
study the possibilities of applying them to the armies of the two contracting countries 
and shall take the necessary steps to carry them out. It shall submit its findings to the 
Supreme Council for endorsement. 

(f) This Council shall have a permanent military body to make all preparatory 
studies on the questions coming up before it. The Council shall organize the func- 
tions of this body by drawing up procedural rules for this purpose. It shall also draw 
up its budget. 

Article 8. (a) The Joint Command shall consist of: 

(1) The Commander-in-Chief. 

(2) The General Staff. 

(3) The units detached for the security of the Joint Command and the conduct 
of its activities. 



(i) This paragraph is not included in the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact.(M.E.J.) 

243 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

This Command shall be permanent, functioning in peacetime and wartime. 

(b) The Commander-in-Chief shall command the forces put at his disposal. He 
shall be responsible to the Supreme Council. His duties shall be: 

(1) To draw up and implement the programs for training, organizing, arming, 
and equipping the forces placed at his disposal by the two contracting countries so 
that they may become a dependable unified force; and to submit these programs to 
the War Council for examination or to the Supreme Council for endorsement. 

(2) To prepare and carry out joint defense plans to meet all eventualities arising 
from any possible armed attack on one of the two countries or on their forces. For 
the preservation of these plans, he shall rely on the decisions and the directives of the 
Supreme Council. 

(3) To deploy the forces put at his disposal by the two contracting countries in 
peacetime and wartime in accordance with joint defense plans. 

(4) To draw up the budget of the joint Command and to submit it to the War 
Council for consideration prior to final endorsement by the Supreme Council. 

(c) The appointment or dismissal of the Chief Aides of the Commander-in- 
Chief shall be undertaken by the War Council in agreement with the Commander-in- 
Chief. As for the rest of the Command Staff, appointments and dismissals shall be 
undertaken by the Commander-in-Chief in agreement with the Chief of Staff of the 
Army concerned. 

Article 9. (a) The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the Joint 
Command in, peace and wartime, all striking units including the troops concentrated 
on the Palestine borders. The War Council, in conjunction with the Commander-in- 
Chief, will fix the number of troops to be entrusted with each of the two tasks, the 
recommendations of the Council to be considered as final immediately on being ap- 
proved by the Supreme Council. 

(b) The War Council, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, 
shall make a precise list of the installations and bases necessary for the carrying out of 
plans and will decide on priority, (i) 

Article 10. (a) A joint fund in which the two contracting parties will participate shall 
be established for the achievement of the following objectives: 

(1) All expenditures incurred by the Joint Command shall be equally shared by 
the two contracting parties. 

(2) With regard to the expenses for the maintenance of military installations 
mentioned in Article 9, paragraph (b), they shall be borne in the proportion of 65 % by 
the Egyptian Republic and 35% by the Syrian Republic. 

(b) Each of the two contracting states shall pay all salaries and indemnities for 
the military and civil personnel to be seconded for duty by it with the Joint Command, 
the War Council, and other committees in conformity with the financial regulations 
of each of them. (2) 



(1) In the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact the text is as follows: 

Article 9. The two contracting parties will place at the disposal of the Joint Command, 
in peace and wartime, such forces as may be deemed necessary by the War Council in 
agreement with the Commander-in-Chief. This shall be done with the approval of the 
the Supreme Council. (M.E.J.) 

(2) In the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact the text is as follows: 

Article 10. Each of the two contracting countries shall pay the salaries and remuneration 
of the military and civilian personnel attached to the Joint Command, the War Council* 
and other committees in accordance with its own financial regulations. (M.E.J.) 

244 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Article 1 1 . None of the provisions of this pact shall in any way affect or be intended to 
affect the rights and obligations which may result from or which may accrue in con- 
formity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter or with the responsibilities 
borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of world peace 
and security. 

Article 12. This treaty shall be for a term of 10 years automatically renewable for 
further terms of 5 years.( i) Each of the two contracting parties may terminate the 
pact by notifying the other party at least one year before the expiration of any of the 
above terms. 

Article 13. This treaty shall be approved in conformity with the constitutional rules 
in force in each of the two countries, the instruments of ratification to be exchanged 
at the Syrian Foreign Ministry in Damascus within a period not exceeding 30 days 
from the date of the signing of the pact which will come into force immediately on the 
exchange of the documents. (2) 

Exchange of Messages between King Saud, President Quwatli and 
President Nasser in Cairo and King Hussein Regarding 

Arab Aid for Jordan 

March 8-17, 1956 (3) 

(a) Message from King Saud, President Quwatli , and Colonel 
Nasser, 8 March, 1956 

Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings. 

H.E. Sayid Said al Ghazzy is conveying to Your Majesty our Arab brotherly 
greetings, coupled with our true appreciation and the renewal of our desire already 
expressed for holding a quadripartite conference with Your Majesty, either in Amman 
or in any of the other three capitals to discuss Arab problems and to take steps towards 
a complete and firm understanding among the Arab States - the details of which will 
be conveyed to Your Majesty by H.E. Sayid Said al Ghazzy. 

We take this opportunity to reiterate what has been formerly expressed to Your 
Majesty regarding our complete readiness to cooperate with Jordan and to stand at 
her side. 
March 8, 1956. 

(Signed) SAUD SHUKRI KUWATLY JAMAL ABDUL NASER 

(b) Reply by King Hussein 
H.M. King Saud 
H.E. Sayid Shukri Kuwatly 
President Jamal Abdul Naser 
Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings. 

I received your message of March 8th, 1956, conveyed by H.E. Sayid Said al 



(1) In the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact the text is as follows: 

This treaty shall be for a term of 5 years automatically renewable for further terms of 
5years t (M.EJ.) 

(2) This paragraph not included in the Egyptian- Saudi Arabian Pact. (M.E.J.) 

(3) Translated by the British Foreign Office from text pubished in Jordaniannewspapers 
on March 29, 1956; copied from Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.U.P., 
I959)> PP* 34-3*. 

245 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Ghazzy which contained your true Arab brotherly greetings for which I return the 
same feelings with great appreciation. 

I listened very carefully to the details conveyed by H.E. 
I thank you for your great sympathy and noble concern. 

However, regarding your noble desire for holding a quadripartite conference either 
in Amman or in any of the other three capitals, to discuss Arab problems and to take 
steps towards a complete and firm understanding among the Arab States, I have the 
pleasure of reminding my dear brothers that this matter was the subject of previous 
messages already addressed to the Kings and Heads of other Arab States, conveyed 
to you personally in March last through my Prime Minister Sayid Samir Rifai and the 
Head of the Royal Diwan Sayid Bah j at Talhuni and was the subject of talks among 
yourselves. 

Replies to these messages were received from H.M. King Faisal of Iraq and H.E. 
Lebanese President who confirmed their support and acceptance. Replies of support 
but not of acceptance were also received from H.M. King Saud and H.E. President 
Shukri Kuwatly. No reply has yet been received to the message from Premier Jamal 
Abdul Naser. 

In addition, I explained in my messages, as I considered to be my duty, to my 
dear brothers what has been and still is disturbing me, namely the aggressive inten- 
tions of Israel and my hope of uniting all ranks and all the powers of the Arab States to 
face the evil threat and the danger which are confronting our dear national home. 
I also suggested the idea of holding a conference among themselves in Amman for 
this purpose. 

In view of this situation, which I always have and still hope to be the source of 
appreciation and the support of my dear brothers, I cannot agree to any diversion 
from this idea which I have already expressed and which has received the support 
and acceptance of a group of other dear friends. To take a new stand as proposed in 
your brotherly message to be limited to the four of us does not, in my opinion, agree 
with the noble aims which we all wish and it does not serve the interests which we all 
endeavour to realise for the welfare of our noble nation, the defence of its dignity and 
the guarantee of its future. 

I have explained these matters to your messenger which he will in turn convey 
to you. 

I take the opportunity to express my thanks and appreciation to your readiness 
to support Jordan and to stand at her side. 
I convey to Your Majesty and Your Excellencies my greetings etc. 

(Signed) HUSSEIN IBN TALAL 

(c) Message from King Saud, President Quwatli, and Colonel Nasser, 12 March 1956 

H.M. King Hussein 

Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings. 

In appreciation of the supreme Arab interests for liberation and defence against Israel 

and the Jewish threat, the Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Syria and Egypt confirm previous 

written and oral messages regarding the offer of aid to Jordan to replace the British 

subsidy to the Arab Legion and the National Guard in the event of the stoppage of 

the British subsidy. The aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue for 

a period of not less than 10 years. 

246 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

At the same time we express our readiness to coordinate military cooperation 
with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and consider any aggression on Jordan as 
directed against any other Arab State, and the armistice lines of all Arab States as 
one line. 

Please accept our greetings etc. 
March I2th 1956. 

(Signed) SAUD SHUKRI KUWATLY JAMAL ABDUL NASER 

(d) Reply by King Hussein, 17 March 1956 
H.M. King Saud 
H.E. President Shukry Kuwatly 
H.E. Premier Jamal Abdul Naser 
Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings. 

I received with thanks and appreciation your message which says that the three 
sister States, the Saudi Arabia Kingdom., Syria and Egypt, have offered aid to Jordan 
to replace the British subsidy to the Arab Legion and the National Guard in the 
event of the stoppage of the British subsidy, and that the aid will be extended to the 
Hashemite Kingdom for a period of not less than 10 years. 

I wish to express my great thanks and appreciation for the noble brotherly sym- 
pathy shown by this noble offer. I do not doubt the noble Arab spirit of this offer 
which is a true guarantee to our hopes of realising the ties of cooperation and dignity 
to our noble nation. 

However, the subsidy which the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan obtains from 
Britain in accordance with the provisions of the existing treaty between the two 
countries is part of Britain's commitments according to the treaty. On this basis, 
Jordan has the full right to request the British side to fulfil them so long as the treaty 
remains in power, but I welcome any aid you offer to my country. 

At the same time, my country declares that she is ready to coordinate military 
plans among ourselves in the face of the common enemy and reiterate what I have 
previously said that the armistice lines of all Arab States are one and I am glad that 
you have the same views, as already confirmed by your side. 

Greetings etc. 

March iyth 1956. (Signed) HUSSEIN IBN TALAL 

Communiqu Issued by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria ] ju. 

March 12, 1956(1) 

In the grave circumstances that now surround the Arab countries and threaten 
their security, we have seen fit to meet in order to study all the aspects of the situa- 
tion, and to complete consultations that had been previously going on between our 
governments and to conclude them with whatever resolutions we deem necessary. 

Our meetings have thus taken place in the period from Tuesday, March 6, to 
Sunday, March n, 1956. 

(i) The text is copied from the Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 7 (1956), pp. 143-145. 

247 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Our views on all problems laid down for discussion were identical. Hence, we 
have been able to unify our wills for the execution of an all conclusive plan which 
will be our shield against all eventualities or unpleasant surprises. 

Our talks have been conducted in an atmosphere of true friendship, which was 
supported and strengthened by our mutual understanding and cemented by our 
unified, unshakable faith in Arabism and our boundless confidence in a happy future 
for the Arab Nation. 

Our will has been strengthened and our spirit augmented by what we observe 
with satisfaction namely, the increased national consciousness of the Arab Nation. 
We look with confidence and admiration to the great role that Arab public opinion 
has come to play with enlightened awareness and unfaltering courage. 

We have examined the situation in the Middle East in all its aspects. We are all 
agreed to work for peace. Its realization and preservation can only be founded on 
true cooperation between nations, a cooperation based on the respect for the inde- 
pendence of each country, of human rights, the United Nations Charter, and 
the principles underlying it, as well as absolute equality between nations. 

We staunchly believe that the real peace which our countries, together with all 
the other nations in the world, look forward to, will not prevail unless every 
nation is inspired by such principles in the formulation of its policy toward other 
nations. In this way, the tension arising from the interference of some nations in 
the internal affairs of others, as well as from the exercising of pressure by differ- 
ent ways and means, will ease considerably. 

We hereby declare our determination to safeguard the Arab world against the 
evils of the cold war by keeping it away from its diverse currents, and again, by 
adopting an unbiased policy toward it. We will thus preserve its true interests. 

We also declare that the defense of the Arab world should spring right from the 
heart of the Arab Nation in accordance with the requirements of its own security, 
away from all foreign pacts which try to utilize defense organizations in serving 
the personal interests of any of the great powers, sacrificing, meanwhile, Arab in- 
terests and aspirations and doing away with the unity of our Nation. 

It pleases us on this occasion to reaffirm our strong stand for the principles an- 
nounced in the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, for we conside these principles 
to be the landmark guiding our policy in the international sphere. 

In the period extending from March 6 to March n, 1956, there met in Cairo: 
His Majesty King Saud ben Abdel Aziz, His Excellency el Sayed Shukry al-Ku- 
watly and Premier Gamal Abd an Nasser. 

The heads of state held several meetings, wherein they studied the situation 
in the Middle East in the light of the principles and bases embodied in their state- 
ment. They have come to well-defined decisions concerning the problems which 
were laid before them. The following are some of them : 

1. An all-conclusive plan was set up for ensuring Arab security, preserving the 
safe structure of the Arab Nation and defending it against the dangers of Zionist 
aggression and foreign domination, which prevent a state of peace and stability from 
reigning over the area, thus creating a state of tension and constituting a threat. 

2. An all-conclusive plan was laid down to coordinate Arab defense plans in or- 
der to face any act of violence that Israel -which persists in pursuing an aggressive 
policy defying the principles of law and justice, and ignoring United Nations resolu- 
tions - might resort to. 

3. An all-conclusive plan also was set up regarding the situation arising from 
the stand certain states have adopted by allowing the recruitment of their sub- 

248 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

jects into the Israeli armed forces. 

4. An agreement has been reached as to the stand the security of the Arab nations 
necessitates regarding the supply of Israel with arms which allow her to persist in her 
policy of aggression. 

5. An all-conclusive plan was laid down to counteract attempts exerted through 
the Baghdad pact to bring pressure to bear upon Arab countries, endangering 
Arab security and disuniting the common Arab front at a time when the Arab coun- 
tries feel they are in bitter need of being united in effort and policy. 

6. It has been agreed that all possible support should be given to Jordan, and 
every help be extended to her in the event of any foreign pressure or Zionist aggres- 
sion, thus insuring for the courageous people of Jordan the realization of their aspira- 
tions. 

The conferees contacted His Majesty, King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, to convey this to him and to confirm the utter and complete readiness 
previously expressed to assist Jordan and stand by her side. 

7. An all-conclusive plan was set up by the conferees to strengthen the ties bind- 
ing the Arab world and foster cooperation between the Arab countries on the largest 
scale possible, so as to realize purely Arab aims. The conferees also studied ways and 
means of achieving Arab unity, which the three heads of state staunchly believe to 
be the strongest safeguard guaranteeing the independence of the Arab countries 
and securing a means for the completion of their progress. 

8. The conferees set up another all-conclusive plan for the coordination of 
Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian policy in political, military, economic and cultural fields, aim- 
ing by such thorough coordination at the mobilization of all forces and their direction 
toward the realization of the general good of the Arab Nation. 

9. The conferees also formulated a plan to face the problem arising from the 
British occupation of the Buraimi Oasis and the Oman Emirate, and defined the 
means leading to the ending of this dispute in a way which preserves to these areas 
their Arab character and prevents any breach of their sovereignty. 

10. The conferees have decided after extensive examination of the present situa- 
tion in North Africa, that French policy which persists in violating the rights of the 
North African peoples gravely threatens the peace of that area. France has to recog- 
nize the rights of the North African peoples to independence in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principle that all peoples have the right 
to national self-determination. 

11. After studying all Arab questions, the conferees decided to utilize all possible 
means of leading to a just solution of these problems in a manner compatible with 
Arab sovereignty and rights. 

Communique on the Talks between King Hussein and 

President Quwatli 

Damascus, April, u, 1956 (i) 

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate. On Tuesday 29th Shaban 



(i) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), April 17, 1956, p. 27. The text is copied from 
Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.U.P., 1959), pp. 38-39. 



249 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

1375, equivalent to loth April 1956, King Husain of Jordan and President Shukri al- 
Quwwatli of Syria held a series of talks in which Samir al-Rifai, the Premier of 
Jordan, and Sa'id al-Ghazzi, the Premier of Syria, took part. They discussed various 
matters and questions of interest to the Arab world in general and to Jordan and 
Syria in particular. 

The talks were characterised by a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood as a result 
of the sincere brotherhood, firm love and unshaken confidence in the future of the 
Arab nation which bind the two countries. These are derived from the national con- 
sciousness in the world of Arabdom. 

Complete agreement was reached on the various points discussed. The follow- 
ing was decided. 

(i) In view of the fact that Israel is pursuing a clearly aggressive policy, disre- 
garding the UN resolutions, and endeavouring to create a state of tension and to dis- 
turb peace and security along the armistice lines, both parties wish to confirm their 
previous declaration, that these lines around Israel are considered as a single defence 
line, by placing it on practical bases. It was agreed that the competent military author- 
ities should undertake to co-ordinate the two armies' defence plans and military co- 
operation in general in order to repel and resist any Jewish attack on the armistice 
lines, to unify efforts, and consolidate the two countries' defensive forces. 

The two parties affirm that the responsibility for the defence of their countries, 
and of all the Arab homeland, against the aggressive Jewish danger falls on all the 
Arab countries. Acting on this consideration, the two parties agreed to unify their 
efforts and endeavours to tighten the bonds of cordiality and brotherhood among all 
the Arab countries, and to obtain joint co-operation between them for the co-ordina- 
tion and unification of military plans, defensive forces, and all other means of co-op- 
eration, in order to resist this threatening danger. 

(ii) The Arab countries alone shall be considered as being entitled to defend 
themselves and to repulse aggression against their territory. 

(iii) The two parties agree that their policy is based on non-accession to foreign 
alliances. 

(iv) The two parties shall endeavour to promote close co-operation between the 
two countries in the economic and cultural fields in order to attain the common 
objective - comprehensive Arab unity. 



156 



Military Pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen 

April 2i, 1956 (i) 

The Governments of the Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the Kingdom of the Yemen, in order to strengthen the Arab League Charter and in 
proof of the loyalty of the contracting States to these principles ; in a desire to add to 
the strengthening and tightening of military co-operation; in eagerness to maintain the 
independence of their countries and to preserve their security; in the conviction 
that the establishment of a collective security between them is considered a main 



(7) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), April 24, 1956, pp. 30-32. The text is copied 
from Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.U.P., 1959), pp. 43-46. 



250 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

factor in ensuring the security and independence of each of them, and in realisation 
of their aspiration for collective defence of their entity; in order to maintain security 
and peace in accordance with the Arab League Charter and the UN Charter and its 
aims; and in implementation of the provisions of Paragraph I, Article 9 of the Arab 
League Charter: have agreed to conclude a pact for this purpose, and delegated the 
following representatives : 

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Egypt, the Premier Gamal Abd 
al-Nasir; on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His 
Majesty King Saud ibn Abd Al Aziz; on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of 
the Yemen, His Majesty the Imam Ahmed. 

After exchanging the documents of authorisation which give them full authority 
and which were found correct and in good form, they have agreed as follows : 

Article i : The contracting States declare their eagerness for the perpetuation of 
security and peace and stability and their determination to settle all international 
disputes by peaceful means. 

Article 2: The contracting States consider any armed aggression committed 
against any State thereof or against their forces as an aggression against them. There- 
fore, and in implementation of the legitimate individual and collective right for the 
defence of their entity, each of them is bound to hasten to the assistance of the State 
against whom aggression is committed and to adopt forthwith all measures and to use 
all means at its disposal, including the use of its armed forces, in order to repel ag- 
gression and to restore security and peace. 

In implementation of the provisions of Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and 
Article 5 1 of the UN Charter, the League Council and the Security Council will be 
notified forthwith of any aggression committed and of arrangements and measures 
taken in this respect. The contracting States undertake not to conclude a separate 
peace or any agreement with the aggressor without the consent of the other two States. 

Article 3 : The contracting States will consult one another at the request of any 
of them whenever international relations become seriously strained or disturbed in a 
manner which may affect the security of the territory or the independence of any one 
of the contracting States. In the event of the danger of imminent war or the existence 
of a sudden emergency which is deemed dangerous, the contracting States will hasten 
at once to take the precautionary and defensive measures which the situation requires. 

Article 4 : In the event of a sudden aggression against the borders or the forces 
of one of the contracting States, in addition to the military measures which will be 
adopted to face this aggression the three States will immediately resolve upon the 
measures to put the plans of this agreement into effect. 

Article 5 : In implementation of the purposes of this agreement the contracting 
States have decided to set up the following : a Higher Council, a Military Council, and 
a Joint Command. 

Article 6 : (a) The Higher Council will be composed of ministers of foreign affairs 
and defence of the contracting States. It is the official body to which the commander- 
in-chief of the Joint Command shall refer, and from which he shall obtain higher di- 
rectives concerning military policy. The Higher Council is empowered to appoint 
and dismiss the commander-in-chief. 

(b) The Higher Council, at the proposal of the Military Council, will draw 
up the regulations of the Joint Command and define its competence and duties. It is 
responsible for the amendments which may be introduced to it at the recommenda- 
tion of the Military Council. The Higher Council has the right to set up committees 
and sub-councils or temporary councils when deemed necessary. 



251 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

(c) The Higher Council is responsible for taking up recommendations and 
decisions issued by the Military Council which are outside the framework of the 
chiefs-of-staff agreements. 

(d) The Higher Council issues the rules and regulations, and organises the 
meetings and the work of the Military Council. 

Article 7: (a) The Military Council is composed of the Chief of the Egyptian 
Army Staff, the Chief of the Saudi Arabian Army Staff and the Chief of the Yemeni 
Army Staff. It is the advisory body to the Higher Council. It is responsible for mak- 
ing recommendations and putting out directives with regard to military plans and for 
all duties and activities assigned to the Joint Command. 

(b) The Military Council will issue its recommendations concerning war 
industries and communications necessary for military purposes, their co-ordination 
and management to serve the military forces, and everything connected with them in 
the contracting States. 

(c) The Military Council will study the programmes drafted by the Com- 
mand for training, organising, equipping and arming the forces placed under its com- 
mand. It will also study the possibility of applying them to all the armies of the 
contracting States. It will take measures to ensure their implementation, and will sub- 
mit to the Higher Council what it decides upon for ratification. 

(d) This Council has a permanent military organisation which will under- 
take all studies and preparations for the subjects and questions submitted to it, and 
the Higher Council will regulate this organisation by rules and regulations drafted 
for this purpose. The Council will also draft its Budget. 

Article 8: (a) The Joint Command includes the commander-in-chief and the 
staff of the units to be assigned to ensure the Joint Command and the administration 
of its function. This Command will perform its work in times of peace and war and it 
has a permanent status. 

(b) The commander-in-chief will lead the forces to be placed under his 
command, and is responsible to the Higher Council. 

(c) The commander-in-chief will have the following powers: (i) drafting 
and implementing programmes for training, organising, arming and equipping the 
forces which will be put by the contracting States under his command so that they 
may become a unified force, as well as submitting these programmes to the Military 
Council; (2) preparing and implementing the joint defence plans to meet any expected 
or likely armed aggression which may be committed against any of the contracting 
States or their forces - in preparing these plans he will depend on the resolutions and 
directives drawn up by the Higher Council; (3) distribution of the forces put by the 
contracting State under his command in peace and war, in accordance with the joint 
defence plans; (4) drawing up the Budget of the Joint Command, submitting it to the 
Military Council for study, then having it finally ratified by the Higher Council. 

(d) The appointment and dismissal of the senior assistants of the com- 
mander-in-chief are to be made with the knowledge of the Military Council in agree- 
ment with the commander-in-chief. As for the remaining members of the Command 
organisation, they are appointed by agreement between the commander-in-chief and 
the chief of the army staff concerned. 

Article 9: The contracting States will place at the disposal of the Joint Command 
in time of peace and war any forces which the Military Council, in agreement with the 
commander-in-chief, deems as necessary to be placed under its command subject 
to the approval of the Higher Council. 

Article 10 : Each of the contracting States will pay the salaries and compensation 

252 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

to military men and civilians selected for work for the Joint Command, the Military 
Council, or other committees in accordance with their respective financial regulations. 

Article n : There is nothing in the provisions of this pact which may affect or 
be intended to affect in any way the rights and obligations which are or may be bind- 
ing on any of the contracting States in accordance with the UN Charter and the re- 
sponsibilities which the Security Council shoulders in order to maintain universal 
peace and security. 

Article 12 : The period of this pact is five years, which is automatically renewable 
for a further five years, and so on. Any of the contracting States may withdraw from 
the pact after notifying the other two States in writing of its desire to do so one year 
prior to the date of termination of any of the periods aforementioned. 



Communiqu^ on the Talks between King Saud, Colonel Nasser, and 1 C H 

the Imam Ahmed *%// 

Jidda, April 21, 1956 (i) 

On loth and i ith Ramadan hijra year 1375 - zoth and 2ist April 1956 - the Imam 
Ahmed the King of the Yemen, Gamal Abd al-Nasir the head of the Egyptian Govern- 
ment and King Saud I of Saudi Arabia met in Jidda. During these two days several 
meetings were held, during which questions of interest to the three countries in par- 
ticular and relating to maintaining peace and security in the Arab world in general 
were discussed. Talks and consultations among the three Heads of State were con- 
ducted in an atmosphere of friendship and complete understanding. The three lead- 
ers worked for consolidating friendly co-operation among their three countries, taking 
into account the aspkations of the Arab nation for freedom, honour, peace and security. 
Their meetings ended with the conclusion of a tripartite defence agreement which 
was signed by the three leaders. The meetings have also served as an opportunity 
to exchange views for drawing up practical plans to strengthen economic, cultural 
and technical links between the three countries, and to consolidate their co-operation 
for the good and well-being of the Arab nation. 



Extract from a Speech by Samir ar-Rifa'i, Prime Minister ICO 
of Jordan, in the Chamber of Deputies Regarding Foreign 1 3 O 

Aid to Jordan and Oil Revenues 

May 7, 1956 (2) 

I shall begin by dealing with the Arab aid referred to by certain Deputies. I wish 
to reaffirm in present circumstances what I have frequently stated before, namely 
that the Government has welcomed and always will welcome Arab aid, whether it be 
aid which in fact has been offered or any aid which may be offered in the future. It is 



(j) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), April 24, 1956, p. 30. The text is copied from 
Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.L7.P., 1959)* PP* 42-43. 
(2) Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), May 11, 1956, p. 27. The text is copied from 
Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.U.P., 1959), pp. 46-47. 



253 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

enough to say that the letters exchanged by the King and his brethren, the leaders of 
the Arab countries concerned, which have been released for publication, were very 
frank on this subject j they expressed Jordan's receptive attitude towards Arab aid. 

However, there is a point which I would like to clarify at this juncture because 
certain Deputies have linked Arab aid with British aid. This financial aid from Bri- 
tain is provided for in the Anglo- Jordanian Treaty of Alliance. It is neither a dona- 
tion nor a grant. It is wrong of us to continue to give it names that do not indicate 
its true nature. It is merely an obligation imposed on Britain, among the obligations 
incumbent upon her under the Treaty, in return for Jordan's obligations towards 
Britain. 

If someone claims that the Government should abandon this aid, and 
that it should be replaced by Arab aid, this means that the Jordanian Govern- 
ment must exempt Britain from an obligation while retaining Jordan's obligations. 
This is not a correct principle in international relations based on alliances. Further- 
more, Britain is not entitled to cut off the aid, which is a contractual obligation, unless 
she wishes to provoke Jordan into relinquishing her own obligations. I do not believe 
that Britain intends to follow such a course. 

The method of paying this aid is another matter. I am happy to inform the Cham- 
ber that the Government is giving due consideration to this question. It has initiated 
the necessary measures to deal with the problem. The Government will submit the 
outcome of its efforts to your Chamber as soon as possible. 

Another point I wish to speak about is the revenue from the petroleum company. 
Certain Deputies raised this question when they said that the Iraq Petroleum Com- 
pany paid the Syrian Government large sums of money in the way of increases ; they 
criticised the Government for not taking any action to claim a similar increase. In 
reality, this information is wrong. Following the completion of its agreement with 
the Syrian Govcrnent to increase the royalties, the Iraq Petroleum Company began 
negotiations with the Lebanese Government. The Jordanian Government is awaiting 
the completion of these negotiations before beginning its own discussions with the 
company on the basis of the results achieved by the two sister Governments. 

In regard to the TAP-line Company, the concession agreed upon with it includes 
a condition providing clearly that any increase secured by any other neighbouring 
Arab country automatically becomes applicable to the Jordanian Government without 
the need for negotiations in this respect. For this reason, the Government is awaiting 
the outcome of the TAP-line negotiations with the Syrian and Lebanese Govern- 
ments, so as to secure the same rights. 



ICQ Statement by General 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Joint Arab Command 

November 30, 1956 (/) 

During the year 195 6 Egypt became bound by military agreements with the King- 
dom of Saudi Arabia, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the Yemeni Kingdom and 
the Syrian Republic. The five countries were committed to hasten co-ordination of 



(j) Summary of World Broadcasts Part IV, The Arab World, Israel, Greece, Turkey, 
Persia (Monitoring Service of the B.B.C.), December 5, 1956, p. 6. The text is copied 
frjm Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (O.U.P.., 1959), p. 342-343. 



254 



International Affairs: Treaties) Agreements) Relationships 

military efforts in face of any armed Israeli aggression on any one of them in defence 
of their territory and freedom. 

When the Israeli aggression opened against Egypt on the evening of 29th 
October, in my capacity as C-in-C of the joint Arab forces, I issued instructions to 
put into effect the plans prepared to meet this treacherous aggression. On the evening 
of 30th October Syrian armoured units began to move from their concentration points 
to areas allocated for their operations within the territory of the Hashimite Kingdom 
of Jordan. The Saudi forces were assigned to move to the Jordanian-Israeli front to 
undertake a joint operation with the Arab Jordanian army and the National Guard. 
The nature of these movements required that they should be accomplished in com- 
plete secrecy and that operations should begin as soon as the common enemy exhaust- 
ed his military potentials in his attack on Egypt. Thus the larger success would be 
achieved in the operations on other fronts. 

After the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt on 30th October, and the partici- 
pation of the French air force in the Sinai operations, the General Command clearly 
saw that the battle in progress put Egypt against the two Western countries. Israel 
was merely a tool used by imperialism to create sufficient justification for interven- 
tion against Egypt. Thus the Egyptian Government decided not to involve the Arab 
States in military operations which would not have decisive results with regard to the 
Anglo-French attack on Egypt. Orders were therefore issued to the commands of 
the joint forces to avoid taking part in substantial military operations. The objective 
of these forces was defined as the defence of their own territories against any attack. 
Only thus were we able to avoid providing justification for a wider intervention 
against the whole Middle East area. We were also able to maintain the security of 
those two sister countries and of their forces. 

The battle against imperialism has not yet ended, and our forces and the forces of 
the Arab States are prepared to face any aggression in a unified joint operation. We 
shall fight together and victory will be our ally, by the will of God. 

Speech by Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id of Iraq, Concerning ] (\(\ 
the Baghdad Pact, Transmitted by the Iraqi 
Broadcasting Station 

December } i6 3 1956(1) 

My Compatriots: 

The Arab nation is passing to-day through a stage more complicated and graver 
than any which it has ever witnessed in its recent history. For it to emerge success- 
fully from this stage demands a great deal of patience and wisdom and a greater 
amount of co-operation and solidarity among all the responsible and non-respon- 
sible^) members of the Arab nation, so that they may come out victorious and proud 
from the crisis at this phase. The succession of events and developments have been so 
swift during this stage that I found myself compelled to talk to you about them. 
I would have preferred that (this) talk should take place after the withdrawal of the ag- 



(1) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text published by the Iraqi 
Directorate-General of Guidance and Broadcasting) and courteously supplied by the 
Iraqi Embassy) Beirut. 

(2) By "non-responsible" is presumably meant "not in power 9 '. ED. 



255 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

gressive forces from the Arab territory occupied by them following the recent vicious 
aggression. 

But since His Excellency President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir has spoken, and since 
His Excellency President Shukri al-Quwwatly has also spoken, and the evacuation 
has taken its imminent course, I, too, have found myself in duty bound to speak to 
my brethern, the sons of the Arab Nation in general, and to my honourable compa- 
triots, the sons of Iraq, in particular. (This is) in order to unveil certain truths which 
have remained hidden from public opinion for quite a time. 

But before I start my talk, I wish to draw attention to the fact that every states- 
man has the right to risk his property or his reputation or even his own life, but he has 
no right to risk the safety of his nation and the very being of his country. 

It is the duty of the judicious and honest statesman to bear first and foremost in 
mind the safety of his country, its protection from foreign aggression, the safeguarding 
of the security of the citizens, and the means of assuring an honourable life for them. 
If the statesman has faith in this and does his best to achieve it, he may have his con- 
science clear and may also tolerate (all) the comments and accusations his actions may 
be exposed to, for lying will not get one very far ( j) and the light of the sun cannot be 
obstructed by a riddle. 

Gentleman: 

My talk to you to-day falls in two parts : the first will contain a review of the rela- 
tions between Iraq and the Soviet Union, and the second will be restricted to the 
relations between Iraq and the Arab countries and to the Baghdad Pact. 

Gentlemen : 

In the year 1934 Soviet Russia was accepted as a member of the League of 
Nations, upon an invitation signed by 34 States out of a total of over 50 Member 
States of the League of Nations. Iraq was among the 34 States who signed the invita- 
tion; her signature of the invitation at the time was a definite proof of her good in- 
tentions towards the Russian people. At the general session of the League of Nations, 
which was held in that year, I was approached by Comrade Lietvinoff, the Foreign 
Minister of Russia and her delegate to the session, who broached the subject of the 
necessity for the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations between Iraq and Rus- 
sia. I answered him (by saying) that the necessity of the exchange of diplomatic 
relations between any two countries is determined by their mutual interests, such as 
the existence of commercial and economic relations between them or the residence of 
subjects of one country in the other, and that all such factors were lacking (in the case 
of) Iraq and Communist Russia; the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
our two countries under such circumstances would therefore be meaningless unless 
the object behind it was the spreading of Communist propaganda in Iraq, (a course) 
which would definitely give rise to troubles and disturbances in our country, in view 
of the conflict between Communist principles and our (own) customs, traditions and 
religion. It would (also) lead to the deterioration of the relations between Iraq and 
Russia. Then I told him that for this reason I found it useless at the time to establish 
diplomatic relations between our two countries, in view of my concern for the 
maintenance of good relations between them, and that the non-existence of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries should by no means imply that the relations 



(/) The literal translation of this clause is: "the thread of lies is short". ED. 

256 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

(between them) were not good. Thus, the relations between Iraq and the Scandina- 
vian States, the Latin American, and many others of the Asiatic States were excellent 
in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations between Iraq and these States. 

The Russians later on made repeated attempts for the establishment of such 
relations, and Iraq held to her previous point of view until the outbreak of the Second 
World War, when Russia joined the Allies and both the American and the British 
Governments started supplying Russia with military and other aid through the Per- 
sian Gulf. A Russian mission arrived at Basra in order to facilitate the passage of the 
supplies to Russia. The mission took advantage of this opportunity to start 
contacting some of the Iraqi nationals, especially those who were professing socialism. 
The Russian Government exploited those special circumstances and succeeded in the 
establishment of political relations between the two countries in 1945. The Russian 
Legation in Baghdad was soon to become a centre for various kinds of propaganda. 
Communist books and pamphlets were distributed by the thousand daily. The pre- 
mises of the Legation became a nest for conspiracies and subversive and destructive 
acts in Iraq and the other neighbouring Arab and non-Arab countries. 

Gentlemen: 

I had already, a long time ago, warned the noble Iraqi nation of the Communist 
and Zionist dangers, and I had made the following declaration at a Press conference 
held at the Office of the Prime Minister on January 22, 1947: 

"Communism made its appearance for the first time in the Middle East in 
Palestine in 1929 or 1930. The danger of Zionism and of Communism in this 
country makes us apprehensive of any aid which may carry with it absurd theories in 
the name of the interests of these countries. Can we, thus, accept the view that the 
enemy of my enemy is my ally?" 

This statement was published in detail in the Iraqi papers, including cc az-Zaman" 
in its two issues of January 24 and 25, 1947. 

I believe that the majority of the noble citizens remember the contents of the 
statement which I made at the above Press conference, in the course of which I 
explained the close collaboration between Communism and Zionism in Iraq, 
through Yusuf Salman, Ibrahim Shmayl, Yacoub Afrayem, Isaac and Naji Shmayl, 
and others, and how they started their activities among the students. 

I do not believe that any of the esteemed listeners has forgotten the sanguinary 
events which took place in Iraq shortly before the Palestine War, and how the 
national (political) parties in Iraq did their very best to calm down the situation, 
with no one responding to their appeals. (This was) because the Communists and 
the subversive elements had dominated the situation and wrenched the initiative from 
the national parties until the declaration of martial law as a result of the Palestine 
War, when security was re-established and when the rule of law predominated. 

It appeared from the minute investigations carried out by the Iraqi Government 
that it was the Russian Legation in Baghdad which was financing the subversive 
elements and the saboteurs for the purpose of organizing demonstrations and for the 
spreading of disorder and the diffusion of fear among the secure citizens. The Govern- 
ment seized several documents confirming the activities of the Russian Legation in 
stirring up revolt in the country. The Government therefore decided to close the 
Iraqi Legation in Moscow and to recall its officials, and also requested the Russian 
Government to withdraw its officials from Baghdad. The Russian Government 
complied with this request, but assigned all the Russian officials who, left Baghdad to 
the Russian Legation in Damascus so that they might continue their Communist 



257 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

activities in Iraq from there and be in constant touch with their collaborators in 
the Iraqi territory. 

It is worth noting that similar acts of destruction, subversion and disorder were 
carried out by the Communists in our dear neighbour Iran. 

You will all remember the Tudeh Party, the Supporters of Peace and the Demo- 
cratic Youth; and all of you will remember how Russia succeeded in the establish- 
ment of the Republic of Azarbayjan under the Presidency of Ja'far Bushary. You 
will (further) remember how Mr. Musaddiq (Mossadegh) surrendered to the Commu- 
nists and how they took advantage of the principle of the nationalization of oil in 
order to spread anarchy and poverty in Iran. Our hearts were trembling with fear 
over our dear neighbour and over the dangers to which Iraq would be exposed in the 
event of the success of the Russian plans to destroy the existing regime in Iran and 
add it to the countries falling behind the Iron Curtain. But God the Almighty and 
the Judicious decreed the salvation of Iran at the hands of His Majesty the Shah of 
Iran and (those) of her faithful leaders. They all held firm in the face of the storm, 
and the people rallied around the throne of His Majesty and His wise Government, 
thus crushing the subversive elements, and the country returned to its unity and to 
its state of tranquillity and stability. 

It is useful to mention here that the French Communist Party was in close 
contact with the Communists and with their cells in those Arab countries which were 
at the time under the French mandate. It was this Party which was organizing and 
financing the (Communist) branches in the Arab countries. 

Collaboration between the Communist Zionists in Iraq and the Commu- 
nists in Israel was close. This was clearly confirmed by the documents published 
in several volumes by the Iraqi security authorities, let alone the other documents 
which are still being kept secret. 

Gentlemen: 

Russia's expansionist ambitions are not unknown to anyone, as they are nothing 
new; so is her expansionist policy, for it is not a new policy but an old policy planned 
by the Czars and adopted by the Communists. Russia covets the domination of all 
the countries lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Her adherence 
to this policy has increased; and her efforts to achieve (the aims of that policy) were 
multiplied after oil was discovered in this region and became a vital material, indis- 
pensable to any industrial country [which is trying to impose its economic and mili- 
tary domination over the world] (i) 

These ambitions were made clear to the world by the documents published aftei 
the Second World War, from which it appeared that Communist Russia had re- 
quested Hitler's Germany to give her a free hand in this region in return for her help 
to Germany to dominate Europe. In the same way, Russia's expansionist policy 
became exceedingly evident by (her) taking advantage of the war and by spreading her 
domination over the Eastern European States and imposing her regime on them by 
fire and sword. You are all aware of a part of what is now taking place in Hungary. 

This, in short, is the situation (obtaining) between Iraq and Russia. Conse- 
quently, Iraq has always taken precautions against the danger surrounding her. 
Thus, provision was made in the Penal Code, under His Excellency the late Yasin 
al-Hashimy, for banning Communism and punishing its propagation. (This) law was 



(r) This clause is also bracketed in the original (Ara hie) text. ED. 

258 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements* Relationships 

later modified in 1938 and was made to apply to all subversive acts, including Zio- 
nism and anarchism. 

The depth of the terrible ill-feeling which certain Communist politicians bear 
against Iraq, and the degree of liberty they take regarding even the most elementary 
humanitarian principles, in order to create discord among (sister countries), will 
become apparent to the esteemed listeners from the great lie related by the Soviet 
Union's Foreign Minister, Comrade Shepilov. (This took place) within the greatest 
international circle known to history, the United Nations, when, in disregard of the 
consequences which his lie might entail, he said that Iraq and Israel had agreed to 
partition Jordan between themselves. 

Gentlemen : 

After this brief review of the relations between Iraq and Communist Russia, 
and of Communist ambitions in this part of the world, I now proceed to speak to 
you about the second part of my speech. 

Britain had, during the First World War, wrested Iraq from the Ottoman 
Empire, after battles which extended from 1914 to 1918. She considered (Iraq) as 
enemy occupied territory and established therein an Anglo-Indian Government 
headed by the British High Commissioner. The Iraqi people revolted against the 
occupation and denounced the Mandate. (The people) continued their struggle after 
the formation of the national government under His Majesty the late King Fay sal I, 
from 1921 to 1930, when the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, providing for the recognition of the 
independence of Iraq and paving the way to Iraq's admission to the League of 
Nations, was signed. 

Those who lived at the time of the signature of the treaty and at the time preced- 
ing it will remember very well Iraq's position before the conclusion of (the treaty) 
and the position it acquired thereafter. 

With the treaty Iraq moved from the stage of the Mandate to that of an inde- 
pendence limited by certain conditions. Iraq (then) joined the League of Nations; its 
independence was recognized by the (other) States at a time when the (other) Arab 
countries, including Egypt, were still working hard to obtain a similar treaty. Most of 
you will remember how our Egyptian brethren received the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
in 1936 with rejoicing and admiration and how they called it the treaty of honour 
and independence. But we in Iraq were not satisfied with what we had obtained, 
since we aimed at complete independence, in order to keep abreast of the progress 
of civilization and to contribute to the advancement of humanity after the manner of 
our good ancestors. 

We, therefore, made of the question of the abolition of the treaty and of ridding 
ourselves of its bonds a national claim regarding which no two persons would disagree. 
We have all, Government and people, worked steadfastly for the realization of this 
aim. 

When the United Nations Organization was established and its Charter 
proclaimed, we found in it our best support for getting rid of the bilateral treaty and 
adhering to Article 51 of the Charter, which gives the nations the right to conclude 
regional agreements for (collective) self-defence. But before adopting this poli-y, 
which had been unanimously decided upon by the Iraqi statesmen, we did not fail to 
consider neutrality and its possibilities. 

Gentlemen: 

In March 1954 His Majesty the King was visiting Pakistan, in response to the 

259 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

invitation of its Governor-General at the time, and I had the honour of accompany- 
ing His Majesty on that visit. 

In view of the attention attracted by Pandit Nehru's repeated statements about 
the idea of neutrality, I considered it expedient to visit India before the end of the 
Royal visit, in order to meet the Indian Prime Minister and discuss with him the 
general policy and the possibility of the formation of a strong neutral defensive bloc 
which would stand between the Western and the Eastern camps. 

I arrived at Delhi on March 20, accompanied by their Excellencies, Dr. Diya' 
Ja'far and Khalil Ibrahim; there we stayed until the 3ist. During this time we held 
several meetings with Pandit Nehru and a few Indian leaders. At these meetings we 
discussed several international questions, foremost among which was the Palestine 
question. 

I suggested to Pandit Nehru during these discussions the formation of a strong 
neutral defensive bloc which would comprise India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Turkey and the Arab countries, and which would undertake to guarantee the neutra- 
lity of these countries and the repulsion of any aggression against any of them. (This 
was) because of the huge defensive power of this bloc and the great importance of its 
strategic position. 

But Pandit Nehru rejected this suggestion, basing his rejection on India's 
peculiar circumstances, chief among which were India's wish not to provoke the neigh- 
bouring Communist (countries) extending along its vast boundaries adjacent thereto, 
and the small number of the Indian Army, which is hardly sufficient to maintain 
order within a country numbering over 350,000,000 people with not less than 3 
million Communists. (This) could not permit India to undertake any new commit- 
ments or to send any Indian forces to defend the neutrality of any one of the countries 
of this bloc that may be exposed to aggression. 

When I asked him to advise Iraq as to the means by which she could obtain 
peace, he replied (by saying) that it was necessary for Iraq to co-operate with (those of) 
her neighbours who have international experience which could be drawn upon for 
guidance. 

Upon my return to Baghdad, I made a detailed report covering these dis- 
cussions, which I submitted to the Government, then headed by His Excellency Dr. 
Fadil al-Jamali. I also sent a copy of (that report) to both His Majesty King Sa'ud 
and His Excellency President Camille Chamoun. It was (moreover) my intention to 
submit a copy of it to His Excellency President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir upon my arrival 
in Cairo, as I had intended to go to Egypt and from there to the other Arab countries 
and Muslim States, in accordance with a programme agreed upon. I was astonished 
at that time, however, by the severe attacks which the Egyptian broadcasting stations 
had started to wage against Iraq, accusing her of various charges. (This took place 
when ) nobody in Iraq, responsible or non-responsible, knew of the reason for 
(these attacks). 

His Majesty the King, some time later, graciously entrusted me with the for- 
mation of the Cabinet, which I formed on August 3, 1954. A few days after its forma- 
tion, I learned that Major Salah Salim would be arriving in Iraq, in accordance with 
an agreement with the previous Cabinet. I felt happy on learning of his forthcoming 
arrival. Major Salah Salim arrived at Sarsank on August 15, 1954, accompanied by 
a great number of officials, photographers and correspondents. On the same day, 
(ex-Premier) Sa'ib Salam arrived on a personal (visit). 

On the day folio wing the arrival of Major Salah Salim, conversations started in 
Sarsank under the auspices of His Majesty the King and His Excellency the Crown 



260 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Prince. On the part of Iraq there were (in addition to) myself, Messrs. Shakir al- 
Wadi, Deputy Foreign Minister; 'Abdulla Bakr, Chief of the Royal Court; Najib 
ar-Rawi, Iraq's Ambassador in Cairo; General Rafiq 'Arif, Chief of Staff. On the E- 
gyptian side were Major Salah Salim and Tawfiq Qatamish, Egypt's Ambassador 
in Baghdad; and Mahmud Riyad, Egypt's Ambassador in Damascus. 

After the exchange of the expressions of welcome. Major Salah Salim opened the 
discussions. He expressed his deep regret for the attacks launched by the Egyptian 
broadcasts and the Press against Iraq, and apologized for all he had personally men- 
tioned against Iraq in his statements. He said that the reason for those attacks was a 
misunderstanding of Iraq's attitude. 

(It so happened that) the British Government had, in the course of the negotia- 
tions, requested the Egyptian Government to grant (the British) the right of the 
return of (the British) forces to the Suez Canal in the event of an aggression against 
Turkey; (this was to be) in addition to the (return of these forces in the event of ag- 
gression against) the Arab States. Egypt had agreed to this, but the British Govern- 
ment had for two months put off the signature of the treaty. This coincided with the 
visit which His Majesty the King of Iraq made to Pakistan at the time. The Egyptians, 
thus, imagined that there was (involved) an agreement aiming at the isolation of Egypt, 
from the world. Major Salah Salim added : "Now that we have initialled the treaty, 
and the mistake in our inference has become clear, we apologize for what we said 
and hope that we will start a new page in our fraternal relations, so that we may lead 
the Arab nation to the realization of our noble aims". 

I thanked Major Salah Salim for his sentiments, and assured him that Iraq was 
as much concerned about the interests of Egypt and of the (other) Arab States as 
about her own interests. (I told him) that (Iraq) paid no attention to gossip, but 
aimed at cooperation and the continuation of efforts for the realization of the aims 
of the Arab nation, and that we should forget the past and say "May God forgive what 
has already passed". 

Major Salim then went into the substance of the subject, explaining the situa- 
tion in Egypt and the developments which had taken place before the signature of 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and (also) what the Egyptian Government intended to do. 

When he concluded his statement, I started mine by reviewing the conditions 
then prevailing in Iraq and her natural relations with her two neighbours, Turkey and 
Iran - relations resulting from neighbourhood, economic and social interests, reli- 
gious creeds and historical bonds, in addition to the geographical and market condi- 
tions and the dangers of which we were apprehensive. I referred to the old treaties 
which Iraq had previously concluded with these two neighbours, and emphasized 
that these relations necessitated that Iraq should co-operate with these two neigh- 
bours for the safeguarding of her own security as well as of theirs. I also explained 
at length the fraternal relations which bind Iraq to her sister Arab States, and enu- 
merated the services which Iraq had rendered to them in the national field ever since 
her emergence. 

In this connection, I believe that my Iraqi brethren will still remember that 
Iraq has always been a bastion for Arab nationalism and a refuge to the free Arabs and 
a support to their revolutions of independence. 

I believe that our Syrian brethren will very well remember Iraq's role in the 
evacuation of the French forces from our dear Syria and in enabling the National 
Bloc to take over power therein, as well as Iraq's stand by Syria's side against Israel. 
I need not refer to Iraq's constant assistance to Palestine and her continuous heavy 
sacrifices for saving Palestine. 

261 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

I then turned to the subject of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, and assured the 
Egyptians of Iraq's eagerness to terminate it as soon as possible so that she might 
achieve full independence and sovereignty. I (also) declared Iraq's intention not 
to bind herself with Britain or with any other State by a bilateral treaty, and that our 
co-operation with foreign States would be on the basis of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. I then told Major Salim: "You should have divided the Anglo- 
Egyptian treaty into two parts : the first part, relating to the evacuation of the Brit- 
ish forces, should be the subject of an agreement between you and the British. The 
second part, concerning the return of the British forces to the Suez Canal base in the 
event of aggression against the Arab States or Turkey, should have been (the subject 
of ) a general agreement to which all the Arab States concerned as well as Turkey 
should have acceded. (This is because) the British forces which would be returning 
to the Canal to assist Turkey would have to cross Arab States whose agreement thereto 
had not been secured or views thereon sought." 

Major Salah Salim at this point asked me how to remedy this situation. I 
replied that the Arab States were bound by the Arab Collective Security Pact: if we 
could therefore reach an agreement for strengthening this Pact in a manner that would 
guarantee the security of this region against all kinds of danger, and if we could 
transform (the Pact) into a regional Pact which would be in conformity with Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter and replace (Egypt's) bilateral treaty with Britain, 
we would then be able to ascertain the views of Britain and the U.S. regarding the 
extent of the aid which they would be able to give to the new organization which 
would be replacing the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. 

When the meetings of Sarsank were over, we agreed on minutes consisting of five 
items. I shall now read to you the text of the first and second items thereof : 
"Item One. The two Parties have agreed on the necessity of reconsidering the Arab 
Collective Security Pact, with a view to strengthening it and making it a strong, 
effective instrument that will enable the Arab countries to face any danger which may 
threaten them, and to defend their countries powerfully and efficiently. Each Party 
shall, however, study this question and shall make the necessary contacts with the 
U.S. and Britain in this respect. There will be held in the second half of September a 
further meeting in Cairo between Egypt and Iraq for reviewing the results of the 
contacts and to resume talks. The two Parties will then jointly get in touch with the 
representatives of Britain and the U.S. hi order to discuss this subject in preparation 
for its submission to the other Arab States with a view to reaching a general agree- 
ment thereon. 

"Item Two. The two Parties have agreed to co-operate in combating destruc- 
tive principles by all possible means, and that Egyt would send to Iraq (officials) 
experienced in combating such principles, in order to exchange information with 
the (appropriate) experienced (officials) in Iraq and to co-operate with them in sup- 
pressing these principles in Egypt, Iraq and the other Arab States." 

Gentlemen: 

When we returned from Sarsank to Baghdad, Major Salah Salim contacted the 
American and the British Charges d' Affaires, the two Ambassadors being then out- 
side Iraq. He discussed the matter with them and informed them that he would be 
contacting the American and the British Ambassadors in Cairo. 

Major Salah Salim then returned with his colleagues to Cairo. While we were 
waiting for the results of his contacts, news started reaching Baghdad of a disagree- 
ment between the members of the (Egyptian) Council of the Revolution. One morn- 

262 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

ing, as I was still at home, Mr. Jamal Salim telephoned me from Cairo. After greet- 
ing me and inquiring about my health he informed me that everything that had been 
said about a disagreement between the members of the Council of the Revolution was 
unfounded. He then said that His Excellency Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir and his col- 
leagues (/) were expecting my arrival in Cairo to discuss the details of the subject. I 
thanked him for the sentiments (he expressed), and promised to arrive in Cairo on the 
date agreed upon in Sarsank. In fact, I left Baghdad on September 14 (1954), staying 
in Beirut for only one evening, in the course of which I contacted His Excellency 
CamilleChamoun and the members of his Government and informed them of the 
discussions which took place in Sarsank. On September 15 I was in Cairo. 

We started our discussions on the second day of my arrival, and I had with me 
on the Iraqi side His Excellency Mr. Najib ar-Rawi, our Ambassador in Cairo, and 
Mr. Khalil Ibrahim, the Director of Public Guidance. The Egyptian side was com- 
posed of His Excellency President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir and Messrs. Mahmud Fawzy, 
Salah Salim and Mahmud Riyad. I explained to the participants our point of view, 
which had been agreed upon by the Egyptian delegation at Sarsank. I (also) explained 
in detail Iraq's geographical and market conditions, its private problems, the historical 
relations which bind it to its two neighbours, Turkey and Iran, and the dangers which 
threaten the whole region as a result of the Communist expansionist ambitions, let 
alone the activities carried out by the Communists in the country. I further explained 
to them the benefits which the Arab States would reap from being joined by the 
Muslim States, who would stand together with them against the Zionist danger, and 
by finding a just solution of the Palestine problem that would safeguard the legiti- 
mate rights of the Arabs. 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir was in complete agreement with me in all his 
talks, and realized all the problems which I had explained. But he requested me to 
postpone the discussion of this subject until Egypt had liquidated her own problems, 
since the Egyptians had no confidence in the British in spite of the initialling of the 
treaty. (This was) because the British, as His Excellency Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir said, 
had been promising to evacuate Egypt for 70 years but had never fulfilled their pro- 
mises. 

I then inquired of him as to the time he estimated for waiting. He replied that he 
could not determine a time for that. I told him that the Iraqi people considered the 
termination of the 1930 treaty as a national claim which should be met as soon as 
possible. "In addition, the information we have confirms that the security of Iraq is 
threatened at any moment, that Communist Russia is determined to provoke a civil 
war in Iraq, and that she is training al-Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani and his partisans 
in military methods in the Caucasus in order to form from them an army which would 
infiltrate back into Iraq to carry out military operations and the complete destruction 
of Iraq." 

Then I asked him: "Would you in all honesty allow Iraq to crumble in such a 
disastrous manner? And would you believe that it would be possible for any Arab 
country to stand in the way of the Communist torrent if Iraq were to collapse?" 

When President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir could not find an answer to all these ques- 
tions he replied : "You are better acquainted with your country and its problems, and 
you are free to take whatever measures you may wish in order to protect it against 
danger." 



(/) Literally, "brethren". ED. 

263 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Before the end of the meeting I said to President Jamal: "I am leaving Cairo for 
London for medical treatment. On my way back I shall try to pass through Turkey in 
order to discuss this subject, and I shall be informing you of the results." 

On my departure from Cairo, President 'Abd an-Nasir was at the airport to see 
me off. Our parting was fraternal and cordial; it made me feel that His Excellency 
had understood and comprehended our problems, and that he would be of assistance 
to us in the solution of our private and general problems. 

I stayed in London for several weeks, during which I heard of nothing indicating 
any change in President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's friendly policy towards Iraq. 

On my way back to Iraq, I passed through Istanbul and had a meeting with the 
Turkish Prime Minister. We discussed our two countries' stand from its various 
aspects. I (then) learned that His Excellency Adnan Menderes was to visit Cairo 
during the month of November on an invitation from President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir. 
This meant that His Majesty King Faysal and Mr. Adnan Menderes would be in Cairo 
simultaneously, for His Majesty the King had accepted the invitation which President 
Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir had extended to him to visit Cairo in the same month. I there- 
fore suggested to His Excellency Menderes to pay his visit to Cairo before that of His 
Majesty, and to hold discussions with President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir. (This was) 
because I did not want our brethren in Egypt to believe that Iraq was taking the lead 
ahead of them, for they are extremely sensitive on this point. 

When our conversations in Istanbul were over, we issued a joint communique 
which was broadcast by the broadcasting stations all over the world, and published 
in all the papers. Copies of it were officially sent to all the diplomatic representatives 
of the Arab States in Turkey for communication to their respective Governments. I 
(then) returned to Baghdad and did not hear of any bad reaction to the communique 
on the part of any Arab State from the date of its issue in October until January 6, 1955. 

Gentlemen: 

You will undoubtedly recall the grave incidents which took place in Egypt and 
led to the execution of a number (of the members) of the Muslim Brethren and to the 
arrest of many of them. (This) led the Egyptian Government to request the postpone- 
ment of the visit which it had been decided would be made by His Majesty the King 
to Egypt in November. Likewise, the visit which the Turkish Prime Minister was to 
pay to Egypt in the same month was also cancelled for the same reason. 

Since I had, while in Istanbul, addressed an invitation to His Excellency the 
Turkish Prime Minister to visit Iraq, His Excellency accepted the invitation and ar- 
rived in Baghdad at the head of a Turkish delegation. During (his) visit we held 
further discussions on the subject. (However) no sooner was the joint communique 
issued on January 6, 1955, than, to our great astonishment, we were confronted by a 
severe attack by the Egyptian Government, its broadcasts and Press. (We were as- 
tonished) because the new joint communique did not differ at all from the joint 
communique issued in Istanbul in October and was nothing more than a declaration 
for establishing co-operation to secure the stability of the Middle East area and to re- 
pel any aggression that might be committed against it whether from outside the area 
or from within it. ( This was ) in conformity with the legitimate right of self- 
defence provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The (new) com- 
munique also provided that the Iraqi and Turkish Governments would be in close 
contact with the States which might express the desire to collaborate with them in 
this respect, and that the two Governments would try to secure signature of the agree- 
ment by all these States simultaneously, if possible. 

264 



International Affairs: Treaties^ Agreements) Relationships 

Gentlemen: 

I beseech you, in the name of God : have you found in this statement anything 
necessitating an attack ? And is there anything in it that conflicts with the interests and 
aims of the Arab nation ? And is there anything in it that would justify the outburst 
of our Egyptian brethren against it ? I leave the decision on this to your conscience. 

The campaign continued ; calumny and misrepresentations continued ; abuses and 
accusations also continued. But we kept on being tolerant, forbearing and patient. 

We were attacked before the Sarsank meetings for the simple reason that we 
wanted to consolidate our relations with the greatest Muslim State, which is Pakistan; 
and we are now being attacked because we want to consolidate our relations with 
another neighbouring Muslim State. May God be our Judge, for He is our Lord and 
Supporter. 

In the course of these unjust attacks, His Excellency Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir invited 
the heads of the Arab Governments to Cairo to discuss the application of severe sanc- 
tions against Iraq because Iraq was trying to rally friends around her and to safeguard 
her security and very existence. The heads of the (Arab) Governments accepted the 
invitation to attend the meeting. But I did not have the honour to attend it for reasons 
of health. I therefore delegated on my behalf His Excellency Dr. (Fadil) al-Jamali, 
His Excellency Burhan ad-Din Bash 'Ayan and Mr. Khalil Ibrahim. 

The meetings started in Cairo and the discussions dragged on, but no results 
could be reached by the participants, in spite of the continued attacks by the Egyptian 
Press and Radio, in spite of the threats directed against the members of some dele- 
gations, and in spite of the concocted declarations attributed to some heads of the 
delegations, and the refusal of the Egyptian Press to publish the denials which certain 
heads (of the delegations) attempted to publish to deny the fabrications. And when 
President 'Abd an-Nasir tried at one of the meetings to accuse Turkey of hostility 
to the Arabs, the Iraqi delegation reminded him of the valuable article which His 
Excellency had written about Turkey a few weeks earlier and from which I (now) quote 
to you a few extracts: 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir says : "Whatever there may be between us and 
Turkey at present or may have been in the past we are a part of each other. Our 
forefathers were brothers in history, who shared (one another's) ups and downs. We 
fought side by side in the same field for several centuries in support of (our) ideals." 

Then Jamal says: "Turkey was the first object of aggression by all the vicious 
aggressors, and our turn came next." 

Then Jamal adds : <f Our country and (the Turkish country) are two parts of 
this Arab East Our language and hers are two tongues that have a common diction- 
ary ; her language (has drawn) on ours(z) even though it is written in Latin character." 

Then Jamal also adds : "Our Qur'an and hers are one, divinely revealed to Mu- 
hammad in Macca and Madina, explained by commentators in Baghdad, Syria and 
Egypt, and copied by the hand of the copyists in Istanbul, and is still being recited 
in our own language or in one different from ours by Muslims in Adana, Ankara 
Diar-Bakr and Izmir." 

Then Jamal adds : "Our past and her past are two chapters in one volume of the 
history of the Arabs and of Islam." 

Jamal further says : "Our recent plight and Turkey's plight were brought about 



(/) cc Owr$", above, is given as a translation for "hers" (Kalamiha) appearing in the 
original (Arabic) text - presumably a misprint. ED. 

265 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

by one common enemy who viewed us all with a hostile eye and did not distinguish 
between Arab and Turk." 

And Jamal also says: "We are in all this related to each other, as kin and 'in- 
laws', for everywhere in the Arab lands, in spite of their vastness, there is an Arab 
related to the Turks through his maternal uncle, and everywhere in the lands of the 
Turks, in spite of their isolation in their land, there is a Turk related to the Arabs 
through his uncle on the paternal side." 

Then Jamal says : "We are to-day to Turkey as we have been in the past, faith- 
ful brothers to a sister of pure ancestry and kinship." 

Then Jamal adds: "The danger which lies in wait for Turkey on her nearby 
borders is the same danger which lies in wait for us, even though those lying in wait 
(for both of us) are courteous to us and to her, as a neighbour and friend would be." 

Jamal then goes on to add : "As long as Turkey remains safe we are safe, and if 
we are strong enough to make the enemy heed us, Turkey is safe. For we are for her 
a protecting shield, and she, in her stand towards the enemy, is a shield to us; our 
destinies have therefore united in either case." 

And then Jamal says: "The Turkish people have believed in these facts ever 
since their existence, and they never denied them, and these (facts) are a part of the 
faith of the Arab peoples." 

Then Jamal concludes his article by saying: "I wonder what could the enemy 
expect from our Governments when these have behind them such peoples' faith ?' 

Gentlemen: 

This is what President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir has written about Turkey. Have 
you ever heard or read a more wonderful piece of literature than this in its composi- 
tion, style and meaning? 

This was His Excellency Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's opinion when he wanted to 
conclude a treaty with Turkey and when he wanted to justify the special provision 
made about Turkey in his treaty with England, 

But when Iraq wanted to consolidate her relations with her neighbour Turkey for 
the security of their countries and the safeguarding of their two peoples, President 
Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir burst into a rage, and Turkey seemed no longer to be the same 
Turkey of a few weeks before. 

Our relations with our two neighbours, Turkey and Iran, do not result from the 
Baghdad Pact, and the question of our concern about these relations is not (merely) 
to-day's. For, in addition (i) to the historical ties of neighbourhood which existed 
and will always remain forever, there are other religious, economic, commercial and 
political ties. We (also) have with our two neighbours several treaties and pacts, 
including the Treaty of Neighbourliness and the Boundary Agreements, the Pasture 
Agreements, and the Pact of Saadabad, and many others. I take pleasure in repeating 
to you what I had mentioned in the Press Conference held on November 28, 1946, 
when in the course of a lengthy statement I said the following: "...And the interest 
of Iraq under such circumstances may not be seen by Egypt: for example, we have 
common boundaries with our two neighbours, Turkey and Iran; and I have always 
advocated neighbourliness with Turkey and Iran, because we are bound to co- 
operate with them..." Then I said: "We have a pact with another country, but this 
is a temporary pact which may come to an end; and we can never forget our being 



(i) Literally, "in spite of" (bi'r-raghmi min). ED. 

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International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

neighbours with Turkey and Iran, and the closer our neighbourliness the better it 
will be for us as well as for Turkey and Iran." This is what I said in 1946, and it was 
published in the Iraqi papers, including "Sawt al-Ahali" in its issue of December 



The Cairo Conference ended as it started, and a representative delegation of the 
Conference came to Baghdad. It included His Excellency Sami as-Sulh, Prime Mi- 
nister of Lebanon; His Excellency Mr. Faydi al-Atassi, Foreign Minister of Syria; 
Major Salah Salim; and Mr. Walid Salah, Foreign Minister of Jordan. The delega- 
tion met with the Iraqi side, which was composed of Their Excellencies Tawfiq 
as-Suwaydi, Salih Jabr, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, Burhan ad-Din Bash 'Ayan, 
General Rafiq 'Arif, and Khalil Ibrahim. The meetings continued for several d ys, 
during which it became evident that the disagreement was restricted to Iraq and 
Egypt, and that the other Arab States were not a party to it and did not express an 
opinion about it, according to what Major Salah Salim said. It also appeared that 
Iraq was supposed to secure Egypt's permission before deciding on any policy what- 
soever, even if that policy related to its very security and its own being. 

The representatives of the Conference returned thereafter to Cairo to submit 
this result to the Conference, which soon came to an end without any result (being 
reached). 

In view of the Egyptian Government's importunity and excessively misleading 
propaganda against Iraq, I saw fit to refer the matter to the Iraqi Chamber of Depu- 
ties so that it might consider Iraq's foreign policy in general and the propaganda 
spread by Egypt in particular. 

The Chamber of Deputies met on February 6, 1955 in the morning, and I made 
at the meeting a detailed statement on the Government's foreign policy and explained 
the disagreement between the Egyptian Government and ourselves. I also thanked 
His Excellency Camille Chamoun, President of the Lebanese Republic; His Excel- 
lency Hashim al-Atasi, then President of the Syrian Republic; His Excellency 
Paris al-Khoury, Prime Minister of Syria; and His Excellency Dr. Faydi al-Atasi, 
Syria's Foreign Minister. (I thanked them all) for their praiseworthy efforts in bring- 
ing closer the points of view of the Egyptian Government and ourselves. 

A great number of the esteemed members of the Chamber spoke at the meeting. 
I then asked the Chamber for a vote of confidence in the Government, and the Cham- 
ber voted unanimously "for". 
Gentlemen : 

The Government of Iraq is responsible to the people of Iraq represented by the 
Parliament,(2) and also to His Majesty the King. Its policy is inspired by their 
wishes and is designed to guarantee the interests of the Iraqi people and to safeguard 
the security of the country. On the basis of this and in conformity with the policy 
approved by Parliament, I proceeded to realize your national demand to abolish the 
treaty of 1930 and to solidify the bonds of co-operation between ourselves and our two 
neighbours, Turkey and Iran, as well as with our friend, the great Muslim State, 
Pakistan. (I also proceeded) to establish understanding and co-operation with our 
sister Arab States and adherence to the Pact of the Arab League, the Arab Collective 
Security Pact and the United Nations Charter. 

In the light of these aims I started negotiations for the Pact of Mutual Co- 
operation which was later on called the Baghdad Pact. 



(j) Not printed. ED. 

(2) In Arabic, "Majlis al-Umma". ED. 



267 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

Gentlemen: 

You must have noticed from this account of the succession of events that all the 
propaganda against Baghdad had started before the existence of the Baghdad Pact and 
even before we had thought of concluding this Pact, and that all that is being said 
now by those with ulterior motives, to the effect that the attack is directed against 
Iraq because of the Baghdad Pact, is indeed a mere false allegation aiming only at 
misleading (public opinion) and distorting the facts. The attack had started, as I 
have said, in March 1954, and the Pact was signed only at the end of February 1955. 

If we go further back into the past and review the history of the League of Arab 
States ever since its foundation, the lamentable disputes which paralyzed it would 
become conspicuous to us. For we wanted it to be a League that would unify the 
Arabs, and accepted Egypt as its seat and tried to (see that) the League would cons- 
titute a positive step which would be followed by other steps for the realization of 
Arab Unity which was the supreme goal of the Great Arab Revolt. But events have 
proved that others have, most unfortunately, wanted it to be an instrument of dissen- 
sion, a field for competition and a centre for exploitation. And who of you does not 
remember the crises to which the League has been exposed ever since its foundation 
because of these two conflicting attitudes: the Iraqi point of view and the non-Iraqi 
point of view? 

Could there be one single person in the Arab world who is naive enough and sim- 
ple-minded enough to believe what is being repeated by those with ulterior motives, 
namely that the controversy is caused by the Baghdad Pact? 

Everything tends to show that the aim of this propaganda is to subvert and des- 
troy Iraq so that she may be at the mercy of one side or the other and receive orders 
from this side or the other, or that her revenues may be spent on this side or the other. 

But as for the people of Iraq, the being of Iraq, the development of Iraq, the 
strengthening of the Iraqi Army, the security of Iraq and the dignity of Iraq, these, 
in the opinion of the intriguers,(i) the malicious and the covetous, are all of no con- 
sequence.^) 
Compatriots: 

What is the cause of this uproar which was directed against the Baghdad Pact? 
And is there anything in the Pact that justifies this uproar, and who are those who are 
raising it? And why? 

I shall now read to you the articles of the Baghdad Pact, leaving it to you 
to judge whether there is one single article or one single word in the Pact which is not 
in the interest of Iraq or in that of the whole Arab nation. Here are the articles: (3) 

"Article i. Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the High 
Contracting Parties will co-operate for safeguarding their security and defending 
their existence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation 
may form the subject of special agreements with each other. 

"Article 2. In order to ensure the realisation and effect the application of the co- 
operation provided for in Article i above, the competent authorities of the High 
Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present 



(1) Literally "those with ulterior motives" (al-mughridin). ED. 

(2) Liter ally , "cipher to the left", i.e. of no importance. ED. 

(3) Omissions in the Arabic text appear between brackets in the translation. The 
attention of the reader is also drawn to the fact that Article 8 of the Pact does not 
appear in the speech. ED. 

268 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

Pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have 
been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties. 

"Article 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any inter- 
ference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute bet- 
ween themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 

"Article 4. The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the 
present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations con- 
tracted by either of them with a third States (or States). They do not derogate from, 
and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The 
High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligations 
incompatible with the present Pact. 

"Article 5. This Pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab 
League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this 
region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. 
Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument(s) of accession 
of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. 

"Any acceding State party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, 
in accordance with Article i, with one or more States parties to the present Pact. 
(The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accord- 
ance with Article 2). These measures will become operative as soon as they have been 
approved by the Governments of the parties concerned. 

"Article 6. A Permanent Council, at ministerial level, ( i) will be set up to function 
within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become 
parties to the Pact. The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure. 

"Article 7. This Pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for 
other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by 
notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the ex- 
piration of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for 
the other parties." 

Gentlemen : 

This is the Pact out of which those with ulterior motives want to make the shirt 
of 'Uthman.(2) What have you found in it which calls for criticism ? In taking this 
stand, I would defy all the intriguers (j) and exaggerators to point out to me any 
breach in the Pact, which may be exploited against the Arabs and against their in- 
terests. 

We have by this Pact abolished the treaty of 1930 and so completed our inde- 
pendence, recovered our airfields and guaranteed the security of our country against 
any aggression which may be committed against us. We have not committed our- 
selves by it to any obligations outside the boundaries of our country. It was strictly a 
question of self-defence, which is a natural right of every human being and of every 
state. We have guaranteed a closer collaboration with a Muslim State totalling over 



(1) "of Ministers" (min al-wuzara') appears in the Arabic text. ED. 

(2) The fourth Caliph who was murdered following a split amongst the Muslims at the 
time. His blood-stained "shirt" was later taken and exhibited in the Damascus Mosque 
by Mu'awiya in order to rouse the people against his enemies. The "Shirt of Uthman" 
has since symbolized the enemy's outrageous crime - as in the case of the Baghdad Pact 
here! ED. 

(3) Literally, "those with ulterior motives. 9 ' ED. 

269 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

135 million people and of great international weight. We have spared no efforts in 
taking advantage of this collaboration among the Muslim States for the benefit of 
Palestine and the Arab States, foremost amongst which is Egypt. 

I should like to reiterate here what I had previously declared at the first meeting 
of the representatives of the Baghdad Pact States, when I stated that our commit- 
ments under this Pact do not conflict in any manner with our commitments in accord- 
ance with the Arab Collective Security Pact or the Pact of the League of Arab States. 

The events which followed the conclusion of this Pact have proved that we have 
not failed in our duty towards any Arab country. We have (thus) offered our military 
assistance to Syria and to Jordan on every (occasion) of Israel's aggressions against 
their frontiers. 

When the tripartite aggression took place against Egypt, Iraq hastened to declare 
her strong deprecation of this aggression, and assured Egypt of her readiness to fulfil 
her obligations. The Iraqi Embassy in Cairo cabled us on November 21, that the 
(Egyptian) Deputy Foreign Minister had informed the Ambassador that the Egyptian 
Government fully appreciated the Iraqi Government's attitude towards the problems 
of Egypt and that the Egyptian Government viewed with admiration the policy adopt- 
ed by Iraq towards Egypt. We also hastened to hold a meeting in Tehran which was 
attended by delegates of the Muslim States and presided over by His Majesty the Shah 
of Iran and His Excellency the President of the Republic of Pakistan. We spared no 
efforts in our attempt to secure the quick cessation of the fighting. The Muslim 
States of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq requested the unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal of the aggressive forces, the release of the Egyptian prisoners and the 
respect of Egypt's sovereignty, independence and unity, and the solution of the 
Palestine problem. Then His Majesty the King welcomed the suggestion (/) of His 
Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic, Mr. Camille Chamoun, and 
hurriedly left for Beirut. The resolutions of the Congress of the Arab Kings and 
Presidents were then issued and were in harmony with the Tehran resolutions in aim 
and spirit. 

Then a meeting of the Muslim States was held in Baghdad, and these reiterated 
their support of, and solidarity with Egypt and the Arabs' greatest problem, that of 
Palestine. We were thanked by the Egyptian President for our fruiful efforts in 
supporting Egypt and guaranteeing her security and independence. 

When Jordan asked for military assistance we did not hesitate for a moment in 
sending units of the Iraqi Army, and the Jordanian Commander-in-Chief, General 
'Ali al-Hayyari, was appointed to the joint command of the Iraqi and the Jordanian 
armies. Then the Jordanian Government requested the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
military forces under the pretext that the crisis which had necessitated their entry 
into Jordan had ended. We were thus compelled to accept Jordan's request in spite 
of our conviction that the crisis had not ended and that the danger would not dis- 
appear except with the disappearance of Israel from existence. 

Could anyone malicious person(2), after all this, disparage Iraq or find a justifi- 
cation for his attacks against her? The base revilements and the flimsy accusations 
behind which the group of malicious hirelings and greedy people are hiding have 
become a characteristic of a particular group whose object is no longer unknown. 



(1) Referring here to President Chamourfs suggestion for holding a meeting of the 
Heads of Arab States. See Doc. No. 375. ED. 

(2) The Arabic word used here is "mughrid", literally meaning "a person with an 
ulterior motive". ED. 

270 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements) Relationships 

I should like to emphasize to these groups that everything which has been said or 
is being said about me personally and about Iraq and the Iraqis will never change our 
policy and national aims. Our young State has emerged, grown up and flourished un- 
der the national principles which have become our moral code of life and which we 
cannot set aside however unkind to us the times will be and however far the injustice 
of these groups will go in slander and rebuke. 

It is regrettable that some of our brethren among these groups were not con- 
tent with accusations, revilements and concoctions and the depiction of the situation 
in Iraq in the worse aspects of decay in which they wish to see (her). For they have set 
out to put their imaginings and concoctions into practice by inciting disturbances 
and terrorizing the peaceful citizens, by throwing explosives in public places and 
foreign embassies and by trying to organize a series of assassinations. I believe the es- 
teemed citizens will remember the case of Muhammad 'Ali s lsa and his friends who 
were referred to the criminal courts which tried and convicted them after the establish- 
ment of their crimes, and whose judgments were confirmed by the Court of Cassation. 
I also believe that the esteemed citizens have heard of what has happened in Libya 
and Abyssinia and of what is happening now in Lebanon. 

In spite of the foregoing, we have said that we will not forsake our brethren, 
whatever they may do. And if there is anyone who imagines that we are doing this in 
order to gain their favour or because of our fear of them or because we are afraid of 
their propaganda, events have proved that we are not what they think we are. For we 
advocate principles and doctrines, and as long as we are right we shall not fear any 
delusion, nor will any injustice prevent us from proceeding along our proper national 
course. 

Brethren: 

You will undoubtedly recall the speech (/) which was made by Sir Anthony Eden, 
Prime Minister of Britain, in which he called upon the Arabs and Israel to make cer- 
tain concessions in their claims, in order to bring together more closely their points 
of view. You will also remember how President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir welcomed that 
speech. 

While the negotiations and the discussions were taking place between Egypt, 
America, Britain, and the President of the International Bank, for the financing of the 
Aswan Dam (High Dam), the British Ambassador in Baghdad paid me a visit one 
morning and informed me that President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir was thinking of solving 
the Palestine problem and of putting an end to the present tension, but that he was 
afraid of Iraq's opposition. I answered him (by saying) that Iraq would not object 
to any just solution of the Palestine problem, which would be acceptable to the Arabs 
and especially to those States adjacent to Israel. 

Nearly one week after the above interview I was visited by the Egyptian Ambas- 
sador in Baghdad, who inquired as to my view on the same subject, and I gave him 
the same answer. 

As a further assurance to President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, the Iraqi Government 
sent to its Ambassador in Cairo a cable dated November 19, 1955, which read as 
follows : 

"The Egyptian Ambassador in Baghdad requested us to inform him of Iraq's 
reaction to the statement made by President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir when he comment- 



(i) See Doc. No. 296 ED. 

271 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

ed on the recent speech of Sir Anthony Eden. We answered him as follows: (a) Iraq 
adheres to the Arab League's resolution concerning the claim for the execution of the 
United Nations, resolutions regarding Palestine, (b) Iraq agrees to any solution accep- 
table to the four Arab States adjacent to Israel, namely, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Egypt, (c) Iraq is prepared to co-operate with Egypt to find a just solution of the 
Palestine problem. Please communicate the above to President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir 
and advise us." 

We (then) received from our Ambassador the following cable dated November 
*3> 1955: "Reference your cable dated November 19, 1955. I have met President 
Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir and communicated to him the contents of your cable referred 
to above. He replied that he had received its contents with thanks from the Egyptian 
Ambassador in Baghdad. I asked him as to what had been decided upon with regard 
to Syria's proposal to call a meeting of the Political Committee.(i) He replied that he 
saw that no useful purpose could be served by the meeting of the Political Committee 
under the present circumstances, and that, instead, it would be better for the Arab 
States to consult among themselves and exchange information on the viewpoints of 
the Western States received by the (Arab States) from their diplomatic representa- 
tives, and to try to obtain information regarding the plans of Britain and the United 
States of America for the solution of the Palestine problem, and to make the necessary 
contacts to find out the definite proposals which Britain and America intend to make. 
This is all in order to agree upon a common point of view which would be ready for 
discussion should it be found necessary to call a meeting of the Political Committee." 

Gentlemen : 

We have not, for one day, forgotten the Zionist danger, and I have never per- 
sonally made a political speech without warning the Arabs of this danger and advocat- 
ing solidarity and collaboration and the drawing up of a joint plan to face that danger. 
But this appeal, unfortunately, has always fallen on deaf ears (2), and the Arab 
States have neglected the Arab Collective Security Pact and set out to make bilateral, 
three-party and four-party agreements. Side by side with these went the propaganda 
rousing ill-feeling and spreading discord, until the criminal Israeli aggression took 
place against Egypt and resulted in about sixty victims, apart from the wounded and 
the prisoners. It was then rumoured that the victims were Palestine volunteers. And 
it did not take long before another aggression against the Egyptian Army took place 
(resulting ) in tens of martyrs. (This) was followed by a third aggression against the 
Syrian Army, as is known to all. 

Then the question of the Russian arms deal came to be known, and Russia took 
advantage of this opportunity, but was opposed by the Western Powers. So I stood 
at the meeting which was held by the (Iraqi) House of Notables (the Senate) on 
Thursday, March 29, 1956, and said as follows: 

"The House will undoubtedly recall the two vicious Israeli aggressions commit- 
ted against Egypt - Egypt, the Arab State whose population totals twenty-two millions, 
is attacked by a group which came from abroad, not exceeding one and a quarter 
million in number. What could President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir do but seek the as- 
sistance of Russian arms when he found that he was unable to safeguard the very 



(j) That is, the Political Committee of the Arab League. ED. 

(2} Literally translated, the original Arabic would give "has never met a listening ear". 

ED. 



272 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

existence of Egypt and repel the aggression against her through the (help of) Western 
Powers ?" 

This was what I said in the House of Notables (Senate) in support of President 
Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's arms deal. 

There is no doubt that it was Western policy, aiming at the maintenance of the 
balance of power between the Arabs and Israel, which drove President Jamal 'Abd 
an-Nasir to seek arms, for the meaning of the balance of power is invariably interpret- 
ed as meaning the permanent superiority of Israel over the Arabs, a fact which we 
deprecate and oppose. 

On December 19, 1955, Mr. Anwar as-Sadat arrived in Baghdad, and I was frank 
with him on all the questions discussed. The question of the arms deal with Russia 
was among these questions. 

I explained to Mr. Anwar as-Sadat Russia's historical ambitions regarding the 
region extending from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and (also) the increase 
in Communist Russia's desire to dominate this region following the discovery of 
abundant oil wells therein. This is because ( Russia ) aims at competing with the 
industrial Western States, as has clearly appeared from the communications 
discovered after the occupation of Germany. 

( And I added ) : " Since all the doors (leading to) this region through Iran have 
been shut in the face of Russia, I fear that, notwithstanding my welcome of the arms 
deal, (this arms deal) would be a reason for increasing your conflict with the West 
and (would serve as ) a new door through which Russia would enter the Middle 
East by exploiting the situation and playing upon the feelings of the Arabs, which 
have been inflamed by the catastrophe of Palestine and the distressing state of our 
brethren, the Palestine refugees." 

I then reminded Mr. Anwar as-Sadat that Communist Russia was foremost 
among the States which helped international Zionism and supported the resolution 
of the partition of Palestine; she was not even satisfied with that, but also supplied 
the Jews with arms and petrol during and after the Palestine War. This (I explained) 
meant that (Russia) was supplying Egypt with arms, not in order to serve (the cause 
of ) right and justice but in order to exploit the two sides and realize her historical 
ambitions. For if Russia could succeed in winning the friendship of the Egyptians 
by this means, she would try to stir up troubles and disturbances in order to conso- 
lidate her position in the same way as she did in Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Albania and Bulgaria. 

Then I said to Mr. as-Sadat: "I fear that, because of these arms, Russia would 
drive you to a clash with the West, and you must, therefore, be extremely careful, 
since such a clash would benefit only Russia and the enemies of the Arabs. If you 
have any differences with the West, these can be settled by the same methods where- 
by the question of the evacuation of the British forces from Egypt was settled." 

Then I advised Mr. as-Sadat that we should increase (the number of) our friends 
and not fight on several fronts. I mentioned to him, as an example, the fate of Nazi 
Germany when she fought on several fronts. Then I warned him that we were facing 
a dangerous enemy, namely, Israel, and that we should co-operate to destroy that 
(enemy) before anything else. If we could succeed in driving Israel into the arms of 
Communism, this would precipitate her end, for she would thereby lose the sympa- 
thy of the West and especially that of American public opinion. 

When he asked me about my opinion concerning the solution of the Palestine 
problem, I confirmed to him what I had already intimated to President Jamal 'Abd 
an-Nasir through the British, the Egyptian and the Iraqi Ambassadors. It seems that 
the purpose of Mr. as- Sadat's visit to Iraq was to make sure of this point. 

273 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

As I was talking to Mr. Anwar as- Sadat, I imagined that I was talking to a man 
who fully comprehended the meaning of the state and fully estimated the responsi- 
bilities of government and understood Communism and its danger, in his capacity as 
Secretary of the Muslim Congress, as he claims. But when he returned to Cairo he 
published a series of articles in which he included a part of the conversations which 
had taken place between us, writing them in his own demagogic manner. And, 
instead of driving Israel to Communism, he preferred to drive Egypt to it, thus pro- 
viding a proof of the validity of the doubts harboured by Arab thinkers concerning 
the true nature of Mr. Anwar as- Sadat and the doctrines he aims to serve. 

Matters developed thereafter in a lamentable manner. The International Bank 
withdrew its offer to finance the High Dam, and both America and England went 
back on their promises. It was expected of President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir to control 
his nerves, to resort to prudence and patience, to consult with the Arab States which 
would be affected by the consequences of such action (i) and to choose the oppor- 
tune time for the realization of his desire. But, instead, he immediately declared 
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, with menaces and threats concerning 
other matters. Thus, the Communists exploited this situation, inflaming the feelings 
and (stirring) the blood (of the Arabs). Events developed in a manner which led to 
exposing world peace to a grave danger. 

In the welter of tnis international tension Iraq hastened to support her sister 
Egypt. We thus issued an official statement dated August 5, 1956, in which we de- 
clared our absolute support of Egypt's right to (the) nationalization, (of the Suez 
Canal Company), warning the Arabs at the same time against the Israeli danger. And 
I shall read to you here the text of the above statement. 

Official Statement 

"The Iraqi Government has followed with great concern the political develop- 
ments and implications accompanying the Egyptian Government's nationalization of 
the Suez Canal (Company). The Iraqi Government has also observed with great 
anxiety Israel's activities among the Western Governments to exploit this dispute for 
her own benefit. 

"Iraq, who sees in Israel a great danger threatening the fate of the Arabs, was 
and still is working to put an end to this danger, and has not missed a single oppor- 
tunity of calling upon the Arabs to pay attention to this danger and to work for foiling 
(Israel's) plans which aim at exploiting the present critical situation. For this reason, 
the preoccupation of Arab public opinion with this dispute should not distract (the 
attention of the Arabs) from the danger of Israel, nor should it permit her to fulfil 
interests and ambitions. 

"The Iraqi Government considers that nationalization is an indisputable right 
of states. It hopes that prudence will prevail so as to put an end to the (present) 
dispute. While the Iraqi Government hopes that this will be achieved, it declares that 
it stands on Egypt's side in everything guaranteeing her dignity, sovereignty and in- 
dependence. May the Almighty grant (us all) success." 

*** 
The Iraqi Embassy in Cairo informed us by a cable dated August 9, 1956, that 



(i) Presumably referring here to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. ED, 

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International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir was waiting (to know) Iraq's attitude. When our 
Ambassador communicated to him the above statement, he expressed his thanks to 
Iraq, (both) Government and people. It was kind of President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir to 
have appreciated this solidarity on the part of Iraq. But the Communists, the advo- 
cates of dissension, and those who fish in troubled waters were not pleased with the 
continuation of smooth relations between Egypt and Iraq, and thus resumed the dis- 
semination of their poisons until we reverted to our state of affairs two year ago. 

Gentlemen : 

When we issued this official statement in support of Egypt's right of nationali- 
zation and warned the Arabs of the Israeli danger, those with ulterior motives as well 
as those who lacked foresight interpreted this warning as being deliberately meant to 
distract the attention of the Arabs from the Suez Canal problem.But, as events showed 
later, we were right in what we had supposed, for we always saw the danger posing 
right in front of us, since Israel is on the watch, looking for occasion and oppor- 
tunities. And while the Arabs were exchanging high words and issuing one declara- 
tion after the other, instead of concentrating on action, Israel was uniting her ranks, 
rallying her (people), and exploiting the declarations of the Arabs in order to win the 
sympathy of the world and to incite world public opinion against them. Whoever 
bears this picture in mind cannot forget this danger. For this (reason), I considered it 
my duty to warn the Arabs against the danger whenever I could find a way to do so. 
The succession of the Israeli aggressions against the sister Arab States, and especially 
(Israel's) recent aggression against our sister Egypt, has corroborated the fears of 
Iraq concerning the Israeli danger. We succeeded in requesting the peace- loving 
states to favour stability and to believe in justice, to work with us for the eradication 
of Israel and the driving back of the outlaws and usurpers to where they hold came 
from. 

I shall now read to you the official statement issued by the Iraqi Government 
on November 13, 1956: 



Official Statement 

"The Council of Ministers met this morning and resolved as follows: 
"One - That the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should address a Memorandum to all 
the representatives of (foreign) States in Iraq on the Palestine problem. The text 
of the Memorandum is as follows : c The Iraqi Government has spared no efforts and 
lost no time, ever since the appearance of the Zionist danger in the Arab countries, 
in drawing, on numerous occasions and under various circumstances, the attention 
of world public opinion to, and acquainting it with the expansionist intentions and 
aggressive policy underlying Zionist principles which will soon undermine stability 
and threaten peace in this vital region of the world, and which will give rise to situa- 
tions and opportunities which would be definitely exploited by certain states for the 
realization of their own aims and designs.' 

"It is worth noting that, before the recent clash in Egypt, the Iraqi Government 
had already drawn attention to Israel's aggressive plans for exploiting the controversy 
arising from the Suez Canal crisis. 

"The flagrant Israeli aggression against Egypt, the aims of which have become 
manifest to the whole world, has, in a manner admitting of no doubt, unmasked Israel's 



275 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

intentions and her aggressive objectives in the Middle East. It is these (intentions 
and objectives) which will constantly endanger its peace and security, unless the Israeli 
danger is eradicated and the usurpers are sent back to where they had came from, 
and unless the one million Arab refugees, the indigenous inhabitants of the country, 
are repatriated and their property restored to them in Palestine. 

"This is the just solution of the Palestine problem and of the question of stability 
and peace in the Middle East. Without it, the state of tension will continue to threat- 
en peace in the Arab countries. In order to achieve the above, it is necessary that all 
the peace-loving peoples should collaborate in serious action and not merely in words. 

"After due consideration of all the above, the Iraqi Government considers that 
this is the only adequate plan for securing peace in the Middle East in general and in 
the Arab countries in particular. Otherwise, Israel, who relies for her existence and 
survival on the disturbance of peace and security and on the exploitation thereof, will 
not be able to survive without persisting in hei policy of expansion and aggression. 

"Iraq, therefore, calls upon all the peace-loving states and peoples to co-operate 
seriously in the solution of the problem on this basis, which we consider adequate to 
guarantee the destruction of this element - which is the only element disturbing 
international peace in this region - and thus restore a life of stability and security to 
this part of the world. 

"Two - To communicate the text of the above Memorandum to the Iraqi delegation 
at the United Nations so that it will act accordingly. 

"Three - To communicate the text of the Memorandum to the Conference of the 
Kings and Presidents of the Arab States, now being held in Beirut. 
"Four - To contribute the amount of 200,000 Iraqi dinars to those distressed Egyp- 
tians who suffered losses as a result of the vicious aggression against Egypt." 

Brethren: 

There is no doubt that the facts which I have recounted to you will have made 
clear to you the fallacy of the attacks to which Iraq was and still is being subjected, 
the extent of the injustice and abuse these attacks imply, and the harm they cause to 
the interests of the Arabs. Some of you may wonder as to the reasons for these attacks 
and the aims and purposes of those who are waging them. 

You may be able to know the sources which are opposing us and trying to destroy 
us, and you may be able to understand the aims which these sources are trying to 
achieve by these unjust and irresponsible attacks. 

Communism is the first enemy standing behind these attacks and directing them. 
Iraq's firm stand against the Communist attempts to subvert the country, the Iraqis' 
opposition to (Communism), their deprecation of its principles, and their continuous 
efforts to safeguard their very being, consolidate their security and repel the danger 
against the country - all these have exasperated Moscow against Iraq. For (Moscow) 
wants the region of the Middle East to be a political vacuum which she would occupy 
in order to make her dreams come true. She was, therefore, the first and foremost 
among those who opposed the Baghdad Pact, and it is she who is working assiduously 
and carefully for the destruction of Iraq so as to be able to infiltrate therein and 
spread her domination theieon. Will Iraq thus be committing a crime if she safeguards 
her religion and tradition and protects her heritage and existence ? And will Iraq be 
considered a criminal because she tries to defend herself against the aggressors ? And 
will Iraq be tried and destroyed because she works actively in developing her country, 
working for the welfare of her citizens, raising their living, cultural and moral standard, 
and spending her income for these noble purposes ? And will Iraq be committing 

276 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

a crime if she strives actively to find a solution for Palestine which will guarantee the 
dignity of he Arabs and prevent their being exploited for the benefit of the aims and 
the interests of others ? 

Next to Communism comes aggressive Zionism, for it is Moscow's partner and 
ally in fighting Iraq. I have already shown that Iraq was and still is the strongest 
among those who opposed the pernicious Zionist cancer, warned the Arabs against its 
dangers, urged them to unite and collaborate in order to destroy it, and worked for 
strengthening and equipping her Army so that it might stand on the side of the Arab 
armies in repelling the Israeli danger. And Israel, aware of the danger of Iraq's policy 
to her, has opposed the arming of (Iraq) and opposed her collaboration with the Mus- 
lim States, in the same way as she is opposing the unity and solidarity of the Arabs and 
encouraging their wrangling and disunity. She also hopes that the Aj-abs will persist in 
their negative attitude and in their hostility to the West. (This is) in order that she 
may remain the only one supported by the West and that the West may consolidate her 
State, connive at her aggressions and expansionist policy. Thus, if we wanted the 
Arabs to pay heed to the danger of Israel's aims, Israel would revolt against us, and 
rightly so. But how could the Arabs justify their revolt against us and their partaking 
in Israel's attacks (against us) ? 

As for France, who destroyed the throne of Faysalin Syria and occupied noble 
Lebanon, she found in Iraq a solid barrier against her ambitions in the Arab countries. 
Iraq opposed France in Syria and in Lebanon, and worked actively to drive her out of 
these two Arab countries. I had expressed my deprecation of France's participation 
in the Tripartite Declaration(i) issued by the three Western powers in 1950, and 
feared that France's participation in it would constitute a breach through which she 
could pass in order to re-establish her influence, (a course) which, God willing, I hope 
will never take place again. I also refused the participation of France in the Baghdad 
Pact because of my concern for safeguarding the independence of Syria and Lebanon. 
And Iraq also opposed France in the Arab Maghrib to an extent which led (France) to 
persist in her opposition to Iraq. For this reason, France sided with those who op- 
posed the Baghdad Pact, such as the Communists, the Zionists and their likes, who 
rallied in envy of Iraq and coveted her wealth. 

And in revenge for the attitude of Iraq and of the Arabs towards her, (France) 
also went to the extent of supplying Israel with arms and of supporting Israel's 
aggressive policy. 

There is also another source which has been opposing us in a continuous and 
concentrated manner. This is a known source and it is, most unfortunately, Arab. Any 
sensible person would be puzzled (trying to) justify this opposition which is in harm- 
mony with that coming from our Communist, Zionist, imperialist and French 
enemies. 

The Great Arab Revolt took place on the basis of the principle of unity and free- 
dom. Would Iraq's reward, then, be ingratitude and revilement if she believed in 
this principle and worked for it with sincerity and sacrifice ? And have values so chan- 
ged that whoever works for the unity, safety and security of the Arabs will be accused 
of being a satellite of imperialism? And, so, that whoever works for the reinforcement 
of the barriers imposed by imperialism will be called a national patriot ? And is it 
in conformity with the proper standards that whoever opposes Communism and 
Zionism will be called names which we consider despicable; and that whoever works 



(i) See Doc. No. 276. ED. 

277 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

with ulterior motives, ignorance, grudge, and in return for pay, in order to serve Com- 
munism and Zionism and to remove the obstacles from their way, will be called a na- 
tional patriot? 

God Almighty has said in His Noble Book(i): CC O Ye who have believed, if any 
dissolute person should bring you news, then make sure ye do not hurt anyone 
through your ignorance, lest you should repent for what you did". 

Brethren: 

I have referred at the beginning of this speech to the gravity of the stage through 
which the Arab States are passing, and explained the facts with the frankness you have 
always been used to know in me. You will undoubtedly agree that the gravity of the 
situation necessitates close collaboration and solidarity among all the Arab States and 
peoples. 

It is this gravity which makes me disinclined to refer to the subject of the painful 
state of affairs, to the regrettable incidents, and to the dangerous attitudes confusedly 
(followed and adopted by) some of the Arab Governments attacking Iraq. But we 
hope that these Governments will pay attention to what is in wait for the Arabs at 
this stage, and that they will concentrate on unifying their views, so that the Arabs 
may be able to ward off the danger threatening their countries. 

I therefore appeal to all my Arab brethren in all their countries to (deal with) 
matters with vigilance and prudence, and to resort to courage in order to uphold right 
and combat lies and deception. And I appeal, in particular, to my Iraqi brethren and 
compatriots to unify their ranks in order to oppose the Russian Communist propagan- 
da which comes to us through Shepilov, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and such of their 
puppets as the Zionists, the hirelings, and the absurd followers other than Zionists. 
Let us, then, repeat to them the familiar Iraqi ballad: 

"The House of the master is secure" 

"The House of the master is secure"(2) 

Compatriots, 

You have known me as a struggling young man who advocated and worked for 
the independence of the Arabs and their unity and for raising the prestige of the Arabs 
at a time when (3) the word "Arab" would have cost the speaker his neck. This was 
at a time when those who are to-day advocating nationalism were prostrating them- 
selves at the feet of the oppressors and of the imperialists and accusing us of treason 
and atheism. I have exposed my life to danger more than once, and proceeded on my 
way seeking nothing but the independence of the Arabs, the glory of the Arabs and the 
dignity of the Arabs. I have also been always frank in what I said and clear in my po- 
licy; I believed in what I said and did, and was never afraid of anybody's censure as 
long as I was acting rightly, nor was I deterred by anybody's words as long as I 
considered that I was right. 

The call to Arab nationalism is not accidental to me, but is my very being : I am 
proud of it, and I strive to promote it and to safeguard it whether I am inside or out- 
side the government. If this, then, was my way in my adolescence and manhood, it is 
not strange, therefore, that I should still be so in my old age. 



(1) That is, the Holy Qur'an. ED. 

(2) This means that those who know themselves to be upright need have no fears. ED. 
(j) Presumably referring here to his personal experiences under the Turks. ED . 

278 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

I did and will do my very best to safeguard the independence and the sovereignty 
of this country, to raise its prestige, to develop it, to promote its prosperity and to raise 
the standard of its sons, so that it will become a strong and active factor in supporting 
our Arab brethren and in extending to them a helping hand at all times and wherever 
they may be. 

And, as everybody knows, I do not possess in this world anything for which I 
may be afraid of Communism and its principles, but I do possess the faith to oppose 
(Communism), because of my belief that it is a danger to my country, its sovereignty, 
independence, religion and traditions. May God preserve Iraq as a bastion for 
Arabdom and may He prosper us all to serve Him faithfully under the patronage of 
His Majesty the King and His Highness the loyal Crown Prince; and peace be with 
you. 

Egyptian Government's Reply to Prime Minister Nuri As-Sa'id's \ (\\ 

Radio Speech of December 16, 1956 L U L 

December 20,1956(1) 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id, Prime Minister of Iraq, delivered a speech in which he tried 
to justify the policy he is pursuing - that of alliance with Britain, the enemy of Arab 
nationalism. In his speech, Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id tried to find excuses for Britain's 
colonial policy, and to justify her aggression against Egypt and her alignment with 
Israel against the Arabs. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id's defence of the British aggression against Egypt clearly shows 
that he is defending his (own) policy, which he advocated during his visit to Britain. 
For, during his stay in Britain last July, Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id had talks with Mr. Selwyn 
Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister. In these talks Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id asked for help 
from the British. This help was, however, nothing other than getting rid of the Arab 
(system of) government which advocates Arab national emancipation. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id told the British that the stability of the national rule in Egypt 
would only mean the end of the rule of Britain's friends and consequently the end of 
British influence in the Arab world. 

In defending British aggression, Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id is only defending the crime in 
the contrivance of which he had participated and insisted that Britain should carry it 
out. 

Every Arab knows that the events which befell the Arab nation in 1955 and 1956 
were only the outcome of the signing of the British Baghdad Pact. For the Baghdad Pact 
was the starting point of the great struggle between the advocates of the policy of 
complete independence, which is based on liberation and on the consolidation of 
Arab nationalism, and the agents of imperialism, who work for the firm establishment 
of British imperialism by any means and at any cost - those who would not hesitate 
to sell their country as well as Arabdom for a worthless price, in order to turn the 
whole Arab world into a part of the British sphere of influence. 

The struggle of the free against the agents of imperialism in the Arab homeland 
has developed, and the Arab nation everywhere has risen in support of liberty and in 



(i) This Egyptian reply was made by Mr. 'Abd al-Qadir Hatim, Head of the Egyptian 
Directorate of Information, Cairo', translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) 
text as it appears in al-Ahram, December 21, 1956. ED . 



279 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

support of its free sons, and in opposition to the agents of imperialism. 

The free men in Iraq, as in every (other) Arab country, rose to support (their 
fellow) free men, and to fight the agents of imperialism, until (these) agents of imper- 
ialism ignominiously failed to drag the Arab nation into the Baghdad Pact - that great 
prison into which they had pledged themselves to bring the Arab nation and (for 
which) they had asked for help from imperialism, in order to save them and save their 
future. Hence came the brutal British aggression against Egypt. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id drew for the imperialists a tempting picture (showing) that the 
booty was easy (to get), and made an undertaking with Britain in 1954 to make all the 
Arab States join the Baghdad Pact, and to fetter them under Britain's domination in 
the (above) great prison. But he failed to (carry out) his aim, and was defeated in his 
task. He even failed to deceive the free and proud Iraqi people, who believed that the 
Baghdad Pact was nothing else than a great prison created by Britain, who appointed 
Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id at its head. 

When Nuri a-Sa'id failed, and the Iraqi people rose to strive for liberation from 
the great dungeon into which they had been driven, Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id proceeded to 
persecute the free people of Iraq. On the eve of the secret trials of the brave, free 
Iraqis, he came out with a statement to the Arabs, justifying his crime - a statement full 
of subterfuge and, if anything, proving his guilt and (proving) that he was working 
in the interest of imperialism and at the cost of that of the Arabs and their freedom. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id spoke about talks which preceded (the conclusion of) the 
Baghdad Pact, and about the Baghdad Pact, and he asked the reasons for the attacks 
made against the British Baghdad Pact. 

In order to make the facts known to the whole of public opinion, and to disclose 
the truth about the Baghdad Pact, we hereby make known full (details) of these talks. 

We shall disclose the Sarsank talks as well as those of Nuri as-Sa'id with Presi- 
dent Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, and (thus) show that the Baghdad Pact was signed on 
February 24, 1955, but was only a cover for a bilateral agreement (i) which was 
concluded between Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id and Britain on April 4. In this agreement, Mr. 
Nuri as-Sa'id pledged the opening of Iraq for British bases and Army, and also under- 
took to enable Britain to occupy Iraq completely in the event of war or threat of war. 
He also undertook to keep the bases of al-Habbaniyya and ash-Shu'ayba (Shaiba) for 
use at all times by the British Air Forces, and, further, undertook to let the Iraqi 
Army be controlled by British officers. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id stated that the purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to terminate 
the agreement (2) concluded with Britain in 1930. But, in its place, he signed the 
Baghdad Pact, and pledged himself to make the Arab League States join it. He also 
signed a bilateral agreement with Britain, whereby he subjected Iraq and its fate to 
British domination. 

We have fought the Baghdad Pact lest we should be dragged into this trap; in 
order that the whole Arab world may know what (designs) Britain is harbouring 
against it, and (that it may) realize what role Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id has pledged himself to 
play. 

There has been a great conflict between Egyptian foreign policy and that in 
which Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id believes. 

Egypt's policy (is based on) the conviction that the defence of the Arab States 
should emanate from the Arab States alone, on the basis of the Arab Collective Se- 



(/) See Doc. No. 197 ED. 
(2) See Doc. No. 191. ED. 



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International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

curity Pact, without the participation of any other state or any (one of) the big Powers. 
For the participation of any big Power with the smaller states in (matters of) defence 
means that the smaller states must follow the orders of the big Powers and become 
nothing but satellites of the one that deprives them of their independence and exposes 
them to great dangers. The Arabs will not accept this situation, having suffered as 
they did from imperialism and its domination. No Pact outside the Arab Collective 
Security Pact will be anything but a perpetuation of imperialism in another form. For 
imperialism can, with the lapse of time, change its colour according to the require- 
ments of the situation. 

Nuri as-Sa'id's policy is (based on the premise) that the (Arab) Collective Se- 
curity (Pact) and Arab Alliance are useless, and that Britain must participate in any 
defence of the Arab States. 

Egypt's delegation, headed by Mr. Salah Salim, left for Sarsank in order to hold 
talks with Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id, to try to convince him of the idea of Arab liberation and 
of the force of Arab nationalism, and to convince him that the unification of (Arab) 
foreign policy is important and necessary for the good of the Arabs; that (Arab) for- 
eign policy should be based on full independence and on abandoning the British 
spheres of influence. (The delegation also wanted to convince him) that we should 
build our foreign policy on the basis of co-operation and on that of the Arab Collective 
Security Pact, without the participation of any other state, and on the basis of 
strengthening the Collective Security Pact, by establishing a unified Arab command 
for the Arab armies, so as to avert events (similar to) those of 1948. 

Talks continued in Sarsank from the I5th to the 22nd August (1954), in the 
presence of King Fay sal, King of Iraq. 

Mr. Salah Salim stated at the meeting that Egypt had repeatedly explained to 
the West her view that the defence of the Arab countries was the responsibility of the 
Arab peoples alone, and that the Collective Security Pact was the only foundation on 
which defence should be built. Mr. Salah Salim also said that in view of that, the Col- 
lective Security Pact should be seriously strengthened; thus, it was necessary to create 
a unified command for the Arab armies, since (we) could not wait until an attack had 
taken place against an Arab state and then think of creating this (unified) command. 
The Arab countries must also co-operate in the field of military industries. 

Mr. Salah Salim (further) stated that the Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Fadil al- 
Jamali had declared on February 23 that Iraq would join the Turko-Pakistani Pact. 
(Mr. Salah Salim said) that this would be a disaster for all the Arab countries, and 
that Iraq had (created) difficulties for the Anglo-Egyptian evacuation agreement, by 
insisting that Britain should (be allowed to) return to Egypt in the case of an attack on 
Pakistan, Iraq, or Turkey, at a time when Egypt was insisting that this should happen 
only in the case of an armed aggression, from outside the region, against the Arab 
States. And when Egypt, under great pressure, accepted a (British) return in the case 
of an attack on Turkey, Iraq was insisting on adding Pakistan and Iran. 

Mr. Salah Salim, moreover, said that the position of the Arab States is very strong 
and that their potentials and strategic location make them a match for the West. One 
can even say that the West is in need of us, for it needs the Arabs and their oil. The 
opportunity has come (for us) to stop being followers; we should, indeed, be fully 
sovereign. Our participation in any pact would destroy our sovereignty, would make 
us followers in regard to our foreign policy, and would completely destroy Arab na- 
tionalism. The interest of the Arab world consists in strengthening the (Arab) Col- 
lective Security Pact and in making it the only basis for the defence of this region. 

Mr. Salah Salim (furthermore) spoke about public opinion in the Arab countries 

28l 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

with respect to pacts. He said that public opinion in all of the Arab countries was 
against entering into any pact, because of suspicion over Britain's imperialistic designs 
over the Arab countries, because Britain was still occupying some parts of the Arab 
world, and because the Arabs could not forget the Palestine tragedy. (He also said) 
that statesmen in all the Arab countries had attacked pacts, and that the Arab peoples 
had become convinced of the necessity of non-participation in any pact, following 
upon the refusal in 1950 of the proposal regarding the Middle East Defence (Organi- 
zation), on the part of Turkey, France, Britain, and America. (Mr. Salim added) that 
it would be dangerous if the Arab States, or any of them, were to try to enter into any 
pact, since such an act would cause a wide split in the Arab nation, as well as serious 
disturbances from which the Arab countries would not benefit. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id spoke about the Arab Revolt(j), and how King Husayn joined 
the British in the First World War, in the hope that if the Allies should win, the Arab 
countries would attain complete independence. He then spoke about sectarianism in 
Iraq, and about Turkey's ambitions regarding the Mosul Province, which contains 
the most important oil resources in Iraq. He mentioned that Iran had also some am- 
bitions regarding some of the frontier regions. 

He (also) mentioned that when he was in Pakistan, he asked the responsible 
(authorities) whether they were willing to assist the Arab countries, in the event of 
an Israeli aggression. They answered that that would require the consent of the West. 

The Prime Minister of Iraq (then) suggested that Iraq should conclude an agree- 
ment with Pakistan, but made certain reservations (to the effect) that the subject 
needed discussion and study. 

He then spoke about the (Arab) Collective Security Pact and about its (possible) 
extension, and (said that) among the factors that would strengthen it would be the 
accession of Pakistan (thereto) and the linking of Iraq with the Mediterranean Sea. 

He then spoke about Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and how it could 
be the basis for an agreement with Britain, while at the same time retaining the (Arab) 
Collective Security Pact. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id concluded his statement on this subject by asserting that he 
held no definitive view, and that what he had said was (meant) for discussion only. 

Then Mr. Salah Salim said that it was necessary that the Arab countries should 
strengthen themselves, in order to ward off any aggression against their territory; 
that at present we had the Collective Security Pact, which we must strengthen and 
turn into a useful instrument for the defence of this area, and that we must hasten to 
establish a unified command that will undertake research, study, planning, the super- 
vision of armaments and the attempt to obtain arms. (He added) that Pakistan could 
not offer any military help beyond its territory. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id replied (by saying) that it was necessary for Egypt and Iraq to 
ascertain the views of America and Britain in order to consider the neccessary means 
for strengthening the Collective Security Pact, and that we should act on the basis of 
(their) advice. Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id insisted on the necessity of consulting Britain and 
America, provided that the talks were resumed in Cairo which he would be visiting on 
his way to London. 

Following the return of Mr. Salah Salim to Cairo, President Jamal 'Abd an- 
Nasir objected to (the principle of) consulting Britain and the United States over a 
matter which essentially pertains to our sovereignty. He said that consulting Britain 



(i) That is, that led by Sharif Husayn during the First World War. ED. 

282 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

and the United States would mean entering into negotiation with the two countries. 

On September 9 (1954), President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir received Iraq's Ambas- 
sador to Egypt, Mr. Najib ar-Rawi. The Iraqi Ambassador said that until that time 
no contact had been made with Britain and the United States, in accordance with Mr. 
Nuri as-Sa'id's request, to ascertain their views on the strengthening of the Collective 
Security Pact. (He also said) that Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id would not pay Egypt his 
(proposed) visit, concerning which he had agreed with Mr. Salah Salim, unless con- 
tact was made with Britain and the United States, for discussing the strengthening of 
the Collective Security Pact. 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir made it clear to the Ambassador that consulting 
Britain and the United States would be inconsistent with our independent policy, 
that it was Iraq we were consulting on this subject,and that the British reply was 
well-known to us, as the only means they had for strengthening the Collective Secur- 
ity Pact was their participation therein. This they told us (before), but we have re- 
jected it ever since 1953. 

The Ambassador said: "Your refusal to contact the British and the Americans 
will prevent Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id from visiting Egypt and resuming talks". 

The President said that Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id was free to take the decision he wanted, 
but that it was in (our common) interest that the talks should be resumed, and that 
Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id should carry out what he had promised, until such time as Arab 
interests would be realized. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id arrived in Egypt on September 15, 1954, and had talks with 
President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir on September 15 and 16. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id said that he proposed that Egypt should sign the evacuation 
agreement with the British, quickly and without raising any new problems. As to 
the defence of the region, (he said) that this was a question that concerned all of the 
Arab countries. He (added) that, first of all, the British and the Americans should be 
asked as to their opinion concerning the Collective Security Pact; what its defects 
were, and what (things) they would ask for. He then said that some of the Arab 
countries, such as Syria and Lebanon, were not linked to the West in any way, and 
that these States were linked to the other Arab States through the Collective Security 
Pact. Therefore, (he asserted), we should ask the British in order to know their views 
and (also) the obligations they were asking from those Arab countries. They might, 
for example, ask for some transportation facilities from Syria and Lebanon, in which 
case we would have to notify Syria of this. Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id also said: "We have no 
desire to sign a bilateral agreement with the British ; (but) as there is no link connect- 
ing the British with the Collective Security Pact, where are we going to get (our) arms 
from? Accordingly, the Collective Security Pact should be expanded in order to 
link Syria and Lebanon, (on the one hand), with the Western States, (on the other), and 
thus (enable) them (i) to obtain arms. If this method is sound, and if Egypt can 
easily follow it, we must carry it out. If, however, it is not suitable for Egypt, then 
Egypt can remain as she is, and so can the Collective Security Pact, provided 
that Iraq may seek another method." 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir (then) asked him: "What (you arc) asking for, 
then, is to let Britain join the Collective Security Pact?" (The President) added: "The 
British had repeatedly asked us to enter into a pact with them, but we rejected the of- 
fer and told them that the Collective Security Pact was the only basis for the organi- 



(i) That is, Syria and Lebanon . ED. 

283 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

zation of the defence of the Arab countries." 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id then spoke of the attitude of Turkey towards Iraq, and said 
that the Turks were aspiring to annex Mosul. He then said that our need for arms 
made it necessary for us to be in agreement with Britain and Turkey. 

The President said : "But you have submitted a (draft) agreement to the United 
States (whereby) she would supply you with arms." The President (also) said that 
with regard to letting Turkey and Britain join the Collective Security Pact, Egypt did 
not agree to the adherence of any state to the Collective Security Pact, other than an 
Arab State. 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id said : "(This) may not be the right time for Egypt to take such 
a step, but it may be possible in future ; for this reason, I consider that it will be neces- 
sary for Iraq to co-operate with Britain, in one way or another; this might(take the 
form of) a pact that will include Iraq, Turkey, Britain and Pakistan." 

He (also) repeated his request that Egypt should ascertain the views of Britain. 

The President said : "To approach the British will lead to one of the following 
replies : 

"Either the conclusion of bilateral treaties between the Arab countries and Britain, 
or the conclusion of a pact that will include Britain and the Arab States, or admitting 
Britain and Turkey to the Collective Security Pact. The British had previously asked 
for that, but we rejected all (their) requests, on the grounds that the Collective Security 
Pact was adequate for the defence of the Arab countries, without any detriment to 
their independence. Accordingly, any fresh discussion (of the subject) with them 
would only result in these requests, and would only constitute the opening of new 
negotiations with Britain, (negotiations) which we have no desire to have." 

The President went on : "We cannot think only of defending (ourselves) against 
external aggression, but we must also think of protecting our independence from the 
greeds of imperialism." 

Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id said that it was essential that we should (ascertain the views) 
of Britain, and that the reply to the question would not commit Egypt to anything. 

President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir said that our plan was to conclude an evacuation 
agreement; that we thought that things would not crystallize before the lapse of two 
years after the British withdrawal from Egypt; that Egypt would need two years, 
after the evacuation, to think of and (then) decide upon the policy it would follow. 
"Consequently, I cannot agree to any of these proposals. We want to feel that we are 
independent, and to think while we are independent, (a matter) which requires two 
years after the completion of evacuation." 

Whereupon Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id said that Iraq could do nothing that was inconsis- 
tent with Egypt's plans for independence ; and that she would (still) be in the Collect- 
ive Security Pact, that Iraq could not send any forces to Jordan, for example, in the 
event of an Israeli aggression, that (therefore) the Collective Security (Pact) was a 
dead document(i) and that another method had per force to be sought. 

The meeting ended without reaching any definite agreement. 

In December 1954, the Political Committee of the Arab League held a meeting, 
which was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States. Iraq was represented 
by her Foreign Minister, Mr. Musa Shabandar. 

The Foreign Ministers discussed Arab affairs. The Foreign Minister of Iraq 



(j) Literally, "ink on paper". ED. 

284 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 

said that Nuri as-Sa'id had become convinced of the point of view of Egypt, and that 
he had decided to conclude with Britain an evacuation agreement, similar to the Egypt- 
ian agreement, with the stipulation that (British troops) would return to Egypt in 
the event of an armed aggression against Iran or Turkey. All agreed with him con- 
cerning that (point). 

The Foreign Ministers agreed on the following decisions: 

1. No alliance should be concluded outside the Collective Security Pact. 

2. Co-operation with the West on the basis of solving Arab problems justly, and 
strengthening the Arabs by supplying them with arms. 

3. The reinforcement of the Arab Collective Security Pact, by working for the 
establishment of a joint command for the Arab armies. 

On January 6, 1955, a joint Turkish-Iraqi Communique announced the conclu- 
sion of a defensive pact between Iraq and Turkey. This Communique provided for 
inviting the Arab States to join the pact. 

This was a breach of what the Iraqi Foreign Minister had said in December. It 
was also a surprise blow to Arab nationalism and the policy of Arab emancipation. We 
had realized that Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id's plan was to draw all of the Arab States into a 
pact with Britain, and to place them under British influence, (a course) which would 
endanger the very existence and independence of all of the Arab States. 

For this reason, Egypt asked for a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Arab 
States, in order to discuss the step which Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id had taken, in so far as it 
affected all the Arab States, and in order (also) to warn them against the consequences 
which would result from it. 

On February 24, 1955 Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id signed the Baghdad Pact with Turkey; 
then Britain acceded to it afterwards. The (truth about the Pact) was later made clear 
when Mr. Eden declared in the House of Commons, in 1956, that he was the origi- 
nator of the idea of the Baghdad Pact. 

But Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id was not content with signing the Pact, the purpose of 
which, he said, was to terminate the 1930 agreement with Britain. He also, in addition 
to the Baghdad Pact signed, on April 4, 1955, a bilateral military agreement with 
Britain. Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id (of course) always tries to avoid any reference to this 
bilateral agreement with Britain, as this agreement refutes Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id's 
assertion that the purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to terminate the 1930 agreement. 

The agreement of April 4, 1955, between Iraq and Britain, consists of nine artic- 
les, of two letters from Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id to the British Ambassador in Iraq, together 
with a memorandum appended to the first letter; and of three letters from the British 
Ambassador to Mr.Nuri as-Sa'id, together with a memorandum appended to the second 
letter. These letters are considered complementary to the bilateral agreement con- 
cluded between Iraq and Britain on April 4, 1955. 

This bilateral agreement provided, in Article 5, that the British Government 
should draw up military plans, in conjunction with the Iraqi Government, and 
should (carry out) combined training for the Iraqi and British armies. 

Likewise, Article 8 provided for the occupation of Iraq by the British forces in 
the event of an armed attack or threat of an armed attack. 

The memorandum appended to Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id 's first letter to the British 
Ambassador provides for the continued presence in Iraq of the British in order to 
assist the Iraqi forces with training, and with the installation, operation and mainten- 
ance of facilities and equipment and with the servicing of aircraft. It also provides 
that the command and administration of British installations shall be the responsibility 

285 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

of Britain, and that the British Government shall, for this purpose, make available 
the necessary British command. It also provides for Britain's right to establish bases 
and installations anywhere in Iraq, under British administration. 

The agreement ( /) also provides that each of the (two) Governments shall meet 
the cost of its own forces in Iraq and any (civilian) personnel employed by it, and that 
the Governement of Iraq shall meet the cost of British personnel loaned or seconded 
to the Iraqi forces. 

This is the agreement concluded between Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id and Britain, over 
and above the Baghdad Pact. It is evident that Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id does not refer to 
this agreement at all, and that he totally ignored it in his latest speech. 

The British House of Commons held a session on April 4, (1955) during which 
it considered Britain's accession to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. It also considered the 
conclusion of a special agreement with the Government of Iraq, to replace the treaty 
of 1930. At that meeting, Anthony Eden said that the Pact and the Agreement 
strengthened the influence and voice of Britain throughout the Middle East. 

Mr. Anthony Nutting, (British) Minister of State, said at that meeting that (the 
British Government) was trying to make other countries in the Middle East join 
the Pact. He also said that the Baghdad Pact would provide for greater security for all 
States in the Middle East, including Israel. He then said that the Baghdad Pact was 
in no way incompatible with Israel's interests. 

Mr. Nutting (moreover) spoke about the bilateral agreement between Iraq and 
Britain. He said that, in accordance with the new basis of co-operation, the Govern- 
ment of Iraq assumed (full) responsibility for guarding all (defence) installations, 
including the air-bases of al-Habbaniyya and ash-Shu'ayba; and that these two bases 
were to be jointly used by the Iraqi and British forces. (He added) that R.A.F. squa- 
drons would, under the new agreement, be entitled to visit Iraq and to remain there 
for joint training, and would be looked after by the British authorities permanently 
stationed there. 

Mr. Nutting further said that the new agreement provided that the defence re- 
quirements which would be needed by Britain in Iraq would at all times be kept in 
a state of readiness. 

(Mr.) Elliot (2) said at that sitting that there was one article in the Agreement of 
very great importance for Britain. This article may be summarized (by saying that it 
gave) Britain the right to assemble stores, depots and installations in Iraq, and to 
have (these) visited by British forces whenever they so desired. 

(Mr.) Eden said at that sitting that the purpose sought by (Britiain) in the 
Baghdad Pact was a very simple one. For by acceding to it (the British) have strength- 
ened (their) influence and voice throughout the Middle East. The accession of 
Britain to the Baghdad Pact ensured for her a continuing voice in Middle East 
affairs. 

(Mr.) Eden had (on a previous occasion said in the House of Commons)( j) : "I 
think that a little geographical examination would show the Israeli Government that 
the purpose of this pact lies in a different direction. As they are very intelligent people 



(j) The following provision actually occurs in Memorandum No. 2. ED. 

(2) That w, Mr. Walter Elliot, member of the British House of Commons. ED. 

(3) That was on March 30, 1955, when he informed the House of Commons that the 
British Government had decided to accede to the Baghdad Pact. ED. 

286 



International Affairs: Treaties) Agreements, Relationships 

I should have thought that that would have given them comfort." 

This (then) is the Baghdad Pact, and this is Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id's bilateral agree- 
ment with Britain. 

As to (the reason) why we opposed them, this is far too obvious. For they have made 
of Iraq a British colony, and Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id has sold Iraq to Britain. Indeed, he 
has not been content with this, but wants us to drink from the same cup.(i) He wants 
to turn all the Arab States into British colonies and (make them) a part of the British 
spheres of influence; and if any Arab State were to refuse (to heed his advice), it 
would be (the victim) of plots, intrigues, and the smuggling of arms, as was the case 
with Syria. There is even war, and British aggression, as was the case with Egypt. 

We extend our compliments to the struggle of the free Iraqi people, who have 
refused to (turn their country into) a British colony and a part of the British sphere 
of influence, in the manner Mr. Nuri as-Sa'id wanted them to be. We salute their no- 
ble martyrs who have sacrificed their lives for the sake of the freedom of their country, 
for the liberty of the Arab nation, and for the dignity of Arab nationalism. 

Treaty of Solidarity between Jordan, Syria,Saudi Arabia and Egypt: 

Accord on Jordan 

Cairo, January 19, 1957 (2) 

The Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Syria, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Egypt, being aware of the grave 
responsibilities falling on them for preserving Arab existence and independence, in 
response to the wishes of their peoples and their belief in solidarity for the liberation 
of the Arab homeland, in their appreciation of the fact that the realization of this 
solidarity constitutes a positive step toward the desired Arab union, and in order to 
participate in safeguarding peace and security in accordance with the principles of the 
Arab League Charter and the United Nations Charter, and in their desire to conclude 
an agreement for the promotion of cooperation and coordination of efforts for the ful- 
fillment of these objectives, have appointed and delegated the following representa- 
tives : 

On behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, His Majesty King Hussein I 
and Premier Suleiman Nabulsi; on behalf of the Syrian Republic, Premier Sabri el- 
Assali; on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty King Saud Ibn Abdul 
Aziz; on behalf of the Republic of Egypt, President Gamal Abdel Nasser; who after 
the exchange of credences giving them full powers which would sound correct and 
satisfactory, agreed to the following: 

Article i 

The contracting Governments affirm their faith in the need to maintain solidarity 
and cooperation for bolstering Arab nationalism and independence. They declare 
that they appreciate the need to participate in the responsibilities resulting therefrom. 

Article 2 

The Governments of the Republic of Syria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
the Republic of Egypt, shall share in the expenditure emanating from the obligations 



(1) That is, to suffer the same fate. ED. 

(2) The text is copied from Middle East Journal, vol. n (1957), pp. 194-195* 



287 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

falling on the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as a result of the 
policy of cooperation and solidarity for bolstering Arab existence and independence, 
of the total amount of 12,500,000 Egyptian pounds annually, or their equivalent. 
This amount will come under the "Arab obligations" heading. The supplement of 
this agreement, which is a complementary part of it, organizes the distribution of 
the aid offer among the participant Governments and regulates its presentation. 

Article 3 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall devote the Arab aid to the Jordanian 
Hashemite armed forces including the National Guard forces. 

Article 4 

This agreement is concluded for ten years from the date it becomes effective. If 
the agreement is not amended before the expiration of this period under agreement 
by the contracting Governments, it will remain in force until the expiration of this 
validity. After this date, the treaty will continue unless a year's notice regarding its 
termination is served by one of the contracting Governments on the other Govern- 
ments through diplomatic channels. 

Article 5 

This agreement will be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures 
in force in each of the contracting states. It will come into force from the date of the 
exchange of the instruments of ratification, which should take place in Cairo. In testi- 
mony thereof, the above-mentioned accredited delegates sign this agreement. This 
agreement was written in Arabic in Cairo on the eighteenth day of the second month 
of Jumada, 1376 (hejira year) corresponding to Jan. 19, A.D. 1957. The agreement 
was made in five copies, each contracting Government keeping one copy. The last 
copy will be deposited in the Arab League General Secretariat. 

Supplement to the Arab Solidarity Agreement Providing Aid to Jordan 
The Governments that are signatories to the Arab solidarity agreement in Cairo 
on the eighteenth day of the second (month of) Jumada, 1376 (hejira year), corres- 
ponding to Jan. 19, A.D. 1957, agree to the following: 

Article i 

The share of each state participating in the Arab obligations heading provided in 
Article 2 of the said agreement shall be as follows: the Republic of Syria, 2,500,000 
Egyptian pounds or the equivalent ; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 5,000,000 
Egyptian pounds or the equivalent; the Republic of Egypt, 5,000,000 Egyptian pounds 
or the equivalent. 

Article 2 

Each Government will pay its share of the above-mentioned obligation in two 
equal installments. The first installment shall be paid when the agreement becomes 
effective and the second installment six months after the maturity of the first install- 
ment and so on. 

Article 3 

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan promises to purchase all 
requirements of the armed forces when equipment becomes available in the countries 
of the contracting parties from their own production. The cost of such purchases will 
be entered in the special accounts to be deducted from the Arab obligation heading. 

Article 4 

It is agreed that the Arab obligations stipulated in Article 2 of the agreement are 
intended to replace the sundry annual grants offered by the British Government to 

288 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements) Relationships 

the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the armed forces, includ- 
ing the National Guard, under agreements concluded between them in this respect. 
Cairo, the eighteenth day of the second (month of) Jumada, 1376 (hejira year). 



President J. 'Abd an-Nasir's Speech on the Occasion of the Visit to 
Damascus by the Leaders of the Iraqi Revolution 

July 19, 1958 (i) 

I talked to you yesterday about Arab Nationalism, Arab freedom, Arab inde- 
pendence and the logic of freedom among the sons of the Arab Nation. 

I told you yesterday that Arab Nationalism represents every individual, every son 
of the Arab Nation, that Arab Nationalism does not represent a single individual, but 
springs from the whole Arab Nation. 

I told you in the course of my talk to you yesterday that Arab Nationalism which 
every one of you represents is almost manifest in every Arab country, that Arab Na- 
tionalism which is resolutely determined to start on the Sacred March, which is 
resolutely determined to achieve victory, has countless armies everywhere. I also 
spoke about the vanguard of the Sacred March in Iraq, and about the revolution in 
Iraq and told you that that was Arab Nationalism and that those were the armies of 
Arab Nationalism and that we, every one of us, shall consider ourselves its men and 
armies. 

Yes, I talked to you about the Revolution of Iraq and about the sons of that revo- 
lution and said that they represented the Arab people everywhere and in every Arab 
country. I also told you yesterday about those who had known those heroes, for they 
were representing the people, for they belonged to the vanguard of the people, the 
vanguard of the Sacred March - Neguib El-Rabiei, Abdel Karim Kassem, Abdel 
Salam Amer (2), Sadique Shinshel, Mohammed Hadeed, Abdel Gawaad. They are 
all our brethren, our brethren there in Baghdad. 

Today, here in Damascus, I present to you the vanguard of the Sacred March in 
Baghdad, and with infinite happiness and wholehearted thankfulness to Almighty 
God who united our hearts and united us all in this revolution of ours, I leave them to 
talk to you and leave the microphone. 



U.A.R. - Iraqi Mutual Defence Pact 1 A 

July 19, 1958 (3) L U ^ 

On the 2nd of Muharram, 1378 A.H., corresponding to the ipth of July, 1958, 



(1) The text is copied from President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches and Press 
Interviews during the year 1958 (Directorate-General, Information Department, Cairo, 
1958), p. 161. 

(2) Presumably, "Amer" is a misprint and should be "Arif". ED 

(3) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat 
(Beirut), July 20, 1958. The above Pact was signed in Damascus following the visit of 
Colonel Arij to confer with President 'Abd an-Nasir after the success of the Iraqi revo- 
lution a few days earlier (July 14). .Z). 



289 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

the delegation of the United Arab Republic and the delegation of the Republic of 
Iraq agreed upon the following: 

1. Reinforcement of the pacts and conventions which bind the two countries 
together, foremost among which are the Pact of the Arab League and the Arab 
Collective Security Pact. 

2. Strengthening of the close association declared by the Governments of 
these two countries (to exist between them) in regard to the international situation, 
and (pledging) their determination to rise as one country in the face of any aggression 
against them (both) or either one of them, and to take (all) practical steps necessitated 
by same. 

3. Complete co-operation in the international field in order to safeguard the 
rights of the two countries and to consult each other on the adoption of effective 
means in support of the Charter of the United Nations and in the defence of peace in 
the Arab East as well as in the world as a whole. 

4. Adoption of urgent practical steps for the promotion of cultural and econo- 
mic co-operation between the two countries. 

5. Constant contacts and consultations on all matters of interest to them. 

Signed: 

For the United Arab Republic 

PRESIDENT JAMAL 'ABD AN-NASIR 

For the Republic of Iraq 

COLONEL 'ABD AS-SALAM 'ARIF, 
Vice-President^ Council of Ministers 

1 C Nasir-Shihab Joint Communique* (U.A.R. - Lebanese Border) 

1 U J March 25, 1959 (i) 

On the 25th of March, 1959, a meeting was held on the Lebanese-United Arab 
Republic borders between President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir, President of the United 
Arab Republic, and His Excellency General Fu'ad Shihab, President of the Lebanese 
Republic, to discuss various matters of direct interest to the two sister countries, 
and to exchange views on Arab and international questions. As a result of their dis- 
cussions they agreed on affirming the following principles: 

First: Their eagerness to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and to foster 
mutual and fruitful co-operation between the two sister Republics in all matters that 
would lead to the consolidation of their independence, sovereignty and very exis- 
tence within the framework of the Pact of the League of Arab States and the Charter 
of the United Nations. 

Second: Their belief in the necessity of consolidating Arab solidarity and fully 
supporting Arab causes. 

Third: Their sincere desire to seek positive solutions, as soon (as possible), to 
the economic questions outstanding between the two countries, on the basis of equa- 
lity and the preservation of mutual interests, with a view to assuring the welfare and 
prosperity of their peoples. 



(i) Translated by the Editor from the original (Arabic) text as it appears in al-Hayat 
(Beirut), March, 26, 1959. 

290 



International Affairs: Treaties, Agreements, Relationships 



To this end, the two Presidents have instructed their respective Governments 
to maintain their efforts and to resume their discussions, without delay, in the same 
spirit of cordiality and understanding which prevailed during the meeting of the 
two Presidents and (with the same) sincere and brotherly feelings cherished by the 
two brotherly peoples. 



291 



VII 

The Arab States and Other States: 
The Background 



293 



International Affairs : Background 

Sykes-Picot Agreement for the Partition of the Arab World : Britain 

and France 

April 26 - October 23, 1916(1) 

i. SIR EDWARD GREY TO PAUL CAMBON, 15 MAY 1916 

I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note to your Excellency's note 
of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be 
grateful if your Excellency could assure me that in those regions which, under the con- 
ditions recorded in that communication, become entirely French, or in which French 
interests are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of 
navigation or development, and thvhghts and privileges of any British religious, scho- 
lastic, or medical institutions will be maintained. 

His Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a reciprocal assurance in 
regard to the British area. 



2. GREY TO CAMBON, 16 MAY 1916 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 
9th instant, stating that the French Government accept the limits of a future Arab 
State, or Confederation of States, and of those parts of Syria where French interests 
predominate, together with certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result 
from recent discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the 
whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British 
interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the 
general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political 
situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, pro- 
vided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the con- 
ditions and obtain the towns of Horns, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo. 

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments 

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an 
independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) 
marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) 
France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and 
local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply 
advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of 
Arab States. 

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be al- 
lowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and 
as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. 

3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international adminis- 
tration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and 
subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the 
Shereef of Mecca. 



(i) The text is found in E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Documents on British 
Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, ist.Ser.^vol^pp. 241-251 ; also found in J. C.Hurewitz, 
Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol II, pp. 19-22. ED. 



295 



The Arab States and the Arab League 

4. That Great Britain be accorded (i) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee 
of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His 
Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into 
negotiations for the cession of Cyrprus to any third Power without the previous con- 
sent of the French Government. 

5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade f the British 
Empire, and that there shall be no descrimination in port charges or facilities as 
regards British shipping and British goods ; that there shall be freedom of transit 
for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether 
those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A) ; and 
there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect against British goods on any rail- 
way or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned. 

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and 
protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as re- 
gards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for 
French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, 
whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area(B), 
and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any 
railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned. 

6. That in area (A) the Bagdad Railway shall not be extended southwards 
beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connect- 
ing Baghdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only 
with the concurrence of the two Governments. 

7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a 
railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport 
troops along such a line at all times. 

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the 
connexion of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the 
engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the 
brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be 
prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias- 
Keis Marib-Salkhab Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B). 

8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall re- 
main in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) 
and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from ad valorem to specific 
rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers. 

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned 
areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected 
at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination. 

9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into 
any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights inthe 
blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab 
States without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their 
part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area. 

10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, 
shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third 
Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a 
third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the 
Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as 

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International Affairs: Background 

may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression. 

11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or 
Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as hereto- 
fore on behalf of the two Powers. 

12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab 
territories will be considered by the two Governments. 

I have further the honour to state that, in order to make the agreement complete, 
His Majesty's Government are proposing to the Russian Government to exchange 
notes analogous to those exchanged by the latter and your Excellency's Government 
on the 26th April last. Copies of these r^tes will be communicated to your Excellency 
as soon as exchanged. , th" 

I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the conclusion of th e 
present agreement raises, for practical consideration, the question of the claims of 
Italy to a share in any partition or rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated 
in article 9 of the agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the Allies. 

His Majesty's Government further consider that the Japanese Government 
should be informed of the arrangements now concluded. 



3. SIR EDWARD GREY TO COUNT BENCKENDORFF, RUSSIAN 
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, 10-23 MAY 1916 

I have received from the French Ambassador in London copies of the notes ex- 
changed between the Russian and French Governments on the 26th ultimo, by which 
your Excellency's Government recognise, subject to certain conditions, the arrange- 
ment made between Great Britain and France, relative to the constitution of an Arab 
State or a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria, 
Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured. 

His Majesty's Government take act with satisfaction that your Excellency's 
Government concur in the limits set forth in that arrangement, and I have now the ho- 
nour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government on their part, in order 
to make the arrangement complete, are also prepared to recognize the conditions 
formulated by the Russian Government and accepted by the French Government 
in the notes exchanged at Petrograd on the 26th ultimo. 

In so far, then, as these arangements directly affect the'relations of Russia and 
Great Britain, I have the honour to invite the acquiescence of your Excellency's . 
Government in an agreement on the following terms: 

1. That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzeroum, Trebizond, Van, and 
Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of the Black Sea 
to the west of Trebizond. 

2. That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis between Mush, 
Sert, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omar, the crest-line of the mountains 
which dominate Amadia, and the region of Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia ; and 
that starting from the region of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow 
the crest-line of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman and Persian 
Dominions. These boundaries are indicated in a general manner and are subject to 
modifications of detail to be proposed later by the Delimitation Commission which 
shall meet on the spot. 



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The Arab States and the Arab League 

3. That the Russian Government undertake that, in all parts of the Ottoman 
territories thus ceded to Russia, any concessions accorded to British subjects by the 
Ottoman Government shall be maintained. If the Russian Government express the 
desire that such concessions should later be modified in order to bring them into 
harmony with the laws of the Russian Empire, this modificatiohn shall only take place 
in agreement with the British Government. 

4. That in all parts of the Ottoman territories thus ceded to Russia, existing 
British rights of navigation and development, and the rights and privileges of any 
British religious, scholastic or medical institutions shall be maintained. His Majesty's 
Government, on their part, undertake that sir^'^r Russian rights and privileges shall 
be maintained in those regions which, under ii **> uditions of this agreement, become 
entirely British, or in which British interests art 't v cognised as predominant. 

5. The two Governments admit in principle that every State which annexes 
any part of the Ottoman Empire is called upon to participate in the service of the 
Ottoman Debt. 



4. GREY TO BENKENDORFF, 10-23 OCTOBER 1916 

In reply to Your Excellency's note of the ist ultimo, regarding the arrangement 
between Great Britain, Russia, and France, relative to the creation of an Arab State, 
or of a Confederation of Arab States, and to the partition of the territories of Syria 
Cilicia, and Mesopotamia, provided that the cooperation of the Arabs is s